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Preface 
Thanks to the European Community, our generation has seen the enduring dream of a free, united 
Europe beginning to come true. But the very success of the venture is presenting afresh challenge to 
the democratic people of Europe. 
Membership of the Community has doubled over the years. And the political, economic, cultural 
and security problems to be tackled jointly, if Europe is not to be relegated to a minor role on the 
international scene, have grown in number and complexity. 
Its institutions are intrinsically inadequate. They were improvised rather than planned at the outset 
and have deteriorated in two respects in the interval. Firstly, they have become less democratic, 
power being concentrated in the hands of a few ministers and senior civil servants accountable to no 
one. Secondly, this arrogant oligarchy — epitomized by the protean Council — has become more 
impotent with the years, because six, then nine, later ten and now twelve distinct national systems 
are incapable of devising the long-term, forward-looking policies that Europe needs, or of providing 
the continuity needed for coherent development. 
The first directly-elected European Parliament saw the inherent danger of the shortcomings of the 
institutions. Drawing on the political authority given it by the people of Europe — the ultimate 
source of legitimacy in our democracies — it took it upon itself to draft a Treaty — Constitution of a 
genuine European Union and presented it f or ratification by the Member States of the Community. 
The European Parliament is not composed of impractical theorists and revolutionaries. On the 
contrary, all the political views of the European electorate are represented in its ranks. At the end of 
three years of meetings and committed endeavour, the European Parliament has demonstrated that it 
is capable of identifying, clearly and coherently, what Europe most needs today. 
The vote taken by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984 marked the beginning of a new, 
decisive chapter in the history of European integration. Europe's future will depend in no small mea-
sure on the fate of its proposal. 
As one who assisted at the birth of the European Parliament's brainchild, 1 would like to take this 
opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the constant help and guidance provided by 
the European University Institute in Florence, thanks to the cooperation of its President, Werner 
Maihofer. 
1 welcome in particular that the Draft Treaty on the European Union is examined here in an acade-
mic perspective, which demonstrates the valid contribution of the European University Institute and 
its Policy Unit to the discussion on the future of the European integration. 
Altiero Spinelli 
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Introduction 
Roland Bieber, Jean­Paul Jacqué, Joseph H. H. Weiler 
I. Foundations 
'Determined to lay the foundations 
of an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Euro ρ eA 
The term European Union is delightfully ambiguous; It has been used as the ideological underpinn­
ing and justification for almost all proposals designed to forward the process of European integra­
tion. The most disparate visions and strategies — the Draft Act for European Union (the Genscher­
Colombo proposal) on the one hand and the Draft Treaty itself on the other, to give but two recent 
examples — make reference to European Union. Empirically, one might as well abandon any hope 
of arriving at a common meaning of the term. 
And yet, in the notion of Union we could be tempted to see an underlying ideal­type of European 
integration, a distant aspiration: a Europe which will bring about the elimination of the individual 
Member States as the basic units of political power and sovereignty— a Federa[State, a United States 
of Europe. The reference to the 'Peoples' of Europe, rather than the nation States is evocative of such 
an ideal­type and there can be no denying that this aspiration had at least the role of a mobilizing for­
ce in certain quarters at the beginning of the post­war process of integration. 
This temptation, especially at the rime of institutional ferment and discussions of reform, must be 
rejected. Not simply, or even primarily, because of the current political unpopularity of such an 
ideal­type: after all to the extent that ideology and grand vision have an effect on the political pro­
cess, reality always falls short of ideal types giving more reason to spell out the vision in letters some­
what larger than life. 
There is a more profound reason for such a rejection. The notion of an ideal­type United States of 
Europe, of a European Federal State represents in a most real sense a betrayal of both the deeper 
aspirations of European integration and of Europe's unique contribution to current political life. 
To be sure, in the lore of modern European integration the raison d'être for setting the process in 
motion was largely to negate the ravages brought about by the excesses of the modern and relatively 
new nation State and its ideology. (We know, of course, that the state actors negotiating the first 
European structures were hardly 'tainted' by such lofty aspirations and were concerned, then as now, 
simply to protect the interests of their nations). And yet, that very raison d'être compels the rejection 
today of a European 'superstate'. What achievement will it be, what progress will we have made, if 
EEC Treaty, Preamble, 1st indent. 
we arrive at a point which paradoxically reinforces the very political structure towards which the 
European process was attempting to create a distance? 
We arrive at the same conclusion when considering the significance of the last three decades and 
more of European integration. If the classical expressions of sovereignty are in the control of money, 
diplomacy, police and defence, it is clear that in the modern federation, federalism as an expression 
of shared rule and participation, has become a myth rather than a reality. And historically, all confed-
erations have either disintegrated or evolved into full Federal States. By contrast, with all the known 
weaknesses and difficulties, Europe stands out as a unique experience in shared rule. It is a polity in 
which the individual nation State has not only retained its vigour, but has actually been sustained by 
the wider structure, but in which, at the same time, one has seen the attainment of a remarkable meas-
ure of substantive integration traditionally associated only with 'higher' forms of Federal States. In 
Europe, sovereignty has become, in some real sense, truly shared. What the European experience has 
contributed to international political reality is a demonstration of the ability to reaffirm the conti-
nued existence of the nation State albeit transferred by this very fact of shared rule within wider poli-
tical integrative structure. 
These notions find their most succinct and purest verbal expression in the idea of An ever closer 
Union. The term 'union', utilized in this evolutive manner, clearly covers a multitude of structures 
and modalities changing over time and cannot thus as suggested above, partake of a single authentic 
meaning. Moreover, once we direct our mind to the dualism of 'ever closer' two other basic notions 
come to the fore. 
First, if a process is to go on for 'ever' there is an implicit affirmation of a 'never': the Union is never 
to be consummate, final, achieved. This is not a simple semantic exegetic interpretation. It is a reflec-
tion of a basic burden and virtue of the European construct which is, as suggested above, rooted in a 
balance — not a substitution — between nation State and supranational structure: this balance is, 
and will remain, inherently difficult and often unstable. But that is the price for a polity the virtue of 
which is its truly innovative character and its ability not to fall into the classical patterns of interna-
tional organization or statehood. 
Secondly, the 'ever closer' union phraseology suggests a strong dynamic element. A process on the 
move. We may compare the European polity to a bicycle: essentially unstable except when in 
motion. The maintenance of momentum becomes thus a major concern for the European policy 
maker. This characterization of Europe is clearly Sisyphean. The union will for ever remain a target 
for which one must toil. But as with many great ideals the search is as important as the ultimate goal. 
It is in this context that we must evaluate recent initiatives at reinforcing the European construct. To 
posit as a virtue the delicate equilibrium between Community and Member State is not to suggest 
that the current structures and processes strike a right balance. By common accord the European 
Community of today is deeply flawed in its ability to tackle the major issues on the European 
agenda. Decisional processes are notoriously heavy, democratic legitimacy is increasingly problema-
tic, competences are insufficiently bold. The danger is not crisis, but stagnation, loss of momentum, 
irrelevance. 
Proposals for Community reform come thus, to the outside observer, under a double test: The extent 
to which they offer a new balance between Community (or Union) and Member States which may 
better address the major social, political and economic challenges, and the extent to which they are 
able to insert new momentum into the European process. 
The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union is the most ambitious effort so far to achieve 
sweeping institutional and substantive reform in the European Communities, and the clearest proof 
of the new independence of the directly elected European Parliament. Apart from its immediate poli-
tical significance, it has re-opened the debate on institutional and substantive reform of the European 
Communities at both the governmental and the public levels. 
The contributions in this book offer a comprehensive political, economic, and legal analysis of the 
Draft Treaty, and a realistic assessment of the political and constitutional hurdles it faces in the 
Member States. As editors, our intention was not limited to an analysis only of the Draft Treaty 
itself. The studies in this volume examine the state of the current Communities in many of their 
aspects, and the observations and recommendations made by the authors may be of help to all those 
engaged in the ongoing discussion on the fate of the European Communities. 
We have organized the studies in two parts. In the first part, after an introductory chapter giving an 
overview of the Draft Treaty we have a series of contributions which examine the institutional, con-
stitutional and substantive proposals in terms of their likely ability to answer the shortcomings of the 
present stage of the current European Communities. Naturally, evaluations will be affected by the 
subjective assessment of each contributor. Our pluralistic choice of contributors coming from diffe-
rent Member States, from academia and from the professions, from national administrations and the 
Community organs ensure that a variety of perspectives get covered. In the second part of the book, 
we present 10 national reports which examine the constitutional and political context vis-a-vis the 
Draft Treaty in the Member States. 
The first part will help us thus in analysing the substantive issues whereas the second part will pro-
vide elements for assessing the receptibility of reform within the Member States. 
No one, lease of all the authors themselves, believe that the Draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union in its current form will ever become the new 'constitution' for Europe. And although it would 
be patently wrong to regard the Draft Treaty as an extreme document (despite its weaknesses it has 
an appealing internal balance and a surprising modesty in its reformism) few can deny that its 
promotion has played a major role in shifting the centre of the debate. 
The establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Questions (Dooge Committee) by the 
European Council and its report can be in large measure attributed to the momentum established by 
the Draft Treaty. 
The Dooge report represents a paradoxical relationship to the Draft Treaty: in substance it is pro-
geny; politically it is a counterveiling move. 
The outcome of the current efforts at institutional reform will be determined by an interplay between 
the political forces and substantive content contained in the two documents. It becomes thus of great 
interest to compare the two with a view of verifying convergence and divergence. 
II - Strategies 
What is the state of play on the various proposals for institutional reform? Following the 1984 elec-
tions, Parliament, through its Committee on Institutional Affairs, undertook to monitor work being 
done by national Parliaments on the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, and to remain in 
close touch with them. A delegation therefore visited the various capitals to discuss the matter with 
the national authorities, Parliaments included, and to hear their comments. The next stage could be 
to review the Draft Treaty in the light of the views expressed and the comments made.2 
In June 1984 the Fontainebleau European Council set up an ad hoc Committee for Institutional 
Affairs comprising the personal representatives of the Heads of State or Government.3 This commit-
tee was asked to submit proposals for improving European cooperation. The European Council 
! An initial stocktaking will be found in Mr Seeler's interim report of 9. 4. 1985 (A2-16/85). 
1 See p. 342 of this volume. 
chose the modus operandi, modelled on that of the Spaak Committee appointed by the 1955 Mes-
sina Conference to prepare the ground for the conferences which were to draw up the future EEC 
and EAEC Treaties. 
The Committee produced an interim report, presented to the Dublin European Council (December 
1984), and a final report" which the Brussels European Council (March 1985) decided to make the 
main item on the agenda for the Milan European Council (June 1985). 
It might be in order to compare the ad hoc Committee's report and the European Union Treaty but 
the exercise needs to be approached with caution. The documents have little in common. 
The Draft Treaty is a well-worked text designed to replace the existing Treaties while the Commit-
tee's report is little more than a list of problems and suggestions. By definition, Parliament had to be 
exhaustive and consistent while the Committee could afford to gloss over certain issues, concentrat-
ing on matters which its members regarded as essential. The Draft Treaty was designed for entry into 
force as it stood while the report's sole ambition was to serve as a basis for the negotiation of a new 
treaty. 
The Draft Treaty thus spells out procedures for bringing the Union into being and for its future 
operation, while the report is content to consider basic solutions to specific problems. The intrinsic 
value of the two documents differs. The Committee made no attempt to devise solutions acceptable 
to all its members. Its report sets out the majority view, minority opinions appearing as footnotes or 
annexes. The Committee was very divided on important issues such as voting within the Council, 
which means that the institution given the task of following up the report will have to reconcile these 
opposing views. Parliament, by contrast, made a point of searching for a compromise so that the text 
would be acceptable to the largest possible majority. In this respect too, the Draft Treaty is more 
complete than the report. However, if the two documents are read in conjunction it becomes clear 
that they share the same inspiration and make the same diagnosis of what is needed to achieve 
European Union: 
(i) completion of the Community venture, in particular as regards monetary policy and freedom of 
movement; 
(ii) promotion of economic convergence; 
(iii) introduction of new policies to take account of technological developments and the need to 
establish a cultural Community; 
(iv) aligning political cooperation and Community action and incorporating security aspects; 
(v) reform of the institutions to give the Union an efficient democratic apparatus; 
(vi) establishment of the bases for a genuine European citizenship. 
Because of these shared objectives, there is a measure of agreement between the policies proposed 
and the institutional reforms recommended in the report and in the Draft Treaty. However, the pro-
posed solutions to specific problems do differ on occasion. 
With regard to policies, the two documents are very similar and the areas covered largely coincide. 
The major difference is that the Draft Treaty lays the emphasis on energy policy and regional policy 
which, curiously enough, get no mention in the report. The report opts for the topical, attaching par-
ticular importance to high technology; the Draft Treaty mentions high technology too, but deals 
with it in a more discreet but less complete manner. Other areas are dealt with, if not in identical 
terms at least in a comparable fashion, by the two documents. It would be tedious to give an exhaus-
tive list.5 
Two points on which the documents differ should be noted. The report seems to go further than the 
Draft Treaty on the question of security. Indeed, the Draft Treaty calls for a return to cooperation on 
1 The report is reproduced as Annex II of this volume, p. 330. 
On the Draft Treaty see Part One, Chapter VI. 
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the economic and political aspects of security only. Any extension of cooperation to other aspects of 
security would call for a unanimous decision by the European Council. The report has no such 
reservations and extends cooperation to all aspects of security. However, Mr Dooge (Ireland) en-
tered a general reservation on this section of the report. Parliament's text does not go as far as the 
Committee's text but the formula it comes up with is a compromise between Ireland's views and 
those of the other Member States. As for monetary policy, the report is less than enthusiastic about 
the institutional stage of the European Monetary System. While the Treaty regards this as an essen-
tial step, the report sees it as no more than a possible objective. 
However, these differences are minor. Both documents use the same terms to allow for the tempor-
ary differentiated application of Community law, though the report would appear to impose stricter 
conditions than the Draft Treaty. 
Indeed the report extends differentiation to cooperation, making it possible for Member States to 
conclude partial agreements provided no Member State objects.6 
However, since the report does not set out to provide ready-made operational solutions but a basis 
for negotiation, it is silent on the competences of the Union. The gradual implementation of the com-
petences of the Union implicit in the principle of subsidiary and concurrent competences is missing 
from the report.7 
Although it does make a distinction between political cooperation and the Union's own policies 
(common action), the Draft Treaty integrates the two into a single framework and harmonizes the 
institutional mechanism. The report takes no stand on this, leaving the question open. 
With regard to the institutions, the shared inspiration is evident. Both documents set out to give the 
Union efficient and democratic institutions. But on this too, the Draft Treaty is more complete than 
the report as a comparison of the sections dealing with each institution will demonstrate.8 Contrary 
to the Draft Treaty, the report does not indicate whether the European Council is to become an 
institution of the Union. But it suggests that it will, since the European Council would be responsible 
for appointing the President of the Commission. It could only do so if it were an institution of the 
Union, unless of course it is merely regarded as the framework in which the governments of the 
Member States reach the agreement provided for by the Community Treaties. The Dooge Commit-
tee considers that the European Council should give direction and political impetus to the Commun-
ity.' The Draft Treaty advocates a similar approach. It gives the European Council the political ini-
tiative in establishing the Union. 
But its role would be weakened by other institutional changes, notably the strengthening of the Com-
mission and the granting of increased powers to Parliament. In the Draft Treaty the directional role 
would emerge from the programme proposed by the Commission and adopted by Parliament in the 
investiture debate. Cooperation would be confined to the Council framework. However, the report 
is more precise as to procedures, advocating the establishment of a political secretariat. The Draft 
Treaty on the other hand leaves the Council free to take its own procedural decisions. Both texts aim 
to foster unity within the Council. The report believes that this can be achieved by giving a pre-emi-
nent role to the General Affairs Council. The Draft Treaty goes further, suggesting that specialized 
Council meetings be abolished, giving more permanence to national delegations which would be led 
by a minister specifically responsible for Union affairs. On the voting issue, the majority view of the 
Committee is that there would be a return to majority voting, a vote being called for automatically at 
the request of the Commission or three Member States. Unanimity would be required in a limited 
* The possibility of partial agreements is based on Council of Europe practice. It is not totally disregarded by the Union Treaty 
(cf. Article 68(2;). 
' On the Draft Treaty, see Part One, Chapter III. 
" On the Draft Treaty, see Pan One, Chapters II, IV and VIII. 
* According to the Committeee, this role should be expanded at the expense of its current arbitrator's role. However, the decline 
in the arbitration role depends not on the wishes of the European Council but on the effectiveness of decision-making within 
the Council. 
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number of specified cases only. However, three members of the Committee (Greece, Denmark and 
the United Kingdom) advocated retention of the present system, more frequent use being made of 
majority voting. Mr Dooge could not accept the majority solution. Parliament's Draft Treaty accepts 
the pleading of a vital national interest during a 10-year transitional period, provided that this vital 
interest is recognized by the Commission. The vote would then be deferred. Although Parliament's 
solution is undoubtedly less progressive that the Committee's majority solution, it again represents a 
compromise between majority and minority views. 
The procedure for appointing the Commission is similar in both documents. The President of the 
Commission would be designated by the European Council. His authority over the members would 
be strengthened by the fact that he is involved in their appointment."1 The Commission would be 
sworn in by Parliament, thereby reaffirming its independence and its initiating and executive roles. In 
the Draft Treaty, although the Commission shares the right of initiative with Parliament or the 
Council in exceptional cases, its intervention in the legislative process is made more effective since an 
increased majority is required if the legislature wishes to take a decision despite Commission opposi-
tion. In the report, implicit retention of the main features of the current legislative process would 
allow the Commission to make use of Article 149 where the Council takes a majority decision." Par-
liamentary control over the Commission remains unchanged. 
Parliament becomes a co-legislator. In the Draft Treaty, the legislative process is the subject of speci-
fic provisions designed to balance the powers of Parliament and the Council and to obviate deadlock. 
The report does not recommend granting Parliament a share in decision-making except in a limited 
number of areas as already suggested by the Vedel report. In the event of disagreement between Par-
liament and the Council, a conciliation procedure would be set in train. There is no indication as to 
how it would end. Is this a point which has been left in abeyance or is the idea that conciliation ends 
with agreement between the two institutions, granting each of them the power to block progress? 
This would do nothing to make the legislative process more efficient. 
The separation of budgetary powers is unclear. The Committee would involve Parliament in deci-
sions on own resources in the context of multiannual planning; this links up with proposals in the 
Draft Treaty. However, the text is vague on Parliament's participation in the annual establishment of 
revenue, the coping-stone of the system. The report suggests no changes to budgetary procedure des-
pite the innumerable disputes it has engendered.12 Finally, the report is more restrictive than the Draft 
Treaty or Parliament's involvement in the conclusion of international treaties, limiting it to associa-
tion and accession agreements. 
Some of the solutions proposed in the report are shrouded in uncertainty because the institutional 
aspects have been left open. But the report also gives the impression that its authors wanted to devise 
proposals which could either lead to the revision of the present Treaties or to the conclusion of a new 
treaty to take their place. 
There is also some uncertainty as to the next step contemplated by the authors of the report. It is time 
that they refer to the convening of an inter-governmental conference, but there is no indication as to 
whether this is to be convened under Article 236 EEC or in another context. 
Two questions spring to mind: first the conduct of negotiations and secondly, participation in the 
negotiations. 
On the first aspect the report sets out ideas which are mostly notes. 
10 The actual procedures differ: in the report the Members of the Commission are appointed by the Governments on a proposal 
from the President, while the Draft Treaty confers the power of appointment on the President in consultation with the Europ-
ean Council. 
" The Dooge Committee does not suggest that Article 149 be amended. The Council would therefore have to take a unanimous 
decision if it wished to depart from the Commission's proposal (What about Parliament?). Retention of Article 149 would 
appear to encourage deadlock in this case. 
i- On the Draft Treaty, see Part One, Chapter V. 
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Negotiations would be between government representatives, with the participation of the Commis-
sion. During the course of the negotiations, there could be close contacts with Parliament in accor-
dance with a procedure to be agreed between the conference and Parliament. 
The provisional text agreed by the conference would be submitted to Parliament, which would then 
produce proposals. Areas of dispute would be the subject of a conciliation procedure leading to an 
agreed solution. Since this is a radical undertaking giving the Union a constitution — it goes without 
saying that agreement must be reached between governments, represented by the conference, and the 
people represented by Parliament. The text would then be submitted to national procedures. 
The second, far more sensitive issue is whether the venture can begin before all governments are fully 
prepared to take part. It should be clear that the object of the exercise is to group all current or future 
Member States within the Union. The aim is to pull all European democracies into the net, beginning 
with those which have embarked on the Community venture. No one could be excluded, notably 
because this could raise tricky legal problems. The ideal solution would be for all to participate in the 
negotiations. 
The possibility that some States might object to the convening of a conference cannot be allowed to 
stand in the way of progress. As the President of the French Republic stated in his speech to the 
European Parliament, a number of Heads of State or Government could call on all interested parties 
to join with them in drawing up the Union Treaty. This would make it clear that the other States 
were free to join in the process at any time. At the end of the negotiations, the conference would have 
to deal with the situation of those States which did not wish to join by negotiating an arrangement 
which respected their rights and left the door to subsequent membership open. This solution could 
create legal problems but these should not prove insurmountable if there was the political will to 
advance while preserving the acquired rights of all. The aim is not a two-speed or two-tier Europe 
but rather a Union comprising all Member States of the Community. Nobody regards this objective 
as unattainable, but the States which regard it as essential are duty-bound to inform the others un-
equivocally of their determination to make progress. 
All that remains now is to speculate on the mandate the Milan European Council might give to such 
a conference. If it were to instruct the conference to examine the conclusions of the Dooge Commit-
tee and no more, there is a real risk of reform remaining a dead letter. 
But it could instruct the conference to draft a treaty to replace the existing Treaties by extending the 
powers of the Communities and inform the institutions accordingly. This would be very close to the 
Spinelli approach. 
It should be possible to conclude a treaty supplementing the Community Treaties and leaving them 
intact. However, it would be for such a treaty to govern areas which fall within the Community's 
jurisdiction. These would remain subject to the Community Treaties and to the decision-making 
process provided for them. If this were the case, it is hard to see how the integration proposed by the 
Treaties could be achieved given the deadlock provoked by the institutional machinery which would 
remain in existence. 
If the new Treaty did not include matters now falling within the Community's jurisdiction, it would 
be confined to political cooperation and areas such as culture. The best we could hope for would be 
an improved version of the Fouchet proposal. 
Finally, there is nothing to rule out an approach differentiated by area. On institutional reform, a 
treaty amending the current Community Treaties would be ideal. On political cooperation, the 
report's recommendations could be codified into a solemn declaration along the lines ofthat issued in 
Stuttgart. On new policies, undertakings could be given to implement these under the current Treat-
ies. 
These hypotheses are by no means exhaustive, and the Milan European Council will have a wide 
range of options to choose from. Even if no action is put in hand, Parliament could press ahead on its 
own initiative. 
13 
Whatever the outcome, the developments sparked off by the reforming ideas born of Parliament's 
initiative and the influence of the Draft Treaty on the Dooge Committee's report provides confirma-
tion, if confirmation were needed, of the importance of a detailed analysis of the Draft Treaty estab-
lishing the European Union. 
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PART ONE 
The substance of the Draft Treaty 

Chapter I — The Draft Treaty, an overview 
by Jean-Paul Jacqué 
When the European Parliament undertook to prepare the Draft Treaty of European Union, it was 
not exploring virgin territory. Politically, it could draw on the various processes previously set in 
motion to reform the Communities or to bring about European Union: precedents and setbacks — 
some of them relative — were available in the form of the 1953 political community project, the 
Tindemans report, the Genscher-Colombo initiative and the results achieved at the Stuttgart Europ-
ean Council. 
True, Parliament's intention seems to have been to use the same approach that was adopted in pre-
paring the draft for the European political community, but, since, in the light of what happened with 
the Solemn Declaration on European Union, there was little possibility of the governments being 
able to produce a master plan for the compehensive development of the Communities, the only solu-
tion still available to Parliament was for it to undertake itself the preparation of a Draft Treaty and 
present it to the Member States and their parliaments. 
Good care was taken, however, not to try and recreate the context of the 1950s. All talk of federal-
ism and supranationality was shunned and broad compromises were arrived at with those political 
groups that wanted to see the rights of Member States affirmed (provisional upholding of the right of 
veto, caution in integrating political cooperation into the scope of the Union, etc.). 
Technically, the draft drew extensively on earlier schemes. Innovation in Community institutional 
engineering is a rare feature and Parliament based itself as much on the Vedel report as on other 
papers compiled by the institutions in connection with the Tindemans report. It also extensively con-
firmed solutions born of practice or deriving from the case-law of the Court of Justice. 
Yet the draft, as it stands, cannot be seen as a report by experts who, free of any political constraints, 
are casting about for ways and means to attaining European Union. It is essentially a political docu-
ment which reflects a broad consensus among the political groups. Its prime virtue surely lies not in 
its having met with the approval of Community lawyers and technocrats but in its having been adop-
ted by a majority of 237 votes against 31, with 43 abstentions. 
It goes without saying that the quest for compromise does not justify serious flaws that render the 
draft impracticable; but it does explain some of the silence over a certain lack of clarity in the provi-
sions adopted by Parliament. On several points, the discussion which has begun among the experts 
and is now also going on with the national parliaments should throw up new ideas which Parliament 
will have to consider if, as is likely, it revises the draft in response to the reactions it has prompted. 
On the other hand, it would have been disturbing had the draft not reflected a broad vision — a poli-
tical design for European Union — and this it indeed did. The aim of those who drafted it was to 
spell out the basic characteristics of the Union before considering its methods of action and planning 
its institutional structure.' 
This study draws on some of the arguments set forward in an article written for the Common Market Law Review, 1985,1, but 
also considers more recent discussions. 
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1. The basic characteristics 
of the Union 
a. The Union merges first and foremost as the 
heir of the European Communities 
It marks a step forward in a venture initiated by the Schuman Declaration. 
The preamble of the Draft Treaty puts the Union clearly into that perspective and Article 7 affirms 
that existing Community patrimony is to be preserved. Some way, of course, had to be found to 
allow Community legislation to co-exist with the law of the Union. Affirmation of the principle that 
Community law is to continue to be maintained does not mean that such law is immutable and that 
the Union cannot change it. The solution adopted is to grant each piece of Community legislation a 
special place in the law of the Union. Such legislation can, therefore, be changed only by the proce-
dures applicable to the relevant Union laws. 
To begin with, since new laws take precedence over earlier ones, the provisions of the Union Treaty 
override any Community law that opposes or is incompatible with them. 
In some places the Union Treaty clearly diverges from the Community Treaties, especially where the 
institutions are concerned. In others, it lays down new rules which may clash with Community rules. 
But this is exceptional. The underlying principle is that of maintaining existing Community legisla-
tion as embodied in the Treaties and the acts adopted in implementing them, so that it is grafted on 
to the Union Treaty. The Union's objectives do not replace those of the Community but complement 
them. 
The place of Community legislation in the legal system of the Union depends on the nature of the 
Community laws concerned. 
Those provisions of the Community Treaties which state the aims of the Communities and the scope 
of the Treaties have the same legal value as the Union Treaty and can be ammended only by the pro-
cedure invoked for revising the Treaty. The other provisions of the Treaties come under the heading 
of organic law and can be amended only by an organic law. The other Community acts and the mea-
sures taken in connection with the monetary system and political cooperation can only be amended 
by acts adopted by the Union institutions in accordance with their respective responsibilities. It is 
therefore the procedure for allocating powers to the different institutions which will determine the 
procedure for amending each act. If, say, an act clearly falls within the area assigned to the legislative 
authority, it can be amended only by law. Any disputes that may arise will have to be settled by the 
Court. 
In essence, the existence of this arrangement for the Union to succeed the Community assumes that 
the two cannot possibly co-exist. Admittedly, Article 7 does not pretend to settle the point and the 
drafters of the Treaty have taken good care not to offer a solution even in the final provisions. They 
believed that a solution could be found only empirically, the disappearance of the Community posing 
scarcely any problem if all the members of the Community became members of the Union and negot-
iations were to be undertaken should some of them refuse to join. However, the concern to have the 
Union preserve the Community's patrimony is born of the conviction that the Community must dis-
appear in order to be incorporated into the Union, for otherwise any such misgivings would be 
groundless, as the Community laws will continue to produce their own effect. The Union does not, 
therefore, emerge as an additional Community but as an entity that transcends the existing Commu-
nities while assuming their mantle. 
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b. The democratic nature of the Union 
Though designed within the framework of a democratic Europe, the Community Treaties did not 
particularly emphasize that aspect. Indeed, their specific nature was such that one did not expect to 
find in them any special references to democracy or human rights, even though, as the Court of Jus-
tice was later to demonstrate, they were to be interpreted in the light of the principles enshrined in 
the constitutions of all the Member States. Having a broader purpose, the Draft Treaty underlines 
the democratic nature of the Union. It is to be a union of democratic States and their democratic 
nature is one of the conditions of membership. This opening means that the Union will have to arm 
itself against any internal events in a Member State that might lead that country to violate the prin-
ciples of democracy or fundamental rights. It was important not to disregard the Greek or Turkish 
precedents in the Council of Europe. As a result, Articles 4 and 44 of the draft stipulate that, should 
such events occur, the European Council could, with the assent of the European Parliament andonee 
the situation has been established by the Court, take steps to deprive the country in question and its 
nationals of some or all of the rights enjoyed by them under the Treaty and could go so far as to sus-
pend that country's participation in the institutions of the Union. Such sanctions would not be imp-
osed in the case of an isolated violation, but for serious and persistent violation. 
The Union itself, according to Article 4, grants 
'every person coming within its jurisdiction the fundamental rights and freedoms derived in parti-
cular from the common principles of the Constitutions of the Member States and from the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'. 
The rights guaranteed by the convention are thus incorporated into the Union Treaty. But the Union 
is not bound by the surveillance machinery set up by the convention in that this would only be possi-
ble if the Union signed the convention. The wording on economic and social rights is more cautious 
since the Union undertakes solely to maintain and develop them to the extent that it is empowered to 
do so. And within a period of five years the Union will consider the possibility of its accession to the 
European Convention, the European Social Charter and the United Nations Covenants. These 
undertakings call for several comments. First, the benefit of incorporation is reserved for the Europ-
ean Convention, the Social Charter being excluded on the grounds that not all its provisions were 
accepted by all the Member States. The reference to the covenants is even more tenuous. The Union 
does not regard itself as bound by them and will only consider the possibility of its accession. So one 
is inevitably left with the thought that the majority of Parliament's members are chary of the UN 
Covenants, as a result of which it is only with certain reservations that they are prepared to accept 
that the Union can be bound by them. But even more significant is the fact that Parliament decided 
not to vest the new Treaty with a declaration of human rights. Many members would have liked it to 
open with such a declaration, but the majority appreciated the difficulty of compiling a list of funda-
mental rights and did not want to hold up the drafting of the Union Treaty on that account. The dif-
ferent political groups in the Parliament do not share the same view of fundamental rights, some 
placing more emphasis on civil and political rights and others on social and economic rights. Con-
sensus, though not unattainable, will take a long time to be reached. Care must also be taken to 
ensure that any such declaration is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
For all these reasons, Article 4(3) stipulates that within a period of five years after the Treaty has 
come into force the Union will draw up its own list of fundamental rights in accordance with the pro-
cedure for revising the Treaty. For the time being, the principles common to the national constitu-
tions and the European Convention constitute a minimum benchmark that is particularly satisfacto-
ry in that the competence of the Court of Justice of the Union to uphold fundamental rights is clearly 
affirmed (Article 43). However, the Court of Justice can intervene to protect human rights only at 
Union level and with respect to measures which fall within the competence of the Union and not in a 
more general manner, as some members would have preferred. 
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c. The Union is not intended to replace the Member States 
On the contrary, the Member States conserve their sovereignty, with the Union enjoying only limited 
transfers of competence. The breakdown of responsibilities between the Union and its Member States 
is based on the principle of subordination, meaning that action by the Union is subordinate to that of 
the Member States. The Union is competent only in those areas where it can act more effectively than 
the Member States acting separately can, largely because the scale or effects of the measures concer-
ned extend beyond national frontiers. This principle of subordination determines not only the break-
down of responsibility as established by the Treaty, but also the way in which the Union shall use its 
powers when they run parallel to others, as is true in the majority of cases (Article 12). It is the last 
indent of the preamble to the Draft Treaty which states that the Union's exclusive powers are vested 
in it on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, while Article 12(2) states expressly that clashes 
of responsibilities shall be decided in accordance with that principle alone. Moreover, whenever the 
Union acts legislatively, it must as far as possible confine itself to establishing basic principles, leav-
ing it to the authorities responsible for applying them, and more particularly the Member States, to 
work out the details of their implementation. The Member States are seen here to continue to play a 
major role even within the Union's purview. The Treaty does not provide for the creation of a huge 
administration to apply these laws, but relies instead on the national authorities. This desire to meet 
the Member States half-way may lead to different intepretations of the law in practice if the specific 
national circumstances demand it. Legislators will therefore be able to stipulate time limits or transi-
tional measures since the aim of these practical arrangements for the implementation of the law is 
still its ultimate 'uniform application'. 
d. Finally, the Union is to be established gradually 
The Treaty is not likely to have its full effect until after a lengthy transition period that will enable 
the Member States to adapt to the new situation and will help the solidarity which unites them to 
gather strength. Three points highlight this gradual process. Union powers will be invoked only 
when the need arises, i.e. as solidarity develops. When legislating for the first time in the field of 
overlapping concurrent responsibilities, and most of them are concurrent, the Union must follow the 
procedure of organic law, i.e. a qualified majority, which implies that a fairly broad consensus is 
required. In external policy, the European Council can extend the scope of political cooperation by 
what will in all probability be a unanimous decision.2 Finally, the Treaty cannot put an end to the 
principle of unanimity within the Council but does provide for a less harsh form of veto which will 
remain in existence for a transitional period of 10 years (Article 23(3)). The intention has been to 
ensure that, during the delicate period following the Union's birth, Member States will be able to 
ensure that vital national interests are taken into consideration. This loophole will disappear when 
common experience and institutional practice have enabled the States to arrive at a state of solidarity 
such that there is no longer any room for the pleading of vital interests. To take account of the spe-
cial requirements of external relations, Article 68, by way of derogation in the event of new powers 
and responsibilities being transferred to the Union in this field, allows for the possibility of the plead-
ing of vital interests being extended beyond the 10-year transitional period.1 
All things considered, the Draft Union Treaty turns out to be much less revolutionary than might 
have been supposed. The Union is a direct extension of the Communities and does not constitute a 
'superstate'. It is simply intended to be a more effective structure than the existing ones, hence the 
focus on its operations and its institutions. 
; The Treaty does not establish any decision-making procedure for the European Council, which in this field would have to 
decide unanimously for the transfer to take place; politically, it is hard to see it doing otherwise. 
J This introduces two different decision-making processes: one without 'veto' after 10 years for the powers and responsibilities it 
processed at the outset, the other without a permanent veto for those transferred in the meantime. 
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2. The action of the Union 
The Draft Treaty spells out both the forms of action and the field in which each type of action shall 
be carried out. The main distinction made is between cooperation and common action by the Union, 
but the dividing lines between the areas covered by each method of action are not hard and fast and it 
is possible to move from one area to another. 
a. Common action of the Union 
The term 'common action' was deliberately chosen to replace the classic expression 'common pol-
icy', it being feared that an identical name might create the idea that there was some similarity bet-
ween the two terms.4 However, the Draft Treaty sets up a system which is specific to common 
action. In fact, common action occurs from the moment that the Union intervenes anywhere under 
the responsibility of its institutions. As defined in Article 10(2): 
'Common action means all normative, administrative, financial and judicial acts, internal or 
international, and the programmes and recommendations, issued by the Union itself, originating 
in its institutions and addressed to those institutions, or to States, or to individuals'. 
The determining feature of common action is that it results from acts attributable to the Union, since 
it is taken by the Union's institutions. 
Clearly, common action can occur only within the framework of the powers and responsibilities that 
the Treaty vests in the Union. Here, the Treaty distinguishes between exclusive competence and con-
current competence. This distinction, which seems to have aroused some curiosity in legal circles, is 
not unknown to specialists in federal law. It is found, for instance, in Articles 71 and 72 of the Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. It was not unknown in Community law and is proposed 
explicitly by the Commission of the Communities in its report on European Union of 26 June 1975.' 
Whenever the Treaty confers exclusive powers on the Union, this latter is alone competent to act and 
the 'national authorities may only legislate to the extent laid down by the law of the Union.' Ques-
tions have been asked as to where national law stands in cases falling within the exclusive compe-
tence of the Union if and when it has not produced any relevant legislation. The problem should not 
arise after considering the few instances in which the Union has exclusive powers and responsibilities 
and also in view of the fact that they mostly concern sectors which previously fell within Community 
competence and in which the Community has already acted. But Article 12 stipulates that 'until the 
Union has legislated, national legislations shall remain in force'. Can it be amended? In an initial ver-
sion of the draft, the answer was unclear since any amendment had to be authorized by the Commis-
sion. This condition has now been dispensed with, but it was noted that, in the light of the case-law 
of the Court and since Article 13 of the draft followed the text of Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, the 
power of States here was subject to Commission supervision. In the case of concurrent powers and 
responsibilities, the Member States may act if the Union has not. Action by the Union is subject to a 
condition of substance and a condition of form. The basic condition is adherence to the principle of 
subsidiarity: 
'The Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in 
common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular those whose execution requires 
action by the Union because their dimension or effects extend beyond national frontiers'. 
This ensures that the Union will exercise its concurrent powers only when its action is really necess-
ary. The question has been asked as to how the principle of subsidiarity will be maintained. The 
point at issue is whether the Court would uphold an appeal for annulment based on failure to respect 
In the EEC Treaty the term 'common action' is used within the framework of the agricultural policy (Article 41 ) and of com-
mercial policy (Article 111). In both cases common action is distinguished from coordination. 
Bull. EC, Supplement 5/75, paragraphs 12 and 13. 
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the principle of subsidiarity. It might find that this was a question to be left to the legislators, but it 
might also decide to check whether the legislators' view was not at least tainted by an obvious error. 
Parliament wished to leave the question open to decision by the Court. Moreover, in formal terms, 
the first intervention by the Union in a sector covered by concurrent competence is subject to the 
passing of a law adopted according to the procedure of organic law, i.e. by a qualified majority of 
the legislative authority consisting of Parliament and the Council. Wherever the Union has acted in a 
specific sector, that sector, of course, comes under the exclusive competence of the Union, i.e. the 
Member States cannot take any further measures unless they are so delegated by the law of the 
Union. The scope of the Union's exclusive powers and responsibilities is limited since they cover only 
free movement, the regulation of trade between Member States and the regulation of competition at 
Union level. In external relations, commercial policy is the only field in which the Union has exclu-
sive competence. All the Union's other responsibilities in respect of economic policy, policy for socie-
ty and external relations are concurrent, but obviously those areas in which the Communities had 
implemented common policies fall within the exclusive competence of the Union by virtue of the 
principles concerning the transfer of the existing Community legislation to the Union. 
b. Cooperation 
According to Article 10, cooperation is conducted by the Member States within the European Coun-
cil. The agreements thus reached within the European Council are implemented by the Member Stat-
es, but provision has been made for them also to be implemented by the Union's institutions under 
the procedures laid down by the European Council. 
The initial versions of the draft made a clearer distinction between cooperation and common action 
and showed that common action could exist only in the areas where the Union had exclusive or con-
current competence. For cooperation, the Union, or more precisely the European Council, consti-
tuted a forum of negotiation between the Member States. 
The only obligation imposed on them by the Treaty was to discuss in that forum problems subject to 
cooperation. The wish expressed by certain British Conservatives to make the system more flexible 
by allowing the European Council, if need be, to call on the assistance of the other institutions within 
the framework of political cooperation helped to make the working of the draft more ambiguous. 
But it is still clear from Article 10(3) that cooperation means the commitments (in the sense of inter-
national commitments, agreements) undertaken by the Member States within the European Council 
(and not by the European Council). These commitments cannot be part of Union law and are gover-
ned by international law if they involve commitments intended to have the effect of laws. Reading 
the Treaty, one has the impression that the key area of cooperation should be political cooperation in 
international relations, and, apart from the chapter on international relations, cooperation is men-
tioned only in Articles 46 and 54. Article 46 covers the coordination of national laws in areas that 
fall outside the powers and responsibilities of the Union and Article 54 provides for the setting-up of 
a framework for industrial cooperation. While the value of these activities should not be underesti-
mated, they are not as crucially important as political cooperation. The intention was to dovetail 
political cooperation into the Treaty without any basic change in operation. Article 66 broadly 
defines its scope since it comes into play, in the absence of common action, on issues where the inter-
ests of more than one Member State are involved, this including matters relating to the political and 
economic aspects of security. Article 67 defines the institutional machinery of political cooperation 
and, in particular, the role of the Council of the Union and the Commission, under the responsibility 
of the European Council. The European Council may extend the field of cooperation, 'in particular 
as regards armaments, sales of arms to non-member States, defence policy and disarmament' (Article 
68). One can immediately see the effect of these provisions, which attempt to follow up the ideas that 
have been floated on the independent role that Europe might play in defence. True, the wording is 
cautious, since a priori cooperation does not extend to the military aspects of defence but only to the 
political and economic aspects of security in so far as any clear distinction is possible; a unanimous 
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decision by the Member States will be necessary in order to extend cooperation to defence in all its 
aspects. Nevertheless, a process has been created which can enable the Union to tackle gradually, 
whenever the need is unanimously felt, new areas that are just as essential as those involving defence. 
Here again, we find the stamp of realism. While it would have been tempting, albeit Utopian, to 
include these issues within the scope of the Union's competence, they appear in the small print under 
the heading of cooperation. 
c. Transfers from cooperation to common action 
Originally, the draft presented by Mr Spinelli spoke of potential as well as of exclusive and concur-
rent powers and responsibilities. These were areas which remained subject to cooperation as long as 
the European Council had not decided unanimously to make them the object of common action 
coming under its exclusive or concurrent competence. For the sake of simplicity the Draft Treaty 
does not use the term 'potential competence' but allows, in some instances, for matters coming under 
the heading of cooperation to be transferred to that of common action by decision of the European 
Council after the Commission has been consulted and subject to the agreement of Parliament. The 
cases in which such transfer may be made are laid down in the Treaty and are mainly to be found in 
the sphere of international relations. Internally, this possibility can be resorted to only under Article 
54 in order to convert certain forms of industrial cooperation into common Union action. Conver-
sely, Article 68(2) stipulates that in the field of international relations any area of cooperation may-
become a field of common action.' But, cautiously, it allows for this principle to be waived in certain 
circumstances. First, the process may be reversed and the European Council may unanimously 
decide to place the field back under the heading of cooperation, or even that of competence of the 
Member States. Secondly, in that field, the possibility of pleading a vital interest under the afore-
mentioned procedure will be available at any time. 
Though the first reservation need not concern us particularly, for the opposing opinion of one Mem-
ber State will be enough to prevent reversibility, the second is more serious. It has its origins, of 
course, in the desire to allay national fears in the face of an extension of the Community's powers 
and responsibilities. A case in point is defence. The European Council might unanimously decide to 
include it under the heading of cooperation and then to integrate it into a common action, in other 
words, it might decide that it falls within the competence of the Union institutions. The intention 
understandably was to give Member States additional guarantees over and above the requirement 
that any decision to transfer these areas from the heading of cooperation to that of common action 
must be taken unanimously. 
In the opinion of Parliament's Legal Affairs Committee, the unanimity of Member States may not be 
enough and national ratification procedures may be required. The Member States' representatives 
acting within the framework of cooperation are subject to their respective constitutional provisions 
and are bound by them in any commitments they enter into, which, if need be, may be subject to rati-
fication. It is therefore not true to say that these provisions would enable a European army to be 
created over the heads of the national parliaments! 
Though the transfer from cooperation to common action is possible in the cases explicitly provided 
for by the Treaty, it does not include the equivalent of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, which allows 
the Council to take appropriate measures when action is necessary to attain one of the objectives of 
the Treaty. Those who drafted it believed that the extension of the Union's powers and responsibi-
Article 68(4) even allows for the possibility of transferring a specific problem from the heading of cooperation to that of com-
mon action for the period required for its solution. The intention was to allow the Union to act as such solely while an interna-
tional crisis lasted, as in the case of the Falklands war. 
The expression is clumsy, for placing a matter back under the heading of cooperation implies that it comes under the compe-
tences of the Member States again; the intention was to show that from then on the matter would be excluded from those on 
which cooperation was obligatory. 
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lities contained in the draft justified the Union's being unable to extend them beyond what was laid 
down. The list of powers and responsibilities is therefore exhaustive. However, in social and health 
policy, the use of the words 'in particular' before the list of the Union's responsibilities allows it to do 
things not mentioned in the text of the Treaty. 
Without a detailed appraisal of the Union's powers and responsibilities being made, it is enough to 
note that, besides the field of international relations as just defined, they mainly cover the economic 
policy and policy for society, which includes not only social but also regional policy, the environ-
ment, culture, education, research and information. The aim is to achieve what was intended by the 
Community Treaties but has not been put in practice and also to define new fields in which Parlia-
ment has keenly felt the need for common action. 
Some have expressed the fear that the scale of the Union's responsibilities may turn it into a super 
State (see Pinder). This view is not shared by everyone, since Mr Ehlermann believes that the part of 
the draft devoted to this aspect is the least innovative of all.' This is not the place here to become 
involved in this argument, but it should be recalled that an appraisal of these responsibilities is not 
enough to form an opinion; one must also look at the powers granted to the Union to discharge these 
responsibilities. In the economic sphere, the Union will more often than not play only a coordinating 
role and will not be able to force Member States into doing its bidding; it can only urge them to do so 
(see Article 50 concerning conjunctural policy, and Article 53 particularly (d) and (e) on sectoral 
policy). But there is no point in defining new policies without setting up the institutions capable of 
carrying them out. 
3. The institutions of the Union 
Institutional thinking has been on the basis of the existing system. Though changes are proposed, the 
present institutional machinery remains, even if an effort has been made to render it more democratic 
and efficient. 
a. Changes in the institutional machinery 
At first glance there seems to be little change. The European Council, Parliament, the Commission 
and the Court are still there, while the Council of Ministers takes the name of the Council of the 
Union. 
1. The European Council, the authority responsible for cooperation, remains unchanged, themain 
innovation being that it has been dovetailed into the framework of the Treaty. The draft contains no 
provisions on how the European Council is to operate, it being felt that it ought to be master of its 
own procedures. As for its powers, they are the same as those of the present European Council in the 
field of cooperation, plus the traditional powers of the head of a parliamentary State, such as that of 
appointing the head of the executive, the President of the Commission, and the right of address. The 
links between the European Council and Parliament remain as they are. 
2. As regards Parliament, the Treaty leaves it to an organic law to lay down a uniform electoral 
procedure and does not question the allocation of seats between the Member States. The main 
changes concern the powers of Parliament, which was hitherto only one arm of the budgetary auth-
ority but now becomes an arm of the legislative authority as well. It will play a bigger role in the 
Claus Dieter Ehlermann, 'Vergleich des Verfassungsprojekts des Europäischen Parlaments mit früheren Verfassungs- und 
Reformprojekten' in: Schwarze/Bieber (Hrsg.) Eine Verfassung für Europa, Baden-Baden 1984, p. 269 (276). 
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conclusion of international agreements' and, while continuing to exercise a monitoring function over 
the Commission, will now be empowered to invest it. 
3. The Council of the Union is the heir of the Council of Ministers of the Communities. Parliament 
wished to revert to the practice of specialized Councils and the draft provides for a single Council, 
whose composition is relatively permanent, since the delegations appointed by each Member State 
should broadly speaking remain the same as long as the State has not designated other members. 
Moreover, each delegation is to be led by a minister who is 'permanently and specifically responsible 
for Union affairs'. 
This follows the old idea of Ministers for European Affairs. It is thus hoped to establish the perma-
nence of the Council since only a change in the composition of national governments would allow 
any change in the chairmen of the national delegations. It is also hoped that those ministers who take 
part in all the Council debates will be assigned within their own countries the task of coordinating all 
activities relating to the Union. This would strengthen their authority and consequently that of the 
Council. 
The Community rules have been retained for the weighting of votes in the Council. As was men-
tioned earlier, when the Council decides by a majority it will be possible for a transitional 10-year 
period to plead a vital national interest, but this possibility has been carefully kept within bounds. 
Following the suggestions made at the time of the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union, 
the Member State's vital interest must be jeopardized by the decision to be taken and recognized as 
such by the Commission. When this is the case, the vote is postponed so that the matter can be re-
examined while the grounds for requesting postponement are published. 
This solution achieves a compromise between the proponents of vital interest and those in favour of 
a more integrationalist solution. It has therefore come under fire from all quarters. It is attacked as 
confirming the Luxembourg compromise, but it has been claimed that the essential feature of a vital 
national interest is that only the one who pleads it can judge its authenticity. Finally, the text of the 
draft says nothing about repeated requests for postponements. Are they possible or not? 
If they are, then we have a veto system. In the Union's infancy much will depend on practical deve-
lopments and on the Commission's authority. 
In terms of its powers, the Council emerges clearly as the other arm of the legislative and budgetary 
authority. But it performs other functions, particularly in the field of international policy. If it is 
regarded as a second chamber, it is a chamber vested with important powers more like the United 
States Senate than a weak one such as the German Bundesrat. 
4. The authors of the draft wanted to turn the Commission into an executive vested with real auth-
ority, authority which it takes from its manner of appointment since that owes as much to govern-
ment as to the people. The President of the Commission is to be appointed by the European Council 
after the European elections. He will then form his Commission after consulting the European 
Council. This arrangement should strengthen the Commission's cohesion since, while due considera-
tion is given to the proposals by the Member States, it is the President who appoints the Commissio-
ners. 
The Commission, and it is here that its democratic legitimacy emerges, is invested by Parliament on 
the strength of its programme. It may be dismissed following a motion of censure passed by a major-
ity of Members of Parliament and of two-thirds of the votes cast. Some observers have claimed that 
these rules are those of a parliamentary system but, besides the fact that they are not very different 
from the spirit in which the appointment of the Commission should be made since the Stuttgart 
Solemn Declaration, it should be pointed out that the conditions that would have to be met by a vote 
of censure make it hard to use, since a 'minority' Commission could remain in office as long as it 
Exogenously perhaps, since it participates in the approving of all international agreements. The fate of administrative or techni-
cal agreements should probably be reserved . . . 
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commands the support of a third of Parliament's members. The Commission's greater authority also 
derives from its powers. First and foremost, it retains its power to initiate legislation and the power 
to adopt the regulations necessary to implement it. And, under the legislative and budgetary proced-
ures, it has prerogatives equivalent to a right of suspensory veto. There is no cause to fear greater 
instability and the Commission is assured of a voice in the legislative process. 
In the case of the Court, the draft changes its method of appointment by having one half of the judges 
designated by Parliament and the other half by the Council of the Union. This has raised eyebrows, 
for it would appear to make the selection of judges a political issue, but it is based on the German 
experience. It does not imply any change in the rules governing the breakdown by nationalities with-
in the Court, nor was there any call for it in the debates. The powers and responsibilities of the 
Court, an institution respected by Parliament in view of the essential role it plays in European 
integration, are widened. But the Treaty retains the litigation system for the time being. Appeals may 
be lodged against any acts of the Union on the basis of Article 173 pending an organic law to change 
all appeals consistently in accordance with the objectives set out in Article 43. This solution was pre-
ferred to the immediate preparation of new means of redress under the Treaty, as it allows more time 
for careful reflection. The principles proposed in Article 43 are scarcely original, since they have 
their origins in the reports prepared by the Court and by the Commission as part of the 'Tindemans 
process'. 
The draft does not demolish the existing structures, therefore, but confines itself to making adjust-
ments based on Community experience. Overall, the system is evolving in the direction of parliamen-
tarianism, albeit a rationalized parliamentarianism, and care has been taken to preserve the role of 
the executive. This concern is reflected notably in the way the decision-making procedures work. 
b. Legislative powers 
The number of different types of acts is smaller than what the Community has and is limited to laws, 
which are the work of Parliament and the Council with the collaboration of the Commission, and 
regulations and decisions, which are measures taken by the Commission to implement the laws."' 
The distinction between regulation and directive disappears. This simplification must be due to the 
controversy surrounding the issue of the direct effect of directives. As Article 42 of the draft stipu-
lates that any law of the Union shall be directly applicable, it means that this is broadly speaking 
valid for every law. 
Nevertheless, though the legal category of directive is missing from the draft, the existence of laws of 
the Union· which are comparable to directives is not ruled out. Article 34 stipulates that the laws 
shall as far as possible confine themselves 
'to determining the fundamental principles governing common action and entrust the responsible 
authorities in the Union or the Member States with setting out in detail the procedures for their 
implementation'. 
It can be seen that the implementation of certain laws will be subordinate to the adoption of national 
measures. But if the State does not intervene, then the plaintiff will clearly be able to plead the law 
before the national courts whenever it confers on private individuals rights that they can invoke 
legally. 
'" It should be remembered that the Commission does not have exclusive powers in the implementation of the laws; the Member 
States may find they are given the task of applying them (Articles 13 and 34). 
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c. Legislative procedure 
The legislative procedure is organized in accordance with a two-fold requirement; respect for the 
institutional balance and concern for efficacy. 
For reasons of efficacy, it is important that an institution cannot, by refusing to act, block the deci-
sion-making process indefinitely. Taking its cue from the budgetary procedure laid down under 
Article 203 of the Treaty, the draft establishes a system of deadlines on the expiry of which silence on 
the part of an institution is regarded as tantamount to acceptance. However, to avoid a legal text 
being adopted without any vote, tacit approval can mean the adoption of a law only if it has been 
expressly approved by the other arm of the legislative authority. The institutional balance requires 
each institution to share in the legislative procedure. This balance is a dual one, involving both the 
executive and the legislative on the one hand and Parliament and the Council of the Union on the 
other. 
The balance between the legislative and the executive is ensured by the privileged role conferred 
upon the Commission in the initiation of laws and the evolution of the legislative process. The draft 
confirms the privileged role granted by the EEC Treaty to the Commission in the matter of initiative. 
Admittedly, it no longer has a monopoly of initiative, but it does play an essential role in this respect. 
It can present draft laws and withdraw them at any time before their adoption at first reading." 
Moreover, if Parliament or the Council wish to submit a draft law, they must do this via the Com-
mission, which will therefore retain technical control of the draft. 
Only if the Commission refuses can one of the other institutions submit a draft directly. In view of 
the powers held by the Commission in the legislative process, this should happen only rarely and 
should even more rarely result in a law being adopted. 
All drafts voted at their first reading by Parliament are sent to the Commission for its opinion. In the 
event of an expressly unfavourable opinion, the draft cannot be finally adopted by the Council at the 
first reading unless it secures a qualified majority (two-thirds of the weighted votes and the majority 
of delegations). Parliament cannot therefore override the wishes of the Commission unless it has the 
support of a substantial majority of the Council. Failing that support, the draft must go for a second 
reading. 
The balance between the representatives of the States and the representatives of the peoples is en-
sured by co-decision on legislative matters. To be adopted, a law must obtain the agreement of Par-
liament and the Council. If that agreement is not obtained at the first reading, a conciliation commit-
tee is set up. Should a common text emerge from the negotiations within the committee, it is submit-
ted to the vote in Parliament and the Council. A refusal to ratify the text by one of the two arms of 
the legislative authority will prevent its adoption definitively. If the conciliation committee cannot 
reach agreement, Parliament takes a decision on the basis of the draft that leaves the Council, which 
then has three months to oppose by qualified majority the text voted by Parliament. 
If Parliament accepts the draft in the form in which it leaves the Council, there is little chance of the 
Council opposing it. 
According to Article 38(5) Parliament may amend a text after it leaves the Council only on a propo-
sal by the Commission, which plays a key role here. It is hence conceivable that the Council might 
want to prevent the text from entering into force, but it will then have to obtain more than two-
thirds of the weighted votes. 
In practice, Parliament cannot really have its way unless it enjoys the support of a third of the mem-
bers of the Council and the full support of the Commission. 
So as to enable it to re-examine them if they are too unfavourably received or if they are liable to be the subject of amendments 
which would rob them of their significance. 
2 ' 
Moreover, for a period of 10 years the possibility of vital interests being invoked must be borne in 
mind. 
The aim is to induce the two arms of the legislative authority to reach agreement in the conciliation 
committee — the Council because of the risk that Parliament might act in the last resort in the event 
of failure and Parliament because it may in the last resort have to vote for or against the Council's 
text without being able to amend it. 
At first sight the legislative procedure may appear complicated; but because of the various checks 
and balances required between the different institutions, it was not easy to create a system as simple 
as the one in certain individual States. Moreover, the degree of complexity is well below that of the 
current budgetary procedure under the Community Treaties. The constraints aim at prompting the 
institutions to act by joint agreement while at the same time preventing any one of them from block-
ing a decision. 
d. The budgetary procedure 
Compared with the present system, the budgetary procedure has been simplified. The apportion-
ment of the powers of the institutions is no longer tied to the classification of expenditure as com-
pulsory and non-compulsory. The Council has the right to reject the budget, but failing rejection by 
the Council, Parliament may act in a last resort by a majority of its members and three-fifths of the 
votes cast. However, to avoid any risk of an indefinite increase in the burden that the Union would 
impose upon the taxpayer, raising of revenue is subject to very strict rules. The Union cannot under-
take a new action unless it has obtained the necessary revenue by an organic law, which means one 
that is subject to stricter majority voting. 
All in all, the institutional machinery of the Union has been overhauled to take account of the 
demands of efficacy and democracy. Parliament's powers have been increased, but there is also a 
desire to strengthen the Commission. In adopting the draft of the Union, Parliament was inspired 
not only by a wish to expand its role but in particular by an urge to establish institutions capable of 
implementing Union policy. 
4. Conclusion 
In this form the Draft Treaty has been submitted to the governments so that they can submit it to the 
national parliaments for ratification. Parliament refrained from asking too detailed questions about 
its entry into force. Clearly the Treaty must be regarded not as a revised version of the Community 
Treaties but as a new Treaty encompassing the existing Communities. It has been submitted for rati-
fication by all the Member States and, if all of them ratify it, it could replace the existing Treaties. 
However, to make entry into force conditional upon the accession of all the Member States, is to 
confer upon any single one of them the right of veto. The terms of Article 82 are therefore more sub-
tle: 
'Once this Treaty has been ratified by a majority of the Member States of the Communities whose 
population represents two-thirds of the total population of the Communities, the governments of 
the Member States which have ratified shall meet at once to decide by common accord on the pro-
cedures by and :he date on which this Treaty shall enter into force'. 
Some have seen in this article the possibility of sidestepping certain States and setting up a two-speed 
Europe. This was not the aim of the drafters. The idea is to enable States which have ratified it to 
urge the others to choose: either they join in the venture or they agree to negotiate their relations with 
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the Union with full respect for their rights acquired under the Community Treaties. Article 82 creates 
a strong incentive to ratify the Union Treaty as soon as the critical number of States is reached and 
does not allow States remaining on the sidelines to affirm their support for the Union while blocking 
its implementation by refusing to ratify it. Article 82 makes a choice between membership or non-
membership inevitable as soon as a sufficiently large number of States have joined. Moreover, it 
leaves States the choice of the date of entry into force and of the arrangements for readjusting the 
situation of the Communities vis-à-vis the Union. 
In other words, if the participation of all the members of the Community is the happiest solution, 
entry into force by a majority vote is possible at the discretion of the States that have ratified the 
Treaty. But at no time was it intended to encroach on the acquired rights of members who remain 
outside to process. If they agree to remain outside the Union while not opposing the entry into force 
of the Treaty, the legal situation is clear. If not, the solution lies in the negotiation of a solution by 
which acquired rights remain unaffected. Article 82 infine paves the way for such a procedure with-
out prejudging the substance of the solution that might be reached. 
Finally, as it stands, the draft is not intangible. Parliament has undertaken to ascertain the opinions 
of the national parliaments; it is closely watching the work of the Dooge Committee and is consider-
ing the possibility of convening an inter-governmental conference. If this hope is fulfilled, the draft 
might be amended in the light of the conclusions arrived at within the framework of the negotiation 
with which Parliament wishes to be associated. Otherwise, Parliament will follow its own line, 
which means, too, that it will take account of the observations of the national parliaments in order to 
amend the draft wherever possible, while preserving its essential elements. 
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Chapter II - The institutions 
and the decision-making procedure 
in the Draft Treaty establishing 
the European Union 
by Roland Bieber 
1. Introduction 
a. The role of institutions in an organization 
Any organization needs institutions in order to determine, to express and to implement the inten-
tions of the members of the organization. In political organizations, the institutions provided for by 
the constitution are the formalized structure through which the organization's overall power is exer-
cised.' Institutions, their respective powers and their mutual relations are thus a necessary prerequi-
site of any organization. Institutions also represent, like the tip of the iceberg, the visible part of the 
entity. The very existence of an organization depends on its capacity to remain 'visible', to establish a 
reality for its constituent parts. Through their role in embodying the character of an organization for 
its members, institutions generate and aggregate consent for the organization. Consent within an 
organization — legitimacy — presupposes an identification of its members with the organization. 
Identification (or 'loyalty') can only be achieved when a minimum of stability exists within the insitu-
tional framework. 
Hence institutions fulfil essentially three functions: 
(i) they promote the efficiency of an organization by providing the tools necessary for the achieve-
ment of the organization's aims; 
(ii) they provide legitimacy for an organization through participation of members of the organiza-
tion in decision-making and by rendering this process publicly accountable; 
(iii) they generate identity by integrating social actors into the organization. 
How these basic functions of an institutional system are fulfilled depends largely on the kind of 
institutions which a given constitution provides for and from the way in which cooperation and 
' See Löwenstein. Politicai Powers and the Governmental· Process, 1957, p. 10. Although Löwenstein, like many political scien-
tists, uses the notion of 'institution' in a larger sense, which comprises all political actors, including political parties, it is sub-
mitted here that the fact of being formally recognized by a constitution establishes substantial difference, which needs to be 
taken into account. On the other hand, legal science uses the term 'institution' often in the sense of Organization' (see Hariou, 
'La théorie de l'institution et de la fondation', in Les Cahiers de la Nouvelle fournée, 1925, p. 44; Romano, Santi, L'ordina-
mento giuridico, 1946. 
Since the following text deals with the law of the European Communities, the notion of 'institution' is used here in the meaning 
given to it by Article 4 of the EEC Treaty. It should be kept in mind that the German version of the Treaty uses the more speci-
fic term 'Organe'. This notion is familiar to the English-speaking reader as well. See Article 7 of the UN Charter ('Principal 
Organs'). 
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mutual control are built into the institutional structure. Although any institutional system serves the 
same set of basic functions, the operation of institutions cannot be separated from the aims for which 
they have been created. Institutions and aims are in fact related to each other through a dialectical 
process. 
These observations are valid both for States and for international organizations. In this (formal) 
respect, any text which lays down the guidelines for the institutional system of an organization may 
be considered as a constitution.2 Depending on the number and the stability of the proper values this 
dialectic process has generated for the institution, however, this text may also be considered a con-
stitution in a substantive sense. In this respect the EC Treaties are considered as either in a 'process of 
constitutionalization',3 or already as a constitution.4 
In the present EEC Treaty, Article 4 expressly relates aims and institutions by stating: 
The tasks entrusted to the Community shall be carried out by the following institutions . . . 
This means, on the one hand, that the institutions do not have any function outside the scope of the 
Treaty and, on the other hand that the tasks shall not be carried out by any institution other than 
those provided for in the Treaties. This intrinsic link between policies and institutions has to be kept 
in mind when submitting proposals either for reforms of policies or of institutions. 
b. Institutional essentials in a constitution 
On the assumption that a constitution is the formal framework for determining the aims of a politi-
cal organization and providing the instruments for the achievement of those aims, a draft constitu-
tion has to provide for a minimum institutional structure. In theory, every new constitution has a 
free choice among possible institutions, but constitutional history shows that the variety of institu-
tions tends to be limited and that one of the characteristic features of institutions resides in their 
being designed in reply to previously-existing institutions, either by developing certain features in 
order to make institutions more able to confront new tasks or by avoiding certain errors of past 
institutions.5 
The complexity of modern institutional structures tends to echo the complexity of aims assigned to 
modern political organizations, namely the State and international organizations.' The achievement 
of the traditional formal aims of such organizations (aggregating public opinion, and making, imple-
menting and interpreting laws) entails a more or less complex institutional system, but in any event 
requires different specialized institutions. The 'division of power' among several institutions permits 
a more specialized and therefore more efficient activity of the individual institution and limits at the 
same time its weight in comparison to other institutions. Any draft constitution has to assign the four 
traditional functions to institutions and has to determine, at least in principle, how those functions 
are to be exercised. It has, furthermore, to lay down rules for the establishment of the institutions, 
the procedure for the selection of office-holders and for the duration of their term of office. A further 
Bernhardt, the sources of Community law', in Thirty Years of Community Law, Commission of the EC, 1981, p. 77. 
Weiler, 'The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism', Yearbook of European L., 1981, pp. 267, 292. 
Schwarze, 'VerfassungsentwickJung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft', in Eine Verfassung für Europa, (Schwarze, Bieber, eds) 
1984, pp. 15,23. 
See Mill, Stuart, Utilitarianism, Liberty, Representative Government, 1972, (1st ed. 1910), p. 175 et seq. For recent examples 
see Debré, Les idées constitutionelles du Général de Gaulle, 1974, (for the constitution of the Vth Republic). On the origins of 
the German Grundgesetz, see Hesse, 'Das Grundgesetz in der Entwicklung der Bundesrepbulik Deutschland', in Handbuch des 
Verfassungsrechts, (Maihofer, Vogel, eds), 1983, pp. 3-27. 
Most international organizations have a structure that is less complex than the structure of States, but the same trends towards 
complexity can be observed. Also, the different aims of international organizations lead to partly different institutions. For 
details see Schermers, International Institutional Law, 1972, and Seidl Hohenveldern, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisa-
tionen einschließlich der supranationalen Gemeinschaften, 4th ed., 1984, p. 9. 
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necessary set of rules concerns the relations among the institutions with respect to the execution of 
their respective tasks (e.g. the question of judicial control). Finally, an institutional system must be 
provided with rules which create flexibility within and among the institutions and also for the entire 
institutional system. This flexibility is usually achieved through some level of institutional auton-
omy, either expressly, through the authorization to adopt rules of procedure and to create auxiliary 
institutions, or tacitly through the acceptance of the principle of 'implied powers'. 
c. The starting point for institutional proposals in the 
Draft Treaty establishing the European Union 
The draft is not to be considered as a blueprint of an abstract 'ideal' constitution for a European 
Union. The text has been designed as a constitution for an organization that comprises the members 
of the existing European Communities. It will not create an organization functionally separate from 
the EC but will be the result of an evolutionary process which has its origins in the present Treaties. 
In this respect, the draft follows the same line of thought which has inspired proposals for a closer 
union among Member States ever since the ECSC was established in 1952,s although the first propo-
sal, submitted in 1953, was inspired by more abstract considerations since it built on hardly any 
experience with the institutions of the ECSC that had shortly before been established. 
Therefore, the 1984 draft bears all the signs of traditional constitution-making: it aims at maintain-
ing a maximum of stability in the existing institutional structure, and proposes modifications consi-
dered necessary due to a change in the priority of values. It would, of course, have been possible for 
Parliament to design a completely new and different institutional system, but it was probably easiest 
to maintain the known structures as long as no consensus for deviations from them could be found, 
thus making the possible change 'calculable' for the MEPs. This approach also has its 'external' justi-
fication: as pointed out in the introduction, institutions serve as identification marks of an organiz-
ation. The more stable institutions are, the more capable they are of generating loyalty towards the 
organization and its institutions. This is particularly significant in the present situation, since the loy-
alty of the Community citizens is one of the major shortcomings of existing institutions. It is certainly 
wise to base proposals for a 'new' organization on the existing institutional structure. 
On this basis, it is possible to identify three different currents of thought which influenced the institu-
tional proposals in the draft: 
(i) According to Parliament the evolution of the instutional system of the EC Treaties requires 
major adjustments in order to increase its efficiency and its legitimacy;5 
(ii) The new competences attributed to the Union in the draft imply a further transfer of compet-
ences from national Parliaments and would therefore require a parallel increase in parliamentary 
powers on the EC level;"' 
(iii) In order to promote the further process of integration, it is necessary to strengthen the indepen-
dence of the organization from the Member States." 
These three factors could be characterized as (i) efficiency, (ii) democracy and (iii) independence. 
' See Art. 7, par. II of the draft. 
" For details see Bieber, 'Verfassungsentwicklung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Formen und Verfahren', in Eine Verfassung 
für Europa, (Schwarze, Bieber, eds), 1984, pp. 49-89. 
* This opinion is not limited to Parliament, see, for example, The Report on European Institutions, presented by the Committee 
of the Three to the European Council (1979), and the Vedel report, Supplement 4/72—Bull. EC. 
111 This line of thought was already presented in the proposals for an economic and monetary union ('Werner Plan'), in Supplement 
11 /70 — Bull. EC; see also the report of experts on the economic and monetary union ('Marjolin report'), 1975, Chapter IV. 1. 
" This view can already be found in the EP Resolution of 10. 7. 1975 preceding the Tindemans report, OJ C 179, 1975, p. 23. 
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It seems appropriate to examine the institutional structure of the Draft Treaty in the light of ex-
perience with the institutions established by the EC Treaties and to take into account the specific 
aims of Parliament.12 
2. The institutional system of the EC 
Since the Merger Treaty of 1965, the EC Treaties " provide for four institutions, Assembly, Council, 
Commission and Court. An auxiliary institution, the Economic and Social Committee, fills an 
advisory function in regard to the Commission and the Council within the framework of the EEC 
and Euratom Treaties. Another auxiliary institution was established by the Treaty of 22 July 1975, 
which transformed the control committee into the Court of Auditors." In addition, the institutions 
are surrounded by a large number of complementary entities with different legal natures." Formally, 
the European Council, the conference of Heads of State or Government, acts outside the institu-
tional structure of the Treaties, but it can meet as a Council. The 'Conference of the Representatives 
of the Member States', which is not an institution of the EC, but formally a type of inter-governmen-
tal cooperation, often prepares or complements EC legislation. 
This institutional system reflects concepts about legitimacy of power, of due process in law and of 
checks and balances. But it is not modelled on a specific constitution of a State or an international 
organization. Legislation and executive functions are horizontally divided between the Council and 
the Commission, the Parliament fulfils co-decision and control functions, and judicial control is 
exercised by the Court. The composition of the institutions aims essentially at legitimacy. Thus all 
Member States are represented. Their size, determined with an eye to efficiency, depends on the 
tasks assigned to each. Enlargements of the EC have, therefore, led to an increase in size of the 
institutions. 
The Treaties describe in an abstract way the powers of each institution,"' but those enumerations are 
not sufficiently complete and precise to determine the role of each institution in decision-making. 
The different procedures for adopting legislative acts can only be inferred from the Treaty provisions 
providing for specific policies. 
A particular feature of these procedures is the cooperation between several institutions required to 
adopt legislative acts. Within this cooperation, the Commission has the (formal) right of initiative 
and the task of preparing legislative acts, the Council has the legislative decision power and Parlia-
ment has the task of public discussion and of control over the Commission. This original system 
underwent considerable modifications in the form of Treaty amendments, unilateral decisions by 
institutions, and agreements among the institutions. The modifications strengthened the position of 
the Council to the detriment of the Commission and of Parliament. The institutional system, both in 
its original form as shaped by the Treaties and in its constitutional life, had to face increasing criti-
cism of the efficiency, legitimacy and balance among the institutions. 
For details of Parliament's intentions, see 'Explanatory Statement' in Report of the Committee on institutional Affairs, (Doc. 
1-575/83/C, draftsman Mr Zecchino). 
Art. 4 (EEC), Art. 3 (Euratom), Art. 7 (ECSC). 
Art. 4, III and Art. 206 (EEC). 
For a detailed analysis see Hilf, Die Organisationsstruktur der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1982. 
Parliament, Art. 137; Council, Art. 145; Commission, Art. 155; Court, Art. 164; Ecosoc, Art. 193; Court of Auditors, Art. 
206 EEC Treaty. 
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The most pertinent of these criticisms can be summarized as follows:' 
(i) The institutions of the EC are still not considered by its own citizens as producing and guaran-
teeing solutions for vital problems. 
(ii) The political options underlying decisions are hardly ever made public and are only indirectly 
subject to influence and control. Community citizens do not see themselves as participants in the 
system. In other words, it lacks representativeness. Together, the first two criticisms amount to 
a claim that the Community lacks legitimacy and, hence, has not attracted the loyalty of its citiz-
ens. 
(iii) The efficiency of the system when producing decisions is doubtful. Furthermore, decisions often 
are not taken according to a proper common interest but rather according to the lowest common 
denominator. 
To a large extent similar criticisms are made within States. But within the EC system three main 
amplifying factors can be identified: 
(i) the incomplete legal framework governing relations between the institutions; 
(ii) the dynamic conception of the organization; and 
(iii) the position of Parliament, which differs from that in national constitutions. 
Especially the dynamic conception of the Treaties, which applies, both to policies and to institutions, 
has repeatedly encouraged the institutions to question their present position. As early as 1962, and 
from then on at regular intervals, Parliament has submitted proposals for a substantial increase in its 
own powers. But these proposals were designed as modifications within the present Treaty structure. 's 
Although these proposals were dealt with separately from the preparation of a proposal for the 
European Union, their underlying philosophy with regard to institutions and decision-making is 
similar. The prevailing aim is the strengthening of the parliamentary and Community elements 
against the influence of national governments of the EC system. 
3. The Draft Treaty establishing 
the European Union 
a. The ideological background 
The institutions and the decision-making process occupy a central position in the approach chosen 
by the European Parliament towards European Union. Their key role is apparent from the fact that 
the relevant articles " cover more than one third of the entire Draft Treaty. This formal element 
reflects not only priorities concerning the method of achieving European Union, but also Parlia-
ment's central concern with the failures of the existing system. Parliament, in fact, expressly decided 
in 1982 'to maintain the institutional structure of the Community and to adjust it so that defaults are 
abolished and the Union on the other hand gets the possibility of executing new tasks'.2" Altiero Spi-
nelli has given six reasons for the initiative for a European Union, all of which are related to themal-
" See analysis in the report of the Three Wise Men, supra, footnote 10. 
" See in particular the reports submitted in 1981-82 on relations with Council, Commission and European Council, on the 
conclusion of international agreements and on political cooperation. For details see Le Parlement Européen, (Jacqué, Bieber, 
Constantinesco, Nickel, eds), 1984, p. 143 et seq. 
" Ans 8, 14-44,75,76,78-81. 
20 OJ C 238,1982, p. 25. 
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functioning of the present institutional system of the Communities.21 In fact, Parliament seems to 
consider the draft essentially an instrument to repair defects of the existing institutional system. This 
approach is radically different from the one displayed, for example, in the proposals for an economic 
and monetary union,22 where institutional changes were considered as an annex to an enlargement of 
EC competences. Similarly, the Tindemans report of 1975 on the European Union suggested minor 
institutional improvements only as a consequence of substantive reforms.2! One might object to Par-
liament's approach, that an agreement on institutions and procedures for the solution of future prob-
lems distracts from the necessary agreement on the substance of those problems. But experience 
shows that a well-designed institutional sub-system, like the Court of Justice, may have a larger 
impact on the evolution of European Union than discussions on the substance of policies that remain 
hypothetical because of a defective institutional system.24 
A further objection which might be raised against the method chosen by Parliament is related to the 
'reactive' character of the draft. The institutional parts of the text are heavily conditioned by the pre-
sent Treaty structure; Parliament tries to 'repair' rather than to 'invent'. One might be disappointed 
to see a new adventure like the European Union result from the ruins of the present Treaties. Con-
tinuity is of course the safest way of avoiding major errors and of reassuring political opponents, 
thus a défendable way to increase 'acceptance'. But the stability of the political system, which this 
approach implies, is, in the light of strong negative opinion on the EC, only a relative constitutional 
value. 
One might, therefore, regret that the requirements of an institutional system for the Union, even in 
the context of the present Treaties, have not been further explored. Such an analysis could have tried 
to establish a relationship between the competences of the Union and the necessary instruments for 
their implementation. Another approach could have been to evaluate critically the potential for effi-
ciency, legitimacy and flexibility in the present institutional system and to try to submit suggestions 
for increasing this potential. This might have led to questions such as: Are the present institutions 
sufficiently representative for the people of the Union? Would, for example, a regional representa-
tion or a representation of national Parliaments (like in the draft of 1953) not be necessary? Would 
size, allocation of seats and electoral period of Parliament not have to be reconsidered? 
The main aim of Parliament's draft obviously is to extend its own powers within the present institu-
tional framework. One might well ask whether this step is not at the same time too large (because it 
shifts legislative authority from Council to Parliament) and too small (because it does not substan-
tially increase the overall legitimacy of the institutional system). 
b. The proposed institutional structure 25 
The institutional structure proposed for the Union hardly differs from that existing under the present 
Treaties. In fact, Article 8 of the draft differs in substance from Article 4, par. 1 of the EEC Treaty 
only in adding the European Council to the institutions of the future Union. Parliament seems to 
have included it somewhat reluctantly, since the European Council is placed at the very end of the 
list, which otherwise follows the order as established by Article 4 (EEC). 
In any event, it should be borne in mind that the European Council, although of highly symbolic 
value, is an emanation of national Governments. Its formal establishment and bestowment with spe-
:l Spinelli, Towards a European Union, Sixth Jean Monnet Lecture, European University Institute, Florence, 1983; see also 
Spinelli, in Eine Verfassung für Europa, supra, note 4, p. 231. 
u See supra, footnote 10. 
u Supplement 1/76 — Bull. EC (Chapter V). 
" See Weiler, supra, footnote 3. 
2! For the Court of Justice, see chapter IV by Judge Koopmans. 
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cific powers implies a major transfer of powers from national Parliaments to their respective Govern-
ments. This is particularly obvious for the power of the European Council to establish a Union com-
petence in the field of defence policy. Suspicion of national Parliaments towards the Union is there-
fore likely to increase and might, in fact, create an obstacle to the approval of the draft. 
In the Union, the European Parliament and the European Council will be — as they tend already to 
be under the existing Treaties — the two poles of interinstitutional rivalry and tension. Both will 
claim a maximum of autonomous legitimacy. It is doubtful whether the system proposed for the 
Union is sufficiently sophisticated to balance those tensions. One possibility could have consisted in 
strengthening Parliament by creating a 'Senate' in which national Parliaments were represented. This 
solution was, in fact, proposed in 1953.2* Another method could have been to integrate fully the 
European Council into the institutional system. But the draft's silence about the possibility of trust-
ing constitutional conflicts between the European Council and the Parliament to the Court, and Par-
liament's reluctance to provide for rules of procedure of the European Council2 indicate that Parlia-
ment seems to accept that the European Gouncil enjoys, like a monarch, a particular autonomy. 
Under the present Treaties, the legal powers of the European Council do not differ from those of the 
Council. The draft assigns to it the power to decide new areas of Community competences (Arts 54, 
68). This innovation creates, in fact, a Treaty amendment procedure which one might locate bet-
ween Articles 235 and 236. Those decisions will in most cases have to be unanimous. 
With three exceptions, the proposed text on Parliament confirms the institutional position it has 
acquired within the EC Treaties. In particular, its composition and the term of office are not modi-
fied. The three new features concern its powers: 
(i) its consultative function is transformed into participation in legislation and in the adoption of 
the budget; 
(ii) it approves the appointment of the Commission and it participates in the nomination of the 
members of the Court and the Court of Auditors (although this elective function is not mentio-
ned in Article 16 of the draft, which lists the powers of Parliament); 
(iii) finally, a new element is the recognition of a power to conduct inquiries and to receive petitions. 
The really important question of the legal powers Parliament has for this purpose, however, is 
left to organic laws (Art. 18). 
The institutional position of the Council is visibly reduced in respect to its legislative powers. 
According to Article 21, the Council participates in the legislative and budgetary procedure.28 In its 
composition, the Parliament seems to adopt the idea of 'European ministers'. Article 20 of the draft 
provides that each representation 'shall be led by a minister who is permanently and specifically 
responsible for Union affairs'. This formula looks like interference into the autonomy of national 
Governments. It is in fact difficult to imagine that the Council would refuse the participation in its 
work to a minister who is designated on an ad hoc basis by the Head of State or the national Govern-
ment. 
One indication of the above-mentioned 'reactive' character of the draft can be found in Article 24, 
where it is stated that the Council's rules of procedure shall provide for publicity of meetings in 
which the Council acts as a legislative or budgetary authority. For itself Parliament did not consider 
such a rule necessary. In any event, its application would require substantial changes in the Council's 
internal rules and perhaps in its habits, although the confidentiality of Council meetings at present is 
often pure fiction. 
Contrary to Article 5 of the Merger Treaty, combined with Article 148, par. 1 (EEC), the draft pro-
vides that the Council's rules of procedure shall be adopted by an absolute majority. Although this 
wording establishes a parallel between Parliament and Council, the notion 'absolute majority' is de-
" See Art. 11 of the Draft Statute, submitted by the ad hoc assembly on 10. 3. 1953. 
r See Art. 32, par. 2 of the draft. 
!* See Art. 145 (EEC): ' . . . have power to take decision'. 
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fined differently for the Council (combined majority of weighted votes and of a number of repre-
sentations) 2' and for Parliament (majority of members).30 
The new way of counting majorities in Council renders routine decisions easier, because a simple 
majority is also obtained from weighted votes, thus enabling the four 'big' countries to establish a 
majority.11 But more important decisions, which require an 'absolute' majority are more difficult to 
take (provided that votes are taken at all). 
With respect to the Commission, it should be noted that the draft establishes a link between its terms 
of office and the term of Parliament, thus prolonging the present four-year period to five years and 
underlining at the same time the political responsibility of the Commission towards Parliament. 
The draft provides a somewhat awkward procedure for the Commission's appointment (Arts 25 and 
16). Its President is appointed by the European Council (this appointment meaning at the same time 
cooption to the European Council); the President then selects the other members of the Commission. 
Finally, the Commission obtains 'investiture' from Parliament. This procedure comes still very close 
to the present selection system where Parliament has defacto no influence on the choice of members 
of the Commission, since the Governments are eager to preserve their prerogative in this respect. 
Parliament's underlying assumption is that the President of the Commission, whose authority origi-
nates from the European Council, would seek an understanding with Parliament on the choice of his 
colleagues. This concept is likely to generate conflicts between the two rival institutions who both 
expect the Commission's loyalty. In any event it is at present difficult to imagine that a European 
Council would appoint somebody President of the Commission who has not before committed him-
self to a certain team. 
With respect to the Court and to the Court of Auditors, the draft provides for appointment of some 
of its members by Parliament and by the Council (Arts 30,33). This technique is likely to create con-
flicts among the appointing institutions, e.g. on the methods for providing for a representation of all 
Member States in those institutions. It would be safer to provide for a mechanism which guarantees 
that decisions on appointments are taken in due course before the end of the term of the outgoing 
member. 
The Court of Auditors and the Economic and Social Committee shall no longer enjoy the privileged 
status conferred upon them by Article 4, pars II and III (EEC), where they are mentioned together 
with the main institutions. Together with the Investment Bank and the Monetary Fund they are now 
named 'organs' and listed in Article 33. Apart from this more politically '2 relevant reduction in 
status, the terminology used in Article 33 will contribute to further confusion: in the English versions 
those entities are called 'organs', whilst the German version uses the term 'Einrichtungen'. Until now 
the notion of'organ' was used in the German version of the Treaties for the main institutions (Parlia-
ment, Council, Commission, Court). It is difficult to see why the draft did not use any internation-
ally-recognized terminology such as, for example, that used for the Charter of the United Nations, in 
order to call its entities in as meaningful and least confusing a way as possible. 
In its provision for the rules of procedure of the Court of Auditors, the draft repeats the omission of 
the EEC Treaty by failing clearly to lay down the autonomy of the Court in this respect." 
For the Economic and Social Committee, on the other hand, the autonomy to adopt its own rules of 
procedure has been recognized and is, contrary to the EEC Treaty (Art. 196, par. II), no longer sub-
ject to the approval of the Council. Furthermore, a right of initiative is formally conferred upon the 
ESC (Art. 33, par. 3)." 
Art. 23, par II of the draft. 
Art. 17, par II of the draft. 
Note the difference from Art. 148, par. I (EEC): 'majority of its members' 
Although it is significant for Parliament's narrow concept of representativity. 
A cryptic hint to the internal autonomy of the Court of Auditors can be interpreted from Article 79. 
This right has already been recognized by the Heads of State or Government in 1972, see final communiqué of 20. 10. 1972. 
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The system of 'organs' may be supplemented by the Union itself by means of an organic law (Art. 33, 
par. 5), thus enabling the institutional structure of the Union to grow and to differentiate according 
to future requirements. This last proviso in the chapter dealing with institutions and organs high­
lights a particular dimension of the draft: the large number of references to organic laws which shall 
lay down further details, coupled with general clauses such as that providing for new organs, would 
generate remarkable dynamics within the institutional structure of the future Union. 
c. The decision­making system 
It should first be noted that decision­making also includes the budgetary procedure, that is to say the 
procedure to be followed for the adoption of the budget. The Draft Treaty in Article 76 has — as do 
the existing Treaties (Art. 203 (EEC)) — completely separated the legislative procedure from the 
budgetary procedure." I wonder whether this separation is necessary. It might have been useful, in 
fact, to combine the two procedures. As experience shows, legislation and adopting the budget are 
two faces of the same coin. To ignore this identity is in fact the easiest method of creating conflicts 
among the institutions — and even within the institutions — (Budgetary Council ν Foreign Minis­
ters; Budgetary Committee ν Agricultural Committee). No solution is provided for this kind of con­
flict. 
The objection is not a formality. According to Article 38, par. 4, legislation may be adopted after the 
conciliation procedure by a simple majority of members composing Parliament. But the adoption of 
budget items which the Council has modified requires a qualified majority in Parliament according to 
Article 76 et seq. If Parliament, against opposition from the Council, has adopted legislation which 
established financial obligations, and if Council maintains its opposition in the budgetary procedure, 
it may well occur that Parliament is not able to put into the budget the money necessary to implement 
legislation which it has decided by itself. I wonder whether this result was intended by Parliament. 
Legislative procedure is entrusted by the core Articles 36 and 38 to Parliament and Council, which 
emerge as the joint legislative authority. 
The idea of co­decision is already achieved under the present Treaties in the budgetary field and it 
was proposed for legislation in the 'Vedel report' of 1972. Parliament suggests now that co­decision 
applies to the initiative and to the decisional phase as well. Legislation is generally initiated by the 
Commission. But both Parliament and Council may, if the Commission refuses, introduce legislation 
by themselves. This procedure (Art. 37) is not quite clear. It seems as if only the institution which 
previously invited the Commission to act may introduce draft legislation (Parliament or Council, not 
Parliament and Council). Furthermore, it is not clear what is meant by 'refuses'. Does this imply that 
a draft text has to be submitted within a certain time­limit before Parliament or Council may act by 
themselves? Can the Commission implicitly reject? 
In any event, once the legislative procedure has started, a Bill may be enacted after Council and Par­
liament have had the opportunity to amend it and after at least one institution has approved it. The 
Council may reject draft legislation with varying majorities. But if it does not assemble the necessary 
majority for rejection within a given time­limit, Parliament alone may enact the Bill. This is an 
ingenious proposal which could bring forward two major achievements: 
(i) a participation of Parliament in legislation; and 
(ii) a way around the Council's notorious incapability to gather a 'positive' majority for the adoption 
of a text. 
The procedure, on the other hand, establishes all necessary safeguards against legislation which is 
contrary to the will of a vast majority of Governments. It even provides a safeguard for individual 
governments by giving a formal blessing to the 'Luxembourg Compromise' of 1966 (Art. 23, par. 3). 
For a detailed analysis of the budgetary part of the draft, see the chapter V by Mr Ørstrøm Møller. 
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Unfortunately, it is not clear beyond doubt whether a Government should be allowed to block a vote 
in Council even beyond the time-limit in Article 38 or whether this right can be exercised only within 
this limit. 
It is obvious that this decision-making process would increase the legitimacy of the Union, since it 
would ensure the participation of Parliament. It would facilitate decisions and it would safeguard 
individual States' interests. On the other hand, it might be argued that the decision-making process 
would become more complex and could thus lose in efficiency. This danger, however, seems margi-
nal in the light of the time constraints put on each institution (which for certain legislative projects 
might be too short but could be prolonged on mutual agreement). In comparison to the present 
system the procedure proposed in Article 38 might well be the keystone for any further development 
of the present Treaties, since it would enable the Union to overcome the Communities present iner-
tia. 
But attention must be drawn to the somewhat doubtful proposal contained in Article 38, par. 5 of 
the draft. According to this paragraph, decisions may come into effect even if no vote has taken place 
in the Parliament or Council. The lack of legitimacy of decisions adopted according to this proce-
dure, in my opinion is too great compared to any resulting increase in efficiency of the decision-mak-
ing procedure. It is not compensated by the fact that, in any event, the two other institutions must 
approve a text. It is hardly acceptable that the consent of the directly-elected Parliament is reputed by 
the absence of a vote within a given time. 
The procedure for the publication of laws is rather unique. According to Article 39 of the draft, the 
president of the institution which has taken the last express decision, shall take the necessary meas-
ures for publication. Experience with the use of Article 203, par. 7 (EEC) shows, that in case of con-
flict the formal power to conclude the procedure is of considerable weight. But the decision on the 
budget has an immediate bearing on the institutions only. Therefore a unilateral conclusion in a con-
flictual situation seems acceptable. In order to protect, however, the citizens confidence in the formal 
quality of laws, publication of laws could have been left to a 'neutral' institution, e.g. the Commis-
sion. At least their participation in the publication should have been provided for. 
Finally attention is drawn to Article 41 which establishes an obligation of the institutions 'wherever 
possible and useful' to hear the persons affected by the measures of the institutions. This confirms the 
present legal situation in the EC, as established by the Court.'6 
d. Possible repercussions of the draft on the existing Treaties 
Parliament has carefully kept separate its proposals on institutional reforms within the framework of 
the existing Treaties ' from the proposed institutional system under a new Treaty. But this separa-
tion is somewhat artificial since the institutions devised for the European Union in large part remain 
identical to those under the present Treaties. This close relationship provides the advantage that the 
solutions which were found for given problems of the Union could be used in the context of the EC 
Treaties. This should in itself be considered a major advantage of the draft. 
In fact, the decision-making procedure proposed in Article 38, could become part of the present 
Treaties separately from the remaining text of the draft. Obviously, a Treaty revision in accordance 
with Article 236 would be necessary, but technically it would be possible, even without too many 
changes in the Treaty. This would establish a substantial improvement, less spectacular perhaps, but 
exactly for this reason probably 'easier' to be achieved. 
Such a result, if seen as a step towards an 'ever closer union' would be consistent with the dynamic 
concept as laid down by the draft for the institutions of the Union. 
See Ehlermann, Oldekop, Due process in administrative procedure, Copenhagen (FIDE), 1978. 
SeesHpra, footnote 18. 
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Chapter III - Division of fields of competence 
between the Union and the Member States in the 
Draft Treaty establishing the European Union 
by Vlad Constantinesco 
In some ways the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union links up with the 'constitutionalist' 
as opposed to the 'functionalist' approach to integration. Like the Draft Treaty establishing a statute 
for the European Community, adopted by the Ad Hoc Assembly in Strasbourg on 10 March 1953, it 
is the work of a parliamentary assembly.' But unlike the 1953 text, the 1984 text emanates from a 
single Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage. 
While its parliamentary credentials give the text indisputable democratic legitimacy, its origins may 
also explain why, despite the precautions taken,2 the text contains imprécisions and omissions which 
lead at times to a lack of clarity. This is particularly true of the division of fields of competence. 
This is more novel in terms of the concepts used than in the terms of the results to be achieved. It 
must be said from the outset that — as compared to the Communities — the Draft Treaty breaks 
more new ground on the institutional front than on fields of competence. ' 
The influence of federal models can be detected, notably as regards the distinction between exclusive 
and concurrent competence, but the Community model dominates.4 Moreover, an obvious attempt 
has been made not just to avoid direct confrontation with the Governments of the Member States but 
to involve them in the activities and institutions of the Union. 
Finally, ideological divisions between political groups are probably at the root of compromise solu-
tions which may prove ambiguous from the legal point of view. 
An analysis of the Draft Treaty' from the division of fields of competence angle must begin by defin-
ing the competences of the Union and then go on to consider how they are to be administered. 
1 The question of whether Parliament was competent to adopt the Draft Treaty in 1984 is not discussed here. The Ad Hoc 
Assembly, comprising the ECSC Assembly and the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, was given a mandate by 
the Foreign Ministers of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg on 10 September 1952 to draw up a Draft Treaty-
establishing a European Political Community. 
! The Committee on institutional Affairs was advised by a committee of lawyers consisting of Mr Capotorti, Mr Hilf, Mr Jacqué 
and Mr Jacobs. 
1 Cf. C. D. Ehlermann, Vergleich des Verfassungsprojekts des Europäischen Parlaments mit früheren Verfassungs- und Reform-
projekten, in: Eine Verfassung für Europa. , 176 (Schwarze, Biebereds. 1984). We will be discussing the way in which the line 
of demarcation is drawn between the fields of competence of the Union and those of the Member States rather than the sub-
stance of Union competence. 
For a discussion of the Community system, see Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés Européennes 
(1974). 
A comparison of the different language versions will clear up a number of misunderstandings w hich might arise from a reading 
of the French version alone. 
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1. Competences of the Union 
The first question arising from a reading of the Draft Treaty is the nature of the competences of the 
Union. Since these competences are not immutable, the next question arising is their potential deve-
lopment. 
a. Nature of the competences of the Union 
The relevant provisions appear in Articles 9 to 13 of Part Two of the Draft Treaty. Article 9 lists the 
objectives of the Union in general terms. In defining the competences of the Union, the Draft Treaty 
adopts a different approach to that followed in the Community Treaties and to that customarily 
found in federal constitutions. Indeed it might be said that the competences of the Union are defined 
in two steps. In the first place the Draft Treaty indicates two ways of achieving the objectives of the 
Union: cooperation and common action (Article 10(1)). In the second place, when it comes to defin-
ing forms of common action, the Draft Treaty, in application of the principle of subsidiarity and fol-
lowing federal models, introduces a distinction between exclusive and concurrent competence 
(Article 12). 
Distinction between common action and cooperation 
The overall definition of Union competence is a functional one involving some ambiguity. The auth-
ors of the Draft Treaty obviously wanted to include political cooperation,1' which has developed out-
side the Communities Treaties as such ('cooperation') as well as acquis communautaire ('common 
action'). 
How does common action differ from cooperation? Article 10(2) and (3) makes it clear that two dis-
tinct types of legal instruments are involved. 
Thus, common action means 'all normative, administrative, financial and judicial acts, internal or 
international, and the programmes and recommendations, issued by the Union itself, originating in 
its institutions and addressed to those institutions, or to States, or to individuals.' 
This disparate presentation using several criteria — scope of acts, areas in which they apply, acts 
which are mandatory and those which, apparently, are not, author and addressees — is complicated 
and may cause confusion. Would it not have been possible to adopt a broader, simpler definition (for 
example 'common action means all unilateral and contractual legal acts originating in the institutions 
of the union and attributable to it')? Recourse to the enumerative method Enumerationsprinzip in 
the interests of completeness produces needlessly tortuous drafting and superfluous detail: for 
example, what is the point of being told that programmes and recommendations issued by the Union 
itself are part of 'common action'? 
Cooperation, on the face of it, is defined in simpler terms, although ambiguity has not been entirely 
ruled out. Article 10(3) states: 
'Cooperation means all the commitments which the Member States undertake within the Europ-
ean Council.' 
The measures resulting from cooperation shall be implemented by the Member States or by the 
institutions of the Union in accordance with the procedures laid down by the European Council.' 
On the links between political cooperation and the Community Treaties, see Charpentier, La coopération politique entre Etats 
membres des Communautés européennes, AFDI 753 (1979). 
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Cooperation — which now falls within the competence of the Union — takes the legal form of 'com-
mitments' undertaken by the Member States within the European Council, an institution of the 
Union. The ambiguity arises in the second subparagraph: if the institutions of the Union are quali-
fied to implement commitments given in the cooperation context, they must use their armoury of 
instruments. But we have seen that this is how common action is defined! How then can a distinction 
be drawn between the two?8 
Common action and cooperation are not confined to the 'internal' workings of the Union: this dicho-
tomy is carried through to external competence. Title III (of Part Four) of the Draft Treaty which 
deals with the Union's international relations contains provisions which refer to both in relation to 
the Union's external activities.' Articles 64 and 65 deal with common action, Articles 66 and 67 with 
cooperation. The link with Article 10 is not always clear. The wording of Article 64(1) in particular 
is ambiguous: 
'In its international relations, the Union shall act by common action in the fields referred to in this 
Treaty where it has exclusive or concurrent competence.' 
This implies that the Union could act otherwise where it has exclusive or concurrent competence and 
prompts a further comment: the link between Union competence rather than procedures and meth-
ods of action is rather obscure. The table below may help to clarify matters. 
Purpose Objectives of the Union 
-i 
Competence 
Will this lead to a replay of the debate which took place in France on the concept of 'commitment', which appears in Article 54 
of the French Constitution? See the view of the Constitutional Council as presented in the report by J.P. Jacqué and V. Con-
stantinesco, Le Conseil Constitutionnel et le droit international et communautaire. Colloque de Strasbourg 1982 (in prepara-
tion). 
Another problem may arise, presenting a further ambiguity: if the Member States implement a commitment undertaken in the 
cooperation context, how does this square with arrangements in relation to concurrent competence? 




Common action, in turn, can be organized in two distinct ways in application of the principle of sub-
sidiarity. Union competence can be exclusive (Article 12(1)) or concurrent (Article 12(2)). This dis-
tinction and the underlying principle is borrowed from the law of Federal States. In the Draft Treaty 
the principle of subsidiarity applies to exclusive competence only, although logically it could be used 
as a basis for exclusive competence too: surely some competences are exclusive precisely because they 
correspond to 'tasks which may be undertaken more effectively in common than by the Member 
States acting separately', as stated in Article 12(2). 
Exclusive competence, as in the legal theory of federalism, rules out any action by the Member 
States. Article 12(1) clarifies two points. Firstly, the Member States can be asked to act where the 
Union has exclusive competence if the law of the Union makes express provision for this. In this case 
the Member States will be exercising union competence nationally. Secondly, in a field of exclusive 
competence, national legislation remains in force until such time as the Union has legislated. The 
expression 'remain in force' in Article 12(1) can be interpreted in two ways: either (a) national com-
petence remains intact, Member States being free to take whatever action they deem appropriate or 
(b) national competence remains in being although the national authorities are not free to translate it 
into legal acts ('standstill' clause). The Draft Treaty does not appear to choose between the two inter-
pretations which co-exist within yet another ambiguity. 
Concurrent competence allows the Member States to act 'so long as the Union has not legislated' 
(Article 12(2)). (It would have been preferable if more allowance had been made for the temporal 
dimension of concurrent competence in the French version, for instance by replacing 'là où' by 'là où, 
et tant que', however inelegant this formulation may sound). But how do Member States stand in 
relation to exclusive and concurrent competence? In either case, if the union has not legislated, the 
Member States are free to act, not necessarily in the same fashion, but this is far from clear from the 
wording of the text (cf. earlier comments). 
Where the Union acts under exclusive competence, the national authorities are stripped of their 
powers ratione materiae in the field in question. 
Where the Union acts under concurrent competence, the Member States are free to act only where 
the Union has not acted; conversely, they are not free to act where the Union has acted, as is the case 
where the Union has exclusive competence. Does 'where' designate some sort of 'geographical' area 
of intervention or a rung of the legislative ladder? The line between the two types of competence has 
not been drawn with sufficient precision. 
The principle of subsidiarity underlying this division of fields of competence is spelled out in Article 
12(2). It is a pity that it does not appear at the beginning of the article since application of the prin-
ciple justifies the Union's exclusive and its concurrent competence.'" Furthermore, the 'effectiveness' 
criterion requiring action by the Union could lead to difficulties of interpretation, notably in adver-
sary proceedings. 
b. Development of the competences of the Union 
The competences of the Union are not immutable and the line between them is not well drawn. 
Before considering the revision procedure, we must therefore look at the provisions on transfer from 
cooperation to common action and the way in which concurrent competence can be converted into 
exclusive competence. 
10 The principle has, however, been written into the Preamble, thereby confirming its general validity. 
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Transfer from cooperation to common action 
Article 11 is a procedural provision which indicates the conditions for transfer from one method of 
action to the other. But Article 11(2) also states that such transfer is irreversible: common action may 
not be replaced by cooperation. 
The transfer procedure is not generally applicable: Article 11(1) states that it applies only in inst-
ances expressly laid down in the Draft Treaty, such as industrial cooperation (Article 54(1)) and 
development aid (Article 64(3)). This makes these potential fields for common action: can they the-
refore be regarded as 'potential competences'? I think not. We have seen that cooperation already 
falls within the competence of the union. The expression 'potential competence' could be ambiguous 
since it might be interpreted as applying to a situation where national competence is replaced by 
Union competence, which is not the case. 
These hypothetical cases apart, there can be no transfer between cooperation and common action. 
The field of cooperation can, however, be extended by the European Council. Article 68(1) states 
that this can be done: 
'In particular as regards armaments, sales of arms to non-member States, defence policy and dis-
armament.'" 
Article 11 sets out the procedure: 
'On a proposal from the Commission, or the Council of the Union, or the Parliament, or one or 
more Member States, the European Council may decide, after consulting the Commission and 
with the agreement of the Parliament, to bring those matters within the exclusive or concurrent 
competence of the Union.' 
Reversibility of transfer from cooperation to common action 
Although Article 11(2) claims that the transfer from cooperation to common action is irreversible, 
there are two exceptions to the rule. First, under Article 68(2): 
'.. the Council of the Union, acting unanimously, may exceptionally authorize one or more Mem-
ber States to derogate from some of the measures taken within the context of common action.' 
Second, Article 68(3) states: 
'By way of derogation from Article 11(2) of this Treaty, the European Council may decide to 
restore the fields transferred to common action in accordance with paragraph 2 above, either to 
cooperation or to the competence of the Member States.' 
The first exception probably relates to a hypothesis similar to those governing the safeguard clauses 
in the Community Treaties: however, there is no reference to any time limit on the derogation. 
The second introduces a mechanism for restoring competence and calls for clarification on a number 
of points. The first of these, brought to light by reading Article 68(2) in conjunction with Article 
68(1), is that only a matter subject to cooperation and transferred to common action can be restored 
to cooperation. Exceptional reversibility does not apply to areas subject to common action from the 
outset: what is involved is retrocession of competence within the Union. However, Article 68(2) also 
allows retrocession of Union competence to the competence of the Member States. Is this not tanta-
mount to a clandestine revision mechanism? Particularly since it derogates from the revision proce-
dure instituted by Article 84? 
Does this mean chat the field of cooperation is unlimited? 
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Although the political considerations which prompted the authors of the Draft Treaty and the 
majority of Parliament to adopt this system are understandable, it undoubtedly raises questions on 
the legal front. In the first place, the system is unclear and complicated: the provisions are scattered 
throughout the Draft Treaty instead of being grouped together as their importance and common 
function would merit. In the second place, in the case of governmental powers initially subject to 
cooperation being transferred to common action and finally being handed back to the Member 
States, is it not true that the Draft Treaty gives the European Council sole power to reduce the com-
petences of the Union? 
Revision of the Union Treaty 
The review procedure laid down in Article 84 is largely patterned on Article 236 of the EEC Treaty. 
Two stages are involved in both cases. The initiative lies with the Member States ('one representation 
within the Council of the Union'), Parliament ('one-third of the Members of the Parliament')12 and 
the Commission. 
These institutions may: 
'. . . submit to the legislative authority a reasoned draft law amending one or more provisions of 
this Treaty. The draft shall be submitted for approval to the two arms of the legislative authority 
which shall act in accordance with the procedure applicable to organic laws,' 
that is to say, in accordance with the conditions laid down in Article 38 of the Draft Treaty. The 
second stage begins when the approved draft is submitted for ratification by the Member States 
which authorize its entry into force. 
I would like to bring this brief presentation of the scope of the Union's competence to an end with 
two remarks. Firstly, the Draft Treaty contains no mechanism analogous to that in Article 235 of the 
EEC Treaty which made the development of'secondary' policies possible. This mechanism brought 
an element of flexibility to the division of fields of competence and should perhaps have been re-
tained. Secondly, demarcation of the competences of the Union corresponds to disparate criteria 
which are not always comprehensible. 
2. Administration of 
the competences of the Union 
Two problems will be examined in turn: What is the substance of the competences of the Union? 
How will they be implemented? 
a. Substance of the competences of the Union 
I have no wish to encroach on the subject matter of the other reports. I will therefore confine myself 
to a number of specific points. 
'2 In practice, it is the political groups rather than individual members who will take the initiative. Indeed Parliament only has an 
indirect legislative initiative under Article 37(2). 
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Acquis communautaire 
The acquis communautaire is dealt with in Article 7 of the Draft Treaty. The first paragraph is an 
ingenious statement of principle: 'The Union shall take over the Community patrimony'. The next 
four paragraphs set out how this patrimony will be treated by the Union. Different types of treat-
ment are proposed for the various categories of rules which are regarded as part of the acquis com-
munautaire," depending on their authority. 
Article 7(2) states that certain provisions of the Community Treaties (and associated convention and 
protocols): 
'. . . which concern their objectives and scope and which are not explicitly or implicitly amended 
by this Treaty, shall constitute part of the law of the Union. They may only be amended in accor-
dance with the procedure for revision laid down in Article 84 of this Treaty.' 
These Community rules will be given maximum protection: they will enjoy the same status as the 
Union Treaty. But a number of questions arise. Did the authors of the Draft Treaty consider which 
specific Community provisions were involved? What does the 'scope' of the Communities mean? It 
seems to refer to the Community's territorial competence. 
What is an 'implicit' amendment of the Community Treaties? And who will evaluate it? 
Article 7(3) states: 
'The other provisions of the treaties, conventions and protocols referred to above shall also con-
stitute part of the law of the Union, in so far as they are not incompatible with this Treaty. They 
may only be amended by the procedure for organic laws laid down in Article 38 of this Treaty.' 
These Community provisions will be given less protection: they will form part of the law of the 
Union provided that they are not incompatible with the Union Treaty and will have the status of 
organic laws since they can be amended by that procedure only. It will be for the union legislator to 
establish incompatibility, possibly under the supervision of the Court. 
Article 7(4) reads as follows: 
'The acts of the European Communities, together with the measures adopted within the context 
of the European Monetary System and European political cooperation, shall continue to be effec-
tive, in so far as they are not incompatible with this Treaty, until such time as they have been 
replaced by acts or measures adopted by the institutions of the Union in accordance with their 
respective competences.' 
Secondary Community legislation, measures to implement the European Monetary System and poli-
tical cooperation are ranked below the two previous categories in the law of the Union: they will 
remain in force, unless the legislator finds them incompatible with the Union Treaty, until such time 
as they are replaced by Union acts or measures to which the Draft Treaty assigns no place in the hier-
archy of rules. 
Finally, Article 7(5) states: 
'The Union shall respect all the commitments of the European Communities, in particular the 
agreements or conventions concluded with one or more non-member States or with an internatio-
nal organization.' 
This provision raises an important and complex problem: the fate in the Union of international com-
mitments entered into by the Communities. The wording is ingenious but it does not deal with all the 
difficulties liable to arise. Conventions concluded by the Communities will be 'respected' by the 
Union. What does this mean? Will the Union take over the Communities' commitments? This would 
be the obvious solution if membership was the same. But what happens if only some Member States 
For an attempt to define the acquis communautaire or Community patrimony, see Pescatore, RTDE 617 (1981). 
47 
join? How will the Union then respect prior Community commitments? What exactly does 'respect' 
mean? Is the Union bound by the Communities' commitments? Are they valid against the Union? 
What is the relationship between the Union and the Communities (assuming they still exist) in this 
field? 
Fundamental rights 
The importance the Member States forming the Union attach to human rights is confirmed in the 
preamble to the Draft Treaty ('basing their actions on their commitment to the principles of pluralist 
democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law'). Unlike the Community Treaties — which 
only deal with fundamental rights indirectly from the economic angle — the Draft Treaty contains 
specific provisions on this issue (Article 4). Here again, the essentially 'constitutionalist' character of 
the Draft Treaty is revealed. In the Communities, the case-law of the Court of Justice has developed 
in such a way that the institutions, in drawing up their acts, are required to respect the fundamental 
rights enshrined in the constitutions of the Member States or in international instruments ratified by 
the Member States. Article 4(1) 'constitutionalizes' this case-law to some extent: 
'The Union shall protect the dignity of the individual and grant every person coming within its 
jurisdiction the fundamental rights and freedoms derived in particular for the common principles 
of the constitutions of the Member States and from the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'. 
But the Draft Treaty goes beyond this to tackle economic, social and cultural rights which are often 
distinguished from civil and political rights. In Article 4(2) the Union makes a commitment in respect 
of these rights, some of which are enshrined in national constitutions, in the European Convention 
and the additional protocols: 
'The Union undertakes to maintain and develop, within the limits of its competences, the economic, 
social and cultural rights derived from the constitutions of the Member States and from the Europ-
ean Social Charter.' 
The 'constitution' of the Union is thus enriched by new rules on the protection of fundamental rights 
by using the referral technique which is also to be found in, for example, the preamble to the French 
Constitution of 4 October 1958. 
To guarantee respect for fundamental rights in the Communities, the Commission had suggested in a 
memorandum dated 4 April 1979 that the Community as such should accede to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. The Draft Treaty has drawn inspiration from this. Article 4(3) states: 
'Within a period of five years, the Union shall take a decision on its accession to the international 
instruments referred to above and to the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights 
and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.' 
The French text is slightly ambiguous here should the word 'délibérer' be interpreted in the sense of 
'to decide' or in the sense of 'to discuss with other persons in order to reach a decision' (Dictionnaire 
Robert)? Depending on the answer, the provision imposes either an obligation as to ends or an 
obligation as to means.'" 
Finally, within the Communities, Parliament had called for a charter of fundamental rights to sup-
plement the Treaties. It claimed that only an elected assembly could carry out this work, in the tradi-
tion of the 1791 Constituent Assembly. However, when an opportunity arose for Parliament to 
achieve this ambition in 1984, it understandably preferred to postpone establishment of a list of fun-
damental rights. The final sentence of Article 4(3) merely states: 
14 Comparison with the other language versions shows that the other languages use binding expressions ('shall take a decision', 
'beschließt', 'decide' (Italian) which tends to suggest that the provision imposes an obligation as to ends. 
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'. . .Within the same period (five years) the Union shall adopt its own declaration on fundamental 
rights in accordance with the procedure for revision laid down in Article 84 of this Treaty.' 
The commitment appears to be stronger here but what if the declaration is not adopted by the dead-
line set? Could Article 175 EEC be invoked? It can thus be seen that the Draft Treaty groups all the 
measures to protect fundamental rights taken separately by the Court, the Commission and Parlia-
ment, which the Council endorsed in agreeing to sign the joint declaration of 1977. 
In principle the insertion of fundamental rights at the highest law-making level of the Union should 
have the effect of binding its institutions only. This is what emerges from Article 4(1) and (2): 
'The Union shall grant every person coming within its jurisdiction . . .' 
'The Union undertakes to maintain and develop, within the limits of its competences . . .' 
However, Article 4(4) makes respect for fundamental rights a condition for membership of the 
Union: 
'In the event of serious and persistent violation of democratic principles or fundamental rights by 
a Member State, penalties may be imposed in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of this 
Treaty.' 
All national competences and the exercise of these competences is thus subject to Union supervision. 
From the division of competences point of view it can be said that, although the substance of natio-
nal competences is in no way affected, exercise of these competences is subject to compliance with 
common principles: this situation can be described as a limitation on the exercise of national compet-
ences or as Union supervision of national competences now linked by a common purpose. The situa-
tion is not dissimilar to that arising in relations between the Community and the Member States as 
regards the free movement of persons. 
Common action and cooperation 
Basically, the two methods of action adopted in the Draft Treaty have the advantage of binding 
Community competence and political cooperation to a greater extent than is the case today." These 
fields, now quite separate — political cooperation takes place outside the Treaties — but connected 
at operational and institutional level, would become an integral part of the competences of the 
Union. The acquis communautaire would be preserved by including it in common action. Political 
cooperation would be expressly included in the competences of the Union even if conducted by the 
Member States within the European Council. While all the institutions of the Union are called upon 
to participate in common action, cooperation would be confined to the European Council16 which, 
as we have seen above, has the power to transfer a matter from cooperation to common action.' 
However, cooperation within the Union goes beyond political cooperation to include the: 
'. . . coordination of national law with a view to constituting a homogeneous judicial area' 
(Article 46). 
The establishment of this area — which does not exclude measures to be taken under common action 
— can, according to Article 46, take two forms: 
(i) to take measures designed to reinforce the feeling of individual citizens that they are citizens of 
the Union. 
(ii) to fight international forms of crime, including terrorism.' 
See Ehlermann, supra, note 3, 274. 
The Council of Ministers would have implementing powers. 
And to enlarge the field of cooperation. 
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As we have seen, common action corresponds to Community competence. It is divided into two 
types of competence which will be examined in turn. 
Exclusive competence is obviously the narrower of the two. It relates to the free movement of per-
sons, goods and capital (Article 47), competition policy (Article 48) and commercial policy (and the 
external aspects of exclusive competence) (Article 64).'s 
Concurrent competence covers conjunctural [sic] policy (Article 50), monetary and credit policies 
(Article 51), the progressive achievement of monetary union (Article 52)," the various sectoral polic-
ies: agriculture, transport, telecommunications, research and development, industry and energy 
(Article 53), and the measures coming under the general heading of 'policy for society':20 social pol-
icy, health policy, consumer protection, regional policy, environmental policy, education and 
research policy, cultural policy and information policy (Article 55 et seq.). 
It can be seen that concurrent competence covers all existing common policies other than commercial 
policy, the rules of competition and the secondary policies introduced on the basis of Article 235 
EEC. 
In addition to these two types of competence, Article 49 proposes that the Union take measures: 
'to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings, and 
in particular to companies, in so far as such provisions have a direct effect on a common action of 
the Union.' 
This same applies to national tax legislation. 
This echoes Article 100 EEC which refers to the approximation of provisions laid down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in Member States 'as directly affect the establishment or function-
ing of the common market'. The approximation envisaged by the Draft Treaty obviously comes 
under concurrent competence although this is not expressly stated. 
b. Implementation of the competences of the Union 
Let us now examine the way in which the Draft Treaty organizes implementation of the competences 
of the Union. This can be done from two different angles. First of all we will look at the legal acts 
available to the Union and then go on to describe the way in which these will be applied and imple-
mented. 
Legal acts: the law of the Union2' 
The nature of the legal acts which the Union is empowered to adopt is clearly indicated in the case of 
common action but not in the case of cooperation. The Draft Treaty also defines the characteristics 
of the law of the Union. 
The'doctrine'of the Court of Justice, which made its first appearance in its judgment on the AETR agreement in 1971, is thus 
'constitutionalized' in the Draft Treaty. 
According to Article 2 EEC, these sectors come under 'approximating the economic policies of Member States'. 
1 This derives from the German 'Gesellschaftspolitik': the French rendering is rather odd. It might have been preferable to use the 
neologism proposed by Alexandre Marc to distinguish 'social' in the broad sense, from the 'social' in the narrow sense and 
speak of 'society policy'. On the other hand while the Draft Treaty is a test bed in some respects, semantic innovation might 
have been unwise . . . 
Does the expression 'law of the Union', used several times in the Draft Treaty itself, refer solely to acts adopted by the Union 
under common action or does it also refer to commitments which the Union undertakes in the cooperation context? I feel that 
the broader interpretation is the logical one but, as we shall see below, this interpretation could run counter to the authors' 
wishes. 
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Legal acts under common action 
The ranking of legal acts adopted by the Union under common action is reminiscent of the hierarchy 
of domestic laws. 
At the top of the ladder are laws adopted by the Union legislator to determine the fundamental prin-
ciples governing common action (Article 34).22 Article 35 introduces the idea of differentiated 
application of laws: 
'A law may be subject to time limits, or link to transitional measures which may vary according to 
the addressee, the implementation of its provisions where uniform application thereof would 
encounter specific difficulties caused by the particular situation of some of its addressees. How-
ever, such time limits and measures must be designed to facilitate the subsequent application of all 
the provisions of the law to all its addressees.' 
Thus, express provision is made for derogation from the general and uniform effect of laws2' which 
one would have expected the Draft Treaty to adopt at the same time as the definition of 'laws'. 
Instead of providing mechanisms for organizing operation of the safeguard clauses, which tempo-
rarily relieve a Member State of its treaty obligations so that it can apply them as soon as possible, 
the Draft Treaty opted for the notion popularly known as a 'two-tier Europe'. This notion reflects 
the situation on the ground: differentiation of Community law, whether primary or secondary, 
raises questions about its supposed unity. 
There are two special types of law: organic laws, which govern the organization and operation of the 
institutions (Article 34(2) and Article 38) and budgetary laws which govern the Union's budget 
(Article 34(3) and Article 76). Each of these is characterized by a more binding procedure than that 
governing the adoption of standard laws. 
One rung down the ladder are regulations and decisions whereby the Commission issues the general 
and individual instructions required for the implementation of laws. This power belongs exclusively 
to the Commission.24 
The acts of the Union thus break with the pattern of secondary Community legislation. The disap-
pearance of the directive, which has proved to be a useful legislative instrument, is to be regretted. 
However, a law can be a framework law laying down basic principles only. 
Legal acts under cooperation 
When the Union acts by cooperation, the Draft Treaty does not give it such a complete and varied 
range of legal instruments. The Draft Treaty is extremely laconic on this point, merely indicating in 
Article 10(3) that: 
'Cooperation means all the commitments which the Member States undertake within the Europe-
an Council.' 
It is thus these commitments (a term whose lack of precision we have already noted) which give legal 
form to Union competence represented by cooperation. They could cover a wide range of acts: com-
muniqués, statements of intent, resolutions, agreements, etc., not all of them necessarily legal and 
consequently binding. One paradox — not the least remarkable — of the Draft Treaty is that compe-
" Coincidentally, it is Article 34 which defines law in the French Constitution of 4 October 1958. 
; ' The principle of non-discrimination has been deliberately left out of the Draft Treaty. 
;* The Draft Treaty thus corresponds to the wish of both Parliament and the Commission to break Member States' stranglehold 
on the implementing powers conferred on the Commission by various procedures beginning with the management committee. 
See Ehlermann, supra, 279. 
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tences jointly by the Member States within an inter-governmental body are converted into Union 
competences! 
Characteristics of the law of the Union 
The characteristics of the law of the Union are set out in Article 42 of the Draft Treaty. They include 
direct applicability (but not direct effect: according to the case-law of the Court, direct applicability 
is merely a means of producing direct effect), the supremacy of the law of the Union and the obliga-
tion on national courts to apply it. This last is somewhat superfluous since the supremacy of the law 
of the Union is expressly stated. 
Here again, the basic and fundamental principles of Community law defined and redefined by the 
Court but not expressly included, or at least not with the same intensity, in the text of the Treaties, 
are consolidated and elevated to the status of 'constitutional' rules. 
And again the question arises of whether the characteristics given to the law of the Union apply to 
common action and cooperation: did the authors of the Draft Treaty want to make the 'commit-
ments of the Member States' directly applicable and give them precedence over national law? 
Application and implementation of the law of the Union 
(in the broad sense) 
An analysis of the provisions of the Draft Treaty on the procedure for implementing legal acts attri-
butable to the Union and adopted within its field of competence reveals a differentiated system. Once 
again we need to consider whether the act to be implemented results from common action or from 
cooperation before examining the general obligation to implement the law of the Union. 
Implementation of the decisions resulting f rom common action 
Apart from enumerating the characteristics of the law of the Union, Article 42 of the Draft Treaty 
states that: 
'Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Commission, the implementation of the law 
(i.e. the law of the Union) shall be the responsibility of the authorities of the Member States.' 
The Member States thus have basic implementing powers while the Commission has to be given a 
special implementing power. This provision reflects the Community arrangement whereby, in prac-
tical terms, the Member States are ultimately responsible for the implementation of Community law 
except where powers are delegated to the Commission. 
Article 42 also states that: 
'An organic law shall lay down the procedures in accordance with which the Commission shall 
ensure the implementation of the law.' 
This takes over the Community idea that the Commission is the 'guardian of the Treaty.' In addition 
to recourse to Article 169 EEC, it will also be possible for the Court to intervene at the initiative of 
the Commisson, as will probably be laid down in the organic law provided for in Article 64 which 
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will extend the competence of the Court to 'sanctions on a Member State failing to fulfil its obliga-
tion under the law of the Union.'2' 
One specific and important application of this mechanism for ensuring that the Member States com-
ply with the Union Treaty appears in Article 44 of the Draft Treaty which sets out the procedure to 
be followed in the event of serious and persistent violation by a Member State of democratic principl-
es or fundamental rights or any other case of serious and persistent violation of the provisions of the 
Union Treaty. 
Article 44 thus provides a basis for the imposition of sanctions not only where a Member State has 
failed to discharge its Treaty obligations but also where it has failed to comply with its own internal 
rules establishing democratic principles or fundamental rights. The Article 44 mechanism can there-
fore be used for two quite distinct purposes. In the first instance, it is logical that an instrument like 
the Union Treaty should organize a procedure for penalizing infringements, on a given scale and of a 
given duration, of its own provisions. In the second instance, the Union is given a right of inspection 
of matters falling within the competence of the Member States. Must we therefore assume that natio-
nal competences must now be exercised in the light of the common purpose reaffirmed by the Union 
Treaty, thereby ceasing to be discretionary and becoming mandatory? Is this consonant with natio-
nal sovereignty which, incidentally, the Union Treaty does not seriously call into question? 
Article 44 of the Draft Treaty is interesting for two further reasons: firstly the procedure established 
and secondly the sanctions provided for. 
With regard to procedure, it will be noted that the initiative lies with the Commission or Parliament, 
no doubt because these two institutions embody the interests of the Union as a corporate entity. 
Either institution may ask the Court to establish whether serious and persistent violations have taken 
place. It is understandable that the authors of the Draft Treaty should endeavour to ensure that the 
behaviour of Member States will be examined impartially, but the Court's role is bound to be deli-
cate. Like any qualitative criterion seriousness — even more than persistence — will be difficult to 
assess at times. Furthermore, if the Court is required to assess an internal situation, how will it go 
about it? The next stage of the procedure involves the European Council taking a decision with Par-
liament's approval after hearing the Member State concerned. Is the insistence on Parliament's 
approval excessive? The vote would be taken by a simple majority (see Article 17). 
The European Council has a choice between two courses of action: it can suspend 'rights deriving 
from the application of part or the whole of the Treaty provisions to the State in question and its 
nationals without prejudice to the rights acquired by the latter', or it can suspend 'participation by 
the State in question in the European Council, the Council of the Union and any other organ in 
which that State is represented as such.' 
The Draft Treaty stops short of providing for expulsion. It is clear that, while the period of suspen-
sion could vary, the sanction cannot be permanent since by definition it would no longer constitute 
suspension. It is also worth noting that the offending State forfeits a basic element of its representa-
tion within the Union prior to suspension since it cannot participate in the vote on the sanctions in 
application of the 'nemo judex in causa sua' principle. 
Implementation of decisions resulting from cooperation 
The final sentence of Article 10 of the Draft Treaty reads as follows: 
'The measures resulting from cooperation shall be implemented by the Member States or by the 
institutions of the Union in accordance with the procedures laid down by the European Council.' 
11 Could this organic law give the Court the power to annul a national law which is contrary to the law of the Union? This would 
ensure the effectiveness of the principle set out in Article 42 of-the Draft Treaty which states that 'national courts shall apply the 
law of the Union'. 
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Here again we find the dichotomy between the Member States and the institutions of the Union. 
However, all the institutions of the Union would be qualified to implement cooperation and the 
Commission's 'monopoly' in this area would be broken. 
Be that as it may, in the field of external relations, Article 67(1) of the Draft Treaty states: 
'The European Council shall be responsible for cooperation; the Council of the Union shall be 
responsible for its conduct; the Commission may propose policies and actions which shall be 
implemented, at the request of the European Council or the Council of the Union, either by the 
Commission or by the Member States.' 
The obligation to cooperate 
Article 13 of the Draft Treaty reads as follows: 
'The Union and the Member States shall cooperate in good faith in the implementarion of the law 
of the Union. Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, 
to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by 
the institutions of the Union. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks. They 
shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the 
Union.' 
This is reminiscent of Article 5 EEC to which has been added an introductory sentence referring to 
the spirit of cooperation and mutual trust which should govern relations between the Union and its 
Member States. This reflects the authors' desire to do more than take over the principle enshrined in 
Article 5 EEC and the interpretation given to it by the case-law of the Court. But the authors did not 
go so far as to introduce a 'federal loyalty' (Bundestreue) principle. 
3. Conclusion 
To sum up, it can be said that the division of fields of competence in the Draft Treaty suffers from a 
degree of ambiguity as regards lines of demarcation. The methods of action of the Union can be 
interpreted in two contradictory ways, neither of them satisfactory: either cooperation lies outside 
the competences of the Union — in which case it would be difficult to understand why the institu-
tions of the Union should act — or it falls within the competences of the Union — in which case it 
would be difficult to understand how cooperation, and hence the scope of the competences of the 
Union, could be extended without recourse to the revision procedure. 
Within common action, the distinction between exclusive and concurrent competences should be 
more clearly drawn, particularly as regards the legal situation of the Member States until such time 
as the Union legislates. 
As to the substance of the competences of the Union, the fate of the acquis communautaire and fun-
damental rights is sometimes less than clear. As to exclusive and concurrent competence, there is no 
substantial change in the situation in the present Communities. As Ehlermann states:26 
'Vergleicht man den vorgesehenen Bereich der gemeinsamen Aktionen mit dem Kompetenzenspiel-
raum, über den die Gemeinschaften schon heute verfügen, so stellt man fest, daß nicht sehr viel hin-
zugefügt wird.' 
Finally, the solutions for the implementation of the law of the Union, based as they are on Commun-
ity and federal practice, should be effective. In relation to the Communities, I share Mr Ehlermann's 
;* Supra, note 3, 279. 
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view" that the Draft Treaty was inspired by a determination to change the decision-making process 
rather than a desire to attribute new or wider competences. The amalgam of common action and 
cooperation is more a reflection of the status quo than a new vision of relations between the Union 
and its Member States. This may be the price of political realism. Would that it were also a guarantee 
that the Draft Treaty will actually enter into force. 
" Supra, note 3, 279. 
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Chapter IV — The judicial system 
envisaged in the Draft Treaty 
by Thijmen Koopmans 
1. Introduction 
The European Parliament's Draft Treaty aims, as the Preamble states, at 'continuing and reviving' 
the European Communities as well as the European Monetary System and European political co-
operation. Among these three forms of organization, only the European Communities are relevant, 
it seems, as far as the judicial system is concerned. Thus, the draft seeks to 'continue and revive' the 
existing European Communities. The obvious approach to a discussion of the draft's meaning for 
the judicial system would consist, therefore, in outlining the major problems the actual functioning 
of the Communities has given rise to in this field. 
However, that approach does not look very promising. It may be true that the draft intends to over-
come a certain number of difficulties that tend to characterize the Communities' decision-making 
practices; the draft itself does not say so explicitly, but the explanatory statement starts by expressing 
Parliament's 'dissatisfaction with the Community's institutional system' and its criticism of 'the ina-
dequate nature of the powers conferred on the Communities by the Treaties'.' But it is also true that 
this dissatisfaction and these criticisms do not touch in any way the judicial system framed by the 
Treaties establishing the European Communities. More particularly, they do not concern the Court 
of Justice and its activities. Mr Spinelli, who was perhaps more than any other member of the 
European Parliament actively involved in initiating and elaborating the draft, enumerated in a recent 
article six considerations and experiences that caused the Parliament to take the initiative, and none 
of these six motives had anything to do with the Court.2 Some other authors go one step further: they 
consider that only the Court actually operates as an integrative force in Europe and that it is the 
failure of the other institutions to play such a role which induced Parliament to act.3 
In these circumstances, it is not astonishing that the planned transition from European Communities 
to European Union does not, at first sight, imply major changes in the rules on the Court of Justice, 
or in the judicial system in general. On the contrary, many planned provisions have a familiar ring 
for those who have been working on the basis of the existing Treaties. Such is, for example, the case 
of Article 4 of the draft, on the protection of fundamental rights: in defining these rights as those 
'derived in particular from the common principles of the constitutions of the Member States and 
from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms', it 
1Report on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the preliminary Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, 
Part B, 'Explanatory Statement' (Doc. EP 1-1200/83/B), No 1. 
1 Spinelli, 'Das Verfassungsprojekt des Europäischen Parlaments', in Eine Verfassung für Europa, Von der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft zur Europäischen Union. (Schwarze, Bieber, eds), 1984, p. 231. 
J Example: Pernice, Verfassungsentwurf für eine Europäische Union, EuR 1984/2, p. 126. 
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adopts the formula developed by the Court's case­law and later confirmed by a 'common declara­
tion' on human rights issued by the three other institutions." 
There are novelties, none the less. Jurisdiction of the Court is extended (Art. 43); a system of sanc­
tions is devised (Art. 44); and the prospect of an 'homogeneous judicial area' is held out (Art. 46). 
Each of these three innovations merits our attention, but before trying to analyse them, we should 
like to put them immediately in their proper perspective. The scope of judicial scrutiny depends not 
so much on matters of jurisdiction, nor on the system of sanctions, but rather on standards applied 
by the courts in exercising judicial review. These standards have normally been developed over the 
years; this is also true in the case of the European Communites, where the Court of Justice gradually 
constructed a body of case­law with regard to the margins of judicial control on the basis of the legal 
principles that govern, in the Treaties and in the administrative law of the Member States, the divi­
sion of tasks between the judiciary, on the one hand, and the political and administrative bodies on 
the other. It would be a dangerous misconception to think that an extension of jurisdiction could 
have a bearing on the standards applied for determining the scope of judicial review;' in that regard, 
the new Article 43 might remain without any effect. It is worth adding one other observation: whate­
ver the extension of the Union's powers, economic matters will still form the core of the Union's acti­
vities, as in the days of the Communities. Institutional changes alone will not solve the problems, 
well­known in many legal systems, of combining the conduct of modern economic policies with the 
requirements of judicial review of administrative action.' Things tend to develop very slowly, as judi­
cial attitudes in this respect seem to depend on deep­rooted conceptions with regard to the role of 
courts in general. 
Those who like change may, however, derive some comfort from the idea that the draft, apart from 
making minor changes in the judicial system, is based on a Union with objectives that are much more 
ambitious than those of the existing Communities. It is well­known that the Court of Justice, in 
interpreting the law of the Communities, was often inclined to look at what legal provisions were 
meant to achieve, and that it thereby took account of the general aims of the European Communi­
ties. Its case­law on social security was, for example, entirely based on this approach; the same me­
thod has been applied to more complicated issues, like those concerning the definition of obstacles to 
intra­Community trade. The mere fact that the Draft Treaty fixes new and much wider objectives 
may thus, in the long run, provide fresh inspiration to the judges. The differences are not unimpor­
tant: whereas the EEC Treaty sets out to establish a common market and to promote a harmonious 
development of economic activities (Art. 2), the Draft Treaty seeks to attain 'a common harmonious 
development of society' and to promote peace and even the exercise of full political, economic and 
social rights by 'all the peoples of the world' (Art. 9). 
More immediate consequences for the scope of judicial action may flow from the inclusion of the 
protection of fundamental rights. Comparative legal studies abundantly show how much the powers 
of judicial review are strengthened by the courts' willingness to consider themselves the ultimate 
guardians of human rights; American constitutional law, in particular, has undergone a complete 
change, especially as far as the scope of review is concerned, since the Supreme Court started to re­
appraise the American Bill of Rights in the late 1940s.1' The American example is by no means isola­
ted: the French Conseil constitutionnel only started to play an effective role in French political life 
after it took the courage of interpreting the 1958 Constitution in such a way that its Preamble 
embodies the protection of human rights.' 
In the light of these experiences, an analysis of the judicial system can hardly be accomplished when 
the wider issues raised by the Draft Treaty are not discussed. We shall, therefore, first embark upon 
OJ C 103, 1977, p. 1. The Court's case­law is summarized in Case 44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR 3727. 
See Case 191/82 Fediol [1983] ECR 2913. 
See Mégret, 'Le contrôle par le juge administratif de l'intervention économique dans les Etats membres de la CEE', in Miscella­
nea Ganshof van der Meersch, II, 1972, p. 579. 
See Case 24/75 Petroni [1975] ECR 1149. 
Examples: Shelley ν Kramer, 334 US 1 (1948); Mapp v Ohm, 367 US 643 (1961). 
See Cappelletti and Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law, Ch. 3­c, 1979, esp. pp. 50­72. 
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a rapid journey through the forests of jurisdiction and then steer our course to problems of sub-
stance, hoping thus finally to be able to give an overall assessment of the position of the judiciary 
under the Draft Treaty. 
2. Problems of jurisdiction 
a. General remarks 
Article 43 of the Draft Treaty adopts the Community rules governing judicial review, but it states 
that these rules shall be supplemented on the basis of seven 'principles'. These principles amount to 
seven roughly-defined extensions of jurisdiction; detailed rules are to be given later in Union legisla-
tion. The draft has no provisions on the transition from the old to the new regime; one must suppose 
that the old rules continue to apply as long as the legislative bodies have not yet specified the new 
remedies. 
The seven extensions are all related to lacunae in the actual rules on jurisdiction and to difficulties in 
their application that have been largely discussed at conferences and in legal literature.'" Their impor-
tance is, however, very unequal: some of them involve matters of principle, others are of a sheerly 
technical nature. Anyhow, it would not appear that the seven clauses of Article 43 form Parliament's 
response to the seven deadly sins of the Community; even pride and anger, although common ele-
ments of most political activities, are presumably far removed from the quiet world of judicial life. 
b. Technical problems 
In the technical category, I would first range the extension of the right of action of individuals against 
acts of the Union that adversely affect them (Art. 43.1). Under the present rules, access of indivi-
duals to the Court is excessively restricted. If private individuals, including business corporations, 
and other 'undertakings', are not themselves the addressees of a decision, their rights of action are 
very limited indeed; according to Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, they have to show that the provi-
sions of a regulation or a decision are 'of direct and individual concern' to them. Even a most liberal 
interpretation of these terms cannot bring the Community system into line with most national 
systems of administrative law, which simply require an 'interest'. Both the Court and the Commis-
sion recommended this extension in their opinions on the European Union given in 1975 at the re-
quest of the Council." 
Does the change also mean that private persons can attack general rules as well as individual deci-
sions? The answer must be affirmative; the existing provisions give already such a remedy to the 
Council, the Commission and the Member States. The proposed change brings the system of remed-
ies closer to French administrative law, which always recognized appeals against regulations (though 
not against statutes); German and Dutch law have traditionally been more cautious. The result is 
then that, for example, any enterprise can ask annulment of a Commission regulation on group 
exemptions of a certain class of agreements from the prohibitions of Article 85 (e.g. exclusive licen-
sing of patents), if it feels adversely affected. In other words: the door is henceforth wide open. The 
wider access to the Court may be conducive to a heavier case-load for that institution. But it may also 
have important implications from a legal point of view: direct actions against general rules issued by 
Union institutions can also be used to bring the European Parliament's exercise of its legislative func-
See, generally, Ehlermann, 'Vergleich des Verfassungsprojekts des Europäischen Parlaments mit früheren Verfassungs- und 
Reformprojekten', in Eine Verfassung für Europa, supra, pp. 269, 281-282. 
Report of the Commission on European Union, Supplement 5/75 — Bull. EC, p. 129; Suggestions of the Court of justice on 
European Union, Supplement 7/75 — Bull. EC, p. 18. 
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tion under judicial control. The Court of Justice would thus have the power to review legislation in a 
way constitutional courts usually have. The Court itself proposed as much in its opinion on the 
European Union.12 
The second item in the 'technical' category is equal treatment for all the institutions before the Court 
(Art. 43.2). This seems to imply two things. Firstly, Parliament cannot, under the existing rules, 
bring an action for annulment under Article 173 (EEC), although it can bring an action for failure to 
act under Article 175; Article 173 limits the right of action expressly, as far as Community institu-
tions are concerned, to the Council and the Commission. This is slightly illogical, and it could per-
haps be helped by a somewhat imaginative interpretation, based on the unity of the system of 
remedies rather than on the precise wording of the relevant provisions; it is not completely impossi-
ble that the Court of Justice might be willing to take that route." 
Secondly, equal treatment of institutions before the Court probably implies that the European Par-
liament and the Council will be entitled to submit written observations to the Court, and to argue 
their case orally, in procedures concerning preliminary rulings. At present, the parties to the main 
action, the governments of the Member States and the Commission have these rights, and the Coun-
cil only if the validity or the interpretation of one of its acts is at stake.14 In practice, the Council is 
only represented if the dispute involves the validity of one of its regulations; probably, therefore, Par-
liament will be the only institution to benefit from the principle of equal treatment. Or will perhaps 
the fifth institution that the Draft Treaty adds to the existing four, namely the 'European Council', 
develop the desire to make its views on legal matters known to the Court? It looks unlikely, but it 
cannot be excluded (in particular if the 'European Council' will be endowed with a separate secreta-
riat). 
The third technical item is jurisdiction of the Court to annul an action within the context of an 
application f or a preliminary ruling or of a plea of illegality. This extension of jurisdiction raises a 
highly technical point. It is probably based on the Commission's recommendation to restore the 
balance between the wide powers the Court has under Article 173 on actions for annulment and the 
very limited possibilities opened by Article 177 regarding preliminary rulings on 'the validity . . . of 
acts of the institutions'." The implications of the Commission's idea are not very clear. Firstly, it may 
mean that provisions on the effects of annulment, like Articles 174 and 176, also apply when a 
regulation is declared invalid in a judgment under Article 177. The Court of Justice sometimes 
applied these provisions already by analogy in cases on preliminary rulings,"' but it has been severely 
criticized for doing so, and some of these judgements even roused the indignation of well-known 
French legal scholars.' Secondly, the Commission's proposal may, however, involve a much wider 
problem: if direct actions for annulment under Article 173 are well-founded, the Court declares the 
act in question to be 'void', which has always been taken to mean that the act has never lawfully exis-
ted; on the contrary, a declaration of invalidity under Article 177 presently implies no more than that 
the act is not operative in the case at hand; the judgement does not work erga omnes." 
The Draft Treaty obviously takes up this latter idea by expressly granting a power of annulment in 
the framework of a preliminary ruling. In practical terms, this may not be a very impressive step; the 
Court has already held that national courts are not obliged to ask for preliminary rulings on the 
validity of an act whose invalidity has already been pronounced by the Court in a different case 
under Article 177; the Court went out of its way to stress that national courts remained free to rein-
Suggestions of the Court, supra, p. 18. 
See Case 230/81 Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg v European Parliament [1983] ECR 255. 
Article 20, Statute of the Court of Justice of the EEC. 
Report of the Commission, supra, point 128. 
' Example: Case 4/79 Providence agricole de la Champagne [1980] ECR 2823. 
See Boulouis, Dalloz, 1982, pp. 10-13. 
See Schermers, Judicial protection in the European Communities, 2nd ed., 1979, par. 379 a and b; Mertens de Wilmars, 
'Annulation et appréciation de validité dans le traité CEE: convergence ou divergence?' in Europäische Gerichtsbarkeit und 
nationale Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, (Grewe, Rupp, Schneider, eds), 1981, p. 283. 
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traduce the question, but that they should normally do so only if they felt doubts as to the extent of 
the invalidity already pronounced, or as to its consequences." However, the proposed change has 
considerable importance for the theory of invalidity; it has often been said that the existing rules, in 
opening possibilities for annulment only to certain parties and within certain time-limits, and in 
accepting then a plea of illegality in pending litigation, with different consequences, aim at striking a 
balance between the requirements of legality of administrative action and legal certainty.2" The pro-
posed reform could be seen as sacrificing the latter for the benefit of the former. 
Will the reform increase the jurisdiction of national courts? Article 184, which embodies the plea of 
illegality, is usually considered as the expression of a general principle; the Court of Justice said so in 
one of its Simmenthal judgments.2' If that view is the correct one, it is possible to see the inclusion of 
questions of validity in Article 177 as the expression of the idea that any national court can, by way 
of a plea of illegality, be faced with a problem of validity, and that it was therefore necessary to 
extend the scope of preliminary rulings to these matters. However, if that is true, the proposal to 
grant a power of annulment within the context of a plea of illegality implies that national courts will 
be able to pronounce such an annulment, only supreme courts being bound to interrogate the Court 
of Justice before doing so. The monopoly of annulment, actually in the hands of the Court of Justice 
by virtue of Article 173, would be broken. Such a development would do great harm to the uniform 
application of Union law; it would also raise the delicate question whether annulment by a court of 
one Member State would have effect in a different Member State. For these reasons, it would seem 
wise not to introduce the proposed change without some accompanying measure; personally, I 
would be in favour of extrapolating slightly the line of the existing case-law, by providing that natio-
nal courts cannot pronounce the invalidity of acts of Union institutions without first having interro-
gated the Court of Justice.22 Such an amendment would amount to an increase of the number of cases 
in which reference to the Court is compulsory. The step appears greater than it actually is, as natio-
nal courts will in practice always refer matters of validity of Community acts to the Court of Justice 
under Article 177. The German Finanzgerichte, very inventive in discovering validity problems, grad-
ually developed a practice of never pronouncing an invalidity without having questioned the Court 
of Justice. But national courts should be obliged to follow this road if their appreciation of the vali-
dity of common rules can entail the annulment of such rules. 
c. Declarations of principle 
Under this heading, I bring first the clause on compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to rule on any dis-
putes between Member States in connection with the objectives of the Union (Art. 43.7). These 
objectives being framed in wide terms, almost any litigation between Member States will belong in 
this category. The proposal thus broadens the provisions of Article 182 (EEC). Its result is an 
increase of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice at the expense of that of bodies like the International 
Court of Justice. This is interesting enough for those who like to theorize on the legal character of the 
proposed Union; but its practical bearing is slight, as litigation between Member States is extremely 
rare. 
The proposal has no relation to a recent declaration of the Heads of State or Government (European 
Council) to the effect that international agreements between Member States will, as far as appro-
priate, provide for jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in interpreting these agreements.21 This dec-
Case 66/80 International Chemical Corporation [1981] ECR 1191. 
See Van Rijn, Exceptie van onwettigheid en prejudiciële procedure inzake geldigheid van gemeenschapshandelingen, 1978, 
pp. 249-252. 
Case 92/78 Stmmenthal [1979] ECR 777. 
This might in fact seem a logical consequence of the ICC judgment, supra. 
'Solemn Declaration on European Union', of 20. 6. 1983 (Stuttgart Declaration), Bulletin of the European Communities, No 6-
1983, point 2.5. 
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laration — which concerns the relations between national courts and the Court of Justice, and not 
those between Member States — has a completely theoretical nature; it is the agreements between 
Member States themselves which are to provide for the Court's jurisdiction, and the negotiating 
practice of the Member States' diplomats does not show an excessive zeal in that direction. The 
record of the Interim Committee on the Community Patent is a case in point: it first devised a 'com-
mon patent appeals court' in order to be sure that matters of validity of Community patents would be 
looked into by real experts, and it then came gradually round to the idea that patent law could per-
haps better do without any interference of the Court of Justice. It must be admitted, though, that the 
Court of Justice did not increase its popularity among patent experts by holding that, under certain 
conditions, the principle of free movement of goods precludes patent holders from relying on rights 
national legislation normally attaches to patents.2' 
The second declaration of principle is the clause on jurisdiction of the Court to impose sanctions on a 
Member State failing to fulfil its obligations under the law of the Union (Art. 43.6). As long as imple-
menting legislation is missing, it is hard to see what kind of sanctions the drafters had in mind. These 
sanctions do not encompass suspension of rights deriving from the application of the proposed Treaty, 
or non-participation in certain Union institutions, for that is the kind of sanction only the European 
Council can impose under Article 44 and under Article 4, par. 4 of the draft, in case of 'persistent 
violation' by a Member State of democratic principles or fundamental rights or of other important 
provisions of the Treaty. If that is so, it is difficult to see what kind of sanction the Court should 
impose in case of a 'normal' failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations. Fines seem even less 
appropriate as a sanction for Member States than they were for great steel producers who chose to 
disregard the Commission's production quotas: they will not act as a deterrent. If the Member State's 
failure to fulfil its obligations consists of maintaining legislation not compatible with Union law, one 
might think of nullity of such legislation; the Court of Justice gave a little push in that direction by 
holding that citizens cannot be subjected to penal sanctions if the prohibitions upheld by these sanc-
tions are incompatible with Community law according to a judgment rendered by the Court under 
Article 169." However, such an approach is not very helpful if the Member State's failure consists of 
not having enacted certain measures. 
The problem is not of the greatest importance. Firstly, although at present the judgment that finds 
that a Member State failed to fulfil its obligations can only give a declaration to that effect, expe-
rience shows that the Member State concerned will comply, at least in the long run. Secondly, it is far 
from sure that the introduction of sanctions would help to accelerate the process: more often than 
not, failures to act stem not so much from conscious decisions to be slow, but from somewhat untidy 
tactical moves by governments or government agencies, aimed at staving off peasant rebellions or 
trade-union pressure or at ushering a certain amount of legislation through Parliament without 
major accidents. 
d. Protection of fundamental rights 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice for the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis the Union (Art. 
43.3) has already been extolled for a number of years.2' It is unproblematic, and at the same time it is 
the thin end of the wedge. It is unproblematic because everybody wants it, because it is in the line of 
the general evolution of the European Communities, because it would strengthen the 'Europe of the 
citizen' and because it would ease some existing tensions between national courts and the Court of 
Justice. And it is the thin end of the wedge because it may have a considerable impact on the scope of 
In particular: Case 119/75 Terrapin Overseas [1976] ECR 1039. 
Case 88/77 Schonenberg [1978] ECR 473. 
Example: Report to the European Council on the European Union of 29. 12. 1975 (Tindemans report), Supplement 1/76 -
Bull. EC, Chapter IV-A-1; also in working document 481/75 of European Parliament, pp. 39 and 40. 
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judicial review throughout the proposed Union. We shall deal with that particular topic when dis-
cussing matters of substance and stick, for the moment, to problems of jurisdiction in the strict sense 
of the word. 
The Commission strongly recommended this extension of the Court's jurisdiction in its 1975 opinion 
on the European Union. It based its suggestions on the idea of the rule of law {Rechtsstaat), which it 
also found expressed in the Court's opinion, and it concluded that a Union treaty should provide for 
uniform binding rules protecting the rights of individuals. Therefore, it said, individuals should have 
comprehensive possibilities of access to the Court if they allege breaches of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, so as to enable the Court to play a key role in safeguarding these rights and free-
doms.27 These suggestions, which probably form the background of the proposed reform, may in 
their turn have drawn their inspiration from the German legal system, and especially from the parti-
cular form of action called Verfassungsbeschwerde (constitutional complaint). It is a general form of 
appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court available to any person alleging that his fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution have been denied by any statute, judicial decision or 
administrative act.28 
If a right of action of such a general nature should be given to the citizens of the future European 
Union, its exercise will no doubt have to be qualified in order to keep the judicial system workable. 
In German law, for example, the rule is — subject to some exceptions — that ordinary remedies 
should be exhausted; without such a rule, the Verfassungsbeschwerde would, in a way, criss-cross 
through the normal remedies and appeals and so disrupt the ordinary working of the judicial system. 
The effect of the rule of exhaustion of remedies is that the constitutional complaint more or less func-
tions as a kind of super-appeal, albeit with a limited scope, namely to enable the Constitutional 
Court to check whether the earlier judicial decisions in the case assessed the plaintiffs fundamental 
rights correctly. With some exaggeration, one might summarize the situation as one in which a citi-
zen first fights his way through local court, appeals court and supreme court, and then asks the Fede-
ral Constitutional Court to test whether these judges have duly respected his fundamental rights. 
There are two obvious consequences: the system makes litigation long and costly, and it tends to 
enhance the controlling function of the Constitutional Court. 
Introduction of a remedy similar to the German constitutional complaint would then provide the 
Court of Justice with powers to control the national courts. It might therefore provoke some hard 
feelings among the superior courts. It is difficult to see, however, how fundamental rights could be 
protected by the Court of Justice without implying a certain form of control of national courts. As it 
is, citizens will always be able to bring an action before a national court if they feel aggrieved in one 
way or another, be it by violation of their fundamental rights or otherwise. Community law, or 
Union law, will not diminish possibilities of access to courts existing at the national level, and a right 
of action before the Court of Justice will thus necessarily involve some element of scrutiny of the 
national courts' performance. 
These considerations raise a somewhat different problem. The proposed remedy will, according to 
the Draft Treaty, be available in all cases where 'the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis the 
Union' is at stake. That expression seems to embrace violation of such rights by national bodies act-
ing on the basis of Union law; the mechanism of the common agricultural policy is constructed in 
such a way that practically all individual decisions are taken by national authorities. In such a case, 
the aggrieved person will always first seize the national court as he would not like to lose his right to 
rely on other grievances than those concerned with fundamental rights. Is it open to the plaintiff, in 
such a case, to raise also the incompatibility of the national decision with the national constitution? 
Under the present Treaties, this is a matter of national constitutional law, which has given rise to 
well-known differences of opinion. The German Constitutional Court will probably consider that 
protection of fundamental rights at the Union level dispenses national courts from controlling com-
Report of the Commission, supra, points 124 and 84. 
Grundgesetz, Art. 93; Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, Art. 90. 
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patibility with the national constitution on that particular point;2" such would, at any rate, seem the 
situation if, and as far as, national bodies merely act as agents of the Union. The latter condition gives, 
however, rise to new problems: do, for example, tax inspectors act as agents of the Union when they 
levy value-added tax on certain transactions? Probably not; but in many instances, national legisla-
tion on VAT will raise exactly the same problems on human rights as the Community directives. 
Some national courts, like the Dutch Hoge Raad, always start from the assumption that national 
VAT legislation cannot be applied in a way diverging from the prevailing interpretation of the VAT 
directives. 
Double protection of fundamental rights, on the basis of the national constitution and on the basis of 
the Union Treaty, therefore, cannot be excluded. To make matters worse, there may even be a treble 
protection, as the European Convention on Human Rights will continue to apply. The rule on the 
exhaustion of national remedies in that Convention1" implies, in my view, that an individual com-
plaint to the European Commission on Human Rights would not be admissible before the Court of 
Justice has rendered its judgment under Article 43 of the proposed Union Treaty. Chronologically, 
the Strasbourg institutions would therefore come last. This situation necessarily implies that the 
European Court of Human Rights will exercise a certain controlling function with regard to the deci-
sions of the Court of Justice in this respect. Such would even be the case before the Union adheres to 
the European Convention in conformity with Article 4.3 of the Draft Treaty. The right of action 
proposed in Article 43 for the protection of human rights will thus be conducive to a kind of 'escala-
tion' of remedies. 
These consequences make it urgent to take a fresh look at the question of how to reconcile the two 
great systems of legal integration in Europe, that of the Communities and that based on the Europ-
ean Convention on Human Rights — a problem we shall return to. The same consequences also 
show something else: the price to be paid by European citizens for protection of their fundamental 
rights at the Union level is the risk of having to wait quite a while for their claim to be ultimately sett-
led. 
e. Supervision of national courts 
Article 43.5 intends to create a right of appeal to the Court of Justice against decisions of national 
courts of last instance where reference to the Court for a preliminary ruling is refused or where a pre-
liminary ruling of the Court has been disregarded. The French text of the draft reads 'pourvoi en cas-
sation' for right of appeal. 
The proposed introduction of this remedy rests on the assumption that national courts, and supreme 
courts in particular, presently fail to do what they should do, and that a direct appeal to the Court of 
Justice will help them mend their ways. Practitioners — and the present author is among them — 
will have great difficulty in accepting these two basic premises. As a general proposition, it is just not 
true that supreme courts fail to refer matters to the Court which they ought to have referred. Most 
statements to the contrary rely on considerations of a purely theoretical nature, or on isolated deci-
sions which, without any further proof, are considered as indicative of national courts' general atti-
tudes towards Community law, and in particular towards references to the Court of Justice.11 Such 
hostile behaviour on the part of national courts is very rare indeed. The duty to refer to the Court of 
Justice, as embodied in Article 177, par. 3 (EEC), requires national courts, and especially supreme 
courts, to meet two contradictory demands: on the one hand, they are to be aware that a persistent 
failure to refer will lead to lack of uniform application of Community law and so, ultimately, to dis-
integration of the Community as a legal entity; on the other hand, they should refrain from having 
2* BVerfGE, 37, No 18, Solange Beschluß, 1974. 
'" Article 26, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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europäischen Einigungsprozess, (Carstens et al. eds), 1984, pp. 73, 77. 
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recourse automatically to the Court of Justice in all cases having something to do with Community 
law (for example: in all cases on VAT), even in cases where every lawyer can guess the answer the 
Court will give. It has never been established or, indeed, been posited, that, as a rule, supreme courts 
have not been able to strike a reasonable balance between these two requirements. 
There is more to it. The Court's case-law assumes that Article 177 (EEC) is the expression of a gene-
ral idea inherent in the Treaty's approach to the judiciary: the idea of collaboration between national 
courts and the Court of Justice. It is for that reason that the Court of Justice leaves a certain margin 
of discretion to national courts faced with the question whether or not they are obliged to refer.12 In 
such a situation, granting a power of review of national decisions to the Court of Justice might 
amount to a change of approach, to the substitution of hierachy to collaboration. 
This does not end the debate: would it be a good thing to have hierarchical relations between natio-
nal courts and the Court of Justice? I wonder. Firstly, it is not at all clear whether the system of preli-
minary rulings will in fact work better after such a change. Secondly, we may make, tacitly, a choice 
on the organization of the judiciary in the European Union of the future, and we could very well 
have reasons to regret that choice later. In the long run, it is probably better for the European Union 
to have a 'Union judiciary' alongside the national judicial hierarchy, just as the United States has a 
dual system of courts (federal courts and state courts)." If that is the ultimate choice, it does not seem 
very obvious to begin by creating appeals from State courts to the Union court, the Court of Justice. 
Many observers will think (and some do think already) that the Court of Justice is to be the ordinary 
appeal court for any question involving Union law." If the drafters of the Union Treaty were really 
contemplating a central position of the Court of Justice in the judicial system of the future European 
Union, they would have done better to create Union courts of first instance for appeals exclusively 
implying Union matters and turning on points of fact more than on points of law, like courts of first 
instance in competition matters or an administrative tribunal for staff cases. Creation of such an 
administrative tribunal has already been proposed by the Commission; but the Council, in its own 
mysterious way, discovered first a certain number of difficulties and then found a new problem to 
every solution. However that may be, the time seems to have come to stop bickering about the lack 
of enthusiasm of one or two national courts in their dealings with Community law, and to start 
thinking seriously about the future outlook of the judicial system in a European Union. In that 
respect, the Draft Treaty is a lost opportunity. 
3. Matters of substance 
a. The objectives of the Union 
We saw earlier that the objectives of the Union are couched in wide terms: the Preamble alludes to 
the notions of democracy, human rights and rule of law; the objectives of the Union mentioned in 
Article 9 range from a harmonious society to peace in the world; and the provisions on the policies of 
the Union enable the European Council, in Article 68, to include defence policy and disarmament 
among matters to be submitted to cooperation and, eventually, to common action. There is some 
political cunning in the framing of the Draft Treaty's structure: it embraces many fields of action, but 
it does so in such a way as to permit considering the urgency of one form of action rather than 
another, and to elaborate gradually, subject by subject, the global policy of the Union. This evolving 
model of policy-making has definite advantages for the Union's decision-making practice; but that 
does not mean that it facilitates the work of judges who are to put a certain activity of one of the 
institutions in the general framework of the activities of the European Union. In other terms: the 
question is whether these wider objectives of the Union can still be made operational by the courts. 
,! Case 283/81 Cilfit [1982] ECR 3415. 
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There is one easy answer to this: the Union takes over the Community patrimony, the famous acquis 
communautaire (Art. 7), and encompasses thereby the aims of the EEC Treaty; hence, courts can 
continue to base their interpretations on these aims as they did before. This answer is, however, not 
completely satisfactory, for the real problem is, of course, how the old EEC aims relate to the Union 
objectives. These objectives are new only in part: they also partially restate some of the EEC aims — 
but not all. For example: Article 9 of the Draft Treaty restates the aim of progressive elimination of 
imbalances between regions, but it is silent about fair competition; it recapitulates the prospect of 
free movement of persons, without mentioning free movement of goods. There might, therefore, in 
the view of the drafters of the Union Treaty, be a kind of order of priority between different aims and 
objectives. One would hope not; for it is the very notions of fair competition and free movement of 
goods that have been crucial, in the Court's case-law, for elaborating step by step the legal concept of 
a common market. Most of the grands arrêts have been built on the idea that a common market 
implies abolition of discriminatory situations and of obstacles to intra-Community traffic. 
There may be an element in the Draft Treaty to counterbalance the possible loss of workable general 
concepts: its institutional provisions are manifestly intended to reactivate the Iegislattivc process. This 
is a very important point. Everyday experience shows that in many fields of Community action, har-
monization of national legislation is long overdue. Whether courts can continue to assume that 
Community legislation, though lacking for the moment, will be brought about in the near future and 
that in the meantime case-law can fill the gap is an ever more urgent question. Things get even worse 
when, as happens sometimes, politicians populating legislative bodies show their disdain of the 
Communities' objectives: can courts have resort to these same objectives when acting because 
nobody else does?35 If legislative machinery remains stuck for years and years, it is no longer up to the 
courts to put the situation right: they are not equipped for that type of work in the long run, and they 
cannot go beyond the inherent limits of the judicial office."' The Draft Treaty aims at unlocking the 
wheels of the legislative machinery by giving a new shape to legislative power, which will be shared 
between Council and Parliament. There is no certainty that mere changes in institutional provisions 
will accomplish this feat, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to venture predictions.1 But it 
would surely be bad for the future development of European law if judicial decisions could neither 
rely on clear and workable concepts on long-term aims, nor on any real upsurge of rule-making acti-
vities. 
The Union's takeover of the Community patrimony implies that fundamental market freedoms, as 
embodied in the EEC Treaty and as elaborated by the Commission's practice and by the case-law of 
the Court of Justice and some national courts, will continue to be in force. These market freedoms 
are individual freedoms derived from the concept of a common market.1* They have something in 
common with human rights; in German literature, their legal position has sometimes been charact-
erized as grundrechtähnlich, as not-so-dissimilar." It may be true that classical human rights, those, 
for example, embodied in the European Convention, find their basis in the freedom and dignity of 
the individual person; but some typical market freedoms, like the right to move freely or not to be 
discriminated against, ate not far removed from this same sphere of thought. The question arises, 
then, how the relationship between these two categories of rights and freedoms must be seen and, in 
particular, which one is to prevail in case of contradictory implications. 
The first thing one discovers when thinking about this problem is that most of the time the rights in 
these two categories reinforce each other rather than conflict. Non-discrimination in the common 
President Hans Kutscher said as much in his farewell speech to the Court: see the Court's publication on its ceremonial sittings 
in 1980-81 (Luxembourg, 1982), p. 25. 
See Koopmans, 'De polsstok van de rechter', in Regel en praktijk, 1979, p. 101. 
See Gilsdorf, 'Die Rolle der Kommission bei der gemeinschaftlichen Rechtssetzung', in Der Beitrag des Rechts, supra, p. 91. 
See for a list of these freedoms, Grabitz, 'Implementation of human rights in Community law', in In Memoriam f.D.B. Mit-
chell, 1983, p. 194. 
Bleckmann, 'Die Freiheiten des gemeinsamen Marktes als Grundrechte', in Das Europa der zweiten Generation, Gedächtnis-
schrift für Christoph Sasse, II, (Bieber et al. eds), 1981, p. 665. 
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market fortifies equal protection before the law, and the free development of the individual is helped 
by the freedom to move without being subjected to arbitrary interference by immigration police, cus-
tom officers or tax authorities. The freedom to choose one's profession as it appears in some natio-
nal constitutions could hardly be effective without protection against abuse of a dominant position in 
the market.4" And the gradual inclusion of aliens in the national regimes of rights and freedoms can 
hardly be imagined without the Community's efforts to obtain free movement of persons, and, in 
particular, without the limits that have thus been put on the national authorities' previously unfet-
tered discretion to expel aliens.41 
The remaining difficulty is what to do when there is a clash, and efforts to reconcile the effects of dif-
ferent freedoms fail. I would personally prefer not to take the general view that rights belonging to 
the classical human-rights catalogue should always and automatically override social and economic 
freedoms. Much depends (i) on the persons who claim protection of their rights and freedoms, 
human rights being primarily concerned with protecting the weak against the mighty; (ii) on the 
situation in which protection is claimed, those involved against their will being better suited to 
having their claims upheld than those who willingly accepted that situation; (iii) on the intensity of 
the alleged breach, freedom of expression being more liable to be violated by forbidding demonstra-
tions than by dissolving book cartels. When nothing helps, and when, finally, the chips are down, we 
should probably realize that the European Union will be based on a clear political ideology, descri-
bed in the opening words of the Draft Treaty as 'commitment to the principles of pluralist democ-
racy, respect for human rights and the rule of law', but that it is not based on any choice between 
competing economic philosophies.42 Wide-ranging objectives have thus their use, after all. 
b. The judicial area 
The 'homogeneous judicial area' will be created, according to Article 46 of the draft, by cooperation 
between Member States, i.e. without the exercise of specific powers by Union institutions; Commis-
sion and Parliament 'may', however, submit appropriate recommendations. The degree of homo-
geneity of the judicial area may thus become quite relative. 
The Draft Treaty does not tell us what it means by 'judicial area', but it gives two examples of mea-
sures apt to promote it. The first example is 'measures designed to reinforce the feeling of individual 
citizens that they are citizens of the Union'. As a good fishery policy will certainly reinforce (or even 
create) the fisherman's feeling that he is a citizen of the Union, a clause like this may mean anything 
or nothing. The most likely explanation is that the drafters have been toying with ideas like Europ-
ean passports, exchange of students and duty-free hand luggage. Anyway, the relation with the judi-
cial system looks tenuous. That is certainly not so for the second example: the fight against 'interna-
tional forms of crime, including terrorism'. In the past, suggestions have now and then been made to 
create such a crime-fighting area; for a certain time, President Giscard d'Estaing seemed to pursue 
the idea (espace judiciaire). It is an interesting idea from a general point of view, as its implementa-
tion would extend the Union's business into the field of criminal law. Politically, there are some pit-
falls in this path: experience has shown that some governments do not like to get involved in other 
governments' dealings with terrorist movements. Even the mere coordination of extradition practi-
See also Waelbroeck, 'La constitution européenne et les interventions des États membres en matière économique', in In orde, 
Liber amicorum Verloren van Themaat, 1982, p. 331. 
Example: Article 3, Directive 64/221 for the coordination of special measures concerning the movement and residence of 
foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health (OJ 56, p. 850, English Spe-
cial Edition 1963-64, p. 117). 
The situation is similar in the Federal Republic of Germany: the Constitutional Court refers to 'wirtschaftspolitische Neutra-
lität' (already in BVerfGE, 4, No 2). 
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ces can, as the Basque problem has shown these last years, implicate nations in other nations' prob­
lems, or even in the accompanying violence. 
Consequently, the two examples are not very helpful for finding out what the homogeneous judicial 
area can be taken to mean. The Union institutions could make a virtue out of necessity by inventing a 
legal programme that can do justice to the ambitious wording of Article 46. Why not start a real 
effort to unify commercial law? Lawyers have had guilt feelings ever since Pascal's jeering observa­
tions on the 'trois degrés d'élévation du pole' that turn a whole body of case­law upside down and on 
the 'plaisante justice qu'une rivière borne'.42 Modern conditions make many disparities even more dif­
ficult to understand and to accept. There is one snag: the institutions should first eliminate dispari­
ties that directly affect the establishment and functioning of the common market. And they can 
already do so now, on the basis of Article 100 (EEC), a provision which has given rise to many stud­
ies but whose potential is not nearly exhausted: remarkably little has been actually done so far. 
Meanwhile, the judicial area could as well wait for better times. Scant comfort is offered by one of 
the European Parliament's working papers on the Draft Treaty, seemingly content with the follow­
ing considerations: 'The creation of a judicial area will help to bring to fruition the concept of 
European citizenship, the main component of which is the common enjoyment of fundamental 
rights'.44 
c. The impact of human­rights protection 
Only a few examples suffice to show that human­rights protection may conduce to quite important 
innovations of the law and to results that nobody had imagined before. American criminal procedure 
has been profoundly influenced by the US Supreme Court's stand on human rights, and the prison 
system of many European countries had to be reformed because of the implications of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. To push the matter somewhat further: for a moment it looked as if 
capital punishment in the US would be abolished by the court as contrary to the American Bill of 
Rights, as were state laws forbidding abortion.451 admit that these latter decisions came at a time 
which must by hindsight be described as one of the great epochs of judicial activism in America, a 
wave of activism that culminated about 180 years after the entry into force of the Bill of Rights, and 
one century after the introduction of the XlVth Amendment to the Constitution, which turned out to 
be such a great help to the Supreme Court. But I submit that comparative studies show how difficult 
it is to foresee changes in judicial attitudes in this respect; the French Conseil constitutionnel took 
everybody by surprise when it adopted its new approach in 1971.4' In these matters, prophecies are 
even less reliable than weather forecasts in Great Britain. 
Nobody knows, therefore, whether the Court of Justice will be tempted to spread its wings in a com­
parable way. At all events, the Court's position under the Draft Treaty will be inevitably reinforced. 
Firstly with regard to national courts: under the existing arrangements, the Court and the national 
constitutional courts are, in a way, competing powers in the field of human rights; but the combined 
effect of Articles 4 and 43 of the Draft Treaty will be to confer certain controlling powers on the 
Court of Justice. Secondly, the delicate balance of power between the Court and the political institu­
tions of the Union is tipped in favour of the former: not the legislative but the judicial power of the 
Union will have a final say on the meaning of fundamental freedoms, and thereby on the implica­
tions of these freedoms for all rule­giving and administrative activities. Thirdly, the Court's stature in 
" Pascal Pensées, No 294, (Brunschvicged.) 1950. 
44 Report on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs on the substance of the preliminary Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union, Part C, preparatory documents (Doc, EP 1­575/83/c, working document on the law of the Union (K. de 
Gucht reporting) No 71). 
45 Turman ν Georgia, 408 US 288 (1972); Roe ν Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). 
46 Conseil constitutionnel, 16. 7. 1971, loi d'associations, Ree. 29. 
the eyes of the general public will increase, as it will be easier for the citizens of the Union to see the 
Court really as 'their' court when they have more possibilities of entering into the passions of the liti­
gants. 
Other circumstances suggest that changes of judicial attitudes, if forthcoming, will be slow. It will, in 
the most optimistic forecast, take years and years before Union law will touch on matters of disarma­
ment; it might very well even take years before Union policy will cover subjects like protection of the 
environment, coordination of urbanization schemes or prison reform. Many areas likely to give rise 
to human­rights problems will thus, for the moment, be excluded from the Court's jurisdiction. The 
first years of the Union will probably be characterized by efforts aimed at consolidating and expand­
ing common economic policies and at extending the common market to fisheries and to transporta­
tion. The technicians of economic law will, for the moment, hold their ground. 
Some further thinking, however, gives reason to foresee that unexpected developments may 
nevertheless occur. The Union scheme implies, according to the Draft Treaty, jurisdiction on 
human rights on the part of national courts, the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human 
Rights; each of these categories of judges has its own contribution to make. The Strasbourg court 
may be more sensitive to human­rights issues, just as its Luxembourg sister institution is more liable 
to respond to problems regarding discrimination, or division of powers among the Union and Mem­
ber States. Some mutual adjusting will be necessary. Even now, there are some areas in which Com­
munity law does not seem completely attuned to the evolutions that have taken place under the 
Human Rights Convention. The very liberal interpretation the Human Rights Court gives to 'civil 
rights' covered by the fair­trial clause of Article 6 of the Convention4 may have important conse­
quences for certain practices usually followed in the economic law of the Community, as, for 
example, in competition law. 
This brings us, finally, to the future existence of two areas of legal integration in Europe: the 
European Union and the Council of Europe, under whose auspices the European Convention on 
Human Rights functions. If the Union takes shape in the way indicated by the Draft Treaty, judicial 
relations between these two areas will be strengthened. The Union may, therefore, become more and 
more the real heart of the Council of Europe. Some political developments work in the same direc­
tion. In the near future, Spain and Portugal will accede to the Communities; Turkey will, if it does 
not begin to take return to democracy seriously, become only a nominal member of the Council of 
Europe. What remains then, are chiefly the Member States of the Community and the countries 
bound to it by free­trade arrangements, like Sweden, Norway, Switzerland and Austria. In other 
words: the factual situation in the Council of Europe could be much the same as the one that is grad­
ually evolving in the field of economic integration, where the Community takes the lead but works in 
close collaboration with the countries of the free­trade area. This collaboration could be intensified, 
also at the judicial level. At the moment, the free­trade agreements are interpreted by the Court of 
Justice as well as by the supreme courts of countries like Austria and Switzerland; there is a certain 
risk of diverging interpretations.48 If forms could be found for instituting a judicial collaboration be­
tween the Community and these countries, the future Union might inherit a judicial structure which, 
if gradually extended to other Union matters, would in real terms be at the same time the judicial 
structure within the Council of Europe. After some time, the rift between the two organizations 
would vanish. Such a perspective might help to overcome certain fears among Community lawyers 
about a human­rights court partially composed of judges from third countries that would impose its 
legal views on Union institutions. 
Ringeisen ν Austria, ECHR Series A, (13), 1971; Sporrong and Lönnroth ν Sweden, ECHR Series A, (52), 1982. 
See Case 270/80 Polydor [1982] ECR 329; Case 104/81 Kupferberg [1982] ECR 3641. 
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d. The authority of Union law 
'A genuine rule of law in the European context', said the Court of Justice in its opinion on the 
European Union, 'implies binding rules which apply uniformly and which protect individual rights'. 
It also warned that the Union should not be given a looser legal structure than the existing Commu-
nities, as otherwise the value of Community law would be diminished.4' It looks as if the drafters of 
the Union Treaty took this warning to heart. Article 42 of the draft confirms the main principles 
actually underlying the significance of Community law: direct applicability, precedence over natio-
nal law, joint responsibility of the Commission and Member State authorities for implementation of 
Union law, and possibilities of invoking that law before national courts. Wider access of individuals 
to the Court of Justice, and continuation of the system of preliminary rulings, will do the rest. 
First problem: the fact that legal rules on the authority of Union law are uniform does not necessarily 
mean that this authority will be perceived and endured in the same way by all the citizens of the 
Union. The experience with the Communities has, so far, been very eloquent on this point. Different 
attitudes on the authority of Community law in, say, Italy and the UK result not only from different 
assessments of the European Community and its law, but also from different ideas about what auth-
ority is like. More uniformity depends on the evolution of ideas that are rooted in century-old tradi-
tions and in the way people behave towards their family, the Church, the burgomaster and the tax 
collector. Complete uniformity seems hardly desirable, but some progress in that direction can be 
made. As law evasion is nowadays rapidly spreading from South to North, and insolence with regard 
to public authorities from North to South, we should not despair too quickly. 
Second problem: is there any effective stimulus for public authorities to comply with the Union law 
and to take their share in its implementation? There is, of course, the mechanism of sanctions provi-
ded for by Article 44 of the Draft Treaty. It may help, but it is unwieldy: it requires a request of Par-
liament or Commission, a finding of a persistent violation by the Court, a hearing of the Member 
State concerned, a draft decision of the European Council, approval by Parliament, and a definitive 
decision by the European Council. That will probably mean that it can only be used in cases of 
exceptional gravity. What remains is the possibility for private citizens or undertakings to appeal to 
the direct effect of the Union law over the head of national rules of implementation; experience 
shows that such a way is sometimes very effective.'" This attractive method is not always open: it 
cannot be used, for example, if the Union rules deny a right to somebody (e.g. to replant an old 
vineyard), or if they cannot be effective without collaboration of the national administration (e.g. 
premiums for stocking table wines for a certain period). Citizens always run the risk of drawing a 
blank when they rely too much on the self-propelling qualities of Union law. Compliance with Union 
law by the Member States will therefore probably be secured in much the same way as the one that 
actually ensures the observance of Community law: it is a combination of political pressure by the 
Commission and by interest groups, of legal means, through the threat of legal action by the Com-
mission or by citizens, and of feelings of solidarity; even the most unwilling administration sees after 
some time that the common interest ought to prevail. No statesman, whatever his (or her) brinkman-
ship, will easily take the risk of disrupting the European construction. 
Third problem: will the system of sanctions contribute to the birth of a European Union that has all 
the characteristics of a federal State? Without engaging in battles on labels, one might nevertheless be 
realistic enough to see the difference between the proposed Union and the federal States that the 
world has witnessed these last two centuries. No expedition of Union troops will call the defiant 
Member State to order. And it is perhaps better so: Robert Schuman's famous speech of 9 May 
1950, which triggered off the integration process, sought exactly to displace movement of troops by 
more peaceful ways of coming to grips with each other. 
4* Suggestions of the Court, supra, p. 17. 
!0 See in particular: Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631; Case 8/81 Ursula Becker [1982] ECR 53. 
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I do not rule out, nevertheless, that the proposed system of sanctions has a certain bearing on the 
legal nature of the Union.51 For me, it is especially Article 4, par. 4, on penalties against the Member 
State that persistently violates democratic principles, which gives the Draft Treaty its particular fla-
vour. The Union makes itself, thereby, responsible for the Member States' carrying on their demo-
cratic traditions. Such a situation might have far-reaching effects on the international relations of the 
Union; but it may be too early to speculate. 
4. The place of the judiciary 
Under the Draft Treaty, the position of the judiciary will be reinforced. This increase of judicial 
power is in particular due to two general ideas which seem to belong to the mainstream of the views 
expressed in the draft: the generalization of judicial review and the judicial protection of human 
rights. It is pretty obvious that these ideas have been influenced by experience gained in countries 
with constitutional courts. It is also clear that the drafters of the Treaty focused their attention exclu-
sively on the more general aspects of the jurisdiction of constitutional courts. It is curious to observe, 
in this connection, that the draft is silent on control of regularity of the elections of Members of the 
European Parliament — a more technical subject but one that could, even in the present situation, 
very well be committed to the care of the courts, and even perhaps to the care of the Court of Justice. 
In France, the Conseil constitutionnel has jurisdiction over le contentieux électoral; '~ a similar 
arrangement would neatly fit in the proposed Union and, perhaps, be a first little step on the way to 
uniform electoral procedures.51 
The powers of the Court of Justice are strengthened by the Draft Treaty. This does not result from a 
reinforcement of the Court's position vis-à-vis the national courts, but from the place the Court has 
in the Union's judiciary: its powers increase primarily at the expense of the powers of the other 
Union institutions. Is that an advantage? Personally, I am far from sure that general theories about 
the correct frontier between 'the' judicial and 'the' political area or between work of 'the' courts and 
'the' legislative bodies can be of any great help.54 So much depends on the situation in which the 
dividing line is to be traced. It may be true, as Professor Cappelletti puts it in one of his recent books, 
that there is a general tendency towards an increase of judicial creativity nowadays;" but such a gene-
ral trend does not give us a recipe for every single occasion. On the whole, however, I would not 
regret a certain growth of judicial power in the actual situation of European integration. There are 
certain things the proposed Union will probably have in common with the existing Communities; 
and these have been continuously troubled by their weak political structure. The Draft Treaty seeks 
to overcome this weakness; but it is, at the very least, questionable whether the proposed institutio-
nal changes can achieve such a result. A Union that combines an ambitious programme and far-
reaching powers with a weak political structure may need a strong judiciary. 
There is a second reason not to be too cautious in this respect: it is commonly acknowledged that, 
thus far, the Court of Justice has done its work well. The general layout of European law owes more 
to the patient needlework of the Court than to the defective legislative machinery or to the solemn 
declarations of these last years. It was the Court's case-law that developed the legal principles which 
support Community law — principles many of which can now be found in the Draft Treaty, like the 
priority of Community law, the direct effect of Community provisions and the protection of human 
rights. The very idea of legal principles as part of the law to be observed in the application of the 
See Pernice, Verfassungsentwurf, supra, note 3. 
Constitution française, Art. 59. 
Article 14 of the Draft Treaty seems to acquiesce in the existing lack of uniformity. 
See, however, my article on 'Legislature and Judiciary, Present Trends', in New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe, 
(Cappallertied.), 1978, p. 309. 
Cappelletti, Giudici legislatori f, 1984, pp.19-59. 
Treaties has been introduced and worked out by the Court. Its judgments have consistently, and 
from the very beginning in the early days of the Coal and Steel Treaty, tried to dig up the general 
principles of law that were gradually to form the backbone of the common law for Europe.56 As to 
further evolutions, there is no need to lack confidence. 
Will, then, the Court's position in the famous equilibre institutionnel be substantially changed? Par-
liament seems to think so, for the Draft Treaty modifies the method of appointing the members of 
the Court (judges and advocates general): under the Union Treaty, half of them will be appointed by 
Parliament, the other half by the Council (Art. 30, par 2). The only explanation I have been able to 
find in the parliamentary documents is that such a solution is 'fair and realistic'.5 It is fair to add, 
however, that similar solutions exist in some countries for the appointment of members of the consti-
tutional court.58 The proposal to follow these solutions in the framework of the Union may under-
estimate the difference between a national and a Community context. Experience shows that politi-
cians usually assume — for reasons I personally fail to understand — that the nationality of members 
of the Court is very important. The proposed method might thus lead to a situation where the Coun-
cil would insist on the appointment of 10 or 12 judges on its part, every government represented in 
the Council wanting, so to say, 'his' judge; Parliament would then probably have to add as many, 
and the Court would become completely unmanageable. If parliamentary influence on the appoint-
ment of members of the Court is sought, I should prefer the American system of 'advice and consent': 
judges of the US Supreme Court are appointed by the President, but the Senate has to give the green 
light.5' In fact, the American Senate developed a policy of exercising a certain control on the quality 
and the morality of the President's appointees in order to prevent, in particular, that a none-too-
scrupulous administration could monopolize the court for its own friends. There is no reason why 
the European Parliament could not play a comparable role. 
One final word about the place of the judiciary in the Draft Treaty's scheme. The drafters rely heav-
ily on the courts and on judicial activities for many things they have in mind in order to get European 
integration again on the move; that confidence is not misplaced. They also propose specific ways in 
which the judiciary would get more involved in aspects of the integration process, as the proposed 
extensions of the Court's jurisdiction show; some of these proposals are important and interesting, 
although some others may disappoint. But all this should not make us forget that the real problem 
does not lie here: it is just feasible to make treaty provisions on jurisdiction, and that is perhaps easier 
than to frame a common policy on nuclear energy, or on road transport, or on river pollution. It is 
these policies, however, that Europe is waiting for, alongside of a great many other common polic-
ies. 
European law cannot be made by lawyers alone. That may be a sobering thought for those who like 
to reflect on the relation between law and politics. 
Case 8/55 Fédéchar [1954-56] ECR 299 is an example (principle of proportionality). 
Report on behalf of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, supra, Part B, 'Explanatory Statement', P. 33 (O. Zecchino report-
ing). 
Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, Art. 5. 
US Const. Art II, § 2, d. 2. 
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Chapter V — Financing 
European integration: 
The European Communities and 
the proposed European Union 
by J. Ørstrom Møller 
1. Introduction 
Many people regard the Community budget and the present financial problems as being of a strictly 
fiscal or technical nature. They look upon the budget as a book-keeping exercise which has nothing 
to do with the structure and contents of the Community system. This is a wrong approach. Past 
experience, not only in the life-span of the European Communities, but also the evolution of nation 
States, has given ample proof that the budget is a hinge in the historical process. 
The American rebellion against British colonial rule was based upon a small fiscal question , but the 
political importance has never been forgotten: 'No taxation without representation'. The American 
rebellion was set in motion by a discontent of being taxed without having the right to determine the 
size of the taxation and for what purpose money was collected. 
A large part of history concerning the establishment in the nineteenth century of the German Empire 
is a history of taxation. During that period of human history the main source of government revenue 
was customs duties. No wonder, then, that the first step towards unification of the German states 
was the 'Zollverein' in 1830. 
It is an indisputable fact that no State can be created without having access to revenue. Furthermore, 
the size of revenue will very often determine the scope of development of a new nation State. 
On top of these economic and financial considerations comes the institutional and legal aspect of 
which institution has the powers to collect revenue and to determine the size and composition of the 
expenditure side of the budget. 
Much of Europe's history is a tale of continuous struggle between King and Parliament, about exactly 
that question. The King wanted to spend, but needed the consent of Parliament to collect the neces-
sary revenue. Parliament, on the other hand, did not want to spend and tried to limit the King's room 
to manoeuvre, with the unavoidable result that an institutional clash followed. On the surface the 
struggle was about money, but in reality it was about who governs the realm: the King or the Parlia-
ment. 
No wonder, then, that in recent years the budget has come to the forefront of Community life. 
Financially, the substance and composition of the budget determine financial flows between citizens, 
regions and sectors in the Community, but above all between Member States. There is general agree-
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ment that the financial flows which appear in the budget constitute only part — and some people 
think a very minor part — of the economic and financial consequences for the individual Member 
States of the Community. However, this has not prevented these flows from being used in a highly 
political battle to change the structure of the budget. 
At present, the Community's budget authority is made up of three institutions: Council, Parliament, 
Commission. The Treaty was revised in 1970' and 19752 to increase Parliament's influence on the 
budget, generally in the area of the so-called non-obligatory spending. 
This was regarded as a milestone 10 years ago, but Parliament now takes the view that these increa-
sed powers are insignificant, indeed totally unsatisfactory. 
Pending the possibility of a further change in the Treaty, which has not until now found propitious 
ground in the Council, Parliament has continuously tried to expand its powers by interpreting the 
Treaty to its own advantage every time the budgetary procedure has produced a difference of opin-
ion between Council and Parliament. 
Not surprisingly, this has led to a constant battle between Council and Parliament during the annual 
budget procedure, with Parliament in the attacking role and Council as the defender. There is no 
need to go over that familiar ground. Suffice it to say that Parliament has won certain limited vic-
tories, but, grosso modo, the distribution of powers is still as foreseen when Budget Treaty II was 
implemented in 1975. 
Since 1977, only two budgets (the 1978 budget and the 1983 budget) have been approved without 
any disagreement of legal or political nature between Council and Parliament. Parliament has rejec-
ted one budget (the 1980 budget). Council took Parliament to court on the 1982 budget, but did not 
pursue the matter after a settlement was made. Three countries took Parliament to court on the 1981 
budget, but did not pursue the matter. For the 1979 budget and 1984 budget there was disagreement 
between the two institutions on whether the amount of non-obligatory spending complied with the 
rules laid down by the maximum rate of increase or whether a new rate had to be fixed by mutual 
agreement. 
Some people maintain that the reason for Parliament's attitude towards the budget is that Parliament 
has no powers with regard to the Community's legislative process, which makes it unavoidable that 
Parliament directs its efforts towards the one area where the Treaty provides powers, that is the bud-
get. 
This theory may provide part of the answer but to our mind the main reason is quite simply that Parli-
ament has grasped that the road to influence on Community life and the structure of the Community 
system is by way of the budget. 
This leads to the starting point of this report, which is that the budget and the distribution of bud-
getary powers on the three institutions are of fundamental importance for the structure of the Com-
munity system and the way the Community will tend to develop for the rest of this century. 
We are not dealing with technical questions which are only open for experts but with a political ques-
tion of the highest importance for the future evolution of the European Community. 
' Treaty amending Certain Budgetary Provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty 
establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities, referred to as Budget Treaty 1, which 
was signed on 22.4.1970 (see OJ L 2, 2.1.1971). 
; Budget Treaty 2, signed on 22.7.1975, was published in OJ L 359, 31.12.1977. 
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2. The present Community budget 
a. Size of the budget 
The Community budget is small compared with national budgets as well as gross domestic product 
in the Community. 
Since 1973 the Community budget has amounted to between 1.8% and 2.7% of national budgets. 
At the lower end of the range we find 1975 with 1.8% and at the top we have 1979 and 1980 with 
2.7%. Compared with gross domestic product the percentage has fluctuated between 0.51% (in 
1974) and 0.91% (in 1981). 
There is no need to elaborate on the fact that we are operating with very small figures which have a 
very limited impact on national economies and play a minor role in the integration process. 
The main reason why the Community budget has not grown faster is that, except for the common 
agricultural policy, common policies are still of an embryonic nature. 
The hard fact is that the Member States have not been willing to design and adopt common policies 
giving rise to expenditure over a broad level, but have been quite content to confine the activities of 
the Community to the common agricultural policy. This seems often to be overlooked in the debate 
on the Community's structure. 
b. Expenditure 
This picture is borne out by an analysis of the expenditure side of the budget. 
It is dominated by the common agricultural policy, which in the period from 1973 to 1984 has 
taken up between 60% and 80% of total expenditure. 
Both the absolute amounts and the share of the total budget have fluctuated rather wildly over the 
years. The highest share was realized in 1973, but 1978 comes close. The lowest point was obtained 
in the beginning of the 1980s when the world conjuncture was favourable (high and rising world 
market prices) while at the same time the internal Community production was stable. 
The common agricultural policy is often criticized for its high expenditure level. This criticism does 
not seem to be corroborated by the figures in the annual Community budget. Measured as a percen-
tage of gross domestic product, the common agricultural policy took up 0.36% in 1973 and, accord-
ing to the approved budget for 1984, the corresponding figure for this year is 0.59%. Compared 
with agricultural support in other industrial nations this percentage seems rather modest. Agricultu-
ral support in the USA is running at the same level, perhaps a little higher, while Japan spends approxi-
mately three times as much. 
Since the mid-1970s, the Community has increased appropriations for the Regional Fund and the 
Social Fund. The main purpose is to assist underdeveloped regions in the Community and to provide 
the Community with financial resources to alleviate the repercussions of the international economic 
crisis. In 1973, only the Social Fund was implemented and took up 1.2% of the total budget. In 1984 
the Social Fund had been supplemented by a Regional Fund and these two funds amounted to 
10.4%. This may not be good enough in view of the high ambitions, but it is not as bad as main-
tained by some critical voices. 
The discouraging item when analysing the Community budget is the very limited size of appropria-
tions for industry, technology and research. In 1973 total appropriations for these purposes were 72 
million u.a. corresponding to 1.8% of the total budget. In 1984 total appropriations are 719 million 
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ECU corresponding to 2.8%. This shows clearly that the Community has not been able to launch 
new common policies. 
It is, however, not the fault of the budget system but must be blamed on the lacking political will 
among Member States to adopt and implement new common policies. The Commission has for-
warded a string of proposals but they have become stuck in the thick mud in the Council. 
Table 1 (pages 100-101 ) illustrates the development of the cooperation on the expenditure side of the 
Community budget from 1973 to 1984. 
c. Receipts 
The Community is financed by customs duties, agricultural import levies and up to 1% of a uniform 
assessment basis for value-added tax (VAT).3 
It is remarkable that the financing of the Community is linked to the contents of the Community 
system. 
Customs duties are collected by individual Member States but paid into the Community budget. As 
the Community consists of a customs union it is natural that the revenue of customs duties does not 
belong to any individual Member State but to the Community as such. If a Member State wishes to 
import from the outside world it is free to do so but it has to pay a price in the form of customs 
duties. This is what is called the Community preference. It is therefore no anomaly that the UK, with 
a higher share of its import from the outside world than the Community average, does pay in cus-
toms duties which surpass its share of Community gross domestic product. This is exactly what the 
system means and by producing this result it works as designed. 
The same picture is seen when analysing agricultural import levies. A Community preference is one 
of the fundamental principles of the common agricultural policy, like it or not. These levies, there-
fore, produce the same result for the agricultural sector as the customs duties do for the industrial 
sector. 
The third revenue source, and the buoyant one, is VAT receipts. This is what constitutes the finan-
cial ceiling because the present rules limit the Community's financial resource to 1% of a uniform 
assessment basis. 
This revenue source cannot claim the same link to the contents of the Community system as is the 
case for customs duties and agricultural import levies. There are two reasons why the Community 
introduced the VAT as a financial source. Firstly, it fitted in nicely with the efforts to harmonize the 
basis of indirect taxation in the Community. Secondly, VAT taxes consumption and not investment. 
It is interesting to note that the inclusion of VAT means a certain progressivity in the financing of the 
Community as consumption per head is higher in the richer Member States than in the poorer ones. 
Even if this was not an explicit purpose it goes some way to meet the claims of progressivity on the 
revenue side of the budget, which have been made by some Member States in recent years. 
Table 2 (page 102) presents the total financial resources at the disposal of the Community in the 
period 1973-84 and the importance of the main revenue sources. 
The table bears out that the agricultural import levies are volatile while the customs duties cannot be 
expected to increase significantly. Thus, the only buoyant element is VAT. 
' Decision of 21.4.1970 on the replacement of financial contributions from Member States by the Communities' own resources: 
OJL 94, 28.4.1970. 
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d. Significam elements 
in the Community's financing system 
Viewed in a historical perspective, the financing system of the Community is unique in several 
aspects. 
First of all, Member States are legally committed to pay into the budget what is necessary to finance 
the common activities adopted by the Council (provided, of course, that the revenue needed does not 
surpass the VAT ceiling). This means in fact that the financing of the Community is not dependent 
on national contributions voted by national Parliaments. A refusal by a Member State to pay accord-
ing to the rules of the own-resources system would constitute a breach of an international treaty and 
there would be no doubt how the Court of Justice would rule in such a case. The Community does 
not work under the threat of individual Member States withholding financial resources unless they 
are accommodated in one way or another. The contrast to the financing of traditional international 
institutions is very clear, indeed. 
Secondly, the financing of the Community is not linked to the economic clout of the Member States, 
for example as measured by gross domestic product, but reflects the two corner stones of the Com-
munity, that is the customs union and the common agricultural policy. Also in this respect the Com-
munity breaks with the financing system of traditional international institutions. 
These two factors are the basis for the own resources system, which is one of the most significant ele-
ments of the Community structure. The first factor means that the Community has access to finan-
cial resources from the time they are collected in Member States. This is why they are 'own re-
sources'. The second factor underlines that we are dealing with a Community with 10 Member Stat-
es and not a loose international cooperation encompassing 10 national States. 
3. The Community's budgetary procedure 
a. Different types of appropriations 
The Treaty distinguishes between obligatory and non-obligatory spending. Obligatory spending is 
expenditure which necessarily results from the Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance therewith. 
Typical examples are appropriations for the EAGGF and agreements with third countries. Non-obli-
gatory spending is expenditure which does not necessarily result from the Treaty or from acts adop-
ted in accordance therewith. Typical examples are appropriations for the Regional and Social Funds. 
The distinction between the two types of spending is of paramount importance for the budgetary 
procedure and the distribution of powers among the three institutions that constitute the budget auth-
ority. 
The Commission has the right of initiative in this as in other areas. 
The Council has the final decision with regard to the size and composition of obligatory expenditure. 
This is logical. It is the Council which adopts the legal acts which constitute the basis for expendi-
ture. Accordingly, it must be up to the Council to decide the amount necessary to carry out the 
obligations which follow from these legal acts. It is in accordance with the fact that Parliament does 
not have any legislative power that the powers of Parliament concerning obligatory spending are very 
limited. Had Parliament been given powers with regard to obligatory spending, it would have been 
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possible for Parliament to obtain legislative powers via the budgetary system. By reducing or increas-
ing obligatory spending Parliament would have forced the Council either to change the legal acts or 
to face a situation where the Community could not fulfil its legal commitments. This case is one 
example demonstrating that the distribution of powers among institutions in the Community 
system, as well as the structure of the common policies and their financing, is far more coherent and 
well thought out than most people think when they first meet the very complicated Community 
system. 
With Budget Treaty II of 1975 Parliament got influence on the size and composition of non-obliga-
tory spending. Parliament has the final word with regard to size as well as composition, provided 
that the rules for application of the maximum rate of increase are respected. 
As non-obligatory spending does not result from the Treaty or legal acts it is up to the Community 
institutions to fix the amount for the common activities according to political priority. There are no 
legally-binding commitments. The exclusive power of the Council in the legislative process does not 
prevent Parliament from influencing the size of appropriations for headings in the budget which are 
classified as non-obligatory spending. 
There is a gap in the Treaty in the sense that it does not specify which appropriations are obligatory 
and which are non-obligatory. For a good many years this question was not raised during the annual 
budgetary procedure. The existing classification was taken for granted by all three institutions. This 
peaceful situation was broken in the autumn of 1981 when Parliament unilaterally changed the clas-
sification of some items in the budget and unilaterally decided to classify certain new items as non-
obligatory spending. This was a matter of principle for the Council and as a political solution was 
not reached the Council took Parliament to the Court of Justice. 
During the spring of 1982 a political settlement was worked out and was signed on 30 June 1982 by 
the Presidents of the three institutions. This common declaration contained several new elements but 
the most important one for the classification question is that it lists the disputed items and maps out a 
procedure to be followed in case of disagreement in the future. The common declaration did not pre-
vent Parliament from unilaterally breaking the agreement with the Council in the second half of 1983 
concerning the classification of amounts to be paid out to the UK. 
Parliament has for a long time wished to change the Treaty, exactly on the point of distinction be-
tween obligatory and non-obligatory spending. This is, indeed, one of the major points of the Draft 
Treaty establishing the European Union, which we will take up later. 
b. Existing powers of the three institutions 
According to the Treaty, there is a clear-cut distribution of powers among the three institutions that 
constitute the budget authority. 
The Commission forwards a preliminary draft budget and takes part in the Council's deliberations 
and the meetings in Parliament and Parliament's budgetary committee. The role of the Commission 
in the budgetary procedure is thus very much like the Commission's general role as the initiator and 
the guardian of the Treaty. 
The Council decides on the draft budget which is forwarded to Parliament. Legally this takes the 
form of a Council decision. It is the Council which has the final word with regard to obligatory 
spending, while the fixing of non-obligatory spending partly falls under the competence of Parlia-
ment. 
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It is the President of Parliament who declares that the budget has been finally adopted. 
If important reasons warrant it, Parliament may reject the draft budget and request that a new draft 
be submitted to it. 
Furthermore, Parliament has the final word with regard to the composition of non-obligatory spend-
ing. 
The Treaty implicates a sort of ping-pong between Council and Parliament. Council forwards a 
draft budget before a deadline. Parliament makes amendments (non-obligatory spending) and pro-
poses modifications (obligatory spending) within 45 days, and it is up to the Council to act on these 
proposals. When Council has decided on the proposed modifications the budgetary procedure for 
obligatory spending has been completed. With regard to amendments the Council's decisions are 
communicated to Parliament, which completes the budgetary procedure by finally deciding on non-
obligatory spending at its December session. 
By and large, this procedure has served the Community well and is a good example of how to dis-
tribute powers among various institutions with the aim of establishing an interplay leading up to a 
final decision backed by the consent of all involved. 
This, however, supposes that all the institutions play by the rules. There are two snags in this 
assumption. 
Firstly, the rules do not always cover the whole spectrum of possible problems, and even if they do 
the institutions do not always reach the same interpretation. 
A typical example of this is that the Treaty contains only a general classification of obligatory versus 
non-obligatory spending. If and when a difference of opinions arises, it places the institutions in the 
dilemma of either having to negotiate a common interpretation of the said question or to take the 
matter to the Court of Justice, on the allegation that one of the institutions has acted illegally. Ex-
perience shows that Parliament has found it quite attractive to try to find out just how far it can go 
before the Council finds that a major shift in powers is taking place. This is a highly political game 
with the Council trying to defend its prerogatives without really knowing where to put down its foot 
and how firmly to defend its position. 
Since 1975 Parliament has definitely gained much greater influence on the budgetary procedure by 
gradually pushing the interpretation of the Treaty in the direction wished by Parliament. The aim 
has generally been to make room for a steeper increase in non-obligatory spending than Council has 
voted. 
Secondly, the budgetary procedure, as laid down in the Treaty, is of a legal nature. 
This procedure, however, does not preclude the institutions from circumventing the Treaty and fix-
ing an important part of the budget by a mutual agreement. Such a procedure means that political 
considerations replace the strictly legal procedure. As long as all three institutions are agreed that this 
can be done, it is possible to do it. Who shall take the matter to the Court of Justice with the allega-
tion that one of the other institutions has acted illegally if there is political agreement between the 
three institutions? 
It is in this respect that recent years have shown the biggest slide in the budgetary procedure com-
pared with the strict rules in the Treaty. 
The first and most spectacular example is what has happened to the maximum rate of increase. The 
Treaty clearly specifies how to apply a complex set of rules to respect this rate, but adds that another 
rate may be fixed by agreement between Council and Parliament. 
Reading the Treaty, no-one can have any doubt that the possibility of fixing another rate is some sort 
of escape clause to be used when special circumstances make it appropriate. Otherwise, there would 
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be no reason for having the complex set of rules when this special paragraph could be replaced by 
one sentence saying that the size of non-obligatory spending is fixed by Council and Parliament by 
agreement. This interpretation notwithstanding, Parliament has forced a level of non-obligatory 
spending which surpasses the maximum rate of increase for practically all Community budgets since 
the late 1970s. 
The driving force behind this has been the demand put forward by Parliament that there is a political 
need in the Community for a higher level of spending. This may be right or wrong, but it underlines 
the point that gradually the procedure in the Treaty is being replaced by political considerations. 
This became crystal clear in the second half of 1983 when the draft budget for 1984 was being dis-
cussed. Parliament unilaterally rejected an earlier agreement between Council and Parliament con-
cerning classification of the amounts to be paid out to the UK. Furthermore, Parliament put for-
ward, not as a suggestion but as a claim, that agricultural spending should be reduced by a con-
siderable amount. 
What was alarming about this claim was not that it was made but that it was not made according to 
the rules of the Treaty. According to the Treaty, Parliament should have put forward a modification 
to reduce agricultural spending. This modification would have been approved unless rejected by 
Council by a qualified majority. After the Council decision during the Council's second reading in 
the middle of November 1983, the budgetary procedure for agricultural expenditure would have 
been finished as at this point we are dealing with obligatory expenditure. 
Instead, Parliament put forward its claim at a special meeting between Council and Parliament, 
called during Parliament's final session in the middle of December 1983. Parliament did recognize 
that the budgetary procedure for agricultural spending had been finished, but supported its claim by 
pleading the important political considerations. 
Fortunately for the respect of the Treaty, Council did not budge but chose in this case to stand firm 
and tell Parliament that its claim could not be met as the budgetary procedure for agricultural spend-
ing had been completed a month before. 
c. Conclusion 
The danger of the present budgetary procedure is not that there are certain gaps where different 
interpretations can be put forward, but that one institution, Parliament, is fundamentally dissatisfied 
with the whole structure of the budgetary procedure. 
Parliament is of the opinion that the strict budgetary procedure, as laid down in the Treaty, should 
be replaced by a continuous, political negotiation from start to end of the budgetary procedure. As it 
is the President of Parliament who declares the budget finally adopted, it gives Parliament the upper 
hand in the sense that unless Parliament is satisfied a legally-adopted budget will not be available 
from the beginning of the budget year. 
The Council has resisted this attempt not only because it would greatly increase Parliament's 
influence on the budget but also because Council cannot renounce — not even implicitly — the Treaty. 
Such an action would create a precedent in other areas. 
It is open to interpretation which line the newly-elected Parliament will follow but most indications 
are that it will continue the road taken by the former Parliament. If that happens, Council will, in a 
few years, perhaps sooner, come to a crossroads where it must make the political decision between 
either facing up to Parliament and maintaining its prerogatives as laid down in the Treaty or giving in 
to Parliament and accepting a fundamental change in the distribution of powers concerning the 
budgetary procedure. 
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4. The Community's present budgetary 
problems 
a. Own resources 
It became clear at the end of the 1970s that the own resources, as defined in the Decision of April 
1970, would not be sufficient to finance the Community in the future. Continuation of present 
policies would not be possible as customs duties and agricultural import levies would tend to level 
off, leaving the VAT revenue as the only buoyant element. It is a well-known fact that the expendi-
ture level for the common agricultural policy is highly volatile and a steep increase for a year or two 
would threaten to break through the VAT ceiling. 
It would be even more difficult to launch and implement new common policies. At the beginning of 
the 1980s an increase of the VAT revenue for the Community of 0.1% puts approximately 1 000 
million ECU at the disposal of the Community. This amount is far from what would be necessary for 
a broad range of new common policies. 
In political terms, it was perhaps more important that the enlargement with Spain and Portugal 
would be impossible unless the financial resources at the disposal of the Community were increased. 
If the VAT ceiling was maintained, it would mean that Spain and Portugal were to join quite another 
Community than the one they had wanted to be members of. Such a political venture was simply not 
feasible. 
For 1982 the own resources were fully exhausted. 
For 1983 the Community actually used more than was at its disposal under the own-resources 
system. The call-up percentage of VAT was fixed at 0.99, but expenditures equal to 675 million 
ECU under the common agricultural policy were carried over to 1984. 
For 1984, the Commission estimates a shortfall of revenue amounting to approximately 2 000 mil-
lion ECU. The Commission has asked for this amount to be placed at the disposal of the Community 
by advanced payments of VAT revenue from the Member States. 
For 1985, the preliminary draft budget of the Commission envisages a shortfall of approximately 
1 900 million ECU. 
The Commission intends to solve this problem by letting the increase of the VAT ceiling to 1.4% 
take effect from 1 October 1985, which will make it possible to operate with a call-up percentage of 
VAT for the whole of 1985 of 1.12%. 
It took several years and was very difficult to agree on an increase of the VAT ceiling from 1% to 
1.4%. This compromise, however, must not obscure the fact that this increase will hardly be suffi-
cient to tide the Community over until the end of the 1980s. 
If we start on the assumption that the preliminary draft for 1985 is based on correct data, the Com-
munity will sail into the new era of increased VAT resources with a VAT percentage of 1.12. Add to 
this an estimate of 0.2% which will be needed to finance the enlargement, and the astonishing fact is 
that a new and further increase will impose itself. The European Council has partly foreseen this, 
which is why a further increase to 1.6% taking effect in 1988 is mentioned as a possibility. 
The unavoidable and disheartening conclusion is that the Community may be able to finance itself 
until 1990 on the basis of a VAT percentage of 1.4 or 1.6 but only on the condition that the structure 
of the common activities is frozen in its present shape. 
We will thus see six years from now a Community with one predominant common policy giving rise 
to expenditure, namely the common agricultural policy, and the balance of the financial resources 
used mainly to finance the enlargement. No new common policies giving rise to expenditure will 
have been launched and implemented and the Community system will be just as unbalanced as it has 
been for the last 5 to 10 years. 
It is remarkable that this has not really been understood when the financial problems were nego-
tiated. Only a few countries supported a VAT increase to between 1.56% and 2%. Most Member 
States were quite happy that the VAT increase was limited to 1.4%. Among them were the UK and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which have for years advocated a better balance between the 
Community's common policies. But when the Community came to the crossroads they were not will-
ing to place the financial resources necessary to implement such a policy at the disposal of the Com-
munity. 
b. Budgetary discipline 
A new concept has been born during the recent negotiations on the Community's future financing: 
budgetary discipline. 
Until the meeting of the European Council in June 1983, budgetary discipline was a concept which 
was hardly known in Community circles, but after that juncture it has risen in importance with every 
meeting of the European Council. 
The main idea of budgetary discipline is to define a financial framework for total Community expen-
diture. Before each budgetary year it is decided how much total expenditure is allowed to increase 
and the budget must be drawn up with respect of that ceiling. 
During the first half of 1984 this approach was further refined, in the sense that a separate ceiling for 
agricultural expenditure and for non-obligatory expenditure was worked out. For agricultural 
expenditure, the idea is that the annual increase shall be lower than the growth rate of the own 
resources. Both figures are to be calculated on a base covering three years. Furthermore, account has 
to be taken of special circumstances, in particular following from the enlargement. This phrase 
means that the general rule is not to be applied in a strict sense but may be abrogated if and when it is 
deemed necessary. 
It was primarily the UK, supported by the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, which 
managed to get approval of this idea. 
For non-obligatory spending, agreement was reached that the maximum rate of increase should not 
be surpassed for the coming budgets. To respect this aim the Member States took it upon themselves 
to decide on a draft budget inside half of the maximum rate, which leaves the other half at the dispo-
sal of Parliament. 
It is not difficult to see the political aim of budgetary discipline, but it is, indeed, a strange animal in 
the Community zoo. It is without any foundation in the Treaty or the acquis communautaire. 
Firstly, it is doubtful, to put it mildly, whether budgetary discipline as agreed upon by the Council is 
in conformity with the Treaty. It may be said that the Council is free to impose upon itself any sort of 
discipline but this can hardly be right when the rules infringe the powers of other institutions or run 
counter to the Treaty. 
Secondly, the idea of fixing a framework for total expenditure before the budgetary procedure is not 
foreseen in the Treaty and may, indeed, be said to limit the Commission's right of initiative. What is 
left of this right if the Council has announced beforehand that whatever the Commission puts for-
ward and whichever arguments are used to support it, the Council has already decided what to do? 
The interplay between the institutions is more or less violated in the sense that the Council has de-
cided not to use paragraph 9 of Article 203, which foresees the possibility of fixing a new and higher 
maximum rate of increase. What is the purpose of having this paragraph in the Treaty if one of the 
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institutions decides that it cannot be used? Parliament can rightly say that the finely-tuned budgetary 
procedure has unilaterally been set aside by the Council, in the sense that the end result with regard 
to total expenditure as well as its distribution on obligatory and non-obligatory appropriations has 
been decided in advance by the Council. 
The ceiling for agricultural expenditure may be said to question the contents of what is called obli-
gatory expenditure. Hitherto, obligatory expenditure has been fixed at the amount which followed 
automatically from legal acts adopted by the Council. The amount of obligatory expenditure was, as 
it were, determined by the contents of the legal acts and not to be fixed at an arbitrary level by the 
Council. 
If the ceiling is to be respected, the Council has only two possibilities. The first one is to make 
arbitrary cuts in agricultural spending so that the budgetary ceiling replaces the legal acts as the 
decisive vehicle for the size of agricultural spending. This would mean that the concept of obligatory 
spending was defacto removed from the vocabulary of the Community. The second one is to tell the 
Agricultural Ministers that they must shape a common agricultural policy for which expenditure 
does not surpass the ceiling. This is, of course, feasible, at least in theory, but it means that the poli-
cy-making of the Community is moved from one Council (Agriculture) to another (Budget). Further-
more, an interesting clash would occur in case the Agricultural Ministers are not inclined to follow 
the directives imposed upon them by the European Council and implemented by the Budget Minis-
ters. 
The decision not to surpass the maximum rate of increase is of course perfectly legal, but it is ques-
tionable whether it remains so if the other branch of the budget authority — Parliament — does not 
agree. 
Under this rule, non-obligatory spending would grow at a very modest rate indeed, when measured 
in real terms. It is very difficult to see how the Community could take up new common policies if the 
growth rate of expenditure for this purpose is limited to 7% or 8%. The consequence of this policy is 
thus that the Community is frozen in its present shape, with the inevitable result that all problems 
associated with the Community's future financing will still be there at the end of the 1980s. 
It is often said that as Member States are taking a very rigorous attitude towards the expenditure side 
of national budgets, the same should be the case where the Community budget is concerned. This 
attitude, which is comprehensible, is based on a wrong philosophy concerning the role of the Com-
munity and the division of responsibility between, on the one hand, the nation State and, on the 
other hand, the Community. 
The European nation States have in the past implemented common policies over a broad range. It is 
only natural that these policies are being scrutinized and that expenditure often is being trimmed. 
From time to time existing policies have to be adapted to new circumstances and at present nearly all 
Member States face the unpleasant fact that public expenditure has out-grown what the economic 
base can sustain. 
But this is not the case for the Community. The Community has only one common policy which 
gives rise to expenditure, namely the common agricultural policy. For this policy exactly the same 
scrutiny as the one applied by the nation State has been carried out to make savings. A lot of 
measures have been adopted to this effect. In no other area has a common policy worthy of the name 
been implemented. A restrictive line towards expenditure means that no common policies are being 
shaped. It means that the distribution of responsibility between the nation State and the Community 
is being left to its present status. 
It is strange indeed that no serious attempt has been made to allocate certain tasks to the Community 
and abandon the same tasks at a national level. Such a procedure would mean that the responsibility 
and expenditure would be transferred from national level to Community level. Total expenditure in 
Europe would not rise because national expenditure would go down and Community expenditure 
would accordingly go up. If policies are picked with an eye to what is suited for international co-
83 
operation it may even be cheaper for everybody concerned to let the Community do the job instead 
of having 10 individual nation States trying to do it at the same time! 
The much-heralded concept of budgetary discipline may well turn out to be a snake in the Commun-
ity paradise. Institutionally, it may trigger off a major confrontation between the different branches 
of the budget authority. Legally, it is doubtful whether it is in conformity with the Treaty. It may jeo-
pardize the common agricultural policy and at the same time bar the way for other, new common 
policies. 
c. Budgetary imbalance 
The most difficult point during the accession negotiations in 1970 and 1971 was the UK contribu-
tion to the Community budget. When this problem was solved it was clear that the negotiations 
would be successfully concluded. 
United Kingdom calculations at that time pointed towards a financial burden for the UK, but it was 
rightly stressed by the other Member States that the calculations were based upon the assumption of 
a static Community. If the UK took the lead in developing the Community outside the agricultural 
sphere it would change the pattern of financial flows between Member States. 
It is interesting to note that the UK criticism has not been static but has developed over the years. It 
started as a dissatisfaction with the receipts side of the budget, that is the own-resources system. The 
UK Government took the view that as the UK's share of imports from non-member countries was 
above the Community average, the UK would pay in customs duties and agricultural import levies in 
excess of what a GDP key would have led to. Apparently it did not make any difference that this is 
exactly how the own-resources system is supposed to work because of the Community preference. 
This approach led to the adoption of the corrective mechanism,4 which was agreed in principle at the 
European Council meeting in Dublin in 1975. 
A few years later the UK Government evoked once more the budgetary problem but now it was pre-
sented in the sense that the so-called UK net contribution was grossly out of line with the UK's rela-
tive standard of living. In conceptual terms, this change of approach signified that from focusing on 
the receipts side only the UK Government now also brought the expenditure side into the picture. 
For the last five years the concept of net contribution has dominated the Community's agenda and 
played a major role in the Community's life. 
This is regrettable — for several reasons. 
Firstly, the UK's net contribution amounts to between 0.3% and 0.4% of the UK's gross domestic 
product. The Community as such has paid a heavy price for trying to solve a problem which cannot 
be said to be of importance either for the Community itself or for the UK. This point leaves aside the 
fact that the whole basis of calculation of net contribution is subject to criticism.5 
Secondly, nothing in the Treaty or the acquis communautaire warrants the concept of net contribu-
tion. On the receipts side the own-resources system lays down that the geographical place for collect-
ing revenue is of no importance and that there should be no link between what is paid in from a 
Member State and its share of Community GDP. In fact, it can be said that there is no such thing as 
Member States' payments to the Community budget because what Member States pay in belongs to 
the Community as such and the Member State is only acting as a collector. 
' Council Regulation (EEC) No 1172/76 of 17.5.1976 setting up a financial mechanism: OJ L 131, 20.5.1976. 
! See Møller, Member States and the Community Budget, 1982. 
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On the expenditure side, we distinguish between two types of appropriations in the budget. The 
common agricultural policy is based upon the principle that the geographical place for payments is 
irrelevant. It should amount to the same for the individual farmer whether he receives restitutions, 
sells to intervention or sells his products on the market. Thus the fact that a farmer in one country 
receives restitutions makes it possible for a farmer in another country to sell on the market at the 
going price. This is why we speak of a common policy and not of 10 individual policies which are 
coordinated. For the structural funds exactly the opposite applies. Here we have, at least implicitly, a 
geographical key to ensure that the Community assists less-developed regions in their endeavours to 
obtain economic growth. 
This analysis shows why it makes no sense to operate with the concept of net contribution. The 
receipts side of the budget and the expenditure following from the common agricultural policy expli-
citly reject a geographical key. For the structural funds a geographical key has already been imple-
mented. The concept of net contribution is thus a mixture of receipts and payments — mutually 
incompatible — based on a philosophy which is in contradiction to the very principles of the Com-
munity system.6 
Parliament has adopted a line which has very much in common with the above analysis, which has 
also been stated, at least partly and in softer terms, by nearly all other Member States except the UK. 
In the second half of 1983 and the beginning of 1984 an attempt was made to solve the UK budget 
problem by focusing exclusively on the payment side of the Community budget. The philosophy 
behind this approach was that the UK budget problem had arisen because of the imbalance between 
common policies and the resulting financial flows between Member States. A glance at the expendi-
ture to Member States measured in percentage of their GDP shows that the UK receives a share far 
below the Community average. (For 1982 total expenditure amounted to 0.75% of Community 
GDP while payments to the UK amounted to 0.49% of the UK's GDP.) If the imbalance were cor-
rected, it would mean that the UK's share would approach the Community average and there would 
be no UK budget problem. In the meantime, the Community should take upon itself to alleviate the 
UK problem by partly compensating the expenditure shortfall.7 
At the European Council meeting at Fontainebleau a mechanism was approved that does not totally 
follow this philosophy but at least has certain resemblances. However, the fact that the Community 
at the same time decided to implement a budgetary discipline will mean that in four or five years' 
time the present imbalance between common policies will still exist and the UK's budget problem 
will return to the negotiating table. The weak link in the chain is that the Community did not decide 
to establish new common policies and to regard the mechanism to solve the UK's problem as a transi-
tional mechanism. Instead, it must be feared that the mechanism is here to stay and that new com-
mon policies will never be permitted to take off. 
d. Different philosophies 
towards the Community's financing 
What to the general public appears as a budgetary or financial question is thus a question of which 
philosophy to apply for the future development of the Community. The main battle is about 
approach and not about money, even if the two things in the long run are intertwined. 
One approach — the pure one — gives full priority to the contents of the Community system, that is 
the common policies, and the budget is allocated a role very much in the background. What matters 
'Financing the European Economic Community' Møller, National Westminster Bank Quarterly Review, November 1983. 
Proposal submitted by the Danish Government in August 1983. 
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are the legal acts and the substantial decisions taken by the Council. The budget is merely a book-
keeping account which reflects these decisions but does not have any impact on policy. If expenditure 
is rising too fast or if a budgetary imbalance arises the problem is not a budgetary or financial one, 
but a question of whether or not the Community system works as intended. The budget is the instru-
ment which sets off the alarm but any correction has to be taken via a change or an adaption of the 
existing legal acts. The budget has no role in policy-making. 
The own resources should be expanded considerably. The increase of the VAT ceiling to 1.4% and 
possibly a further increase to 1.6% is regarded as totally insufficient. There must be enough financial 
manoeuvring room to permit the development of new common policies while at the same time the 
existing common policies are continued grosso modo in their present shape. The role of the own-
resources system is to provide financing of the common policies adopted by the Council. In principle, 
no financial ceiling should be applied as this will implicitly act as a brake on efforts to further the 
integration process. 
Budgetary discipline as worked out during the first half of 1984 is a sort of anathema to this 
approach. For obligatory spending expenditure follows what is necessary to implement the common 
policies. For non-obligatory spending, appropriations necessary to launch and implement new com-
mon policies should be approved. This does not mean that the Community should spend without 
taking into account the harsher financial climate, but that a financial strait-jacket is totally out of 
order. 
An analogy to national policies is rejected on the basis that a Community in an embryonic phase 
must necessarily face a rapid increase in spending as common policies are gradually accelerating. The 
concept of net contribution does not belong in this context. The own-resources system works as 
designed and the expenditure side of the budget may be changed if there is a need for it but, if so, it 
must be done by way of the common policies and not by intervention in the budget itself. 
The other approach — the budgetary one — looks at the Community system from the opposite side 
of the spectrum. 
The budget must work inside a rigorous financial framework and produce equitable financial results 
for each Member State. If something is wrong with the budget it should be remedied at once by direct 
changes in the budgetary and financial mechanisms. If such steps are incompatible with the existing 
common policies and the legal acts adopted by the Council, these have to be changed to produce the 
necessary budgetary and financial results. First priority is thus given to the budget and all the rest has 
to follow as best it can. It does not really matter what we do or what we do not do in conformity or 
not with the Community system as long as the budgetary results are satisfactory. 
The analytic base for the Community system and its budget is approximately the same as for a 
grocer's shop. Expenditure must not exceed revenue and if it does happen expenditure has to be cut 
to fit the revenue available. A higher VAT ceiling can only be contemplated when a rigorous savings 
policy has not brought down expenditure to the level of revenue. 
Budgetary discipline has been consecrated in this approach. If only the Community can bring its 
expenditure into line all will be well. It does not matter that the commo'. agricultural policy is 
jeopardized and that the integration process is being brought to an abrupt stop. 
In this approach there is a strict analogy to the nation State. When the individual Member State has 
to save the Community must also save. The effect of this, namely, that an existing national policy is 
being trimmed while the common policy of the Community is being killed before it even gets off the 
ground, is not being discussed. 
Budgetary imbalance is another key word in this approach. The budget must show an equitable 
burden-sharing (the word 'profit-sharing' would be far better, as the Community is producing a 
surplus). Failing that, the budgetary system, including the own-resources system, should be changed. 
This should not be done by adapting the common policies to bring about a better balance but by way 
of direct changes in the budgetary system as such. 
86 
This underlines the difference in conceptual terms between those who have talked about a better 
balance between common policies and those who have used the term a better budgetary balance. 
This may sound like a question of semantics but is not at all so. It is a question of how you approach 
the very principles of the Community system and which role to assign to the budget. 
Until 1980, the first approach (the pure approach) was the only one in the Community. There was 
no talk about budgetary discipline or budgetary imbalance and the concept of net contribution was 
never heard of. 
The founding fathers of the Community had with great skill drawn up a Community which was logi-
cal in the sense that the substantial decisions taken by the Council were the determining factor and 
the budget did not play any role as such in policy-making. The reason for this is not difficult to com-
prehend. It was the only way to further the integration process where new common policies could 
continuously be launched and implemented. In this conceptual framework the driving force is new 
decisions and the financing is being provided by the Member States without questioning the growth 
rate of expenditure or the financial result for each individual Member State. 
The founding fathers realized that a Community where the financial aspect is predominant would 
stop the integration process. Member States would try to save money (either to reduce total spending 
or to use the amount at national level) and Member States would only support the common policy if 
the difference between receipts and payments was positive. 
This prediction of what one or the other of the two approaches would mean for the European 
integration process has indeed been borne out by experience during the last 5 to 10 years. 
Around 1980, the picture changed, in the sense that the pure approach was no longer the only 
approach. One Member State, with more or less firm support from one or two other Member States, 
introduced the budgetary approach. 
The heart of the matter of the negotiations on the Community's future financing for the last five 
years has been whether the pure approach should continue to be the predominant one or whether it 
should be replaced by the budgetary approach. This has been difficult to realize because tangible fac-
tors such as financial flows and money have been in the forefront of the picture. However, digging a 
little deeper we see clearly that the money question has only been a skirmish while the main battle 
concerning the conceptual basis for the Community has raged in the background. 
The solution reached by the European Council at Fontainebleau in June 1984 may be said to safe-
guard the essential elements of the pure approach, while at the same time accommodating important 
elements of the budgetary approach. It is thus a political compromise, and as such it will undoubt-
edly place the Community in a difficult situation when necessary decisions are to be taken in the 
years ahead. 
The battle has not been won by any party but a cease-fire has been concluded in the hope that the 
problems will diminish as the Community develops further. That is a pious hope and it remains to be 
seen whether it will be fulfilled. 
e. The position of the European Parliament 
The European Parliament has for many years supported the European integration process. Indeed, it 
can be said that up to the mid-1970s Parliament put forward many ideas for new common policies. 
After that period, however, Parliament's attention has gradually focused more on institutional ques-
tions than on the contents of the Community system. Parliament has devoted more and more time to 
obtaining increased powers and more influence on the decision-making procedure, with the inevi-
table result that less time has been available for dealing with the common policies. 
87 
With regard to the budgetary question, Parliament has always defended what we termed the pure 
approach in the analysis under point 3 above. Not only has Parliament been a steadfast supporter of 
the Community system, but it has maintained its procedure concerning the budgetary system and its 
role even in a period where several Member States have been willing to consider important changes. 
On many occasions Parliament has pointed out the pitfalls and weaknesses in the special arrange-
ments agreed in the Council as temporary solutions to the UK's budget problem. Parliament has cal-
led for a permanent solution in conformity with the principles of the Community system and within 
the framework of the existing own-resources system. With regard to own resources Parliament has 
taken the view that the existing 1% VAT ceiling is totally insufficient to finance the Community. 
Parliament has asked for abandonment of the ceiling, or at least introduction of a more flexible pro-
cedure to lift the ceiling if and when the need arises. 
Parliament has been heavily criticized for being a spendthrift and it is correct to say that the word 
budgetary discipline does not play a predominant role in Parliament's vocabulary. This is, however, 
not surprising in view of Parliament's general philosophy regarding the Community system. Parlia-
ment's position is also more nuanced. Parliament has tried to impose savings in the common agricul-
tural policy on the Council, without much success. Nor has the attempt to increase non-obligatory 
spending been successful, as the Council has not provided the necessary legal basis for new common 
policies. 
The UK budget problem, or rather the term budgetary imbalance, has been regarded by Parliament 
as a result of the imbalance in the Community system and not as a strictly budgetary or financial 
problem. Parliament's views on the philosophy behind the Community system and the role of the 
budgetary system are thus logical and correspond closely to the approach which dominated the Com-
munity scene until 1980. 
Parliament is the only institution which has been able to define and maintain a coherent view on the 
problem of the future financing of the Community. The Council has been under constant pressure 
from one Member State with more or less support from a few others. The Commission has found it 
difficult to map out the narrow road between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, the Commis-
sion has by instinct defended the pure approach. On the other hand, the pressure for a political solu-
tion has pushed the Commission towards the budgetary approach. 
5. Summary of part five - the finances 
of the Union (Articles 70-81) 
Article 70 contains the general aims and provisions. 
Article 71 concerns the revenue. The Union inherits the revenue system of the European Commu-
nities. This means that in the starting phase VAT will be the main revenue source. However, the 
Union may by an organic law create new and other revenue sources. Contrary to the present pro-
cedure such a step does not require ratification in Member States. 
Article 72 deals with expenditure and lays down that expenditure shall finance the common policies 
adopted by the Union. 
Article 73 proposes a system for financial equalization to alleviate excessive economic imbalance be-
tween the regions. 
Article 74 puts forward a proposal to divide responsibility between the nation States and the Com-
munity. It also contains a provision for multiannual financial programmes which will provide the 
framework for revenue and expenditure in the years ahead. 
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Artide 75 confirms that the budget must be in balance. It also defines the role of lending and borrow-
ing. 
Article 76 defines the budgetary procedure, which will be even more complicated than the already 
existing rules in Article 203 of the Treaty. 
Article 77 deals with provisional twelfths in case the budget has not been approved at the beginning 
of the financial year. 
Article 78 says that the budget is implemented by the Commission. 
Article 79 deals with audit of the accounts. 
Article 80 and Article 81 concern the account and discharge of the annual budget. 
6. The main features of Parliament's proposal 
a. General philosophy 
The starting point for the analysis of the provisions concerning the finances of the Union (Arts 70-
81 ) is that Parliament does not wish to change the role of the budgetary system in the integration pro-
cess. 
Adoption of Parliament's proposal would mean that the budgetary system would play the same role 
as was assigned to the budgetary system in the Treaty of Rome and the acquis communautaire that 
developed in the period 1958-80. It is the legal acts adopted by the Union which determine the size of 
the expenditure and Member States are committed to put the necessary financial resources at the dis-
posal of the Union. It is explicitly said that the revenue of the Union shall be utilized to guarantee the 
implementation of common actions undertaken by the Union. 
Parliament turns a blind eye to recent ideas concerning budgetary discipline and budgetary im-
balance. The role of the budget is to reflect what has been agreed upon by the decision-making 
institutions and the role of the financial system is to provide the necessary financial resources. 
Once more Parliament turns out as the defender of the philosophy behind the Treaty of Rome and 
the approach designed to facilitate and further the integration process. This is not surprising when 
one recalls that Parliament was for many years the advocate of new common policies. With its Draft 
Treaty, Parliament has once more invoked the need for new common policies. The distribution of 
roles assigned to, on the one hand, the budget, and on the other, the contents of the Community 
system reflects this list of priorities. 
b. National policies versus common policies 
An interesting feature of the Draft Treaty is that it takes on without any hesitation the distribution of 
responsibility between, on the one hand, national policies and, on the other, common policies. This 
is a task the present Community has evaded with great skill to the detriment of the Community 
system as well as the budgetary system. The Draft Treaty foresees that the Commission shall submit 
a report on the division between the Union and the Member States of the responsibility for imple-
menting common actions and the financial burdens resulting therefrom. 
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The Community would be well served if this task is carried out properly. With regard to substance it 
would do away with the present mess where nobody knows which tasks are assigned to the Com-
munity (except for the common agricultural policy which, by the way, is gradually being renation-
alized by national subsidies) and which tasks are to remain at national level. 
With regard to the budget, such a division of labour would provide a much better possibility for 
making the necessary financial resources available because it could be proved that the national trea-
suries would witness lower expenditure in the areas where common policies were launched. This is 
certainly a key feature in the Draft Treaty and it may be said without any reservations that the pre-
sent Community or a future Community on the basis of the Draft Treaty — or another Treaty — 
will only be viable if Member States muster the political will to grasp the magnitude of this problem 
and find the necessary answers. 
On top of the common agricultural policy, which should certainly continue to be a common policy, 
we would like to bring forward a few ideas of our own where the efforts wholly or partly could be 
transferred from national to Community level. 
Industrial policy is a prime example. Not only could the Community pursue and increase efforts to 
improve the internal market but a common policy designed to promote industry in the entire Euro-
pean geographical sphere could be mapped out. In many circles it is feared that this would be a costly 
venture where the Community would take over lame-duck industries and run up the cost associated 
herewith. This is far from certain. The Community could be more selective. It could condition finan-
cial assistance on an equitable effort by private industry. It could provide equity capital instead of, or 
as a supplement to, loan capital. The Esprit programme is an example of how this could be done in a 
way that is agreeable, and hopefully profitable, to the Community, to the nation State and to private 
industry. 
Research and technology also come to mind. In the United States or Japan there are not 10 Member 
States competing with each other in the same area. Europe should concentrate its research on com-
mon policies and common programmes. We should learn from the United States that only where 
research is linked to private industry do we get the necessary new technology. The task for Europe 
would then be to pool research and technology expenditure in sectors associated with the new tech-
nology and to provide the necessary framework for a fruitful cooperation between research institutes 
and private industry. 
In the same breath, Europe should build the necessary infrastructure to transfer knowledge, not only 
inside each individual nation State but also to the 10 Member States. Such an infrastructure could do 
two things for Europe. Firstly, it could launch Europe into the era of the information society by pro-
viding the necessary tool. Secondly, it would offer a springboard for European industry into this new 
era as a producer and a consumer. Let us not forget that the Roman Empire was based upon trans-
port of people. The British Empire which emerged during the industrial revolution was based upon 
transport of goods. In the coming age it is transport of knowledge which will be decisive, and if 
Europe does not master this we shall not be able to compete on an equal footing with the USA and 
Japan. 
These are only a few examples of what can and should be done at the Community level. It illustrates 
the fact that the starting point in the Draft Treaty, namely national level versus Community level, is 
the right one. It also shows clearly that even if something, perhaps a lot, can be done without giving 
rise to expenditure, Europe will never be able to weather the point unless all Member States show a 
much clearer commitment to increase the financial resources of the Community. It is also clear that 
such an attitude will only emerge if the Community and the Community institutions are able to 
demonstrate for which purposes they need the money and that the money will be spent in an efficient 
way for worthwhile projects covered by common policies. 
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c. Revenue 
It is explicitly said in Article 71 that when the Draft Treaty enters into force the revenue of the Union 
shall be of the same kind as that of the European Communities. The Union inherits the revenue 
system from the European Communities. However, the Union may, by an organic law, amend the 
nature or the basis of assessment of existing sources of revenue or create new ones. Until that time, 
the revenue sources of the Union are thus customs duties, agricultural import levies and VAT. As the 
only buoyant element is VAT we will limit our analysis to that particular element. 
The Draft Treaty rejects the present system, according to which an upper limit for the call-up percen-
tage of VAT is determined in the Treaty. The Union may call up the amount of revenue necessary to 
finance the common policies adopted by the Council. This is in conformity with the main philosophy 
advanced by the Parliament concerning which is the cart and which is the ox, the Community system 
or the budget. 
This approach is brought out clearly in Article 74, par. 2, according to which a multiannual finan-
cial programme lays down the projected development in the revenue and expenditure of the Union. 
These forecasts shall be revised annually and be used as a basis for the preparation of the budget. 
Thus, the heart of the matter is that the multiannual programme sets forth an annual increase in 
expenditure which governs the annual increase in the call-up percentage of VAT. 
As we shall see when we analyse the expenditure side, the distinction between obligatory and non-
obligatory spending is rejected, and there is thus no limit either for the annual increase in expendi-
ture, or for the revenue sources. 
Institutionally, the procedure means that the Council's exclusive powers on the revenue side of the 
budget are rejected in the sense that it is the Union which determines common policies, expenditures 
and therefore also the total amount of revenue. 
This is undoubtedly a major step. The Council has up to now vigorously defended its exclusive 
powers with regard to the revenue side of the budget. The Commission's proposals'1 to grant Parlia-
ment a say in increases of the VAT percentage above 1.4% were rejected with near-unanimity by the 
Council. 
There has been no development in the last 6 to 12 months indicating that the Member States would 
take a more favourable attitude towards granting Parliament powers on the revenue side. There is no 
reason to hide that nearly all Member States find it a hideous idea to transfer some of their taxation 
powers to the European Parliament, regardless of the procedure it would involve. 
It is just as clear that this is a corner-stone in the edifice proposed in the Draft Treaty. If the Europ-
ean Parliament does not receive powers with regard to Community revenue, it does not make much 
sense to increase its powers with regard to expenditure and common policies, because Council could 
block the use of such powers by limiting the available revenue. 
The argument is often advanced that the European Parliament will never be a real parliament with-
out powers to tax the European citizens. It is certainly correct that no parliament has ever manifested 
itself without taxation but there is not much prospect that Member States are willing to cross that 
bridge at the present juncture. 
Another argument to support taxation powers for Parliament is that it would mean a more 'responsi-
ble' parliament taking a more restrictive attitude towards expenditure. This may be right or wrong 
but to our mind the argument is a little bit out of context. Either it is a good thing to increase expen-
diture for common policies or it is a bad thing. Whether or not it would help to bring about a change 
in the mood of the European Parliament seems to be slightly irrelevant. 
'The future financing of the Community — Draft decision on new own resources'. Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, COM(83) 270 of 6.5.1983. 
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The virtues of basing the Community's finances on VAT are fairly clear. The VAT system is already 
working. The assessment base is well-known. It has been implemented in all Member States. It is 
buoyant. It introduces a certain element of progressivity on the revenue side of the budget. So far, so 
good. 
It is, however, to be regretted that the occasion has not been used to float ideas for other sources of 
revenue. To do so is to invite criticism for being too fanciful. But to limit the Community's revenue 
to VAT will pose difficulties in two respects. Firstly, there is certainly a limit to the amount of VAT 
revenue which the Member States will forgo. Secondly, the crucial element in the financing system — 
the connection between common policies and revenue sources — is not being pursued. 
It would have been a good idea if the European Parliament had put forward proposals for other 
sources of revenue which go at least some of the way towards meeting these preoccupations. 
One possibility would have been to propose an energy levy, either in the form of a direct levy on 
energy consumption or an energy import levy. Both possibilities are feasible and both could be com-
bined with important progress towards a common energy policy in the Community. 
Another idea could be to focus on nation State aids in the Member States. According to Articles 92 
and 93 of the Treaty of Rome, Member States are authorized by the Commission to use State aids 
when certain conditions are fulfilled. The Community could go a step further and use the nation 
State aids as a tax basis for Community revenue. The system could require Member States to pay a 
certain percentage, for example 10%, of authorized nation State aids into the Community budget. 
Such a system would certainly make it less attractive to operate a State aid system in Member States. 
It would serve as a Community instrument to promote a more efficient industrial basis in the whole 
Community while at the same time providing a handsome revenue for the Community. 
The Draft Treaty does not rule out that the Community may need new and other revenue sources. It 
is stated explicitly in Article 71, par. 2, that the existing sources of revenue may be amended or that 
the Union may create new revenue sources. The provisions concerning revenue sources are therefore 
not totally static but dynamic in the sense that it is foreseen that the Community may not in the long 
run be viable with a financial framework confined to the present revenue sources. It is, however, 
doubtful whether it will be possible to introduce new revenue sources by means of an organic law. 
Indeed, it may be said to be highly unlikely that the Member States will give up the need for ratifica-
tion which is presently required to create new revenue sources. 
The Draft Treaty maintains the present system where the Member States collect the revenue. It is, 
however, foreseen that the Union may set up its own revenue-collecting authorities. In legal terms, 
this seems to be superfluous. In any case it can be taken for granted that the Member States will not 
be willing to establish such authorities. 
d. Lending and borrowing 
According to the Treaty and the present financial regulations, the Community can borrow on the 
international capital markets and lend the amount for specific purposes defined in a legal act adopted 
by the Council. 
There is no general provision for the Community to borrow and lend. It can only be done when the 
Council has so decided and specified the amount and the aims. The legal act adopted by the Council 
is the pivot of the operations while the presentation in the budget is only for book-keeping purposes. 
The Draft Treaty changes this situation. 
The Union may authorize the Commission to issue loans. The maximum amounts are defined in the 
annual budget. It is explicitly said that borrowed funds may only be used to finance investments. 
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These provisions are not totally clear and not totally in conformity with Article 75, which says that 
the adopted budget must be in balance. If we are dealing with a balanced budget, as is the case for the 
present Community budget, loans may clearly not be used to finance expenditures covered by the 
budget. 
This problem could be solved if the Draft Treaty contained a provision for loan financing and 
opened the door for a budget where revenue would not equal expenditure but this is not the case. 
Then we are more or less back to square one, in the sense that loan operations can only be used for 
specific purposes in accordance with a legal act. If that is the idea it is difficult to see why the Draft 
Treaty should contain provisions on loan operations. If it is not the case it should be more clearly 
explained which role is assigned to lending and borrowing. 
It is an open question whether the proposed lending and borrowing differ from the task already per-
formed by the European Investment Bank. 
The provisions concerning lending and borrowing are thus among the weakest and most elusive in 
the Draft Treaty, which is a pity because a more important and a more clearly-defined role for lend-
ing and borrowing could definitely promote the integration process. 
If, on the other hand, the idea is that loan financing is brought in when receipts do not equal expen-
diture to balance the budget, we are in fact operating with a system where the budget ex definitione is 
balanced. Whenever there is a shortfall of revenue, loan financing builds the gap. Loan financing 
may thus be said to be an automatic residual. 
It would have been helpful if the Draft Treaty had been clear on this point, that is whether a balanced 
budget means that receipts defined as revenue sources equal expenditure or a balanced budget means 
that receipts, including loan operations, equal expenditure. 
e. Expenditure 
Aside from doing away with the VAT ceiling the revenue side of the budget proposed in the Draft 
Treaty does not differ in principle from the present own-resources system. The same analogy of con-
tinuation cannot be said to exist for the expenditure side, which in several respects differs fundamen-
tally from the present budgetary system. 
Even if the general philosophy — common policies determine expenditure — is the same in the Draft 
Treaty as in the Treaty of Rome and acquis communautaire, several important changes are introdu-
ced in the Draft Treaty. 
The first and most important one is that the Draft Treaty rejects the present distinction between obli-
gatory and non-obligatory expenditure. All expenditure is treated on an equal footing with regard to 
annual increase and, as we shall see later, in the budgetary procedure. This change is in conformity 
with the change in the legislative procedure, which rejects the hitherto exclusive powers of the Coun-
cil. 
Analytically, it makes good sense to supplement the proposed legislative procedure with a budgetary 
procedure where all sorts of expenditure are subjected to the same rules and procedures. There is no 
reason to distinguish between obligatory and non-obligatory spending if and when the present Com-
munity system is replaced by a system where the legal basis for expenditure is of a quite different 
nature. 
We must bear clearly in mind that the Draft Treaty foresees a Community system, a legislative proce-
dure and a budgetary system which differ substantially and in principle from the present system. 
There will be no legal acts which automatically lay down the size of expenditure, as is the case for 
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obligatory spending under the present rules. There is no maximum rate of increase for non-oblig-
atory expenditure, and the finely-tuned balance between Council and Parliament, which is brought 
about by the present system, is replaced by quite another balance of powers. The annual increase for 
total expenditure is determined in the framework of multiannual financial programmes. 
This is clearly one of the cases where the Draft Treaty hopes that political wisdom will prevail 
because it is not foreseen what happens if such programmes cannot be agreed upon or if they give rise 
to expenditure out of proportion with realities or what Member States are willing to accept. It is said 
that the programmes shall be revised annually, but that is one of many provisions which in them-
selves are admirable but which at the same time open possibilities for confrontation between the 
institutions and the Member States. 
The Draft Treaty contains a modest but very useful provision which the Community should have 
taken up long ago, namely to evaluate annually the effectiveness of the common policies in view of 
the costs associated therewith. There is no doubt that for too long a period expenditure has gone on 
rising in the Community without a thorough analysis of the common policies and the common 
actions to prove whether the money is spent for the designed purposes and, if so, it is spent in the 
right way. 
A cost-benefit analysis would do the Community a lot of good. If the result were that some of the 
money was not well spent then the Community could make savings and by so doing prove that is is 
not acting as a blind man's buff. 
If, on the other hand, the analysis proves that the money was well spent the Community would 
remove the suspicion that this is not so and be in a much better position to increase spending. 
This provision in the Draft Treaty would be a very useful instrument when deciding on the division 
of responsibility between, on the one hand, the national level and, on the other, the Community level 
and it would go a long way towards providing the basis for the multiannual financial programmes 
(all assuming that the analysis is carried out in an efficient way and that failures are exposed and not 
stowed away). 
ƒ. Financial equalization 
It is specifically said in Article 73 that a system of financial equalization shall be introduced in order 
to alleviate excessive economic imbalances between the regions. It is, however, not said how such a 
system should work. The starting point for an analysis must be whether it should work on the 
revenue or on the expenditure side of the budget. 
If the idea is to introduce a financial equalization system on the revenue side the effect would be a 
complete change in the own-resources system. We have seen in Chapter II that the own-resources 
system does not take relative welfare into account. If this were to be done to ensure that Member 
States with a GDP per capita below Community average should pay less than Member States with a 
GDP per capita above Community average a complete recast of the system would be called for. Of 
course, such a change could be implemented if the Member States were willing to do so. But it should 
not be obscured that it would mean a replacement of the own-resources system by quite another 
system. 
In legal terms, the effect would be that revenue collected in the Member States is not the property of 
the Community from the moment of collection because it had to be subjected to a multiplication fac-
tor reflecting relative welfare. Or, in other words, the revenue had to pass through national treasur-
ies in order to be reduced or increased by a multiplication factor and only after that process had been 
completed the amount would be transferred to the Community. Such a system is perfectly feasible, 
but only if the national treasuries were introduced as an accounting machine between, on the one 
hand, the citizens and the enterprises and, on the other, the Community. 
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This point is more clearly seen when keeping in mind that the same effect could be obtained by pay-
ing in VAT according to the present rules and introducing a special levy on Member States with a 
GDP per capita above Community average and a special subsidy on Member States with a GDP 
below Community average. 
The effects for VAT as an 'own resource' have been analysed in a recent work by G. Isaac.' The 
conclusion is that a multiplication factor means that any idea of VAT as an 'own resource' (illusory 
or real) cannot be maintained. In this case the Community will operate with a taux d'appel and not a 
taux d'imposition. If it is doubtful whether the VAT in its present shape is an 'own resource' such 
doubts will not any longer persist if a multiplication factor is introduced. 
It is doubtful whether such a system would bring about a real equalization. It would of course mean 
a transfer from rich to poor Member States but it would not necessarily mean a transfer of money 
from rich to poor citizens. 
This point can be illustrated by an example. Denmark would pay a sum of money to Greece but to 
do so all Danish citizens would be taxed regardless of their income and all Greek citizens regardless 
of their income would witness an alleviation of their fiscal burden. The implication would be that a 
poor Danish citizen would be taxed in order to alleviate the fiscal burden of a rich Greek citizen. 
This is really the heart of the matter because it would mean that we are moving away from the idea of 
a Community to a more traditional pattern of international cooperation where Member States are 
transferring money between each other. This can hardly be what the European Parliament wants. 
To avoid this effect the equalization system would have to be introduced on the expenditure side. It 
would mean that schemes to support poor regions and poor citizens would be implemented. The 
Social Fund is already performing this task with more or less success. Similar schemes or funds could 
be set up. With the equalization system operating on the expenditure side of the budget we are back 
in the mainstream of Parliament's philosophy regarding the Community system and the role of the 
budget. 
g. Budgetary procedure 
In the present budgetary procedure (Article 203 of the Treaty) we have the following distribution of 
powers between the institutions: 
(i) The Commission proposes. 
(ii) The Council decides on a draft budget which is forwarded to Parliament. The Council takes the 
final decision with regard to obligatory spending. During the institutional interplay with Parlia-
ment, Council has an important say with regard to non-obligatory spending. It may even be said 
that Council by way of the maximum rate of increase exclusively can define the framework for 
non-obligatory spending, but not its composition. 
(iii) The President of Parliament finally approves the budget. Parliament may forward modifications 
on obligatory spending but has no direct powers in this area. With regard to non-obligatory 
spending Parliament has the final word but cannot surpass the maximum rate of increase with-
out the consent of the Council. 
It is thus the Council which has the upper hand in this institutional interplay. 
The Draft Treaty proposed by the European Parliament constitutes a sweeping change. 
* Isaac, Quelles Ressources pour la Communauté Européenne;', presented to CEDECE, Toulouse, 18-20.10.1984. 
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It is still the task of the Commission to forward a preliminary budget. The Council finds itself strip-
ped of all powers to decide and is relegated to the institution which makes amendments to the Com-
mission's proposal so that Parliament can decide. Parliament is the institution which, in the end, takes 
all decisions with regard to size as well as composition of the budget. 
It is no overstatement to say that the budgetary procedure and the distribution of powers between the 
institutions have been completely turned around. 
It becomes clear already in the first phrase which says that the Commission forwards the draft bud-
get to the budget authority. According to Article 203 of the Treaty the preliminary draft budget is 
forwarded to the Council. Under the present rules it is the Council which establishes a draft budget 
by a Council decision and forwards it to Parliament. 
This is not the case in Article 76 in the Draft Treaty. According to the proposed procedure, the 
Council may approve amendments and the amended budget is forwarded to Parliament. The 
implication of this is that unless Council agrees on an amendment the appropriations in the Commis-
sion's draft budget stand. Under the present rules there is no appropriation unless Council takes a 
decision with qualified majority. 
It seems to be a minor point but may not prove to be so in practice that amendments according to the 
Draft Treaty shall be approved by simple majority. In a Community of 12 Member States, approval 
of amendments calls for the vote of seven Member States. Judging by experience in recent years, it is 
highly unlikely that seven Member States will agree on an amendment and the proposed procedure 
would thus mean that the large majority of the appropriations proposed by the Commission would 
stand. 
The next step in the procedure is a first reading by Parliament. Parliament may amend by an absolute 
majority the amendments of the Council. Parliament may also on its own initiative approve other 
amendments by a simple majority. This brings out the general thrust of the proposal, which is to 
increase Parliament's powers. 
The third step gives the Commission the possibility of opposing amendments approved by the Coun-
cil or by the Parliament. If the Commission chooses to do so, the appropriations are referred back to 
the relevant institution, which will have to make a fresh decision, this time by a qualified majority. 
The fourth step gives the Council the right to amend the amendments approved by the Parliament. 
This can only be done by a qualified majority defined in Article 23, par. 2 (b) as three-fifths of the 
weighted votes cast. 
After having done so, the Council once more forwards the draft budget to Parliament, which at its 
second reading may reject amendments of the Council by a qualified majority. 
This finishes the budgetary procedure and Parliament finally adopts the budget by an absolute 
majority. 
It is clear that the Council can never decide finally on an appropriation or reject amendments propo-
sed by Parliament. The Council can only make amendments either to the original draft forwarded by 
the Commission or to the amendments approved by Parliament. The only powers which are given to 
the Council are that by a qualified majority it can request the Commission to submit a new draft. 
The proposed procedure is very complex, even Byzantine. It is difficult to see why and how such a 
procedure is proposed when the aim quite clearly is to transfer the decision-making powers from 
Council to Parliament. 
It is difficult to see why the Draft Treaty in some cases proposes simple majority, in other cases quali-
fied majority and in other cases again absolute majority. It makes good sense to use different voting 
procedures under the present rules because of the distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory 
spending and the finely-tuned balance between Council and Parliament. But it does not make much 
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sense under the system proposed in the Draft Treaty, which does away with the distinction between 
different types of expenditure and places the decision-making exclusively with Parliament. It looks as 
if the authors have wished to forward a procedure which at least bears some resemblances to Article 
203 while not containing any of the important features of this article. 
7. The implication for economic integration 
In the last 30 years economic integration, among other things in the shape of economic and monetary 
union, has played a predominant role in the academic and political debate. Many scholars have tried 
to map out ways to facilitate and promote economic integration and many studies have been prod-
uced. As the European Community is the only genuine example of economic integration, it is only 
natural that many of the ideas have been put forward in the European debate and that many of the 
European experiences have served as basis for the academic debate. 
In 1977 the Commission sponsored the MacDougall report10 on the role of public finance in Europ-
ean integration. The MacDougall report is the main reference work to determine whether or not 
financial measures will promote the integration process. 
It is both disappointing and regrettable that the provisions on finance in the Draft Treaty do not really 
make an attempt to take up the challenge of the MacDougall report to design a budgetary and finan-
cial system suited to promote economic integration. 
In fact, the MacDougall report has pointed the way ahead in calculating the size of Community 
expenditure necessary for different stages of the integration process. It is said that in a pre-federal 
integration stage Community expenditure should rise to between 2% and 2.5% of total Community 
gross domestic product. 
The next stage could be a federation, with expenditure running at 5-7% of GDP (2-3 percentage 
points higher if defence expenditure is included). At this stage, the European federation would 
encompass many common policies to increase productivity and living standards while at the same 
time alleviating regional differences. 
In the final stage, total Community expenditure would amount to 20-25% of GDP or perhaps even 
higher, placing the European federation on an equal footing with the USA. 
To our mind, the Draft Treaty would have stood a better chance if it had been based firmly on the 
solid theoretical background provided by the MacDougall report. This could have been done by 
incorporating in the Draft Treaty a gradual phasing-in of higher Community expenditure as replace-
ment for expenditure at a national level. Changes in the expenditure as well as the revenue could 
have been planned at predetermined levels which would have given a clear picture of where the Com-
munity is going and how fast. 
The MacDougall report analyses efforts to equalize income differences in existing federations. It 
comes to the conclusion that inter-regional differences have been reduced by up to 40%, even if fede-
ral expenditure amounts to a very small size measured in terms of GDP. The exact figure for the USA 
is federal expenditure amounting to between 2% or 3% of GDP to reduce inter-regional income dif-
ferences by up to 40%. 
Nor is it discussed or foreseen in the Draft Treaty whether we should use the Community budget to 
influence the business cycle. It is quite evident that this has not been the case in the past, because a 
Commission of the European Communities, MacDougall report: The role of public finance in the European Communities, 
1977. 
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budget of less than 1% of total Community GDP will not have any tangible effect on the business 
cycle. This will, however, not be true if total expenditure rises, reaching, for example, between 3% 
and 5% of GDP, and the possibility for influencing the business cycle will grow as expenditure rises 
as a percentage of GDP. 
It may or it may not be the intention of the authors to see the budget in such a role but the topic is not 
raised, either directly or indirectly. 
The same applies to the distribution of responsibility between the private and the public sectors. In 
many Member States this question is in the forefront of the political debate and the question of which 
tasks should be fulfilled by the public sector and which tasks should be taken up by the private sector 
is giving rise to many reports of different nature. 
As a more specific measure, loan transactions can be used to promote a real European capital mar-
ket. If and when lending and borrowing is included in the financing of the Community's activities, 
the Community clearly forgoes a possibility to promote economic integration if the opportunity is 
not used for building a European capital market. 
In the longer perspective there seems to be a gap in the analysis concerning the relationship between 
monetary policy and fiscal policy. If we are to establish an economic and monetary union in Europe 
we have to establish consistency between what is done by monetary policy and what is done by fiscal 
policy. There must, so to speak, be parallel progress. This is a point which has been elaborated by 
Allen and Kenen." 
They do not find a fiscal union absolutely necessary as a supplement to a monetary union, but it 
would certainly facilitate things a lot. The essential point is, however, that it is difficult to ensure 
consistency between monetary policy and fiscal policy if decisions are taken on different levels. In 
this respect the Draft Treaty poses a very serious problem, indeed. If total Community expenditure 
rises to a magnitude where it influences the business cycle and plays a role in the integration process, 
fiscal decisions would be taken on national as well as Community level. It is far from certain that the 
same would be the case for monetary policy. In any case, we would face an acute dilemma of econo-
mic-policy decisions in different areas being taken on different levels with the clear risk that incom-
patible decisions are taken. 
The finance provisions cannot be said to promote the integration process, and the reader of the Draft 
Treaty is left with the impression that this aspect was not really taken into account when the finance 
provisions were drawn up. 
8. Conclusion 
Our general appreciation of the finance provisions in the Draft Treaty is that it is primarily the insti-
tutional aspect which interested the authors. The main goal has clearly been not only to increase Par-
liament's powers but to shift nearly all of the present powers invested in the Council to the Parlia-
ment. That may be good or bad according to political preference. Clearly the authors are of the opin-
ion that it would be good but their case is not argued properly. 
With regard to the specific provisions, many of the proposals appear to be very cumbersome in prac-
tice. This goes for example for the complicated budgetary procedure in Article 76. 
There is a certain logic in the institutional system put forward and the role assigned to budgetary and 
financial questions. The transfer of legislative powers from the Council to the Union and the remo-
" Allen and Kenen, Asser Markets, Exchange Rates and Economic Integration: A synthesis, 1980. 
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val of the distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory spending is a case in point, but that also 
means that weaknesses in the legislative and decision-making areas will have repercussions for the 
budgetary and finance provisions. 
The general philosophy is coherent and very closely follows the one which lies behind the Treaty of 
Rome, that is, the contents of the Community system determine the size and composition of the bud-
get and the own-resources system provides the necessary financial means. It is, however, regrettable 
that the authors have focused so narrowly on the institutional aspect of the finance provisions that 
the possibility for shaping a budgetary and financial system in harmony with the development of new 
and other common policies has not been used. 
Member States are required to accept very important changes. Firstly, the expenditure level and 
accordingly also the revenue is fixed by the Union without any ceiling. Secondly, the Union may by 
an organic law (no ratification is required by Member States) introduce other revenue sources than 
the existing ones. Judged by recent experience it is not likely that the proposed transfer of powers to 
the European Parliament and the far-reaching changes regarding revenue sources will be supported 
by Member States. 
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TABLE 1 - Distribution of payments appropriations 1973-84 
(million) 
I. Administration 
2. Research, technology, 
energy 
3. Reimbursement and 
support to Member States 
4. Regional Fund 
5. Special arrangements to 
the UK 
6. Social Fund 
7. EAGGF-Guarantee 
8. EAGGF-Guidance 





























































































































































































































































































































For 1973 — 82: Court of Auditor's annual report. 
For 1983-84: The annual budget published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. 
1 Including supplementary and amending budget No 1 for 1984. 
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Source: Preliminary draft budget for 19X5. Vol. 7. pp. A/68. A/69. A/72. 
1 From 197 
and thre 
has not yet been implemented in Greece 
973 to 1978 all Member Stales paid financial contributions and no Member States paid in VAT contributions. 1979 was a transitional year. Six Member States paid VAT contributions 
;e Member Slates financial contributions. From 1980 nine Member States have paid VAT contributions and Greece has paid tinancial contributions as the uniform assessmenl basis 
Chapter VI - Economic and 
social powers of the European Union and 
the Member States: Subordinate or 
coordinate relationship? 
by John Pinder 
For a quarter of a century Europe has lived on the political capital invested in the Treaty of Rome. 
Industry, trade and agriculture have been transformed by the Common Market, the commercial and 
the agricultural policies laid down in that Treaty. The European Community has held fairly firm 
against the fragmentation of the market that bedevilled relations between its member countries in the 
1930s: and it has become a trading power on the scale of the United States. But the institutions and 
instruments that made this possible were inherited from the founding fathers. Far too little has been 
done to build on that inheritance. 
'Far too little': those are normative words. The norms of economic union to which they relate include 
a completely open internal market, for services and high technology products as well as the more 
ordinary manufactures; enough monetary integration to ensure against beggar-thy-neighbour deva-
luations within the Community and to provide a means of defence against American interest rates 
and the Japanese exchange rate; a common energy policy that offers a stronger defence against the 
effects of disruption in the international petroleum market; a common industrial policy to promote a 
European information technology that can compete with the Japanese and the Americans. Without 
such measures, our efforts to recover a dynamic and competitive European economy will remain 
hamstrung. With them, there should be no cause for inferiority to the great economy of the United 
States. 
The root cause of the Community's failure to develop may be identified in the right of veto. 'How can 
the complex and diversified unit that the Community has become', as President Mitterrand put it in 
his address to the European Parliament on 24 May 1984, 'be governed by the rules of the Diet of the 
old kingdom of Poland, where every member could block the decisions? We all know where that 
led." The European Parliament's Draft Treaty proposes to eradicate this cause of Europe's impo-
tence through the principle of Union legislation enacted by majority votes of both Council and Par-
liament.2 The importance of this proposal can hardly be exaggerated. Instead of spending years dis-
cussing matters critical to our future before reaching either weak decisions or none at all, this method 
of legislating is designed to enable the Community to take action on them in good time: to convert 
common action from an unsatisfied need into an effective reality. 
Europe Documents, No 1312, 20. 5. 1984, Brussels, p. 6. 
J.P. Jacqué identifies these as the heart of the Parliament's proposals: 'instaurer le vote à la majorité qualifiée du Conseil' and 
'doter le Parlement d'un droit de participer à la prise de décision législative et budgétaire'. See 'Bilan et perspective sur le plan 
institutionnel', in The European Parliament on the Eve of the Second Direct Election: Balance Sheet and Prospects (Hrbek, 
Jamar and Wessels eds.) 1984, p. 93. But see also the possibility under the Draft Treaty of enacting Union laws with a minority 
vote in the Council, discussed below. 
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The voting system for enacting laws by co-decision of Council and Parliament is stipulated in Articles 
17,23 and 38 of the Draft Treaty, where obstruction by veto finds no place. Unanimity is, it is true, 
required for amendment of the Treaty (Art. 84), appointment of the Commission's President (Art. 
24 — it is assumed that the European Council will continue to use the unanimity procedure) and 
integration of defence and foreign policy (Arts 66-68). But it is fair to suppose that, under the proce-
dure proposed in the Draft Treaty, economic policy would not be obstructed by individual member 
governments. 
The Draft Treaty gives the Union the Community patrimony5 together with the right to legislate over 
a vast field of economic and social policy, which includes the essential powers implied by the norms 
indicated above and a lot more besides. The Union's right is, properly, to be exclusive with respect to 
the completion of the common market and the common commercial policy (Arts 47-48,64); and it is 
to share with the Member States a concurrent right to legislate on almost the whole of economic pol-
icy and a large part of social policy. This paper will go on to show, article by article, why the field for 
Union legislation on economic and social policy may be regarded as too extensive. But since the 
draft's endeavours to deal with this problem are to be found for the most part in its general and insti-
tutional provisions, it is necessary first to consider these in so far as they bear upon the issue. 
a. Concurrent competence: a risk of 
over centralization ? 
'If the system of the Union is to be uniform, the law of the Union must take precedence over national 
law . . . This is not a question of political supremacy, but simply a condition of consistency." If the 
European Union is to establish the essential elements of an economic union its laws must clearly have 
supremacy over Member States' laws as far as those elements are concerned. But where concurrent 
competence reaches beyond the essentials, the case for Union supremacy is not so clear. For although 
the term has a fine ring about it of share-and-share-alike, concurrent competence turns into exclusive 
competence with respect to any matter on which the Union has legislated. As Wheare put it, the auth-
ority which, 'in case of conflict, is to prevail . . . will possess, in my opinion, potential though not 
actual exclusive jurisdiction';5 and Biehl observes that concurrent competence has been the most 
important basis for centralization in the relations between Bund and Länder in the Federal Republic 
of Germany.6 
Thus it appears that the scope of concurrent competence in the Draft Treaty would allow the Union 
to fix the rate of any tax anywhere within its territory, to control the budgets of national or local auth-
orities, to stop any research programme, to drive a road through any part of a member country, to 
determine the school curriculum and to run the health service. Although it may be objected that the 
Union would not in practice for a very long time, perhaps never, do such things, it is necessary to 
examine very carefully any aspect of its constitution that could be more centralizing than those of the 
existing democratic federations such as Australia, Canada, the German Federal Republic, Switzer-
land or the USA. 
Article 7 of the Draft Treaty includes in the Community patrimony the EC Treaties, conventions, protocols and acts, together 
with 'the measures adopted within the context of the European Monetary System and European political cooperation'. 
De Gucht, 'Working Document on the Law of the Union', in Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee on institutional 
Affairs on the substance of the preliminary Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, Part C, preparatory documents, 
European Parliament Document 1-575/83/C, 15. 7. 1983, p. 11, para. 32. 
Wheare, Federal Government, 1951, (1st ed. 1946), p. 79. 
Biehl, 'Die Ausgestaltung des Finanzausgleichssystems in der Bundesrepublik im einzelnen', unpublished paper, 1983, p. 62 et 
seq. See also for a general discussion of centralization versus decentralization in the German context, (Biehl, 'Die Entwicklung 
des Finanzausgleichs in ausgewählten Bundesstaaten: Bundesrepublik Deutschland', in Handbuch der Finanzwissenschaft, 
(Neumark, Andel and Hallereds. revid. ed.), 1983, Vol IV, 3, pp. 71-122. 
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One reason why the European Union needs to be less centralized than the existing federations, not 
more, is to reflect the cultural and social diversity which is such a cherished value for the peoples of 
Western Europe. To err on the side of an overcentralized economic policy would moreover be parti­
cularly inappropriate when there is so much uncertainty as to which policy can deal successfully with 
the contemporary economy. Experiments with a variety of policies are needed; and the Union's soli­
darity could only suffer from attempts to enforce on the Member States a policy that failed. Much of 
the diversity of social policy reflects diversities of culture and society, which should be respected not 
suppressed; and social policy too can only benefit from variety and experiment. 
More fundamentally, the danger of overcentralization has been sensed by contemporary Europeans 
and they do not like it, at any level of government. The contemporary reaction against over-centra­
lization, reflected in the popularity of the slogan 'small is beautiful', is not an evanescent fashion but 
a profound response to a great dilemma of modern society; and a Union that does not respect this 
need for decentralization will not serve its people well. They could become politically alienated and 
the foundations of civic order be undermined if the Union were to suppress the political vitality of the 
local or national communities within it, as it could if it were to assume responsibility for the bulk of 
economic and social policy. 
b. The Draft Treaty's attempts to limit centralization 
The principal architect of the Draft Treaty, Altiero Spinelli, was aware of the danger of over-centra­
lization. The chief defence which he and his colleagues in the European Parliament's Committee on 
Institutional Affairs devised against it was the principle of subsidiarity, which according to Spinelli 
would make'Union action . . . subsidiary to that of the Member States, and not vice versa'.7 
The Draft Treaty provides that 'The Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be 
undertaken more effectively in common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular 
those whose execution requires action by the Union because their dimension or effects extend be­
yond national frontiers' (Art. 12)." Yet the question whether 'effects extend beyond national fron­
tiers' is a matter of degree; and American experience shows that it can be interpreted very widely 
indeed. The US Constitution empowers Congress'to regulate commerce . . . among the several Stat­
es'. Not only have the words 'regulate' and 'commerce' been 'so liberally construed by the Supreme 
Court that the federal government now has almost complete control of the industrial and commer­
cial life of the country'.' There has been further pressure to interpret 'the phrase . . . "inter-state 
commerce" . . . so generously that "intra-state" disappears altogether'.'° As justices of the Supreme 
Court said in 1935 'There is a view of causation that would obliterate the distinction between what is 
national and what is local in matters of commerce. Motion at the outer rim is communicated percep­
tibly, though minutely, to recording instruments at the centre." The Supreme Court then drew a dis­
tinction between 'direct and indirect effects'. But by 1942 the court was concerned not with whether 
effects were direct or indirect but whether they were substantial: 'Even if an activity be local and 
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress 
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on inter-state commerce, and this irrespective of whether 
Spinelli, 'Note on some problems of terminology', in Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs , Part C, supra, p. 160. 
" The Preamble expresses the intention slightly differently: 'to entrust common institutions, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, only with those powers to complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than the States 
acting independently'. 
' Goodhart, 'The constitution of the United States', in Studies in Federal Planning, (Ransome ed.), 1943, p. 256. 
'" Wheare, supra, at p. 143. 
" Justices Cardozo and Stone, in the case Schechter Poultry Corporation, ν United States (1935) 295, US 495, 554, cited in 
Wheare, supra, at p. 143. 
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such effect is what at some earlier time might have been defined as "direct" or "indirect"."2 Although 
these cases date from four or five decades ago, they have been cited because they relate to a period 
when economic centralization became a big issue in the US, and hence throw some light on the possi-
bility of this happening in Europe. They indicate that to confine Union legislation to tasks whose 
'effects extend beyond national frontiers' may not provide a very significant limit to Union compe-
tence without a fairly generous concept of how substantial the effects would have to be. 
Whether a task can be 'undertaken more effectively in common' depends, moreover, on the nature of 
the task. The Draft Treaty stipulates that the Union shall effect the approximation of the laws relat-
ing to taxation 'in so far as necessary for economic integration' (Art. 49). If economic integration is 
defined, as it could be, to include fiscal uniformity, this does not leave diversity much of a chance. 
Wherever, indeed, the Union decides to adopt uniformity in a particular field as an objective, the 
principle of subsidiarity is no help, because such a task can hardly be undertaken except in common. 
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides that the central government shall have 
legislative rights in the field of concurrent legislation 'in so far as a necessity for regulation by federal 
law exists because . . . the preservation of legal or economic unity demands it, in particular the pre-
servation of uniformity of living conditions extending beyond the territory of an individual Land'." 
This provision has been interpreted, according to Biehl, as placing on the Bund an obligation to pro-
mote the unification of living standards in the federation, with highly-centralizing consequences for 
economic policy, squeezing the autonomy of both Länder and local authorities.14 The European 
Union Draft Treaty, one of whose objectives is 'the progressive elimination of the existing imbalanc-
es between its regions' (Art. 9), may contain the potential for a similar outcome." 
The Freamble to the Draft Treaty does qualify its determination 'to increase solidarity between the 
peoples of Europe' by acknowledging the need to respect 'their historical identity, their dignity and 
their freedom'. But this seems to offer scant protection against the ample potential that the draft 
offers for objectives that would tend to uniformity. When to this is added the tendency of policy-
makers in institutions that govern large areas to give weight to economies of scale rather than to the 
value of diversity in government of small areas,16 the suspicion that the principle of subsidiarity may 
not be a strong enough guarantee against overcentralization can only be reinforced. 
In addition to the principle of subsidiarity, the Draft Treaty contains two devices intended as checks 
to overcentralization. One of these is that laws shall 'as far as possible . . . restrict themselves to 
determining the fundamental principles governing common action and entrust the responsible autho-
rities in the Union or the Member States with setting out in detail the procedures for their imple-
mentation' (Art. 34). It may be doubted, however, whether fundamental principles can be made 
effective without specifying their implications in a good deal of detail; and the Community's expe-
rience appears indeed to show that a directive, which is supposed to bind Member States 'as to the 
result to be achieved', but to 'leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods', is fre-
quently more detailed than a regulation, which is to be 'binding in its entirety and directly applicable 
in all Member States' (Treaty establishing the EEC, Art. 189). 
The second device lies in the system of voting on Union legislation in Parliament and Council. Bigger 
majorities are required to enact organic laws than other laws; and 'a law which initiates or extends 
common action in a field where action has not been taken hitherto by the Union or by the Commu-
12 Supreme Court in the case Wickard v Filburn (1942) 317 US 111,125; US v Darby (1941) 312 US 100,119; cited in Wheare, 
supra, at p. 143. 
11 English translation from MacMahon, 'The Problems of Federalism: a Survey' in Federalism Mature and Emergent, (Mac 
Mahon: ed.), 1955, pp. 3,16. 
" Biehl, Die Ausgestaltung des Finanzausgleichssystems, supra,p. 63 et seq. and Die Entwicklung des Finanzausgleichs, supra, p. 
78, p. 85 et seq., p. 97 et seq. 
" See also Art. 45.2: 'The structural and conjunctural policies of the Union shall... promote ... the progressive elimination of the 
existing imbalances between its various areas and regions', and Art. 58: 'The regional policy of the Union shall aim at reducing 
regional disparities...'. 
14 See, for example, Rees, Government by Community , 1971, especially Chapter 2. 
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nities must be adopted in accordance with the procedure for organic laws' (Art. 12). The meaning of 
'extends common action in a field where action has not been taken hitherto' is not absolutely clear 
(how can action be extended if it has not been taken hitherto?). The intention is surely to require the 
procedure for organic laws wherever a law would reduce the field of competence of Member States; 
and it might be better to express this provision in that way. The important issue is, however, the pro-
cedure for voting on organic laws, as provided in Articles 17, 23 and 38. 
Organic laws may be passed by qualified majorities in the Parliament (a majority of members and 
two-thirds of votes cast) and in the Council (two-thirds of the weighted votes cast and a majority of 
the representations). If the qualified majority is obtained in the Parliament but not in the Council, 
however, or if the Council has amended the draft law by an absolute majority (a majority of the 
weighted votes cast, comprising at least half the representations), the draft is considered by a Coun-
cil-Parliament Conciliation Committee. Failing agreement there, the 'text forwarded by the Council' 
goes back to the Parliament, which can again approve the draft by a qualified majority. The final 
vote must then betaken within three months in the Council, which may reject the draft by a qualified 
majority: thus the law is enacted provided that one-third plus one of the weighted votes of the mem-
ber governments are in favour. 
The 'text forwarded by the Council' may, of course, have been amended by an absolute majority in 
the Council; and if this is the text on which the Parliament votes, at least an absolute majority in the 
Council will have favoured the law, rather than just the one-third plus one required for the final vote. 
But Parliament may amend the 'text forwarded by the Council' provided that the amendments are 
tabled by the Commission. The Parliament can, therefore, if it has the Commission's support, over-
rule a weighted vote of anything up to two-thirds of the representations of the Member States. While 
a qualified majority in the Parliament is certainly harder to secure than a simple majority, there must 
still be concern that two-thirds of the votes cast by MEP's could favour steps towards excessive cen-
tralization, perhaps because they were subject to a wave of ideological fervour, political passion, or 
annoyance with a particular member country or minority of countries, perhaps because they failed to 
appreciate the cumulative effect of a series of measures each of which appeared reasonable enough in 
itself. It is precisely in anticipation of such errors of judgment by majorities of politicians that federal 
constitutions contain legal as well as political safeguards against what the founders regard as exces-
sive encroachment on Member States' fields of jurisdiction; and the reason why the Committee on 
Institutional Affairs did not use the word federal in relation to the Draft Treaty cannot be that they 
envisaged a Union which would offer less safeguards for the Member States than would a federal 
system. 
The enacting of laws against the opposition of up to two-thirds (or even up to half) of the weighted 
votes of the representations of the Member States can indeed hardly be what Spinelli had in mind 
when he wrote that'the concept of competences in the draft . . . demands strong proof of consensus 
both within Parliament and in the Council any time a forward leap is envisaged'.1 Nor can it really 
be said that Union action is subsidiary to that of the Member States. The Draft Treaty seems to 
reflect, indeed, a continuing preoccupation with the problem of a Community that is too weak in 
relation to the States, whereas once a Union is established with wide competences and majority vot-
ing, the problem can become the converse of strong Union and weak States. But any such preoccupa-
tion is by no means the only reason why the Draft Treaty does not embody a satisfactory solution to 
this problem. More significantly, the complexity and interdependence of modern economy and 
society have made economic and social policy so pervasive and interdependent that a clear division of 
Spinelli, Towards the European Union, sixth Jean Monnet Lecture, Florence, European University Institute, 13 June 1983. 
Corbett accepts that, in the case where a law is passed against a weighted majority of up to two-thirds in the Council, 'we no 
longer have real co-decision', but believes that 'it is surrounded by sufficient safeguards, and at the end of a long enough proce-
dure, to be regarded as exceptional', (Corbett, 'Reform of the Council: The Bundesrat Model' in The Federalist, July 1984, p. 
60). But the safeguards do not seem that strong, nor the procedure that long; and even were 'he case exceptional, a crucial com-
petence might nevertheless be removed from Member States. 
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powers between Union and States has become increasingly difficult to define.18 It should cause no 
surprise if second thoughts are needed on such an intractable problem. 
c. Stronger safeguards 
If it is accepted that there is a case for stronger safeguards against overcentralization, the European 
Parliament may wish to consider what changes in the Draft Treaty could help meet that case, with-
out undermining its central features of co-decision, majority votes and competence with respect to 
the essential elements of economic union. 
One such safeguard could be a stronger voting role for the Member States' representatives in the 
Council, without approaching the paralysing right of veto. 'Strong proof of consensus' within the 
Council could be provided by the requirement of a qualified majority (two-thirds of weighted votes 
and a majority of the representations) if an organic law, or one that reduces the competence of Member 
States, is to be enacted. Even an absolute majority (a majority of the weighted votes and at least half 
the representations) would serve better than the one-third plus one of weighted votes proposed in the 
present draft. 
The American cases cited earlier may indicate that a more precise definition of the reach of the 
phrase 'inter-state commerce' could have strengthened the propensity of the Supreme Court to inter-
pret it in a way that gave weight to the autonomy of the States; and the German Commission on 
Constitutional Reform made suggestions for sharpening the wording of certain of the articles of the 
Basic Law that relate to the relation between Bund and Land competences, in ways that would secure 
greater autonomy for the Länder." It may be worthwhile for jurists at least to consider the potential 
for making the principle of subsidiarity more effective by sharper definition in the Treaty and by 
'spelling out further the role of the Court in defending the principle of diversity'.20 
Something of this purpose has been served by the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the US Con-
stitution, providing that no person be deprived 'of life, liberty and property without due process of 
law', which have caused the Supreme Court at times to invalidate legislation to regulate economic 
life.2' The interpretation of the equivalent elements of the Canadian Constitution seemed, according 
to Wheare, to amount to a power for the central government to legislate on 'trade and commerce, 
except where it conflicts with property and civil rights in a province', with the latter phrase being 
given such a wide interpretation that 'the scope of "trade and commerce" has been greatly narro-
wed'.22 But there was in both cases 'much uncertainty about the respective powers of general and 
state governments, because of the conflicting and ambiguous language adopted'.21 In view of the 
greater diversity among the European peoples, it is particularly important that the Union Treaty be 
as clear as possible in this respect. 
The Draft Treaty offers everybody within the Union's jurisdiction 'the fundamental rights and free-
doms derived in particular from the common principles of the Constitutions of the Member States 
and from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
" This point was already made in the mid-1950s by Fischer, 'Prerequisites of Balance', in (Arthur W. Macmahon ed.), 1955 
Federalism Mature and Emergent, p. 62, where Fischer also cited Beloff, 'The Federal Solution in its Application to Europe, Asia 
and Africa', Political Studies, June 1953, regarding the centralizing tendency in federations that has followed on the expansion of 
governments' economic and social responsibilities. 
" Biehl (Die Ausgestaltung des Finanzausgleichssystenis.suprs, at p. 76) cites from a critique on this point in Grabitz, 
Dezentralisierung des Politischen Handelns , Forschungsbericht des Kommunalwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, 1979. 
20 Pryce, 'Towards European Union', (Report of a Federal Trust Study Group on the European Parliaments draft proposals for a 
new Treaty, 1983), New Europe Papers, 8, p. 12. 
21 Wheare, supra, p. 145. 
22 Ibid., p. 137. 
" Ib id . , p. 149. 
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doms' (Art. 4.1) and requires the Union to undertake 'to maintain and develop, within the limits of 
its competences, the economic, social and cultural rights derived from the constitutions of the Mem-
ber States and from the European social charter'. The EEC Treaty provides that it 'shall in no way 
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership' (Art. 222); and 
Article 7 of the Draft Treaty makes the 'objectives and scope' of the Treaties establishing the EC into 
'a part of the law of the Union' which can 'only be amended in accordance with the procedure for 
revision' of the Treaty, i.e. by unanimous agreement (Art. 84). If 'the rules in Member States govern-
ing the system of property ownership' are not to be counted among the 'objectives and scope' of the 
Rome Treaty, however, this provision could be amended by the procedure for organic laws (Art. 
38). Further consideration should perhaps be given to the possibility of strengthening any of these 
potential bulwarks against too much centralization. 
Amended voting procedures, sharper wording of general principles and guarantees of human rights 
may, however, not by themselves offer sufficient guard against overcentralization. We will therefore 
consider, in analysing article by article the Draft Treaty's sections on economic and social policy, 
how far the Union's powers could usefully be limited by closer definition of particular aims or fields 
among its competences, of the instruments it may use in relation to them, or of the conditions under 
which they may apply. We will at the same time try to identify those aims, fields and instruments that 
must be allocated to the Union if it is to create an economic union which can satisfy the essential 
needs of its citizens. 
d. The common market and 
common commercial policy 
The aims and instruments for achieving a common internal market and an external trade policy were 
already given to the Community in the Treaty of Rome. Without them, there can be no economic 
union. The common market remains far from complete because the Community's institutions, blo-
cked by the right of veto, have not been strong enough to ensure that the aims of the Treaty are re-
alized. The Draft Treaty for European Union would rectify that institutional weakness; and there 
can be no faulting the draft for maintaining external trade and trade among the Member States as 
fields of exclusive Union competence. The questions that should be raised about these articles (47-49 
and 64) relate, rather, to a certain excess of detail and a potential for excessive harmonization. 
External trade policy 
Excess of detail can hardly be attributed to the draft's provision for external trade policy: 'in the field 
of commercial policy, the Union shall have exclusive competence' (Art. 64.2). The Union's compe-
tence is simply defined by the field. 
Nor does the definition of the field seem likely to present undue difficulty. The Treaty of Rome uses 
the words 'common policy in the matter of external trade' (Art. 111.1) and that presumably includes 
invisible as well as visible trade. It is not so clear that the Draft Treaty provides for a common policy 
on all other aspects of external economic relations, which have grown increasingly important with 
the growth of international economic interdependence. Development aid is covered (Art. 64.3); and 
the provision for monetary union (Art. 52) centralizes part of currency reserves and in other ways 
implicitly concerns external monetary relations. But it is not so clear that the Union would have 
power to make policy on inward or outward investment. 
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Trade among the States 
The draft's treatment of internal trade is not so straightforward. Article 47.1 includes the words 'The 
Union . . . shall have exclusive competence for trade between Member States', which would, with 
the addition after 'competence' of the words 'in the field of policy' (to avoid any implication that a 
State-trading system might be intended) be precisely analogous to the provision for external trade 
policy: simple definition of a field of exclusive competence. But the draft also adds the objective 'to 
complete, safeguard and develop the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital within its 
territory' and stipulates instruments in the form of 'detailed and binding programmes and timeta-
bles', specifying the number of years within which free movement is to be achieved. Yet it is not obvi-
ous that the institutions of the Union should be told by the Treaty precisely what they must aim to do 
in their field of exclusive competence or how they are to do it. There can be no doubting that free 
movement of people, services, goods and money among the Member States must be one of the bases 
of the Union; and perhaps 'complete, safeguard and develop' adds something to the objectives 
already defined in the EC Treaties 24 without adding too much. But the detailed specification of 
means for attaining the objectives may be based on an inappropriate analogy with the Rome Treaty, 
when detailed Treaty obligations had to be employed to secure action by the Member States since the 
Community institutions lacked the strength to ensure that even such a central objective would be ful-
filled by the development of Community policy after the Treaty had been ratified. With the institu-
tions designed by the Draft Treaty, however, the boot is on the other foot. The Union institutions 
have the strength to make their own policy in any field of Union competence, without being told how 
to do it by a treaty ratified by the States. 
When we see how far such a bare definition of competence as 'to regulate commerce . . . among the 
several States' has taken the US federal government into regulation of the economic affairs of the 
States, we may have cause to ask whether 'complete, safeguard and develop' might not give too much 
weight to the case for harmonization where this conflicts with cultural diversity. This again raises the 
question whether the Draft Treaty could better embody the value of diversity in its objectives and in 
some other of its provisions. 
The Draft Treaty might, then, be improved by reducing the provision on internal trade to the plain 
definition of the field: 'The Union shall have exclusive competence in the field of policy for trade bet-
ween Member States'. But this does not come high on the list of potential improvements; the Union 
could live with the text as it stands. Article 47 also gives the Union exclusive competence 'to com-
plete, safeguard and develop the free movement of persons . . . and capital'. Beyond the free move-
ment of workers, which the Treaty of Rome lays down,25 the free movement of persons is not a mat-
ter of economic policy and so will not be considered here. The Draft Treaty requires the free move-
ment of capital to be completed 'within a period of 10 years following the entry into force of this 
Treaty'; and this has to be seen in conjunction with the draft's provisions for monetary union, of 
which the movement of capital is one aspect (see below). 
Competition policy 
The Draft Treaty gives the Union exclusive competence 'to complete and develop competition policy 
at the level of the Union' (Art. 48). The Rome Treaty defined the aims of competition policy as being 
to prevent abuse of'a dominant position within the common market' (Art. 86) and to prohibit agree-
ments 'which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
'The Community shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover all trade in goods' (Rome Treaty, Art. 9.1 ); 'restrictions 
on freedom to supply services within the Community shall be progressively abolished' (Art. 59). 
'The free movement of workers shall be secured within the Community by the end of the transitional period at the latest' 
(Art. 48.1). 
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prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market', five main types of 
such agreement being specified (Art. 85). This definition has stood the test of a quarter of a century 
fairly well. The main objection has been that Rome Treaty omits any safeguard against the creation 
of dominant positions as distinct from their abuse; and the Draft Treaty is surely right to generalize 
to the economy as a whole the system for authorizing mergers that is provided with respect to the 
coal and steel sectors in the ECSC Treaty (Art. 66). The wisdom of the words 'complete and develop 
competition policy at the level of the Union' is not so clear, if this gives the Union a free hand to 
range beyond the definitions of competition policy in the Treaties establishing the EEC and the 
ECSC. Might not the term 'competition policy' be stretched far beyond those limits? Does 'policy at 
the level of the Union' mean that the Union's competence still reaches only to agreements' likely to 
affect trade between the Member States', or is it less meaningful? If the answers to those questions 
imply scope for expansion of Union competence far beyond the concepts of the existing Treaties, it 
might be wiser to stick closer to those Treaties' wording that has stood the test of time fairly well. 
Article 48 of the Draft Treaty contains two further points, which may respond to criticisms of the 
articles on competition policy in the Treaty of Rome. One concerns 'the need to prohibit any form of 
discrimination between public and private undertakings', here it might be argued that provisions 
inherited by the Union from the Rome Treaty offer adequate safeguard against this.26 The other 
point enjoins the Union to bear in mind 'the need to restructure and strengthen the industry of the 
Union in the light of the profound disturbances which may be caused by international competition'. 
It has for some time been argued that the Commission could, under the existing Treaties, authorize 
joint programmes of capacity reduction by hard-pressed sectors and, after insisting on the point that 
such programmes must show a benefit to the consumer, the Commission has begun to adapt its policy 
in this direction. Article 85 does indeed allow the Commission to permit any agreement 'which con-
tributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment 
of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possiblitity of eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the products in question'. If words such as 'fair share', 'not indispensable' and 
'eliminating competition' are thought to load the dice too heavily against agreements that help to 
improve production or promote technical or economic progress, there may be a case for rectifying 
that more precisely in Article 48 of the Draft Treaty, rather than introducing concepts such as 
'restructuring' and 'profound disturbances which may be caused by international competition', 
which present difficulties of interpretation and rest uneasily in what amounts to the constitution of a 
union of States. 
Approximation of laws and taxation 
The Draft Treaty follows the Treaty of Rome in seeking to iron out those aspects of Member States' 
laws and taxes that distort economic transactions within the common market. The Rome Treaty 
provided for 'the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market' 
(Art. 100). The Draft Treaty, referring to 'the laws, regulations and administrative provisions re-
lating to undertakings, and in particular to companies', sets the somewhat different objective of 
approximating them in so far as they 'have a direct effect on a common action of the Union' (Art. 
49). The US may have left too much autonomy with the individual States in matters of company law. 
But local variations in 'provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action' may have 
'. . . any aid granted by a Member State or rhrough State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between 
Member States, be incompatible with the common market' (Rome Treaty, Art. 92). 
I l l 
their justification in the social and cultural diversity among European countries; and it seems desira-
ble to preserve such variation where it does not substantially and 'directly affect the establishment or 
functioning' of the common market or the economic union. Might not the Draft Treaty's formula-
tion which requires approximation where there is 'a direct effect on a common action of the Union' 
make it too easy for the Union to initiate common action that implies excessive uniformity, and then 
to steam-roller any of the Member States' policies or practices that stand in the way? If so, it might be 
better to return to the Rome Treaty's 'directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common 
market', and perhaps add 'and substantially' after 'directly'. 
Article 49 of the Draft Treaty goes on to require that 'a law shall lay down a statute for European 
undertakings', which fills a need about which the Rome Treaty was not sufficiently explicit. 
Although the Commission found a justification for proposing a European company statute in order, 
among other things, to reduce distortions in the common market, the proposal has not been adop-
ted. Article 49 then moves on to 'the approximation of the laws relating to taxation', which a Union 
law is to effect 'in so far as necessary for economic integration within the Union'. Economic integra-
tion could, as suggested earlier, be defined in such a way as to require complete fiscal uniformity 
throughout the Union. That this is not a fanciful suggestion shown by one of the most-quoted books 
on the subject, which asserts that 'total economic integration presupposes the unification of monet-
ary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies'.27 Yet the structure and rates of tax are at the heart of 
modern politics, and of social policy in particular. The Union needs to get the money for its own 
expenditure (Arts 71,75 and 76 of the Draft Treaty provide for this) and divergences between Mem-
ber States' taxes should be reduced in so far as they substantially distort inter-State trade. But beyond 
that, the States should be left to collect their own taxes at their own rates in their own way. The 
alternative is likely to drain them of political vitality, by shifting to the Union the major decisions of 
social policy. 
Two changes in Article 49 might help to guard against this. One would be, drawing in part on the 
wording in Article 101 of the Rome Treaty, to replace 'in so far as is necessary for economic integra-
tion' by 'in so far as Member States' taxes substantially distort the conditions of competition in the 
Union' (or perhaps 'substantially distort economic transactions among the Member States'). In addi-
tion, it might be appropriate to exclude personal income tax from the Union's jurisdiction. For whe-
reas a certain measure of harmonization of company tax and indirect tax may be needed to make the 
economic union work efficiently, the case for interference in the States' income taxes is weaker; and 
this would preserve for them a chasse gardée where they can vary their total revenue and influence 
the distribution of incomes. 
e. General economic policy 
The Member States have reached a stage of interdependence where they need a common economic 
policy, to help maintain equilibrium between their economies, provide a framework for their econo-
mic development, safeguard their interests in and contribute to the management of the wider interna-
tional economy. The drafters of the Rome Treaty did not venture to seek a transfer of powers to this 
end from the States' central banks and finance ministries. The Draft Treaty is more courageous. 
Article 50 gives the Union 'concurrent competence in respect of conjunctural policy, with a particu-
lar view to facilitating the coordination of economic policies within the Union'. The word 'conjunc-
tural' has an association with the management of shorter-term trends in the economy, which may be 
unfortunate at a time when policies designed to be effective over a longer period tend to be viewed as 
more important. Perhaps the more operative term is, in any case, the 'economic policies' that are to 
be coordinated. But whether we speak of conjunctural or general economic policies, we have entered 
a field which is harder to define than trade policy, competition policy or the approximation of tax 
27 Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, 1962, p. 2. 
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and company law; so it is harder to envisage the limits of Union action in coordinating the economic 
policies of the States. 
One point is quite clear: 'Laws shall lay down the conditions under which the Commission, in con-
junction with the Member States, shall utilize the budgetary or financial mechanisms of the Union 
for conjunctural ends' (Art. 50.4). The Union is to use its money ('our money', if we are the Union's 
citizens) with regard for the aims of its conjunctural (better perhaps 'economic') policy. The limits to 
this action depend on the amount of money to be raised and spent by the Union; and the Draft Treaty 
sets no limit to this. Member States intending to establish the Union could well raise the question of a 
limit to the Union's tax-raising powers since, as the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany 
shows, the division of revenue between them is fundamental to the balance of power between Union 
and States. The Union would be too weak in relation to the States, and unable to make its proper 
contribution to efficiency and welfare, if it were shackled by limits of the order of magnitude that 
now prevails; but it might be reasonable to consider, in the light for example of the MacDougall 
report,28 a limit of say 5% of the Union's GDP, which could be raised only by Treaty amendment.2' 
The limits to Union power under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 50 are not so easy to define. Para-
graph 2 requires the Commission to 'define the guidelines and objectives to which the action of the 
Member States shall be subject on the basis of the principles and within the limits laid down by laws'; 
and paragraph 3 stipulates that laws 'shall lay down the conditions under which the Commission 
shall ensure that the measures taken by the Member States conform with the objectives it has defi-
ned'.10 Thus the Union is to establish the aims of Member States' economic policies and control the 
means, i.e. policy instruments, by which the aims are to be achieved. 
The outcome of a Member State's economic policy is a matter of common interest, because inflation 
or deflation is transmitted to other Member States through the economic transactions between them. 
It is therefore right that the Union should seek to influence the Member States' policies towards a 
mutually satisfactory outcome. But a requirement that the Union control 'the measures taken by the 
Member States', which could well become control over all their economic policy instruments — 
however these might be defined — is another matter. 
One reason for doubting its wisdom is that the relationship between measures and outcomes is a 
matter of judgment, not of objective fact; and such judgments have become hazardous in these tur-
bulent times. They offer a shaky basis for a massive incursion into the policies of the States. 
A second reason for doubt is uncertainty as to the instruments which the Union might feel justified in 
requiring the Member States to use under its supervision. Incomes policy is a contentious issue, hotly 
contested by liberal economists, by politicians who believe in them and by many traditionalist trade 
unionists. Yet it is quite conceivable that incomes policy, which not long ago enjoyed widespread 
support, could again win enough support to be enacted as Union law on the basis of two-thirds of 
the votes cast by the Members of the European Parliament (which need be no more than a bare 
majority of all MEPs), together with acceptance by the Commission and by the representatives of 
France, Greece and Italy in the Council (or Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain after enlargement), to 
name only currently socialist-led governments which could account for more than one-third of the 
Council's weighted votes. The Members of the last European Parliament must have thought such a 
Union law feasible, or they would not have voted in favour of Article 56, which provides that 'the 
2" Commission of the EC, The Role of Public Finance in the European Communities, 2 vols, April 1977. 
;* There would be less risk of a Treaty-entrenched limit stunting the development of the Union sometime in the future if Treaty 
amendments were to require a large majority, rather than unanimity of the Member States as proposed in Article 84. 
'" Paragraph 3 goes on to make 'the monetary, budgetary or financial aid of the Union conditional on compliance with the measur-
es taken under paragraph 2 above'. It is normal that balance-of-payments support should be conditional on governments' com-
pliance with policy guidelines; but it is another question whether a Union policy for supplying cheap butter to old-age pensio-
ners should be withdrawn from those who inhabit a certain Member State, just because of recalcitrance by a government they 
might well have voted against, over an issue which can be quite a subjective one — as negotiations between the IMF and Brazil, 
for example, show. 
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Union may take action in the field of social and health policy, in particular in matters relating to ... 
collective negotiations between employers and employees, in particular with a view to the conclusion 
of Union-wide collective agreement'. Now it happens that the present writer shares the view that 
imperfections are inherent in modern labour markets to the extent that, if inflation is to be control-
led, the only alternative to high unemployment is incomes policy — even if the incomes policy takes 
the non-statutory form of nation-wide or industry-wide (as in the FR of Germany) collective agree-
ments between trade unions and employers' associations. But to impose this view, which may after 
all be mistaken, on a country where the government is bitterly opposed to incomes plicy or the trade 
unions are going to kick it overboard would be to court a failure of that policy and to strain solidar-
ity within the Union up to or beyond the breaking point. The same could be said of an attempt to 
counter a recession or restrain a boom by investment planning (see Article 51, with its 'objective of 
coordinating the use of capital market resources by the creation of a European capital market com-
mittee'). 
Alternatively, a right-wing qualified majority of MEPs, supported by a right-wing Commission and 
the Governments of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany (or the UK, Denmark, Germany 
and the Netherlands after enlargement), could prohibit incomes policy or investment planning in the 
Member States that wanted to use those instruments. Or they might decide that budgetary laxity was 
generating inflation in some Member States and that national budgets therefore had to be controlled. 
This is quite plausible, since budgetary control was wanted by the officials and central bankers on 
the Werner Committee, whose widely-acclaimed report proposed that 'quantitative guidelines will be 
given on the principal elements of the public budgets, notably on global receipts and expenditure, the 
distribution of the latter between investment and consumption, and the direction and amount of the 
balance'.31 Nor are bankers, officials and politicians lacking today who are convinced that budgetary 
control is the key to a healthy economy. Yet central control of the States' budget balances, let alone 
of the size of their receipts, expenditure, consumption and investment, is a concept that is alien to 
federal systems; and even in the highly-centralized United Kingdom, the present government has 
encountered great difficulty in imposing such constraints on the local authorities. 
Union control over States' budgets would, then, be an infringement of their autonomy that the 
search for a unified economic policy could hardly justify. Not only is the economic outcome of such 
measures quite speculative, but consistency of the several States' economic trends, although desira-
ble, is not an absolute necessity, with the interdependence among them, although very significant, 
remaining far short of the interdependence among the regions of most Member States. 
With the exception of money, indeed, the idea of Union control of the States' instruments of general 
economic policy seems to be of dubious validity. The non-monetary instruments, such as incomes 
policy, budgets and quantitative planning, are highly sensitive in terms of both party-political 
orientation and the autonomy and vitality of the States' policies. To harness Member States' instru-
ments of this kind to a concept as wide and general as that of the Union's economic or conjunctural 
policy would launch the Union into uncharted and quite likely dangerous waters. The risk of danger-
ous waters must sometimes be taken. But here it does not seem justified, because control over 
monetary policy, for which the interdependence of the national monetary systems is anyway a con-
vincing motive, would give the Union instruments as powerful as it probably needs at its present 
stage of economic interdependence. A simple solution would, then, be to define the Union's concur-
rent competence for economic policy in terms not of this potentially enormous field, but of more spe-
cific fields and instruments: 'budgetary or financial mechanisms of the Union' (Art. 50.4) and the 
field of monetary policy — or, if more precision were desired, specified instruments of monetary 
policy. This might imply either amending the Draft Treaty in order to subject Article 50, pars 1-3 to 
the method of cooperation rather than concurrent competence, or deleting those three paragraphs 
altogether. Some unnecessary undergrowth would thus be cut from the draft, while giving the 
Union, in the field of monetary policy, the crucial strength that the Community now lacks. 
Report to the Council and the Commission on the realization by stages of economic and monetary union in the Community, (the 
Werner report), Supplement 11-1970-Bull. EC, 8. 10. 1970, p. 19. 
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f. Monetary union 
Article 52 deals with monetary union. Before that, however, comes Article 51, which gives the 
Union 'concurrent competence as regards European12 monetary and credit policies, with the particu-
lar objective of coordinating the use of capital market resources by the creation of a European capital 
mai ket committee and the establishment of a European bank supervisory authority'. The Union is 
given concurrent competence with respect to monetary union in Article 52; and if there is enough dif-
ference between monetary and credit policies to justify specifying the credit policies too, this could 
perhaps be done in the latter article. The purpose of Article 51 seems, however, to be specifically to 
introduce the European capital market committee to coordinate the use of capital market resources 
and the European bank supervisory authority. 
With free movement of money and of financial services, a common regulatory framework for banks 
and capital markets is a logical measure. But the 'particular objective of coordinating the use of capi-
tal market resources' seems to imply a planning of investment that is not practised in the majority of 
Member States and is hard to reconcile with the neo-liberal philosophy that underlies Article 33.4, 
which affirms that 'the European Monetary Fund shall have the autonomy required to guarantee 
monetary stability'. Neither the neo-liberal doctrine of Article 33.4 nor the dirigiste implications of 
Article 51 as it stands seem likely to appeal to a majority of Member States; nor do they embody 
principles that are essential for the establishment of the Union, even if it might later come to adopt 
them. Article 33.4 was not in the Institutional Committee's earlier draft" and the present text could 
afford to do without it unless the Member States want to retain it. Article 51 could be confined to the 
establishment of the regulatory framework for the banks and capital markets. 
Article 52 requires that all Member States are to participate in the European Monetary System (52.1) 
and gives the Union 'concurrent competence for the progressive achievement of full monetary union' 
(52.2). Monetary policy will, as has already been suggested, remain a crucial field for Union policy 
after monetary union (however defined) has been achieved, as well as in the achieving of it. There 
should be no doubt about this, and it would be better to establish it in the article on the monetary 
system and monetary union, not just as an adjunct to credit policy as in Article 51 of the present 
draft. Article 52.2 could define the field of competence in such words as 'the Union shall have con-
current competence in the field of monetary policy'. The objective of full monetary union would be 
stated in a separate sentence." 
The significance of this objective depends on how 'full monetary union' is defined. In his preparatory 
document, the rapporteur on economic union wrote that 'the final objective, which it will be possible 
to achieve following a series of automatic, irreversible stages, will be that of advanced unity which 
may go so far as the creation of a genuine common currency which is exclusive or parallel to the 
national currencies'." Whether the common currency is exclusive or parallel is a critical distinction, 
for an exclusive common currency puts an end to any monetary or currency policy conducted by the 
Member States. Changes in the exchange rate are no longer available to help correct disequilibria 
between Member States' economies, so that the whole burden of adjustment is likely to be thrown on 
to deflation or inflation; and if pronounced cultural or institutional differences underlie the disequi-
libria, the dose of deflation or inflation required to overcome them might be severe enough to endan-
ger the Union's political stability. A parallel currency, on the other hand, gives the Union a common 
instrument of policy and medium for transactions, while leaving room for Member States to secure 
changes in their exchange rates and to conduct monetary policies alongside that of the Union. 
How can there be concurrent competence as regards 'European monetary and credit policies', when the States can hardly have 
competence for European policies? Should it not be concurrent competence for monetary and credit policies in so far as these 
substantially affect inter-State economic transactions? 
Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, Part A. Motion for a Resolution, European Parliament Document 1-
575/83/A, 15. 7. 1983. 
Another drafting question: can the States really exercise competence for the 'achievement of full monetary union'? If not, the 
definition of the field of concurrent competence should certainly be separated from the objective of monetary union. 
Moreau, 'The Economic Union', in Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs , Part C, supra, p. 57, par. 129. 
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Despite the risks involved in moving to an exclusive common currency, the benefits of reaching that 
stage would be great. The European currency would be an enormous convenience to business and to 
citizens. It would enhance the security of the Union's internal market against the danger of frag-
mentation. It would give the Union a powerful instrument to counter external monetary threats such 
as high American interest rates or a low Japanese exchange rate, and to participate in constructing a 
sound international monetary system. It would set the seal on the economic union and affirm, not 
just in words but in a most impressive deed, the commitment to political union among the Member 
States. It is therefore desirable that the definition of a full monetary union includes the creation of a 
common currency and the ending of exchange rate changes and of controls on movements of money 
among the Member States. 
Article 52 of the Draft Treaty requires all Member States to participate in the European Monetary 
System (subject to Article 35, which allows for delays to be authorized if Union laws would cause 
'specific difficulties' for particular States) and provides for an organic law16 to 'lay down rules govern-
ing ... the procedures and the stages for attaining monetary union'. The rules are to govern in parti-
cular 'the statute and the operation of the European Monetary Fund', 'the conditions for the effective 
transfer to the EMF of part of the reserves of the Member States', 'the conditions for the progressive 
conversion of the ECU into a reserve currency and a means of payment, and its wider use' and 'the 
duties and obligations of the central banks in the determination of their objectives regarding money 
supply'. The transfer of part of the States' reserves to the EMF and the wider use of the ECU, includ-
ing as a reserve currency and a means of payment, would give the Union the means to develop its 
monetary system, based not only on the exchange-rate mechanism and lending arrangements of the 
EMS but also on the promotion of the ECU as a parallel currency and on the EMF as a federal 
reserve bank. This system could, as it developed, increasingly secure the benefits associated with an 
exclusive European currency. The use of the parallel currency could, indeed, evolve to the point 
where changes of the States' exchange rates, even though formally permissible, were no longer prac-
ticable, and later to replace the national currencies altogether. 
This could be the best route to full monetary union. But whatever the likely proportions of organic 
evolution and of formally enacted steps, one major barrier will probably have to be confronted: the 
prospect of progress to full monetary union without their explicit consent may well be more than 
some Member States will accept. The problem lies not just with the British or the French. The Ger-
mans, whose society has in the past been torn apart by inflation, remain acutely sensitive to the dan-
ger of catching it from their partners. The Bundesbank was hard to convince that even the fairly 
innocuous Stage One of the EMS was not going too far and firmly opposes the transition to Stage 
Two and the establishment of the European Monetary Fund. The ECU cannot at present even be 
used for deposits in Germany, as is done in other EC countries, on the grounds that it is linked to 
other Member States' currencies and hence 'regarded by the Bundesbank as an indexed unit, which 
cannot be used for deposits in Germany under Article 3 of the 1948 Currency Law'.r The German 
Government and Parliament could commit the Federal Republic to monetary union, despite any 
opposition from the Bundesbank, if the grounds for doing so appeared politically secure. But the fear 
of inflation is deep-rooted enough among the people to render conflict with the Bundesbank on such 
an issue politically dangerous; and such fears would not be allayed by Article 52.4, which allows the 
European Council (presumably by a unanimous vote) to suspend entry into force of the monetary 
laws for five years after the Treaty becomes effective. Wessels, in a commentary on the Draft Treaty, 
finds it singular that the draft does not require ratification by national Parliaments for the establish-
ment of full monetary union (or of a West European defence system).'8 
Requiring a qualified majority in the Parliament, together either with an absolute majority in the Council, or with the support of 
the Commission and a minimum of one-third plus one of the weighted votes in the Council (see above; we have suggested a 
two-thirds majority in the Council above). 
Lomax, The Time is Ripe: The European Monetary System, the ECU and British Policy, (Report of a Federal Trust Study 
Group), November 1984, p. 23. 
Wessels, 'Der Vertragsentwurf des Europäischen Parlaments für eine Europäische Union', Europa-Archiv, April 1984, p. 242. 
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If German support for the European Union Treaty were to be conditional on provision for Member 
States' assent to any approach to full monetary union beyond the point of no return, the European 
Parliament would probably wish to adapt the draft in order to accommodate the German Govern-
ment. The example might be found useful of the formula for transition from the first to the second 
stage when establishing the EEC, which was 'conditional upon a finding that the objectives specifi-
cally laid down in the Treaty for the first stage have in fact been attained in substance' (Rome Treaty, 
Article 8.3); the objective this time would be sufficient compatibility among the Member States' eco-
nomies to justify an expectation of continuing equilibrium among them. The Rome Treaty required 
unanimous agreement for its 'finding'. Qualified majorities in Council and Parliament would be pre-
ferable in the Union; but it might be necessary to settle for the unanimity procedure. The transition 
in this case would be to full monetary union, whether with an exclusive Union currency or, if 'natio-
nal monetary symbols', as the Werner report put it, were to be retained, with 'the total and irreversi-
ble convertibility of currencies, the elimination of margins of fluctuation in exchange rates, the irre-
vocable fixing of parity rates and the complete liberation of movements of capital'." The condition 
for moving to full monetary union could be incorporated in the Draft Treaty with 'the procedures 
and the stages for attaining monetary union' (Art. 52.3), and would deal with the timetable for the 
free movement of capital (Art. 47.3) as well as with the permanent locking of parities or the replace-
ment of national currencies by a European currency. 
g. Microeconomic policies 
The need for European industry to have secure access to a wide European market does not grow less. 
The third industrial revolution causes specialization and scale of output, and hence the need for the 
wide market, continually to increase; so measures to remove the remaining barriers within the mar-
ket and to keep it open become increasingly important. The Treaty of Rome has provided most of 
the instruments needed for this, with its articles on the free movement of goods (Articles 9-37) and 
the rules governing competition (Articles 85-94, which include the control of State aids that may dis-
tort competition). 
If removing distortions to competition were all that is required of microeconomic policy, these 
instruments of negative integration provided by the Rome Treaty as it stands would be sufficient, in 
the hands of the institutions of the European Union which, unlike those of the Community, would 
be strong enough to ensure that the instruments are fully used. But the market imperfections inherent 
in the modern economy as well as the social pressures generated by the third industrial revolution 
have caused all the European governments to introduce a wide range of industrial policies. If these 
policies were a temporary aberration, the instruments of negative integration could control and even-
tually remove them. But although there is disillusion about support for lame ducks and lax treatment 
of uncompetitive firms, none of the European governments shows signs of abandoning policies to 
promote technological development and to facilitate adjustment; and except on the implausible 
assumption that the structure of industry will come to approximate the perfect competition model, 
economic theory justifies the governments. The European Union will be born into a world where 
industrial policy is a necessary fact. Thus the Union's microeconomic policy cannot be confined to 
the extirpation of Member States' industrial policies. 
One consequence of this is that the Union should recognize the validity of Member States' or firms' 
industrial policies where these contribute to economic progress rather than stand in its way. This is 
doubtless why the Draft Treaty enjoins the Union, in making its competition policy, to 'bear in mind 
... the need to restructure and strengthen the industry of the Union' (Art. 48). The Community has 
likewise accepted the Member States' subsidies to a number of troubled industries, while trying to 
Werner report, p. 10. 
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ensure that the subsidies are linked with measures of adjustment. Thus the instruments of negative 
integration can be used to promote positive adjustment: subsidies to troubled sectors or agreements 
among those sectors' firms can be made conditional on measures to promote a return to competitive­
ness. 
The Community's financial resources have provided it with a carrot to go with its stick. Money from 
the Social Fund, the Regional Fund, the European Investment Bank, the New Community Instru­
ment and ECSC funds has been used to support industrial adjustment. The ECSC Treaty, in addi­
tion to authorizing the Community to raise loans and to levy a turnover tax of up to 1% of the value 
of coal and steel production (or more if a two-thirds majority in the Council so decides), gives the 
Community powers to influence investment, and to control production and prices if a 'manifest 
crisis' (Art. 58) has been declared. Thus the Community can complement its right to control Member 
States' subsidies by the use of its own, rather slender, financial resources; and in coal, steel and, of 
course, agriculture, by more direct regulation of the market. But outside these particular sectors, the 
Community has only a slight capacity to do more than attempt to control the industrial policies of 
Member States, whereas here must be a strong presumption that interdependence has reached the 
point where the States' policies alone are not enough, but common policies using substantial com­
mon instruments are also required. 
The powers to tax and borrow that the Draft Treaty gives the Union (Art. 71.2) would make a very 
big difference, if the Union uses its financial resources to support its microeconomic policy. The 
Draft Treaty also makes particular provision, in Article 53 on 'sectoral policies', for agriculture and 
fisheries, energy, transport, telecommunications, industry, and research and development. 
An introduction to that article specifies its concern with 'specific sectors of economic activity' and 
'sectoral policies'."° While these terms are appropriate for agriculture and fisheries, energy, transport 
and telecommunications, the word 'sectoral' is not so apt with respect to industry and to research 
and development, where at least some of the Union's policies should apply over a much wider area 
than is commonly known as a sector. 
The aim of the Union's sectoral policies is defined in the first sentence of Article 53 as 'to meet the 
particular needs for the organization, development or coordination of specific sectors of economic 
activity', which sounds as if the drafters had schemes of sectoral planning rather prominently in 
mind, even if the aim of 'development' could encompass almost any legitimate aim of policy. As if 
aware that the first sentence may have a dirigiste flavour, the next sentence may be intended to re­
assure liberals in that the policies 'shall, by the establishment of reliable framework conditions, in 
particular pursue the aim of facilitating the decisions which undertakings subject to competition 
must take concerning investment and innovation': the Union is to provide a framework for invest­
ment and innovation in a market economy. 
To the non-lawyer, the wording of this introductory paragraph may seem unwieldy and give a slightly 
odd impression. But it is not necessary to raise objections provided that the jurists can assure us that 
it adds something significant to the draft without giving too much scope for unintended or unpre­
dictable consequences. If the jurists are not sufficiently sure of that, the draft could be strengthened 
by confining this paragraph to 'the Union shall have concurrent competence in the fields of sectoral 
policy specified in this article, in so far as such policies substantially affect inter-State trade'. 
Again, the Union's concurrent competence is to apply to policies 'at the level of the Union'. But can Member States have compe­
tence for policies at Union level? Would it not be better to give the Union concurrent competence for 'sectoral policies in so far 
as these substantially affect inter-State trade'? 
ι is 
Industry; research and development 
Both paragraph d of Article 53, on research and development, and paragraph e, on industry, are 
concerned mainly with the instruments of Union policy, and in this both emphasize coordination and 
guidance of the policies of Member States. For research and development, the Union 'may draw up 
common strategies with a view to coordinating and guiding national activities and encouraging co-
operation between the Member States and between research institutes', while for industry it 'may 
draw up development strategies with a view to guiding and coordinating the policies of the Member 
States in those industrial branches which are of particular significance to the economic and political 
security of the Union'. 
The Draft Treaty cannot be faulted for concentrating on instruments rather than aims in these two 
fields. For the aims can hardly avoid being as broad as those of economic policy, which are outlined 
in the Preamble of the Draft and defined in Article 9.41 But the general injunction to the Union to 
coordinate and guide 'national activities', in the case of research, and 'the policies of the Member 
States', in the case of industrial branches with particular significance for economic and political 
security, does not help to determine the limits to centralization in the Union. Apart from the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, there is no legal limit, it would seem, to the Union taking control of the whole 
of research activities in the Member States, with the power to shut down a programme of research on 
developing a microcomputer or even on a cure for influenza, for that matter/2 Nor, as we have seen, 
is the principle of subsidiarity much help since the Draft Treaty defines the coordination of national 
research and development activities as an objective of Union policy — which can hardly be under-
taken more effectively 'by the Member States acting separately'. More than in most other activities, 
freedom and variety are essential for research. The Union should surely confine itself to the promo-
tion of research projects whose scale puts them beyond the scope of the several Member States and to 
cooperation with the States in encouraging research and development, rather than 'coordinating and 
guiding national activities', which could open the way to telling not only the public authorities in the 
Member States, but even eventually the researchers, what they are and are not to do. Those func-
tions which are suitable for the Union in this field could be performed by use of the Union's financial 
resources, without need for powers of compulsion over the research policies of Member States, let 
alone of independent institutes and researchers. The Union's financial power will be such that it 
should be able to offer joint finance on terms that would induce Member States to cooperate, or fail-
ing that, the Union could sponsor its own projects independently, without any resort to compulsion. 
Thus it would be better to omit the provision for coordination of national activities and to concen-
trate on the remainder of the paragraph on research and development, concerning expenditure of the 
Union's own money on promoting research, whether on its own or jointly with others. Paragraph d 
would then read 'in the field of research and development, the Union may provide financial support 
for joint research, may take responsibility for some of the risks involved and may undertake research 
in its own establishments'. If omission of the sentence regarding coordination of national activities 
does not preclude Union control of the Member States' research policies and activities, a sentence 
should be added to preclude it specifically. If reference to common strategies and coordination is held 
to be desirable, this could be by the method of cooperation, which depends on unanimous agree-
ment. 
There must be a similar concern about the provision for 'guiding and coordinating the policies of 
Member States' in the field of industry. The limitation of such control to 'those industrial branches 
In particular 'the economic development of (the Union's) peoples with a free internal market and stable currency, equilibrium in 
external trade and constant economic growth, without discrimination between nationals or undertakings of the Member 
States by strengthening the capacity of the States, the citizens and their undertakings to act together to adjust their organization 
and activities to economic changes'; 'the progressive elimination of the imbalance between its regions'; 'the improvement of 
international commercial and monetary relations'; 'the harmonious and equitable development of all the peoples of the world'. 
If 'national activities' were interpreted as applying to Member States' public policies, the field for intervention would be limited 
to that extent; but it would still be very wide, particularly in relation to those Member States where public support for research 
and development is large. 
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which are of particular significance to the economic and political security of the Union' is doubtless 
intended to confine the scope for directive policies on the part of the Union to certain sectors that are 
especially security-sensitive, even if the term 'economic and political security' might permit of wide 
interpretation. But however wide the interpretation, the restriction to security-sensitive sectors may 
offer too narrow a scope for Union policy: much of industrial policy aims to promote innovation and 
investment and to facilitate adjustment over the whole of'industry' (including services as well). Such 
matters are already the subject of Community policies on competition, State aids, external trade and 
expenditure from its funds and financial instruments; and it seems desirable that there should be 
scope for the Union to play a more positive role in promoting innovation, investment and adjustment 
than the Community has been able to do. It seems likely that the Community patrimony already 
offers the legal basis for any desired expansion of such expenditure from the resources that would be 
available to the Union. But if there is any doubt about this, paragraph e on industry could provide, 
as paragraph d on research and development does, for Union expenditure to promote innovation, 
investment and adjustment, whether alone or jointly with Member States. 
The Esprit programme is but a small beginning to such expenditure, confined at present to research; 
Euratom's expenditure has also been dwarfed by that of Member States; and the large public invest-
ment in developing European aircraft has been kept separate from the Community. But Union prog-
rammes of development and investment in such high-technology branches could well be promoted 
on the basis of Union finance. (Article 54.1 also provides for 'industrial cooperation structures', such 
as, presumably, the Airbus programme, to be converted 'into a common action of the Union' if the 
European Council so decides). 
Union funds could also help to secure adjustment in sectors with problems such as shipbuilding or a 
number of branches of chemicals or engineering. An aim of Article 53.e may be to ensure that ratio-
nalization programmes for such branches are not obstructed by, say, one firm or one Member State. 
The industrial logic of this may be impeccable, if one takes, as the present author does, a rather Japa-
nese view of industrial policy. But unless 'branches which are of particular significance to the econo-
mic and political security of the Union' can be quite narrowly defined, the provision for Union co-
ordination could go far to suppress the industrial policies of Member States. If such a degree of cen-
tralization is not thought desirable, there could be merit in resting the Union's industrial policy on 
the existing Community instruments (competition policy, control of State aids, common commercial 
policy), with the crucial expansion of the funds available for Union expenditure. Paragraph e could, 
then, refer to this Community patrimony (as does the paragraph on agriculture — see below) and 
provide for Union expenditure (along the lines of paragraph d on research and development); and it 
is for consideration whether the paragraph could stop short at that/' Additional instruments, that 
could be useful for Union policy in industry as well as other fields, would be the 'specialized Euro-
pean agencies' which Article 54 authorizes the Union to establish. 
Transport, telecommunications 
The main concern of Articles 74 to 84 of the Rome Treaty, on transport, is to remove any distortions 
that affect intra-State trade. The European Investment Bank offers means for investment in 'projects 
of common interest to several Member States which are of such a size or nature that they cannot be 
entirely financed by the various means available in the individual Member States' as well as 'projects 
for developing less-developed regions' and some other projects 'called for by the progressive estab-
lishment of the common market' (Rome Treaty, Art. 130); and the Regional Fund and New Com-
" Paragraph e of Article 53 also includes two sentences about procedures. 'The Commission shall be responsible for taking the 
requisite implementing measures. It shall submit to the Parliament and the Council of the Union a periodic report on industrial 
policy problems.' Such procedures are not specified in respect of other matters amd it is not clear why the Union should not be 
left to fix its own procedures in this matter too, instead of having them enshrined in the Treaty. The draft would be none the 
worse without these two sentences. 
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munity Instrument could also be used to finance projects that would contribute to a Union transport 
network. But it remains true that 'the distinctive feature of the common transport policy is the lack of 
positive guidance given by the (Rome) Treaty'/4 A transport network that makes movements of 
people and goods among the Member States easier is an important element in creating a political and 
economic union, and the Draft Treaty is right to require the Union to 'undertake common actions to 
... develop the capacity of transport routes so as to create a transport network commensurate with 
European needs' (Art. 53.b). It may not be so certain that the Rome Treaty's provisions against dis-
crimination and distortions in inter-State transport need to be supplemented or replaced by a further 
requirement for the Union to 'undertake common actions to put an end to all form of discrimination, 
harmonize the basic terms of competition between the various modes of transport, eliminate 
obstacles to trans-frontier traffic' (Draft Treaty, Art. 53.b). Nor, following our earlier argument 
about subsidiarity, is the requirement for the Union to 'pursue a policy designed to contribute to the 
economic integration of the Member States' necessarily appropriate in a Treaty designed to keep the 
Union to what really needs to be done in common, since 'economic integration' can be so widely de-
fined (see above). It might be better to replace this reference to economic integration by a formula-
tion similar to that suggested above for tax harmonization, e.g. 'in the field of transport, the Union 
shall remove distortions that substantially affect economic transactions among the Member States'. 
The Rome Treaty has no reference to telecommunications, which have become increasingly impor-
tant with the rise of information technology. The Draft Treaty remedies this omission with para-
graph c of Article 53, which requires that 'in the field of telecommunications, the Union shall take 
common action to establish a telecommunications network ...'. Since the analogy with the case for a 
Union transport network is quite close, it seems odd that this is not followed, like the reference in 
paragraph b to the transport network, by 'commensurate with European needs'. The text continues, 
instead, to require common standards and harmonized tariffs. The common standards are doubtless 
desirable but it might be advisable to confine the requirement to harmonize tariffs by 'in so far as 
necessary to facilitate inter-State communications'. The text then provides that the Union 'shall exer-
cise competence in particular with regard to the high technology sectors, research and development 
activities and public procurement policy'. This reference to research and development in relation to 
telecommunications seems to add nothing to paragraph d on research and development. It is ques-
tionable whether the 'high technology sectors' related to telecommunications should be treated diffe-
rently from other high-technology sectors which would come under paragraph e on industry; and the 
same could be said of public procurement. If the high technology sectors and public procurement 
need to be mentioned here, they should surely also be mentioned elsewhere; if they do not need to be 
mentioned elsewhere, it is doubtful whether they should be accorded a special mention here. 
Agriculture, energy 
For agriculture and fisheries, the Draft Treaty rests solely on the Rome Treaty: 'in the fields of agri-
culture and fisheries, the Union shall pursue a policy designed to attain the objectives laid down in 
Article 39 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community' (Draft Treaty, Article 53, 
par. a). Article 39 of the Rome Treaty lists five objectives: 'to increase agricultural productivity'; 
'thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community'; 'to stabilize markets'; 'to 
assure the availability of supplies'; 'to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices'. Sta-
bilization of markets and security of supplies relate to the peculiar characteristics of agricultural mar-
kets and of food as the most basic economic necessity; and prices to the consumers also relate, up to 
a point, to the latter characteristic. But productivity and producers' living standards are not more 
relevant to agriculture than to various other sectors; and the question has been asked why one group 
of producers should be specially favoured in this way. The answer lies, of course, in the bargain that 
Despicht, Policies for Transport in the Common Market, 1964, p. 34. 
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was struck when the EEC was established; and the retention of the Rome Treaty's formulation may 
be seen as a political condition of acceptance of the European Union Treaty. 
Special treatment is also given to the field of energy in the Treaties establishing the European Com-
munity. For coal (as for steel), the objectives can be grouped under headings similar to those for agri-
culture, with the addition of the development of international trade (ECSC Treaty, Article 3). For 
atomic energy, safety and security are also stressed (Euratom Treaty, Article 2). But there is no men-
tion in these Treaties of oil or gas, or of an overall energy policy. 
As with agriculture, paragraph f on energy in Article 53 of the Draft Treaty is confined to the state-
ment of objectives: 'in the field of energy, action by the Union shall be designed to ensure security of 
supplies, stability on the market of the Union and, to the extent that prices are regulated, a harmon-
ized pricing policy compatible with fair competitive practices. It shall also be designed to encourage 
the development of alternative and renewable energy sources, to introduce common technical stan-
dards for efficiency, safety, the protection of the environment and of the population, and to encou-
rage the exploitation of European sources of energy'. 
Security of supplies and stability on the market are of peculiar importance with respect to energy as 
to agriculture; and standards for safety and for the protection of the environment and of the popula-
tion also have particular significance in the field of energy. The Draft Treaty is right to give the 
European Union these responsibilities which the Member States are decreasingly able to carry, or 
where, as in the case of safety and environmental standards, actions in one Member State can have 
significant effects beyond national frontiers. The objective of a harmonized pricing policy to the 
extent that prices are regulated is also hard to gainsay, although it seems likely that this is already 
covered by Article 101 of the Rome Treaty, which requires the removal of any 'difference between 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States (which) is dis-
torting the conditions of competition in the common market'. Encouraging the development of 
alternative and renewable sources of energy as well as other European sources are worthy aims; 
encouraging conservation would also be a worthy aim — but this raises the question whether it is 
advisable to list objectives in so much detail, or whether these more detailed objectives are not impli-
cit in the wider objectives of security and stability. There should be some reluctance to enshrine in a 
treaty that has many of the characteristics of a constitution specific policies that may in the future 
cease to be such significant priorities. But apart from this, and the perhaps unnecessary addition of 
'common technical standards for efficiency' among the things that Union action is to introduce, para-
graph f appears to include only objectives with respect to which a strong case can be made for com-
mon action by the Union, and not to include matters that would be better left as the exclusive pro-
vince of the States. Whether, in order to preserve their proper province for the States, the Union 
competence should be explicitly confined to action in pursuit of the specified objectives is a matter 
for jurists rather than economists to judge. 
h. Social policy 
The Institutional Affairs Committee's rapporteur on 'policy for society' was concerned to gain popu-
lar support for the European Union project. 'We cannot', he wrote, 'expect Community citizens to 
enthuse about a purely institutional project or support it without knowing what policies, and the 
substance thereof, will be implemented by institutions of the future Union'. But he went on to 'admit 
that a positive description of the policies aspired to cannot include many practical details if it is seen 
as part of a venture designed to result in the drafting of a text that could serve as a constitution'.45 We 
have already encountered, in our examination of the part of the Draft Treaty concerning economic 
Pfennig, 'The European Union's powers in the area of policy for society', in Report of the Committee on Institutional Affairs, 
Part C, supra, p. 65, par. 2, p. 66, par. 5. 
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policy, some articles that appeared to contain unsuitable details. But the part of the draft on 'policy 
for society' raises doubts of another order: regarding the suitability of allowing the Union to coerce 
the States at all where social policies are concerned. 
Article 55 of the Draft Treaty gives the Union 'concurrent competence in the field of social, health, 
consumer protection, regional, environmental, education and research, cultural and information 
policies'. Thus the Union appears to have potentially exclusive competence (see above) for social 
policy as a whole or, if the word 'social' is to be more narrowly interpreted than in customary English 
usage, at least over a very large part of social policy. 
It is a normal principle of federal constitutions that functions are not transferred from the States to 
the federal government unless the States are unable to perform them satisfactorily; and the drafters of 
the European Union Treaty clearly intended the principle of subsidiarity to have the same result (see 
above). Proposals for federal systems usually envisage leaving the great bulk of social policy with the 
States.46 Yet the constitutional defence of States' autonomy in these matters under the Draft Treaty 
seems to rest heavily on the principle of subsidiarity, which may as we have seen be an inadequate 
safeguard. 
One way to limit the scope for the Union's incursion into Member States' autonomy in these fields 
would be to confine the Union's 'concurrent competence in the field of social, health, consumer pro-
tection, regional, environmental, education and research, cultural and information policies' (Art. 55) 
explicitly to only such parts of those fields as are specified in the subsequent Articles 56 to 62. Yet 
even this would leave some provisions with highly-centralizing potential. Thus 'the regional policy of 
the Union shall comprise the development of a European framework for the regional planning poli-
cies possessed by the competent authorities in each Member State' (Art. 58). If a framework is to be 
effective, it is necessary to ensure that the policies made within the framework do indeed conform to 
it: hence the possibility that the Union could veto a local authority's decision to build a road by pas-
sing a town or, conversely, could force the building of a road in the teeth of local opposition. Article 
58 opens the door, then, to detailed interference by the Union in what can be very local affairs. 'The 
Union-wide validity and equivalence of diplomas and school, study and training periods' (Art. 60) 
may give the Union scope to impose excessive uniformity of curricula in schools and higher educa-
tion. 'The establishment of general comparable conditions for the maintenance and creation of jobs' 
(Art. 56) might be interpreted extremely widely; and 'trade union rights and collective negotiations 
between employers and employees, in particular with a view to the conclusion of Union-wide collec-
tive agreement' has already been mentioned as an area where there could be high risks in Union inter-
vention without local consent. 
A second possibility would be for the Union to be allowed to spend its money in the fields or on the 
aims specified in Articles 56 to 62, or even in the very wide fields listed in Article 55, but not to inter-
fere in legislation or expenditure by Member States, except where the Rome Treaty already provides 
for this (e.g. with respect to equal pay and to the size of subsidies to investments in the various reg-
ions). Harmonization of Member States' legislation could also be subject to the method of coopera-
tion, based on unanimous agreement among the Member States.4 If the European Parliament is not 
convinced by these arguments, and Union control over States' legislation is thought to be particularly 
important in some parts of the areas listed in Articles 55 to 62, the list of subjects specified in these 
articles should at least be carefully scrutinized in order to determine where the case is particularly 
strong, so that subordination of State to Union legislation would be confined to as short a list of sub-
jects as possible. 
" See, for example, Rossolillo, C;rr<j territorio istituzioni, 1983, p. 62 et seq. 
' Article 55 could then read 'The Union shall conduct its relations by the method of cooperation in the field of social, health, con-
sumer protection, regional, environmental, education and research, cultural and information policies'. 
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i. Conclusions 
A number of ways in which the Draft Treaty might be amended have been considered, some of which 
may be regarded as important or even essential improvements, others as minor ameliorations that 
might help to make the draft stronger or more acceptable. 
Perhaps the most significant single issue is whether the principle of subsidiarity can be made a more 
effective safeguard against the danger of overcentralization. One possibility is to define the principle 
more sharply, particularly in order to forestall any tendency to circumvent it by adopting inherently 
centralizing objectives. Another would be to give more weight to the values of diversity and decentra-
lization in the general objectives of the Union. A third would be to ensure that the Union's guaran-
tees of human rights are defined as effectively as possible to this end. 
A different form of general safeguard would be the requirement of an absolute or a qualified majority 
of the votes of Member States' representations in the Council, instead of just one-third of the weigh-
ted voles plus one, if the Union is to enact laws that 'extend' its common action. (On the other hand 
it would seem desirable that appointment of the Commission's President and amendment of the 
Treaty could be decided by something short of unanimous agreement.) 
None of these general safeguards seems, however, strong enough to obviate the need to define limits 
to the Union's action in fields specified in the Draft Treaty, in order to prevent the exercise of the 
Union's concurrent competence from automatically giving the Union exclusive competence over an 
excessively wide area. These limits may be defined in terms of the aims, fields or instuments of Union 
policy, or conditions that must apply if Union action is to be justified. 
One of the ways in which Union activity can be limited in certain fields is by confining it to cases 
which 'directly affect the establishment or functioning of the common market' (as the Rome Treaty 
puts it, in Article 100 on the approximation of laws) or which involve 'distortions in economic trans-
actions among the Member States', or some such formulation. Such limits have been suggested above 
with respect to competition policy, approximation of laws relating to undertakings, tax harmoniza-
tion, transport and telecommunications; and it has been suggested that the cases be further limited to 
those with a substantial effect. 
Other aims can in addition be allocated to the Union, such as stability of markets and security of sup-
plies (agriculture, energy). As far as agriculture is concerned, this aim is not defined in order to limit 
Union activity to action taken to further it, but in order to guide Union action within the wide field 
of agricultural policy which is open to it. There is a case, however, for limiting any use of special 
Union powers allocated by the Draft Treaty in the field of energy to these and a few other specified 
ends such as safety and environmental protection, beyond which any action in this field would have 
to rest on the powers given to the Union elsewhere in the Draft Treaty, as well as in the Community 
Treaties. Other examples of specific aims laid down for the Union are the creation of a 'telecommu-
nications network' and of a 'transport network commensurate with European needs'; and the 
Union's powers specific to these two fields could well be limited to that, together with the removal of 
distortions that substantially affect economic transactions among the States. 
A narrower definition of fields for Union action than the Draft Treaty proposes has been suggested 
for competition policy (to concern the matters defined in the EEC and the ECSC Treaties), and for 
tax harmonization (to exclude personal income tax). A narrower definition has likewise been sug-
gested for the field that contains the heart of the Draft Treaty's economic proposals: conjunctural (as 
the Draft Treaty puts it) or general economic policy. Here it is proposed that, while the Union should 
use any of its own financial and budgetary instruments in pursuing its general economic policy, its 
interventions regarding the Member States' laws, policies and instruments in this field should be con-
fined to monetary affairs, leaving the States' and local authorities' budgets in the sphere of Member 
States' autonomy. 
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This leads on to the issue of those provisions in the Draft Treaty that give the Union concurrent com-
petence to coordinate the policies or actions of the Member States. Where, as with monetary policy, 
exclusive competence for the Union is a legitimate eventual aim, such a provision is justified. Where, 
as with research and development, such a degree of centralization appears highly undesirable, it has 
been suggested that the Union's activity be based on expenditure from its own resources (which 
under the terms of the Draft Treaty can be very substantial), whether alone or jointly with Member 
States, but that no provision be made for the Union to exercise compulsion over the research policies 
or programmes of the States or over private research and development. Industrial policy comes 
somewhere between the two, but this paper, in accordance with the decentralist (or federalist) philo-
sophy that underlies it, leans towards a formulation in the Draft Treaty similar to that suggested for 
research and development, bearing in mind that the Community patrimony already gives the Union 
important instruments of industrial policy in the form of the competition policy, the control over 
State aids, the common commercial policy, and the financial and budgetary resources which under 
the Draft Treaty can be increased so as to carry much greater weight. 
Also in line with the paper's decentralist and federalist philosophy, it is suggested that the Union's 
power to control the States' laws, policies or expenditure on social policy should be very restricted, if 
indeed the Union is to have any such power beyond the few items that it inherits from the Commu-
nity. The Union's power to spend its own money in these fields using the method of common action 
is viewed more tolerantly. Apart from this, however, the method of cooperation appears more suit-
able than that of common action over most if not all of this field, because the relationship between 
Union and States should not be based on compulsion. 
The major instance with respect to which it has been suggested that Union competence could be limi-
ted by a condition is that of full monetary union, transition to which could be conditional on Mem-
ber States' agreement that adequate equilibrium had been established in their mutual economic relat-
ionships. 
Apart from those matters that reflect the great issue of subordinate or coordinate relationships bet-
ween the Union and the States, there are some articles that contain what appears to be unnecessary 
detail, whose removal would strengthen the Draft Treaty. Examples are to be found in the articles on 
telecommunications and the free movement of goods and services. 
None of these detailed criticisms of the Draft Treaty's provisions for economic and social policy 
should be taken as calling in question the essential principles that are embodied in the draft. The 
intention is quite the opposite. The draft has attracted the support of the Belgian and Italian Parlia-
ments and President Mitterrand has said kind words about it in his address to the European Parlia-
ment on 24 May 1984;4S and it has been on the agenda of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutions 
established following Mitterrand's initiative at the Fontainebleau Summit. But that is a far cry from 
ratification of the Draft Treaty as it stands. A great deal of effort will have to be put into persuading 
Parliaments, the public and of course Governments if a European Union Treaty containing the Draft 
Treaty's essential features is to be ratified; and careful consideration of proposed amendments to the 
draft should both help to improve the Treaty and contribute to the process of persuasion: a sort of 
engrenage between the European Parliament and political forces in the member countries. Such a 
process is not only necessary if enough Governments and Parliaments are to be convinced that the 
Treaty should be ratified. It would also help to establish what Wessels has rightly stressed is an 
essential basis of the European Union: its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.49 
One particular merit of giving a prominent place in such discussion to the main concern of this paper 
— safeguards for the proper autonomy of the Member States — could be to channel nationalist reac-
tions in a constructive direction. Even if one does not go all the way with Friedrich's categorization 
of the type of constitution to which we are accustomed in the West as 'a system of effective, regular-
Supra. 
Supra, at p. 243. 
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ized restraints upon the exercise of governmental power',50 this is certainly an important requirement 
for the European Union Treaty. The Union should be based on a coordinate relationship between 
Union and States, not on the subordination of one to the other; and the preservation of sufficient 
autonomy for the States is an essential part of this. But it is, equally, important that the Union not be 
subordinate to the States in matters where Union action is necessary for the general welfare. Thus the 
European Parliament should not fail to defend the hard core of its draft: co-decision by Council and 
Parliament with no time-limits and with majority votes; basic economic powers in the fields of the 
internal market, monetary union and the Union's financial resources. 
50 Friedrich, 'Federal Constitutional Theory and Emergent Proposals', in Arthur W. Macmahon (ed.), supra, at p. 516; Friedrich 
refers here to his Constitutional Government and Democracy (revised ed.), 1950. 
126 
Chapter VII — Foreign affairs powers 
and policy in the Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union 
by Peter Brückner 
1. Introduction 
In the context of the present paper, entitled 'Foreign affairs powers and policy in the Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union', the term 'policy' is to mean areas in which the Union possesses 
international relations powers. Indeed, the actual concrete policies to be pursued by the Union in the 
various fields of foreign relations are to be determined by the competent institutions of the Union at 
the relevant moment. Thus, I shall not dwell on the kind and contents of commercial policy, deve-
lopment-aid policy, etc. to be conducted by the Union. 
This definition seems to be in harmony with the general approach reflected in the Draft Treaty, i.e. 
an institutional rather than a functional approach. 
For similar reasons, the present study will mainly focus on the foreign relations machinery in the 
broad sense of the term. Will the machinery set up by the draft work according to the underlying 
intentions? This approach will perhaps facilitate the task of analysing and judging the relevant parts 
and provisions on their own merits, irrespective of the rather widespread doubt whether at this 
moment a new treaty is the best way to set about achieving greater European unity. It is not for us to 
answer this question as such in the present context. However, our critical remarks may in certain 
respects raise questions as to whether a Draft Treaty following an institutional approach is adequate 
to solve the problems of the unsatisfactory functioning of the Community inter alia in the field of 
foreign relations. 
At the same time, it must be recognized that the present Draft Treaty offers an excellent basis for dis-
cussing a coherent foreign relations system of a European Union. May the following comments be 
perceived in the same constructive spirit in which the draft has been elaborated. 
2. Major problems in the functioning of the 
EC foreign relations 
The Treaty of Rome does not contain a separate chapter on external relations.' The complex of 
provisions relating to foreign relations can hardly be said to belong to the most successfully drafted 
' The ECSC and Euratom Treaties do contain such chapters but the relevant provisions have had little significance and will not 
be dealt with further in this paper. For a more complete analysis of the EEC external relations see Megret, 'Le droit de la Com-
munauté économique européenne', Relations Extérieures, 12. 
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parts of the Treaty.2 Yet the external competence of the Community concerns the very life nerve of 
the Community's legal system. 
The provisions are scattered all over the Treaty and can only be fitted into a coherent system with 
some intellectual effort. Such efforts have been deployed first and foremost by the European Court of 
Justice, which in the ERTA decision introduced some coherence and consistency into the field of for-
eign relations, in the first place with regard to the extent of Community competence. The ERTA 
judgment (Case 22/70 [1971] ECR 263) is the basis for the doctrine of parallelism, whereby treaty-
making power would be co-extensive with the exercise of internal competences in any given field 
even without an explicit treaty-making authority in the Treaties. 
This case was considered controversial in many quarters, but the Court hardly had any choice. It 
could not have rendered a non liquet. Subsequently, the Court continued to fill in the gaps left by the 
Treaty in cases like Kramer (Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 [1976] ECR 1279) and Opinion 1/76 ([1977] 
ECR 741) concerning a draft agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for inland waterway 
vessels. 
The Court's own words in this Opinion are illustrative. After stating that 'the power of the Com-
munity to conclude such an agreement is not expressly laid down in the Treaty', the Court continues 
by saying that 'authority to enter into international commitments may not only arise from an express 
attribution by the Treaty, but equally may flow implicitly from its provisions'. 
The Court concluded that wherever Community law has created for the institutions of the Commun-
ity powers within its internal system for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community 
has authority to enter into the international commitments necessary for the attainment ofthat objec-
tive even in the absence of an express provision in that connection. 
By this addition the Court went beyond the scope of the ERTA doctrine, opening new avenues for 
external Community competence but generating, simultaneously, futher controversy. 
The reference to 'necessary' etc. is surprisingly similar to the language of Article 235, which in an 
obiter dicta in ERTA was also recognized as a legal basis for concluding Community agreements — 
and used in practice, in particular in the field of environment protection. (It also evokes the language 
of the Copenhagen report of 1973, par. 11, which states that Governments will consult on all impor-
tant foreign-policy questions provided, inter alia, the subjects concern European interests where the 
adoption of a common position is necessary or desirable.) 
Both under the Opinion 1/76 doctrine and Article 235, the problem arises whether 'necessary' is a 
political concept leaving a nearly unlimited discretion to the competent institutions, in particular the 
Council, or whether it is rather a legal principle leaving a right of censorship to the Court. 
Even in the area where the Treaty provides expressly for Community competence, i.e. commercial 
policy under Article 113, problems arose as to the interpretation of this concept in Opinions 1/75 
([1975] ECR 1355) and 1/78 ([1978] ECR 2151). 
These opinions constitute, together with the ERTA judgment, the leading cases in regard to the 
exclusive character of Community competence. The severe peremptory approach in Opinion 1/75 
was somewhat mitigated in Opinion 1/78 (the Rubber Agreement), demonstrating the conflict bet-
ween legal orthodoxy and political reality. 
The 1970s were characterized by a dynamic development of establishing international relations and 
by a progressive assertion of Community power in respect of treaties. In practice, the Community 
lawyers were often faced with the problem of determining whether the Community was competent to 
conclude agreements with third countries where the political need for such action was felt. Or rather, 
1 Article 228 states somewhat pompously that 'where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Com-
munity and one or more States', etc. However, the Treaty provides for only two or three types of such agreements (Arts 113, 
229 and 231, and the afterthought in 238). 
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the Community had to respond to a series of external challenges in new fields such as environment 
protection, fisheries, development aid, transport and even in the classical area of commercial policy. 
The doctrines were refined; already then the notions of exclusive, concurrent and potential compe-
tence together with the concept of mixed agreements were emerging. 
However, by the end of the 1970s the problem was not so much the determination of the legal para-
meters of Community external competence but rather the reluctance of the Community to avail itself 
of the external powers recognized by the Court. 
The conflict lies between, on the one hand, the Commission, having obtained the support of the 
Court for a wide interpretation of Community powers, and on the other hand the Council and/or 
individual Member States, reluctant to surrender their powers in the field of external relations and 
accept Community competence. Experience has shown that even if they do accept Community 
action in a certain field they are sometimes very hesitant, in the event, to allow financing such action 
through the Community budget (Rubber Agreement, Opinion 1/78). 
The problem is not only of an internal nature. The attitude of third States has also been an important 
element in the process of mounting the Community as an actor on the international scene. Two 
trends seem to be noteworthy. 
Certain third States have not been prepared to recognize the legal capacity of the Community under 
international law. In particular the USSR and Eastern European countries have for a long time main-
tained such a negative attitude. This factor has contributed to the difficulties of conducting a com-
mon commercial policy. The Council Decision of 22 July 1974 introducing a procedure of consulta-
tion relating to economic cooperation agreements still to be negotiated on a bilateral basis illustrates 
this difficulty. 
In recent years the Eastern bloc attitude has softened in certain respects, in particular in certain mul-
tilateral forums. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which allows for Commun-
ity participation, provides a good example. 
Conversely, in other situations practice has shown that third countries tend increasingly to regard the 
Member States and the Community as a unity, often more than the Member States do themselves, 
and expect the Ten/EC to act as an entity on international issues. The difficulties of responding to 
such expectations have manifested themselves in two related respects. 
Experience has shown that subjects for international negotiations, in particular in multilateral 
forums, rarely fit the structure of the EC Treaties. Even in economic fields, the subject may often 
involve matters under Community competence as well as under Member States competence. In fact, 
there may be a sliding scale from exclusive Community competence as well as under Member State 
competence. In fact, there may be a sliding scale from exclusive Community competence, potential 
competence, Article 116 matters and Member States competence. In such cases resort has been made 
to 'mixed agreements'. 
In other instances, deliberations among the Ten within European political cooperation (EPC) have 
lead to political decisions which required the intervention of the Community for their implementa-
tion. 
EPC discussions on political aspects of proposals concerning economic aid to third countries provide 
clear examples, for instance food aid to Poland and economic assistance to Central America. Other 
cases show that the present distinction between EPC and Community creates difficulties even if the 
political will to carry out international action is manifest. Thus the decisions on economic measures 
('sanctions') against Iran, the USSR and Argentina were taken within EPC. The decisions were in cer-
tain cases implemented by Community measures (e.g. first phases of USSR sanctions), in other 
instances by the Member States according to national legislation (Iran).1 
! The later phases of sanctions against USSR and the case of Argentina revealed fundamental difficulties due to a lack of agree-
ment among Member States on the extent of Community powers. 
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Conversely, economic cooperation within a Community framework may open the door for political 
cooperation. Relations with the ASEAN countries provide a good example. 
The CSCE, the Euro-Arab dialogue and in particular the UN Law of the Sea Conference are examples 
where Community action and political cooperation go rather successfully hand in hand. 
In fact, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the Ten acting in political coopera-
tion and the Community. The picture becomes even more blurred when account is taken of fields of 
cooperation among the Ten which progressively have moved away from EPC proper and established 
their own framework such as Trevi and espace judiciaire. Both areas deal with relations among the 
Ten rather than with relations between the Ten and third countries. 
It may be argued that the difficulties encountered when responding to one or the other kind of a 
'mixed' situation are due to the 'old-fashioned' and 'inadequate' structure of the Community and that 
a simple restructuration of the institutional framework would serve to overcome these difficul-
ties. However, it is impossible to reconstruct history. It may, indeed, equally be argued that the 
increased engagement of the Community/the Ten would never have taken place without the present 
structure which has allowed for a gradual and flexible evolution of powers according to needs. In 
particular, this would not have happened in the absence of a distinction between Community and 
EPC. It is at least noteworthy that some Member States weighing the pros of Community action 
against the cons of surrendering powers in the external field have been willing to make certain con-
cessions along the road. Ministers have grown out of the absurdity of flying from one capital to 
another to underline the legal distinction between Community and EPC affairs. However, some of 
them at least seem very reluctant to give up the fundamental bastion, i.e. that decisions within EPC 
as a matter of principle are taken by unanimity. 
Even if the Council and the Member States have been prepared to accept the evolution of Commun-
ity competences, also in new areas not foreseen by the fathers of the Treaty of Rome, they have not 
always been willing to draw all the consequences, in particular in matters of negotiation procedure. 
The present negotiation regime has evolved through practice, inspired largely by Article 113 proce-
dures and by international State practice. The legal principles defended in particular by the Commis-
sion have been in constant clash with so-called political realities. 
The difficulties reside mainly in the fact that the articles of the Treaty (other than Article 113), which 
according to the Court provide a legal basis for external action as well have not been drafted for such 
application. The present picture is multi-faceted and sometimes confusing. Among the main ques-
tions which still give rise to difficulties are the following. 
In practice, the Commission always asks the Council for prior 'authorization' to negotiate agree-
ments even in areas outside Article 113, which is the only provision stipulating this requirement. 
This practice is contested by some authors, but seems to meet with Commission acquiescence. 
Another open question is to what extent the Commission may entertain prior contacts with third 
countries. 
The nature of the decision of the Council authorizing negotiations has also been questioned. The 
present doctrine regards it as an act sui generis, an internal preparatory step in a long process which 
— as distinct from the process of internal law-making — involves one or more third parties. Hence, 
it has been generally felt that a certain number of special factors should be taken into account when 
applying the system of the Treaty in practice to the process of international law-making. 
Agreements on protection of the environment and fisheries agreements are concluded on the basis of 
Article 235 and Article 43 respectively. Both provisions require consultation of the European Parlia-
ment. At what stage of the process should consultations take place? In practice, Parliament is consul-
ted when the agreement has been signed. Certain informal procedures serve to ensure that Parliament 
is kept informed during the negotiation process. Recently, a parliamentary request has been made for 
information already from the stage where draft directives are being elaborated by the Commission. 
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The question is how such requests can be reconciled with the vital need for confidentiality in interna-
tional negotiations. 
According to Article 228 of the Treaty, the Commission is the Community negotiator. Paragraph 1 
of this article provides a clear, general rule. However, it is among those which are most frequently 
violated in practice. Often the Commission has to share its negotiator task with the Council Presi-
dency, even in cases where a 'mixed' solution is not necessarily called for. 
The co-participation of the Presidency does not always reflect the wishes of the Council and Member 
States. It may be necessary in negotiations with third countries which still have reservations about 
the Community as an international actor. In other situations, it has been felt useful to have a Mem-
ber State supporting the Community position. 
However, in general the two-headed delegation formula serves to make Community negotiations 
very complicated. Further complications may arise when individual Member States insist on speak-
ing as well. 
The PROBA 20 formula is the expression of a practical solution to problems of an internal and 
external nature. In some respects it is not in conformity with the Treaty system (recognizing mixity 
where there is obviously no legal need). In other respects it has brought practice closer to the Treaty 
by recognizing an increased negotiator role for the Commission. 
Negotiations are, as a rule, monitored directly or indirectly by a group or committee composed of 
Member State representatives. The system of Article 113 has come off on negotiations under other 
articles. 
This practice has been contested in certain quarters. The fact that the Council and Member States 
attach great importance to this system was highlighted recently with regard to negotiations and con-
sultations with third countries in fishery matters. 
The present negotiation system is not in conformity with the Treaty, nor is it functioning as effect-
ively and smoothly as it could. Member States are reluctant to surrender their external powers into 
new fields not expressly covered by the Treaty [l'effet de freinage). This fear is largely responsible for 
the Member States' wish to monitor closely the Commission as spokesman in external affairs. Proced-
ures taking account of Member States' (and Parliament's) interests have contributed to making action 
at Community level a cumbersome affair. (The task is not made easier by the general lack of delega-
tion of power within the systems of the various institutions.) 
Conversely, this has in certain cases affected Member States' confidence in the ability of the Com-
munity to act appropriately on the international scene. Member States often fear that the Commun-
ity is unable to react fast enough and that Community action, because of the transparency of pre-
parations, cannot guarantee the required confidentiality in negotiations. 
To some extent it is a vicious circle. The question is where to break it. 
3. International relations of the Union 
a. General observations 
Title III of the Draft Treaty is devoted to the international relations of the Union. Apart from the 
seven articles in this chapter (Arts 63-69), the draft contains certain other provisions dealing wholly 
or in part with external affairs. 
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Thus, the fourth preambular paragraph reaffirms 'the desire to contribute to the construction of an 
international society based on cooperation between peoples and between States, the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, security and the strengthening of international organizations'. 
A similar but not quite identical provision is found in Article 9, section 3. Sections 2 and 4 also deal 
with objections concerning the international relations of the Union. 
Furthermore, the following provisions contain particular references to the Union's external relations: 
(i) Article 4, par. 3, concerning the Union's accession to human rights conventions; 
(ii) Article 6 on the legal personality of the Union; 
(iii) Article 7 on the Community patrimony, in particular paragraph 4; 
(iv) Article 16, section 1, Article 21, section 2 and Article 28, section 7 specifying the functions of 
the Parliament, the Council and the Commission respectively. The powers and functions of the 
European Council are specified in Title III. 
The provisions of Title III, of course, have to be read in conjunction with the general rules of the 
Draft Treaty, in particular Part Two, on the objectives, methods and competences of the Union, Part 
Three, on the institutional provisions, and Part Four, concerning policies of the Union. 
Compared with the present system, the main feature of Title III, seen together with Article 7, par. 4, 
is that EPC has been brought under the auspices of the Union. In principle, the distinction between 
Community and EPC matters has been broken down. However, Title III is not limited to setting the 
objectives and competences in the external field; it also provides for methods among which some 
apparently are meant to take account of the sensitive and delicate character of EPC issues. As a gene-
ral rule, EPC matters are subject only to the method of cooperation. They may be transferred to the 
area of common action. However, Article 68 pars 2 and 3 contain special rules, derogating from the 
general system of the Draft Treaty and designed to introduce a special flexibility in the EPC area. In 
general, the impression is that the authors of the Draft Treaty have attempted to preserve the EPC 
system at its present stage of evolution when introducing it into the framework of the Treaty. 
Finally, a word on the terminology used in this part of the draft. The term 'international relations' 
has been chosen as the principal notion. 'External relations' is the label for international relations 
conducted by 'common action', typically actions covered by present Community powers. 'Foreign 
policy' is the term frequently applied to international relations conducted by 'cooperation', as a gene-
ral rule relations dealt with under EPC. 
b. Objectives and the Treaty system of 
international relations 
Article 63 sets out the principles and objectives of the Union's international relations. Paragraph 1 
takes up and expands the language of paragraph 4 of the Preamble and Article 9. Seen as a whole, 
Article 63 may to some extent be repetitive. 
The express reference to Article 9 in paragraph 2 introduces some uncertainty regarding the relation-
ship between the two paragraphs of Article 63. Paragraph 1 states that the 'Union shall direct its 
effort in international relations towards the achievement of . . .' whereas paragraph 2 says that the 
Union 'shall endeavour to attain the objectives set out in Article 9'. At the same time, paragraph 1 
contains objectives mentioned as well in Article 9, such as peace, détente, and improvement of inter-
national monetary relations. Conversely, the term 'cooperation' does not appear in paragraph 1. 
The methods (common action and cooperation) are only mentioned in paragraph 2; it is not clear 
whether these methods also apply to attain the objectives of paragraph 1. If so, it might help to intro-
duce the last sentence of paragraph 2 in a new, separate paragraph 3. 
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Apart from these more specific comments, it seems that the language of paragraph 1 in certain 
respects is too specific and in other respects too much an expression of pious wishes. 
Instead of 'disarmament' (the term of Article 9), paragraph 1 refers to 'mutual balanced and verifia-
ble reduction of military forces and armaments'. This, of course, is one method of disarmament, in 
fact the one pursued presently by the Ten; but it need not be the only method and not necessarily the 
preferred method in the next decade. 
The term 'strengthening of international organization' does not strike the right note. All the Member 
States are presently devoted to very restrictive budget policies in nearly all international organiza-
tions. They are, as a general rule, committed to foreign policy guidelines aiming at avoiding the 
establishment of new international organizations unless they can be justified as absolutely necessary. 
A term like 'strengthening of international cooperation' might be more appropriate. 
External actions of the Union are either common action or cooperation. The fields of cooperation 
may be transferred to common action (Art. 68.2) and the fields of cooperation may be extended 
(Art. 68.1). 
Article 10, par. 2, defining common actions, specifies that they may be addressed inter alia 'to States', 
a term which seems to encompass 'third States'. Other subjects of international law, such as interna-
tional organizations, are not specifically mentioned as addressees. 
In resumé, the system may be described as follows. 
Within the framework of common action the Commission is the Union negotiator; guidelines are 
issued by the Council; the Parliament is kept informed at every stage and approves — together with 
the Council — international agreements. 
The European Council is responsible for cooperation. 
The Commission is the institution exercising the right of (active) legation (or representation) abroad. 
c. Analysis of the operative provisions on 
international relations 
Article 64, par. 1 seems to confirm the principle of parallelism between internal and external Union 
powers. Thus, in its international relations, the Union shall act by common action in the fields refer-
red to in this Treaty where it has exclusive or concurrent competence. 
The question is how the concept of 'common action' should be interpreted in the sense of Article 64, 
par. 1. The provisions of Article 10, par. 2 define 'common action' as all normative, administrative, 
financial and judicial acts, internal or international, issued by the Union itself, originating in its 
institutions, etc. Article 12, par. 2 provides that where the Treaty confers concurrent competence on 
the Union the Member States shall continue to act so long as the Union has not legislated. In this 
situation, it may be asked whether Member States shall continue to act — also in the external field.4 
Assuming that the Draft Treaty were based on the same system as the Treaty of Rome, the situation 
with regard to external relations would be as follows. 
If the institutions of the Union cannot arrive at a decision to act at Union level in cases where it has 
exclusive competences the legal consequence is not that Member States may act.' If the competent 
' Paragraph 4 of Article 64 concerns cases where the EC has exclusive competences which have not been fully exercised and does 
not address this situation where there are concurrent competences. 
s It should not be excluded that the institutions of the Union, under certain conditions, might delegate the power to act to the 
Member States. 
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institutions cannot act in areas where there are concurrent competences the legal consequence is that 
Member States may continue to act — of course, with respect of the provisions of Article 13. 
This is one thesis which might well be advances as an answer to our question. It is, at least, the result 
of a fair interpretation of Article 64, par. 1 read in conjunction with Articles 10 and 12. 
It is, however, not the result flowing from a reading of Article 65 which is built on the assumption 
that the Commission is the sole representative of the Union in the exercise of its competences, exclu-
sive and concurrent. 
The conflicting interpretations seem to stem from the fact that Article 64, par. 1 — perhaps inadver-
tently — has married the issue of competences with the issue of the modalities for their exercise. If so, 
it may be advisable to review Article 64, par. 1 in order to make the necessary choices and clarify the 
situation.6 
We see no objection to a legal construct whereby the Union acts at the external level through the 
'competent institutions also in areas where no competence has been exercised at the internal level. It 
might be argued that Article 64, par. 1 presupposes the adoption of an organic law concerning the 
operation of the Union's external actions — in the field of exclusive as well as concurrent compet-
ences. 
In the meantime, it might be wise to adopt a pragmatic approach which ensures total parallelism bet-
ween internal and external powers: where the competence is exclusive internally the Union is exclu-
sively competent in the external field; in areas of concurrent internal competence the Member States 
remain competent to act externally until the adoption of a law according to Article 12, par. 2 infine. 
It follows from this scenario that mixed negotiations and mixed agreements cannot be avoided under 
the Draft Treaty. This is not necessarily to be regarded as an evil. Mixity, properly administered, 
offers flexible solutions in many situations. 
The areas referred to in Article 64, par. 1 are found mainly in Part Four of the draft 'The policies of 
the Union'. Since the provisions covering the various fields have been drafted essentially with a view 
to action within the Union, they may give rise to some difficulties of interpretation when applied to 
international action. Indeed, it may create difficulties when a particular policy is applicable 'within 
the Union', see Article 50, par. 1. 
One example may illustrate the problems which may be encountered. Environmental policy is dealt 
with in Article 59. This provision is very general in certain regards and surprisingly specific in other 
respects. It is not quite clear whether the list of special policies is exhaustive. Protection, for example, 
of the marine environment is not mentioned in particular, and yet this is the field which has most 
often been the subject of negotiation of international agreements by the Community. 
A solution may be sought through recourse to the general provision of paragraph 4 of Article 64, 
which seems to encompass external policies under exclusive Community competence established as 
well on the basis of Article 235 (EEC). This, however, would hardly be a legally-secure solution. 
Paragraph 2 of Article 64 confirms in particular that commercial policy remains a field of exclusive 
competence. Whereas Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome contains certain contributions to the inter-
pretation of the notion of commercial policy, the similar provision of the draft is very lapidary. 
Mr Derek Prag's working document (Doc. 1-575/83/C, p. 113) gives certain indications as to the 
intentions of the authors, but otherwise the text of the draft is not very helpful. The present formula 
6 See similar criticism in Constantinesco, Division of fields of competence between Union and the Member States, chapter III, this 
volume. 
7 See Weiler, 'The External Legal Relations of Non-Unitary Actors: Mixity and the Federal Principle' in Mixed Agreements 
(O'Keefe and Schermers eds), 1983. 
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may, after all, be preferable in order to allow for a dynamic interpretation of 'commercial policy' 
based inter alia on the Community patrimony. 
Development aid policy (DAP), referred to in paragraph 3 of Article 64, is not defined, for instance, 
in relation to commercial policy. 
The provision prescribes that during a transitional period of 10 years DAP shall progressively 
become the subject of common action by the Union. 
It is not entirely clear whether all aid, including aid granted by Member States, is to become the sub-
ject of the Union's DAP and thereby of common action. The last part of the paragraph seems to pre-
suppose the continued coexistence of independent DAP programmes by Member States. This would 
be a flexible and wise solution. Recognizing the very important internal policy factors underlying 
DAP in every Member State as well as the special ties that certain Member States entertain with parti-
cular developing countries it would hardly be realistic to expect any Member State to surrender all 
policy powers in this field. 
The provision transferring the Union's DAP progressively to common action leaves open the ques-
tion whether the DAP is to be subject to exclusive or concurrent competence of the Union. This may, 
of course, become the subject of a special organic law. In any event, the scenario which may result 
from paragraph 3 of Article 64 seems to be DAP within areas under exclusive as well as concurrent 
competence. In the latter fields, Member States may continue to act so long as the Union has not 
legislated. Furthermore, Member States preserve the power to act under their independent pro-
grammes which shall be coordinated with the DAP of the Union. Finally, it cannot be excluded that 
certain political aspects of aid policy will be dealt with under cooperation. 
Paragraph 4 of Article 64 aims at situations where the exclusive competence of the European Com-
munities has not yet been fully exercised. Indeed, it is true that in some cases under the common 
commercial policy the Community has not been able to act, for instance vis-à-vis certain Eastern 
European countries and the USSR. In other cases, for example in relation to Japan, the inability to 
act seems due rather to opposition by Member States. While the exclusivity of Community compe-
tence in these cases is undisputed, at least in principle, there may be areas where the concept of 
'exclusive competence' is not subject to unanimous interpretation by the Commission and Member 
States. The dispute relates inter alia to the pre-emptive effects of agreements concluded on the basis 
of ERTA plus Opinion 1/76 and perhaps also of Article 235 (EEC). 
This leads to an intricate question relating to the continued coexistence of Article 235 of the Treaty 
of Rome and the provisions of the present Union Treaty, which does not contain a similar provision 
(and perhaps does not need it)/ How would Article 235 (EEC) operate in particular in relation to 
paragraph 4 of Article 64 (DT)? 
Article 65 contains the regime governing the conduct of common action. At first glance, it appears to 
reinforce the role of the Commission as the sole representative of the Union vis-à-vis the exterior. 
The new feature is the increased role of the EP. According to paragraph 4 all international agree-
ments shall be approved not only by the Council but also by the EP. 
The approach seems to reflect a praiseworthy attempt to balance the need of an effective regime 
against the need to observe certain basic democratic principles. The question is whether a reasonably 
balanced result has been found. 
When considering the co-decision power of the EP with regard to all international agreements to be 
concluded by the Union it should be recalled that no Member State Parliament has such extensive 
powers. This, of course, should in itself be no excuse for not making the procedures of the Union 
more democratic. However, the Union is not based on a parliamentary system; the Council is not 
* See Doc. 1-575/83/B, p. 5, par. 12, 'Explanatory Statement'. 
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politically responsible to the EP. Consequently, it hardly seems justified, in principle, to grant such 
co-decision power to the EP. 
In any event, it is difficult to understand why EP should have a co-approval power with regard to all 
international agreements without any discrimination. Many agreements do not deserve such treat-
ment. 
Moreover, the provisions of Article 65 seems to exclude application of the so-called simplified proce-
dure, whereby an agreement may be concluded solely by signature of the parties without subsequent 
ratification or approval. 
Conversely, paragraph 4 refers only to international agreements but not to other international acts 
(unilateral legal or political acts), whereas paragraph 2 seems to cover only acts entailing legal 
obligations. It is not specified which institution approves such acts. 
It might also be argued that some international actions do not even merit submission to the Council. 
There should be a subsidiary organ for handling current affairs, for instance Coreper, which, in spite 
of its very important role in actual practice, is not even mentioned in the draft. 
Paragraph 3, concerning information of the EP, does not define the term 'every action'. It may cover 
any action preparing for or being part of the negotiation phase. The term 'every action' should, 
therefore, at least be made more specific in order to make sure that the confidentiality of negotiations 
is safeguarded. 
Finally, it is not made clear whether the Commission may take external initiatives without prior 'auth-
orization' by the Council. 
In summary, the procedures laid down in Article 65 do not seem to offer an acceptable solution to 
the problems which face the Community as an international actor. On the contrary, Article 65 
appears to have added further obstacles to the present cumbersome machinery. In particular, the co-
decision power of the EP goes further than necessary to safeguard the relevant democratic guarante-
es. 
The following suggestions might serve to make the regime more acceptable. Firstly, it might be use-
ful to codify the present practice of setting up a committee composed of representatives of Member 
States to assist the Commission during negotiations. Experience has shown that such a monitoring 
system will eventually facilitate the task of the Commission. 
Secondly, it would probably be wise to couple the provisions of paragraph 3 with a clause concern-
ing the establishment of a permanent foreign relations committee of the EP, authorized to receive 
information on actions in the field of international relations. The Draft Treaty might also prescribe 
that the rules of procedure of this committee should contain certain provisions on confidentiality, 
etc. This would be consistent with present practice and might enhance the flow of information on 
international actions. 
Thirdly, it might be appropriate — if the system of EP co-approval is maintained — to limit the cate-
gories of international agreements subject to co-approval by the EP in order not to overload EP with 
technical agreements of minor importance. Various criteria might be applied. International agree-
ments having financial implications or containing provisions which would affect existing Union law 
or introducing new rules which — if made internally — would fall under the articles concerning draft 
laws should always be subject to co-approval of the EP. Furthermore, the approval of the EP might 
be made subject to a silence procedure. In any case, there should be a special provision dealing with 
the situation where the EP — or the Council — fails to take a decision concerning the approval of an 
agreement. 
Conversely, agreements dealing with subjects which otherwise would fall under the regulatory power 
of the Commission according to Article 40 might be left for the Commission alone to negotiate and 
to conclude unless the Council decides against with a qualified majority. 
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Artide 66 and the following articles represent one of the major new features of the Draft Treaty: the 
inclusion of EPC in the Union system. 
The question is what the draft has achieved by this inclusion, in particular whether the draft has 
overcome the obstacles which so far have made Member States keep EPC outside the Community 
framework. Apparently, the draft has adopted a very careful approach which attempts to codify the 
present state of evolution of EPC. 
Article 66 defines the scope of cooperation. Contrary to the basic documents of EPC (the declara-
tions of Luxembourg, Copenhagen, London and Stuttgart) this article seeks to define more precisely 
the areas of political cooperation. Where EPC so far has progressed step by step, whenever and wher-
ever it has been possible to obtain unanimity, within parameters defined as 'all major policy ques-
tions of interest to the Member States as a whole' the Draft Treaty attempts to establish a catalogue 
of areas inspired by the subsidiarity principle. Apparently, the Union is not to have a foreign policy; 
the Union is rather intended to constitute a framework or forum for mandatory cooperation. By 
establishing a catalogue and by using a terminology that is so wide and vague that it may embrace 
any foreign policy issue of concern to more than one Member State, the draft has adopted a maxima-
listic approach. Seen in conjunction with Article 68, there seem to be no limits as to what matters 
might come under cooperation. Under the present system, EPC is governed by declarations of a poli-
tical nature. According to the draft, EPC will be made the subject of a legal text introduced by the 
mandatory words: 'The Union shall conduct', etc. 
This leads to another question of principle, namely whether matters covered by cooperation fall 
under the competence of the Union or of Member States. The answer to this question is relevant, for 
instance, in relation to the role of the Court in the area of cooperation. 
It seems to result from the provisions of Article 12 eo contrario that such matters do not fall under 
Union competence. However, a simple reading of the provisions of Article 68, par. 3 (i.e. 'the 
European Council may decide to restore the fields transferred to common action either to coopera-
tion or to the competence of the Member States') may lead to the conclusion that the areas covered 
by cooperation are not under Member States competence either. 
According to the logic of the construct intended by the draft, it seems most reasonable to conceive 
matters of cooperation as falling under the competence of Member States. Otherwise, the provisions 
of Article 67, pars 2-4 would not make sense. However, a problem arises if — as foreseen by para-
graph 1 of Article 67 — an action is to be implemented by the Commission. Is the Commission act-
ing on behalf of the Member States or on behalf of the Union by means of acts of the Union? In the 
latter case, the question is whether the matter is to be considered as transferred to Union competence 
at the stage of implementation. 
If the Draft Treaty is to avoid the present problems relating to the complex interdependence of Com-
munity matters and EPC matters, as for example, in the field of economic sanctions, it must be ensu-
red that the management of political matters remains under cooperation, unless expressly transferred 
to the field of common action. The reason is that the voting rules will not be the same: under co-
operation they are likely to be unanimity whereas common action will be governed by majority vot-
ing. 
An example may illustrate the problem. Modifications of the rules on liberalization of trade in goods 
may be one of the instruments by which economic sanctions are introduced vis-à-vis a third country. 
These rules fall, as such, under common action but, if modified for foreign policy reasons, should be 
governed by the rules under cooperation unless the European Council expressly authorizes the 
Council of the Union and/or the Commission to implement these measures according to the rules on 
common action. If necessary, it should be possible to authorize one or more Member States to dero-
gate from such measures. This would be in the spirit of the provision in Article 68, par. 2 infine. 
Article 67, on the conduct of cooperation, raises the question why cooperation as such is reserved for 
the European Council whereas the Council of the Union shall be responsible — only — for its con-
duct. 
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Experience from EPC has shown that cooperation is required as a day-to-day affair and that — for 
practical reasons — it must be delegated to a large extent to the level of officials.' Of course, the 
broad terms of Article 67 open the possibility for setting up a machinery similar to the present EPC 
machinery, in particular the Political Committee. Not that it should be imitated, but the right way of 
improving the present system would seem to be to build on the most successful features while keep-
ing the basic EPC patrimony intact. 
Compared to the present EPC system, Article 67 contains a novelty by granting the Commission a 
right of initiative in the foreign policy field. This may be a controversial issue in many Member States. 
In any event, such a new task will inevitably affect the organizational structure of the Commission. 
(A new Directorate-General of Foreign Affairs?) 
Paragraphs 2 and 3 use the term 'the Union' without specifying the competent institution. Otherwise, 
these provisions seem to contain a sufficient degree of flexibility. The crux of the matter remains: 
what are the more precise parameters for cooperation and which is to be the decision-making rule of 
the European Council and of the Council of the Union when acting within the field of cooperation. "' 
Paragraph 4 preserves the valuable patrimony concerning the role of the Presidency. 
Article 68 concerns extension of the field of cooperation and transfer from cooperation to common 
action. Paragraph 1 mentions specifically as some of the new areas of cooperation, armaments, sales 
of arms to non-member States, defence policy and disarmament. Depending on the definition of 'dis-
armament', it should be noted that disarmament-related issues are already subject to political co-
operation among the Ten within the UN and CSCE. The objective 'disarmament' is also mentioned 
in Article 9. Suffice it to say that the other matters, like defence policy, are highly controversial issues 
and that they will raise a host of questions as to the relationship between the Union and organiza-
tions like NATO and WEU of which most or some of the Member States are members. It will come 
to the surprise of nobody that mentioning these subject matters is tantamount to waving the red flag 
in some capitals. At least, if there are no limits as to the matters which may become the subject of 
cooperation — and subsequently of common action — the parliaments of Member States would be 
justified if criticizing the draft for giving too extensive powers to the European Council. 
The power to authorize one or more Member States to derogate from common action measures is a 
sound expression of pragmatism. The constraints of Article 35 do not apply as such, but the prin-
ciples thereof should be borne in mind. This authorization would serve to legalize situations like 
those the Community has experienced in the field of sanctions (see above under 3). 
Paragraph 3 contains a revolutionary provision of a heretical nature in a Community context. It 
allows for a reversal by empowering the European Council to decide to restore fields transferred to 
common action either to cooperation or to the competence of the Member States. Taking account of 
the very delicate fields found in the foreign-policy arena the rule as such seems very useful; it allows 
for flexibility and balances to some extent the daring perspectives of paragraph 1. 
The novelty of Article 69 is that the Commission may tepresent the Union — and not only the 
institution as such — in third countries and internationl organizations. Article 69 deals with the so-
called droit de légation active, as distinct from the right of representation in international negotia-
tions. It seems that a provision on droit de légation passive is missing, and that a clause to this effect 
might be useful. In fact, this issue has been the subject of some controversy in the history of the Com-
munity. 
The right of active representation is a prerogative of the Commission in matters subject to common 
action. In the fields of cooperation the task is shared with the Presidency's diplomatic agent. 
' The interim report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Institutional Affairs submitted to the European Council at its meeting in Dub-
lin December 1984, foresees a reduction from three to two annual meetings of the European Council. 
10 Another question is whether a Council of the Union composed of ministers permanently and specifically responsible for Union 
affairs, see Article 20, will be acceptable as a forum for cooperation matters, if these ministers are not foreign ministers as well, 
as in France, for example. The composition of the Council should be open to some flexibility. 
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d. Open issues 
When looking at the present Community regime it should be noted that certain issues have not been 
taken up for express regulation in the Draft Treaty. 
Since it cannot be ascertained by what kind of act international agreements are approved it is not 
possible to state whether the term 'law' in Article 39 on publication could be interpreted to the effect 
that international agreements of the Union are to be published. Nor is there any provision concern-
ing the registration of the Union's agreements with the United Nations Secretary-General. This 
obligation may be said to flow from international law. However, since a special system of registra-
tion has been established with regard to agreements concluded by entities like the European Com-
munity, it might be useful to insert a provision to this effect. 
Considering the coexistence of Article 228, par. 1.2 of the Treaty of Rome, concerning the judicial 
review of the Court in the area of international agreements, a special clause of a similar nature — 
which does not exist in the present draft — may not be necessary. The question of introducing a bet-
ter rule than Article 228, par. 1.2 might, however, be considered. 
The intricate legal question on the effects of international agreements in the Community / Union legal 
order has not been taken up and there may be several good reasons for leaving it to the jurisprudence 
of the Court. A rule like the provision of Article 228, par. 2 might, in the event, be adjusted and 
inserted in the draft. 
Other problems which the Community has faced in practice relate to the right of representation of 
the Union in organs set up by mixed international agreement, in particular if the agreement contains 
the traditional clause which does not allow two members of the same nationality. Furthermore, the 
voting right in international organizations has presented problems both in 'mixed' and 'pure' situa-
tions. The question is whether the general policy of the Union should be to strive for a number of 
votes corresponding to the number of its Membet States or only one vote. Legal and political argu-
ments may be advanced for one or the other solution. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Draft Treaty clearly states (Art. 70, par. 2) that common 
actions are, in the event, to be financed by the revenue of the Union. The question concerning financ-
ing of measures taken within the field of cooperation is apparently left open. 
4. Conclusion 
The international-relations regime of the Draft Treaty, grosso modo, forms a logical and coherent 
system. 
The main novelty compared to the present situation is the formal inclusion of the EPC in the Union 
system. Efforts have apparently been deployed in order to ensure continuity and the largest possible 
extent of flexibility. The 'flexibility' regarding the definition of foreign-policy areas under coopera-
tion is, however, so great that it may prove counter-productive in the effort to obtain acceptance by 
Member States. Furthermore, the draft leaves open the crucial question of the decision-making rule 
in the area of cooperation. 
In the classical area of common action, the Draft Treaty has built rather faithfully on the Community 
patrimony. However, the rules concerning the conduct of common action should be reviewed. The 
negotiation system would probably create more problems than it solves. It will be so heavy that this 
factor alone may deter Member States from 'surrendering' external powers to the Union. In particu-
lar, it would be difficult to justify the role of the EP to the extent foreseen by the draft. 
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Finally, seen from the point of view of international relations it is hardly possible to conceive of a 
Union of less than all Member States. Indeed, the system of Article 82, allowing for a progressive 
creation of the Union, could not be reconciled with the regime on international relations of the Draft 
Treaty. In any event, it has been difficult to mount the Community as an actor on the international 
scene and to explain its legal personality; it would be virtually impossible to explain the coexistence 
of a Union with a different membership to third countries. 
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Chapter VIII -
The institutionalization process 
under the Draft Treaty 
by Luciano Bardi and Gianfranco Pasquino 
1. Introduction* 
The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union constitutes the most tangible piece of evidence so 
far of the new assertiveness of the directly-elected European Parliament. In Altiero Spinelli's own 
words, the European Parliament decided to assume, on behalf of the citizens which had elected it, 
the task of preparing and proposing a wide-ranging reform of the Communities, after having realized 
'the obvious impossibility of overcoming the glaring contradiction between the needs of Europe and 
the ability of Europe run by the Council to respond to these needs'.' 
There is widespread agreement that most of the shortcomings of the EC are due to the inadequacy of 
its institutions and it is quite understandable that such a staunch European as Spinelli should devote 
so much effort to a proposal largely centred on institutional reform. Institutional blueprints, how-
ever, always present numerous gaps and undetermined aspects which may produce results sharply 
contrasting with those originally envisaged by the draftsmen.2 In the case of the Draft Treaty such an 
assessment is made even more difficult by the rather oblique and imprecise way in which the desira-
ble end results are expounded by Spinelli. One can only deduce that Spinelli, convinced of the inade-
quacy of the Council's decision-making, envisages an institutional structure attributing more de-
cisional power to the genuinely supranational bodies of the EC to the detriment of those expressing 
intergovernmental decision-making patterns.' The broad goal of greater supranationalism as the 
solution to most EC problems, however, docs not allow for an assessment of the internal consistency 
of the set of institutional provisions contained in the Draft Treaty. Besides problems stemming from 
Although the conclusions and general approach of this paper were elaborated jointly, Luciano Bardi is primarily responsible 
for the section entitled 'The institutions of the European Community', and Gianfranco Pasquino for the section on 'Institutio-
nal reform in the Draft Treaty for a European Union'. 
Spinelli, Towards the European Union, Sixth Jean Monnet Lecture, European University Institute, Florence, 13 June 1983. 
Just one example very close to our hearts: Article 14 of the Draft Treaty stipulates an organic law to determine a uniform 
procedure for the election of the European Parliament. The existing literature, on the other hand, provides us with conclusive 
evidence that even apparently minor differences in electoral laws can produce radically divergent consequences for the political 
systems they affect. See, in particular, Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1967; Katz, A Theory of Parties and 
Electoral Systems, 1980. On the basis of the future law, the European political system might develop in a number of different 
directions which are impossible to envisage here. 
Spinelli, supra. Our observation on the vagueness of Spinelli's motives, due to a variety of political and practical constraints, is 
only meant to underline the ensuing methodological problems. We are also aware that by implicitly defining the Council of 
Ministers as an inter-governmental institution we are not doing full justice to its supranational attributes. See, Weiler, 
Supranationalism Revisited — Retrospective and Prospective, European University Institute working paper, Florence, 1981. 
But for our purposes, the erosion of the Council's supranational features, pointed out by Weiler himself, at pp. 36-40, 
authorizes the more reductive definition. 
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defects of institutional blueprints in general, and of the Draft Treaty in particular, further analytical 
difficulties are to be found in the attempt to come to grips with the dynamic nature of political pro-
cesses. In various political systems a number of institutions have been known to evolve in such a way 
as to acquire scope, importance and powers going well beyond those specifically provided for in 
those systems' constitutions. 
Spinelli's motives may be assumed to be based on his and others' assessment of the performance and, 
inevitably, of the shortcomings of the EC and its decision-making institutions. But institutionaliza-
tion, that is the process whereby institutions acquire their position in the political system, can be 
measured at various points in time on the basis of objective criteria. Certain characteristics of the 
internal organization of an institution indicate its ability to become externally institutionalized vis-à-
vis other bodies interacting in the system. In particular, Samuel Huntington and Nelson Polsby agree 
that institutions should be adaptable, autonomous, reasonably differentiated from their environ-
ments and complex/ 
Evaluating the present institutional balance of the EC in the light of these criteria should provide us 
with both an idea of the shortcomings the Draft Treaty would presumably aspire to eliminate and 
with a measure of the degree of institutionalization reached by each relevant EC body under the pre-
sent Treaties. These findings can be examined in the light of the specific provisions of the Draft Trea-
ty. An assessment of the institutional provisions of the Draft Treaty would thus depend on which 
institutions prove to have the greatest potential for further institutionalization. Our attention will be 
mostly devoted to internal aspects of individual EC bodies' institutional development. But each 
institution's internal development will have external consequences affecting all the others. The politi-
cal development of the system as a whole will depend on the overall balance of relationships in the 
EC institutional circuit, and in this light our study of individual institutions is to be understood. 
2. The institutions of the European Community 
a. General problems 
The institutional set-up of the EC has suffered from a number of general problems, largely attributa-
ble to defects in the original design. It is not our intention here to proceed to a systematic evaluation 
of the malaise of the EC. But a quick overview will serve as a background for our analysis. As others 
have convincingly pointed out, the evolution of the EC has been severely hindered by the peculiar 
features of the Treaty of Rome. Lacking the flexibility normally characterizing constitutions, the 
Treaty made it impossible for the EC to develop beyond a certain point. Even if'there is some move-
ment in the joints of the Treaty, permitting interpretation and institutional evolution . . . the very 
length and specificity of the European document compounds the fact that it is a treaty requiring unani-
mous approval for change', thus making it 'different from a document that allows change to be made 
in it only with the support of a large majority of its constituent members'.5 Such rigidity contrasts 
with the need for flexibility implicit in the functional and neo-functional principles embedded in the 
Treaties. 
4 The four categories will be termed respectively as: adaptability, autonomy, coherence/boundary definition, and complexity. 
See Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Democracy', in 17, World Politics, 1965, p. 386 and Political Order in 
Changing Societies, 1968; Polsby, 'The Institutionalization of the US House of Representatives', 62, Am. Pol. Science Rev., 
1968, p. 144. On internal and external institutionalization, see Cotta, Classe Politica e Parlamento in Italia. 1946-1976, 1979, 
p. 285 et passim. 
s Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler, The Politicai Organs and the Decision-Making Process in the United States and the European 
Community, forthcoming. 
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Individual theories of integration have demonstrated their inadequacy not only in predicting but also 
in explaining the evolution of the EC/ Some of the major problems afflicting the EC and its institu-
tions, however, can be explained by considering the limits of the functionalist principles that in-
formed the original communitarian design. Contrary to the hopes that interest aggregation would 
more and more often take place at the European level (as the formation of European trade union 
federations would indicate), national interest groups are protecting and entrenching themselves 
rather than overlapping (as the sad reality of wine and fish wars is showing), thus contributing to the 
endless disputes among the Member States' governments. Insulating the Commission from national 
governments to protect its independence, resulted in a division of the policy-making process along 
functionally determined lines, involving the competent branches of the national bureaucracies and 
ultimately strengthening the nation State.7 
Moreover, wherever a spill-over effect has indeed taken place, enlarging the scope and augmenting 
the import of EC activities, it has also underlined the problem of legitimacy within the Community. 
Commissioners are individually appointed by the member Governments while the Commission as a 
whole is subject to the censure of the European Parliament. The prospect of the possible transfer of 
important prerogatives to a virtually unaccountable supranational institution has contributed greatly 
to the strengthening of the Council and to the entrenchment of the unanimity principle. Ever since 
the Luxembourg compromise, unanimity has been the rule, and the few instances in which majority 
votes have been taken in the Council to overrule individual members' paralysing vetoes must be con-
sidered as sporadic exceptions. The rationale behind all this would be that unanimity makes each 
member Government responsible, and accountable to its Parliament, for each Council decision. The 
reintroduction of majority vote would create a 'democratic deficit' which could hardly be filled under 
the present institutional arrangements.8 
The trend in favour of inter-governmental decision-making was also reinforced by 'protective' reac-
tions of governments to the monetary, energy and general economic crises of the 1970s, culminating 
with the official incorporation of the European Council as a Community institution in 1974. The 
enlargement of the Community, as well as the continuing economic difficulties experienced by all 
member countries, brought to the fore another major problem of the Community, that of 'own 
resources'. The Community has 'a right to its own resources, but it (has) no clear right to resources 
which (are) adequate to perform those tasks which (have) been required of it'. The Community there-
fore lacks autonomy and its proper functioning totally depends on supplementary allocations de-
cided by the Council and ultimately by the Member States.' 
Last but not least, as pointed out in the Committee of Three report on European Institutions, EC 
decision-making has been affected by the 'general phenomenon of an excessive load of business 
aggravated by slow and confused handling (which) may be summed up in the one French word lour-
deur'. '° Such administrative inefficiency, probably due to the decline of the institution best equipped 
to expedite technical procedures, the Commission, found a ratchet in the relationship of interdepen-
dence existing among the various EC institutions and the consequent need for several revisions of the 
same subject matter. 
All of the factors listed above, while having a general, and mostly negative, impact on EC decision-
making, have produced diverging effects on individual institutions. But one could also argue that the 
course of events could at least partially depend on the characteristics of the single institutions invol-
ved and that an institutional explanation of the present situation of the EC can be attempted. 
1 See Webb, 'Theoretical Perspectives and Problems' in Policy-Making in the European Community, (Wallace, Wallace, and 
Webb, eds) 2nd ed., 1983, p. 1. 
7 Henig, Power and Decision in Europe, 1980, pp. 4-5. On the attempts to insulate the Commission see Krislov et al, supra. 
* This analysis is by Marquand, Parliament for Europe, 1979. See also Weiler, supra, at pp. 32-34. 
* Taylor, The Limits of European Integration, 1983, pp. 32-36. 
10 Council of the EC, Three Wise Men's Report on European institutions, 1980, p. 11. 
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b. The Commission 
All commentators agree that, after an initial period during which the Commission carried out its 
tasks competently and efficiently, allowing for the successful take-off of the Common Market, there 
has been a steady and considerable decline in its powers and function-performing capabilities, to the 
point that now the Commission often prepares proposals actually initiated elsewhere (the European 
Council and Council of Ministers on all extra-Treaty policies). The Huntington-Polsby model mea-
sures adaptability according to an institution's age, which is taken to imply an acquired ability to 
attract new functions. In spite of its age, however, the Commission has shown very little ability to 
attract new functions." 
The lack of autonomy the Commission has in disposing of, let alone in acquiring, its own resources 
is certainly a very severe handicap which has hindered the Commission's performance even in areas 
designated as the Commission's domain in the Treaty of Rome. If the unwillingness of the member 
Governments to give up additional portions of their sovereignty was probably an unsurmountable 
obstacle for the Commission, this failure was also partially due to the Commission's structural defi-
ciencies. In other words, the Commission is not sufficiently complex to be able to move into new 
policy areas. This might sound like a paradox given the large number of Directorates-General, Direc-
torates and other sub-units into which the Commission is divided. But even so, as we have seen, the 
Three Wise Men tell us that the Commission is overloaded; it simply has too much work to do in its 
multifunctional position as initiator of Community policy, mediator, administrator and guardian of 
the Treaty. On the other hand, as the various subdivisions of the Commission are determined by the 
total number of Commissioners and Directors-General the Member States are entitled to, they do 
not respond to its actual task-performing needs. As pointed out in the Spierenburg report, there is 'an 
imbalance in the importance of the various portfolios (and the) distribution of staff between DGs 
does not accurately reflect the growth of departmental burdens'. Many of the sub-units tend to per-
form a single function, usually dealing with highly-technical aspects pertaining to a single policy 
area, often overlapping with the work of other sub-units belonging to different DGs. In conclusion, 
also considering that communication within the Commission mostly occurs vertically and almost 
never horizontally, not only is the Commission overloaded, but it also lacks the power of a funct-
ionally complex organization. 
The Commission's lack of legitimacy 'has certainly prevented it from moving into new areas to main-
tain progress and meet fresh challenges' once 'the detailed guidance contained in the Treaties was 
gradually exhausted'.12 As pointed out by Ernst B. Haas, the concept of legitimacy hinges on partici-
pation/representation and performance." Through the early years of the Community, the Commis-
sion drew its legitimacy from the representativeness of the member Governments, the signatories of 
the Treaty. There is enough evidence that, with the possible exception of the honeymoon period that 
followed the Treaty of Rome, the Member State's grant of authority to the Commission was condi-
tional on the preservation of some means of national control. The national quota system by which 
Commission officials are selected, even if it does not affect the behaviour of individual Commis-
sioners, certainly has an impact on the institutional integrity of the Commission. Moreover, the 
cooptation of national officials into the decision-making process presents 'a major challenge to the 
" Although Huntington uses institutionalization to explain political development, he does not tell us much about possible 
explanations for institutionalization. On adaptability he says that it is a function of age and environmental challenge. The for-
mer attribute is also used as an indicator of adaptability while the latter is practically dropped in the subsequent analysis (Politi-
cal Order, supra, at pp. 13-17). This shortcoming of the model, however, does not detract from its usefulness in assessing the 
level of development of one institution at a given point in time and providing diachronic measures of its institutionalization. On 
the need for a dynamic theory of institutionalization and more powerful explanatory criteria see Sisson, 'Comparative Legisla-
tive Institutionalization: A Theoretical Explanation', in Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, (Kornberg ed.), 1973, and 
Luciano Bardi, Direct Elections of the European Parliament, institutional Development and Power Relations, paper presented 
at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Florence, 1980. 
' ! Three Wise Men's Report, supra, at p. 50. 
" Haas, The Obsolence of Regional Integration Theory, 1975, p. 65. 
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institutional identity of the Commission'. Many such officials see their EC appointment as 'a useful 
interlude in their national career', and, working mainly in technically-specialized committees and 
subcommittees involving representatives of the member countries, never develop a sense of belonging 
to a European civil service.'4 Their mid-career entry, frustrating the aspirations of young 'European' 
officials might indeed contribute to the decline of the performance (and legitimacy) of the Commis-
sion. All of these considerations warrant for the Commission the attribution of a low score on the 
coherence/boundary definition criterion proposed by the Huntington-Polsby model.15 
c. The European Council, the Council of Ministers 
and Coreper 
Given their mostly inter-governmental characteristics, the European Council, Coreper, and the 
Council of Ministers can be considered, at least for analytical purposes, as one institution. Indeed, 
Coreper and the European Council can be seen as responses of the Council of Ministers to shortcom-
ings of the institutional set up of the EC.16 
The Council, in its various ministerial manifestations, has been expanding its policy-making and 
even policy-initiating powers chiefly to the detriment of the Commission. In a parallel fashion, a 
number of accessory institutions have been created (Secretariat) or reinforced (Coreper), giving the 
impression that the Council itself is becoming a permanent European institution capable of giving 
continuity and long-term perspectives to EC policy-making. In order to do so, the Council still needs 
the cooperation of the institution best equipped to expedite technical procedures, that is the Com-
mission. But Council decision-making is also deeply affected, both in scope and efficiency, by its 
need to delegate the administrative preparation of its own decisions to standing or ad hoc working 
parties, set up by either the Council itself, or Coreper or even the Special Committee on Agriculture. 
Such working parties have an enormous importance in determining the inter-governmental nature of 
EC decision-making. According to Christoph Sasse, their 'defacto autonomy . . . leaves them free to 
determine which decisions reach the political (Coreper-Council) level'. Despite, or maybe because of, 
this seldom-acknowledged importance of working parties, they are often staffed with home-based 
experts unfamiliar with EC methods and with little propensity for compromise. The working party 
member's attachment to the national position can considerably delay or even prevent decisions.17 
The EC's cumbersome decision-making processes, now almost exclusively centred on the Council in 
its various forms (Council(s) hereinafter), based on lengthy preparatory stages in ad hoc or standing 
committees at various levels, and involving long bargaining sessions amongst Council members with 
the mediation of the Commission, reflect the institutional ambiguity of what has now become the 
most powerful EC institution. 
In many respects, from the point of view of the would-be European political system, the Council(s) 
are non-institutions. They are even less autonomous and coherent than the Commission. In fact, the 
14 Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Communities, 1970, p. 242 et passim. Many commentators, including 
most official rapporteurs (Spierenburg, Three Wise Men), indicate low morale as one of the main causes of Commission 
inefficiency. Low morale is in turn the product of contingent situations (such as the relative youth of many top officials, which 
undoubtedly is likely to delay the career of lower level employees) and is not explicitly considered in our analysis, which deals 
with factors affecting long-term structural changes. 
11 According to this criterion, an institution must have clearly-defined boundaries, and its members must have a sense of belonging 
and loyalty to it. Leadership positions must be filled by individuals recruited within the organization on the basis of universally-
shared, impartial and impersonal criteria. See Polsby, supra, at p. 145. 
" Henig, 'The European Community's Bicephalous Political Authority', in institutions and Policies of the European Community, 
(Lodge ed.), 1983. According to Henig, 'to all intents and purposes (the European Council) should be considered as the Coun-
cil of Ministers in its highest manifestation (even if) from a strictly legal point of view it is not the Council and does not have 
formal Treaty powers', at pp. 14 and 16. 
17 Sasse, Poullet, Coombes, and Duprat, Decision-Making in the European Community, 1977, p. 96. 
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Council(s) and their activities are directly controlled by the Member State Governments to which 
their members individually belong. Even the various ancillary organizations, such as Coreper and the 
whole host oí ad hoc or standing committees and working parties, are mostly staffed with national 
civil servants all holding very different views as to what is to be done and how to do it. 
But the very same national Governments and civil services, which may be at least partially responsi-
ble for the disappointing performance of the Community in recent years, bestow upon the Council 
those sources of strength which the Commission sorely lacks. The Gouncil(s) derive from the natio-
nal Parliaments, to which their individual members are accountable, the legitimacy to act in any pol-
icy area in the national (as part of EPC) or in the communitarian interest, with or without the rubber 
stamp of the Treaty. In this the Council(s), although meeting sporadically and in various personnel 
permutations, have shown remarkable adaptability exploiting the resources of national diplomatic 
traditions and creating new structures to perform some of the newly-acquired tasks. The wide scope 
of the powers of some of the Council(s) and the interchangeability of some of the ministers involved 
have also given them a sort of discrete functional complexity.18 
Looked at as integral parts of the national governments and the civil services to which all their mem-
bers and officials also belong, the Council(s) and related organizations even have a high degree of 
autonomy and coherence, even if resulting from compromise among peers. 
d. The European Parliament 
Formally, the EP has budgetary powers, control over the executive, a legitimizing function and some 
legislative powers. But in practice, despite direct elections, these powers remain rather limited. Par-
liament's budgetary powers are formally the most important of all, but in practice they amount to 
much less than commonly believed. Being only on the expenditure, and not the revenue, side, they 
have very little impact on policies. Even the power to reject the budget as a whole has only minor 
practical consequences given the provision granting the Commission monthly appropriations (on the 
basis of the previous year's budget) until the new budget is approved." Parliament can only amend 
non-compulsory expenses, that is expenses pertaining to policies not explicitly provided for in the 
Treaties. These expenses amount to no more than 20% of the whole budget. As the powers to pro-
pose modifications of compulsory expenditure and to discharge the budget are even weaker, Parlia-
ment is afforded very few opportunities to allocate resources, let alone raise them. Parliament does 
not even have complete control over its own expenditure, nor does it determine the salary levels of 
MEPs, which is done by the member Governments on the basis of national parliamentary salaries.20 
MEPs also lament the lack of a statute of the European Parliamentarian. This places them in a situa-
tion of objective personal and collective disadvantage with respect to all other EC and national offi-
cials. 
All of the above factors detract from the autonomy and the coherence/boundary definition of Parlia-
ment, despite the relatively small number of dual mandates left after direct elections.21 An evaluation 
of the importance of Parliament's other powers entails a discussion of its singular relationship with 
other EC institutions. Parliament has the power to dismiss the Commission by a qualified majority 
vote. Dismissal of the Commission would be a very draconian measure compared to its effects, and 
as such it has never been used. In any event, the new Commission would still be appointed by the 
Admittedly, if the Council(sl are to maintain their present crucial role in EC policy-making, they will need a permanent structure 
or at least an organic relationship with the Commission. This, however, may not be necessary as long as EC decision-making 
consists of'pure diplomatic-style negotiations', Vedel report, at p. 27. 
Henig, Power and Decision, supra, at p. 70. On the frustration that such provision can cause for MEPs see Spinelli, supra, at 
pp. 10-11. 
Henig, Power and Decision, supra, at pp. 82-83. 
About 25% during the first legislature. We must not overlook the fact, however, that many consider a number of dual mandates 
necessary to preserve a link between the EP and its national counterparts. 
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member Governments. This feature of the EC institutional set-up also belittles the legitimizing func-
tion of the EP, since it has no executive body to appoint and to invest with the legitimacy it draws 
from the European people through direct elections. 
The legislative powers of the EP amount to the power to express opinions on Commission proposals 
with very little or no impact on the legislative output. The emergence of the European Council as the 
primary policy-making unit has in fact weakened the EP's position, as it has no organic relationship 
with the former body. As pointed out in the Vedel report, the EP's 'consultative function is impaired 
by the fact that, although the Commission seeks the support of the Parliament, it enters into negotia-
tions with the Council even before submitting its formal proposals to the latter'. Given the limits of 
Parliament's powers and functions little can be said about its (functional) complexity and adaptabil-
ity. After direct elections, however, with the parallel increase in the size of the Assembly, the EP has 
developed a more diversified structure. At the same time, some of its sub-units, such as the parlia-
mentary groups, have become themselves more salient, while the scope and number of EP activities 
seems also to have increased. Boosted by its new legitimacy, the EP has become more vocal on a 
number of issues, such as civil rights and nuclear deterrence, having international resonance. The 
very Draft Treaty we are here examining testifies to the EP's attempt to give itself the powers and 
functions of a constituent assembly. 
e. EC decision-making: institutional explanation 
The main thrust of Spinelli's argument is that the Community must adopt a new Treaty not only to 
fulfil the federalist dream, but also because the present patterns of inter-governmental decision-mak-
ing are to a large extent responsible for the inefficiency of EC machinery and for the declining appeal 
of the European ideal in at least some of the Member States. Much of the criticism of the present 
Communities centres on the lack of political will for integration. Without 'political will' there will be 
no solution to the Community's malaise, but it is a very fuzzy term, and a very difficult variable to 
operationalize. Although the motives of the individual States will probably always be particularistic, 
they might adopt pro-European strategies on the basis of some of those very motives. As a result of 
the combination of various pro- or anti-European impulses, one could conceive situations where the 
overall 'political will' in favour of integration might be neutral or even moderately positive. More-
over, as several federal and consociational experiences suggest, the presence of adequate institutional 
structures might actually help shape the 'political will' of the various would-be members of the 
Union.22 
A solution to the present problems of the EC might, therefore, lie in a reformation of its institutions. 
But in order to avoid the pitfalls of tautology, one has to accept the view that EC institutional defi-
ciencies may have other (structural) causes than the simple fact that member Governments do not 
want them to work. 
The Community is still an embryonic political system and it would be naive to expect a high degree 
of institutionalization of its decision-making bodies. The low scores on the various criteria of institu-
tional development detected for the three bodies we have considered should not come as a surprise. 
More disturbing for the 'European' cause is the trend .towards a lower level of institutionalization in 
the evolution of the Commission, while the Council(s) seem to have at least the adaptability to fill the 
Recalling the difference between internal and external institutionalization, the internal development of an institution could give 
it the strength to respond to the challenges posed by the environment (i.e. adverse 'political will') and enhance its position in the 
system (external institutionalization). Such internal developments, though, can only help us explain, if not predict, possible 
deviations from the original institutional scheme. On the other hand, as we have seen with regard to the effects of the Treaty of 
Rome on the Commission and the Council(s), respectively, institutional schemes could affect individual institutions very diffe-
rently. 
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vaccum.2' The combination of these two trends is at the root of the decreasing dynamism, efficiency 
and, ultimately, 'Europeanism' of EC decision-making. 
Unfortunately, as mentioned in an earlier footnote, the Huntington/Polsby model for measuring 
institutionalization is descriptive, not explanatory. It has been suggested that the institutionalization 
of an organization might be favoured by activities of its members designed to obtain credit vis-à-vis 
those to which they are accountable.24 This is certainly not the place to attempt a revision of the insti-
tutionalization theory, and it might be enough to say that the legitimacy and accountability of an 
organization must be important prerequisites for its institutionalization. 
As we have seen, the legitimacy of the Commission rests on the specific provisions of the Treaty and, 
as such, the negative institutional development of the Commission may be due to the gradual exhaus-
tion of the tasks provided for in the Treaty or their declining importance vis-à-vis emerging environ-
mental challenges (economic crisis, technological gap, defence concerns, etc.). 
Strictly speaking, from an EC perspective, the Council(s) also present a very low level of institutiona-
lization, and their remarkable adaptability in crisis situations could be hard to explain. But the 
Council(s) have an 'unfair' advantage over the Commission, stemming from their position between 
the European political system and the national ones, that allows them to escape the strait-jacket 
represented by the Treaty. If one considers the Council(s) as a negotiating forum for the representa-
tives of the various branches of the national governments, rather than as an institution of the EC, 
'the agreement to agree' prevailing in the Council might be more than adequate to give it the requisite 
coherence. 
The individual members of the Council derive their legitimacy from their respective national Parlia-
ments. As branches of national civil services, they individually have even more coherence, auto-
nomy, and sense of collegiality; in a word more institutionalization. The desire to strike the best pos-
sible bargain might produce in the short term individual policy decisions not radically diverging from 
those hypothetically made by a supranational authority in the 'general interst'. But the long-term per-
spectives are very different. The ultimate goal of the members of the Council(s) is not the pursuit of a 
'general interest'. Hence the disregard for the development of adequate structures and the lack of 
complexity to carry out the ever-increasing work-load, leading to inefficient operation of EC 
machinery. 
The European Parliament is the 'odd man out' of the situation. It is now the only body with continu-
ing 'European' legitimacy among those we have considered. As such it is struggling towards the 
acquisition of new functions, of more autonomy and of a greater sense of purpose. But it is too early 
to say whether this trend towards greater institutionalization will be enough to carry it beyond the 
limits of its formal powers. 
Summing up, the Commission is probably still the best-equipped institution to carry out the tasks 
pertaining to the functioning of the Community. Parliament, on the other hand, is the only institu-
tion having the European legitimacy to sustain its initiatives. Ironically, their very supranational cha-
racter has limited their internal and external institutionalization in the European political system. 
The development of both institutions has been hindered by the rigidity of the Treaties. The very pre-
cise determination in the Treaty of the Commission's competences seems to have denied it the legi-
timacy to assume the new functions required for the preservation and expansion of the system. In 
other words, the limits posed on the internal institutionalization of the Commission have prevented 
its external institutionalization as well. In the case of Parliament the exact opposite has occurred, as 
" Not only is the Commission losing functions, showing at least rigidity if not dis-adaptability but, with enlargement and the 
defeat of Hallstein's dream to create a truly 'European' civil service, it is also declining in coherence/boundary definition. 
24 See Bardi, supra. 
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the very limited external powers afforded it by the Treaties have discouraged any sort of internal 
institutionalization.25 
The Council(s), on the other hand, have been able to by-pass the rigidity of the Treaties, thus becom-
ing the most important EC decision-making institutions. Their very inter-governmental nature has 
not only given them ad hoc short-term goals and consequently enormous flexibility, but has also per-
mitted them to utilize the material and institutional resources of the Member States. Here it would 
seem that external institutionalization might favour the internal development of the Council(s), but 
the picture is not very clear. The existence of an institution specifically designed to carry out techni-
cal tasks has led the Council to enlist the cooperation of the Commission even for those policy areas 
outside its competence. It is possible that the structures the Commission has developed to accommo-
date the requests of the Council(s) will give it, once more, a more crucial role, made possible by the 
internal weakness of the Council(s) at the European level. 
3. Institutional reform in the Draft Treaty for 
a European Union 
a. The new institutional circuit 
If our diagnosis is correct, those bodies having weaker supranational inclinations have shown greater 
institutional ability to face the difficulties of the Community. The European Parliament could have 
provided the stimulus, the support and the legitimacy for a renewed activism by the Commission. 
But it would seem that the existing institutional circuit was unable to link effectively the two more 
supranational bodies. 
Appropriately, the first institution presented and discussed in the Draft Treaty is the European Parl-
iament. Article 16 identifies the most important functions of the European Parliament in a very 
modern way. Indeed, the European Parliament, as portrayed in Article 16, occupies a central posi-
tion in the European political system. It participates in the three main areas of activity of other bodies: 
legislation, budgetary processes, international agreements. Therefore, it works closely with the 
Council of the Union, which is involved, according to Article 21, in the legislative and budgetary 
procedures and in the field of international relations, with the Commission, and to a lesser extent 
with the European Council. And since it will have the power to conduct inquiries and receive peti-
tions addressed to it by the citizens of the Union, it will keep in close contact with its voters (presu-
mably through the various parties as well). 
Moreover, and most importantly, the European Parliament, though not involved in the selection of 
the President of the Commission and of the Commissioners, is given three important, indeed deci-
sive, powers: it enables the Commission to take office by approving its political programme, super-
vises its activities, and can dismiss it as a body. The relationship between the European Parliament 
and the Commission comes very close to the ones established in pure parliamentary governments, 
though with some significant differences. These will be better appreciated following an analysis of 
the Commission itself. 
An EP with more powers would experience a dramatic increase in the salience and the sheer amount of its business. This would 
not only require a greater institutionalization of procedures but would also, no doubt, induce a development of the internal 
structure of the EP, especially of party groups and committees. Given the multilingual composition of the EP, plenary sessions 
have even more symbolic and practical value than in national Parliaments and party group or committee sessions, where close 
contact allows groups of MEPs to communicate through common languages. 
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There is no doubt that the Commission is meant to represent the executive in the European political 
system. As in all democratic regimes it is an executive which draws its legitimacy from the popular 
will. The (positive) peculiarity is that it enjoys a double, albeit indirect, legitimacy. The President of 
the Commission is designated by the European Council (whose members, by definition, enjoy the 
legitimacy of their respective national electorates). But the Commission as a whole will take office 
only after its investiture by the Parliament (that is, by the representatives specifically elected by the 
European electorate). Once in office, the Commission can be dismissed only after a motion of cen-
sure voted by a qualified majority of the European Parliament. Correctly interpreted, this clause 
entails a shift of power away from the European Council towards the European Parliament. In prac-
tice, away from an inter-governmental body towards a supranational one. 
Strengthened in its legitimacy, as long as it enjoys the confidence of the European Parliament, the 
Commission is given the opportunity to exercise incisive powers as spelled out in Article 28: 
The Commission shall: 
(i) define the guidelines for action by the Union in the programme which it submits to the 
Parliament for its approval, 
(ii) introduce the measures required to initiate that action, 
(iii) have the right to propose draft laws and participate in the legislative procedure, 
(iv) issue the regulations needed to implement the laws and take the requisite implementing 
decisions, 
(v) submit the draft budget, 
(vi) implement the budget, 
(vii) represent the Union in external relations in the instances laid down by this Treaty, 
(viii) ensure that this Treaty and the laws of the Union are applied, 
(ix) exercise the other powers attributed to it by this Treaty. 
Article 28 thus recognizes and codifies the Commission's role as the 'engine of action'. It attributes to 
the Commission the authority, the legitimacy and the powers required to become a supranational 
body capable of dynamic initiatives. The European Council practically loses control over the Com-
mission following the designation of its President and its participation in the appointment of the vari-
ous members of the Commission. Having become responsible to another supranational body, the 
European Parliament, the Commission can participate in a virtuous circle, enlarging supranational 
functions and powers. The lack of mechanisms to solve possible conflicts of opinions and policies 
between the European Council and the Commission, though, deserves some attention. 
Among the mostly vague functions attributed to the European Council — the only very precise one 
being that of the designation of the President of the Commission — it is not clear how the European 
Council might prevent the President and the Commission from undertaking actions not to its liking. 
One can envisage some informal means of pressure, for example by formulating recommendations 
and undertaking commitments in the field of cooperation, informing Parliament about the activities 
of the Union in the fields in which it is competent to act, and, above all, exercising other powers 
attributed to it by the Draft Treaty. It is conceivable that through such practices the European Coun-
cil might make it difficult for the Commission, even when backed by Parliament, to proceed too far 
in some areas. However, in the final instance, an alliance between the Commission and Parliament 
could produce that virtuous supranational circle intended by the drafters. 
The European Council could also seek to muster support from the Council of the Union. This body, 
consisting of representatives of the Member States appointed by their respective Governments, will 
certainly be very responsive to the demands, queries, and pressures of the European Council. Its 
powers, however, are limited. It will, indeed, (Art. 21.1) 'participate, in accordance with (the Draft) 
Treaty, in the legislative and budgetary procedures and in the conclusion of international agree-
ments'. But its suggestions can be easily overruled in important cases. 
Apparently, the Council of the Union retains a major weapon in its budgetary powers. The budget is 
initiated and submitted, in accordance with the Treaty, by the Commission but the Council of the 
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Union may make its approval very difficult. This power might be used as a form of blackmail or bar-
gaining chip when the conflict of interests and policies between the Commission and the Council of 
the Union itself (or the European Council, if that body succeeds in influencing the Council of the 
Union) is very sharp. However, in such a case it will be up to the European Parliament to decide the 
issue. It will not be easy, in view of the predictable cross-cutting pressures, but 'on second reading, 
the Parliament may reject amendments adopted by the Council only by a qualified majority. It shall 
adopt the budget by an absolute majority' (Art. 76.f.). 
If the reasoning followed so far is correct, then neither the Commission itself nor Parliament alone 
are endowed by the Draft Treaty with exclusive and specific supranational powers. It is their poten-
tial and likely collaboration which promises a shift of authority in a supranational direction. This 
shift, alone, would represent a major achievement. Before evaluating the virtuous linkage between 
the Commission and Parliament, however, one must examine the way they can effectively exercise 
their powers and in what areas. 
b. Issue areas 
The division of competences between the Union and the Member States is not rigidly fixed. Rather, 
it depends on the nature of the issue, whether it can be addressed most efficiently at the Union level 
(Preamble, Art. 12.2) and whether it entails transfrontier effects (Art. 12.2). According to these 
principles, competences may be converted from the field of cooperation to that of common action. 
This process, however, is not final: 'by way of derogation from Article 11.2 of this Treaty, the 
European Council may decide to restore fields transferred to common action in accordance with 
paragraph 2 above either to cooperation or to the competence of the Member States' (Art. 68.3). 
Even though the exceptionality of this derogation is stressed, it appears that, subject to unanimous 
approval by the Council of the Union, one or more Member States can refrain from 'some of the 
measures taken within the context of common action'. These possibilities give the European Council 
and the Council of the Union a powerful weapon against the supranational inclinations of the Com-
mission. How this weapon might be used is unknown, because Article 32.2 is exceedingly vague: 
'The European Council shall determine its own decision-making procedures.' 
All this said, the issue areas where common action is explicitly stated and required are several and 
important: within a period of two years following the entry into force of the Treaty, the free move-
ment of persons and goods; within a period of five years, the free movement of services; within a 
period of 10 years, the free movement of capital. 
Writing some time ago in an anticipatory vein, Haas suggested that if institutional evolution were to 
occur along the lines of an 'asymmetrical overlap', 'legitimacy would be increased because collective 
performance would be better, provided the evolving pattern of coordination were to stress the con-
fluence of decisions relating to R&D and economic growth'.11' At present, in the Draft Treaty, there 
is no special emphasis on R&D and on economic growth. Perhaps inevitably, the number of fields to 
be covered by cooperation and/or common action resembles a shopping list.27 Moreover, the evolu-
tion of the EEC has enlarged the number of fields which one way or another are affected by EEC 
actions, policies, and decisions. While this is definitely an instance of'asymmetrical overlap', because 
there is a lack of 'a clear-cut division of competences between the centre and the member units: both 
share in the management of crucial fields of social and economic action', there is little doubt that 
recent difficulties in the relationship among EEC members are due to the inability to identify and 
assign priorities. Therefore, the shopping list presented in Article 53 might not mean much, in and of 
itself. The important step will be taken by the Commission, which is entitled, in several instances, to 
" Haas, supra, at p. 85. 
77 Haas, supra, at p. 84. 
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define the guidelines and objectives to which the action of the Member States shall be subject on the 
basis of the principles and within the 'limits laid down by the laws' (Art. 28). 
Obviously, the most important area of intervention and action is represented by the budget. The 
power of the purse remains a very influential element in analysing and assessing the overall distribu-
tion of power among different institutions. It has been in the past, and in all likelihood will remain in 
the future, an element of contention within the Union. Authority on the budget is shared by the 
European Parliament and the Council of the Union, which are entrusted with its adoption, and by 
the Commission, which submits the draft budget and is responsible for its implementation. The 
sorest issues in the past have concerned the transfer of resources (revenues) from Member States to 
the EEC and their allocation. On these points, the Draft Treaty contains some innovative proposi-
tions. In particular Article 71.3 provides for the possibility of the Union establishing its own 
revenue-collecting authorities, and Article 74.2 provides that 'on a proposal from the Commission, a 
multiannual financial programme, adopted according to the procedure for adopting laws, shall lay 
down the projected development in the revenue and expenditure of the Union'. Once more, the Com-
mission is entrusted with a significant function, with the power to initiate an important programme. 
c. Institutionalization of EC bodies and 
EC decision-making 
The way Union funds are collected, and their amount, will tell us a lot about the role of the Member 
States in the process of unification. Indeed, the financial autonomy of the Union is a clear indicator, 
together with its new juridical status, of its growing potential for institutionalization. The general 
structure of the Draft Treaty seems designed to weaken the ties between the Union and the Member 
States, specifically in indicating the possibilities of a transition from cooperation to common action. 
This observation, however, requires a caveat: some bodies, such as the European Parliament and the 
Commission, can and must better define their institutional boundaries; others, such as the European 
Council and the Council of the Union will encounter some fixed limits. Moreover, one ought not to 
confuse external differentiation with internal differentiation. Obviously, the European political 
system contains potential for both types of differentiation. Both have to be assessed and specified. 
Financial and juridical autonomy leads to external differentiation from the environment. These fac-
tors are bolstered by 'consensus on the functional boundaries' of institutions 'and on the procedures 
for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries'.28 We have seen that, appropriately, 
the functional boundaries have been left somewhat flexible. Dispute resolution is entrusted to two 
bodies, the Court of Justice and a Conciliation Committee (Art. 38.4), to consist of a delegation 
from the Council of the Union and a delegation from the Parliament with the participation of the 
Commission, charged with resolving conflicts deriving from divergent views on draft laws. 
The European Communities as a whole have demonstrated considerable adaptability in facing envir-
onmental challenges. The Draft Treaty itself evidences this fact. The European political system has 
always been characterized by complexity, that is the existence of organizational sub-units, hierarchi-
cally and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational sub-units.2' The ques-
tion we must answer, in our discussion of the Draft Treaty, is which institutions present the greatest 
potential for institutionalization within the European political system it would create? 
There is little doubt that the European Council enjoys little potential for further institutionalization. 
It cannot exceed certain boundaries in its autonomy from the Member States, and its adaptability is 
limited. Indeed, its very strength, apart from its potential for more or less supranationality, depends 
Huntington, Political Order, supra, at p. 22. 
Id., at p. 18. 
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upon its streamlined structure and close relationship and perfect linkage with the governments of the 
Member States. Moreover, the functions attributed to it by the Draft Treaty do not require for their 
performance any growth in boundary definition or any increase in complexity. It may well be that 
the Member States will want to endow themselves and the European Council with appropriate struc-
tures to counteract the enlargement of functions attributed to the Commission, it is more likely that a 
different strategy will be followed. 
The candidate best equipped to impede the development of supranational patterns of EC decision-
making appears to be the Council of the Union. Made up of representatives of the Member States 
appointed by their respective Governments and led by a minister who is permanently and specifically 
responsible for Union affairs, the Council of the Union is well situated for future institutionalization. 
Obviously, its strength will derive from its ability to interpret the wishes and preferences of indivi-
dual Member States. Therefore, its autonomy will be somewhat curtailed. However, its adaptability 
and its complexity will be determined by the assessment of its importance by the Member States. 
Since Article 21 charges the Council with powers in important areas, including legislative and bud-
getary procedures, the conclusion of international agreements, and international relations, it is likely 
that the Member States will be willing to provide their representatives with all those resources needed 
effectively to confront the Commission and Parliament. Therefore, the adaptability, the boundary 
definition, and the complexity of the Council of the Union are likely to grow. Individual Member 
States' ministers, permanently and specifically responsible for Union affairs, will put something of 
their career at stake in this function and will have a vested interest in surrounding themselves with 
highly-competent collaborators. The very size of the delegation, as well as a sign of the interest each 
individual State has in European affairs, will deter coups de main by the Commission and/or Parlia-
ment. Moreover, a large representation could be organized in a functionally and structurally-effi-
cient way. If and when this becomes the case, the Council of the Union will pre-empt some of the 
activities traditionally carried out by the European Council and become the true counterpart of the 
Commission and Parliament. Its internal institutionalization will favour and facilitate its external 
institutionalization. '" 
One can only speculate about the potential for institutionalization of the two more supranational 
institutions, but the past experiences of the Commission and of Parliament and the Draft Treaty 
itself furnish some indications. The choice of the President of the Commission by the European 
Council is likely to be particularly important. Presumably his designation, because of his key role, 
will have to be unanimous. The European Council may, therefore, tend to select individuals lacking 
a prominent personality." It is also possible that the President's subsequent formation of the Com-
mission will be strongly influenced by his consultation of the European Council. On the other hand, 
Parliament might also intervene, as we stressed above. Moreover, it is well-known that the office, 
especially when endowed with significant functions and exposed to appropriate historical circum-
stances, may shape the role. Much will, of course, depend on the relationship to be established with 
the European Parliament, and on the vigilance of public opinion. 
In the light of past experiences and grievances, the most important factor will be the organization 
and structure of the Commission. It is easy to foresee a major confrontation of opinions, interests, 
and strategies when Article 26 is implemented: 'The structure and operation of the Commission and 
the statute of its members shall be determined by an organic law'. Until then we can only speculate. 
If the Commission represents the executive of the European Community, then its composition ought 
to be fairly representative in terms of nationalities of its Member States. Its size should not exceed 
Since it has been intimated that evolution toward a bicameral legislature is desirable, the transformation of the Council of the 
Union in this direction would be welcome. See Chapter 10 of Herman and Lodge, The European Parliament and the European 
Community, 1978. 
A different assessment is provided by Coombes, 'The Problem of Legitimacy and the Role of Parliament', in Decision-Making in 
the European Community, supra, specifically when (at p. 345) he states that: 'To ensure that the executive was led by a figure 
of strong political identity and intention, the governments' representatives could be required to make this appointment by qual-
ified majority vote. That outcome might, however, be the last desirable under certain conditions'. 
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that of viable cabinets, but it should not be fixed in the organic law in order to allow for that flexibil-
ity that the drafters of the Treaty have strenuously sought to build into its institutional design. Pre-
dictably, a critical choice will concern the structural autonomy and the financial independence of the 
Commission. Its structural organization will be better left undetermined so that new fields and new 
problems can be appropriately dealt with, again with flexibility. As to finances, it is in the interest of 
the Commission to enjoy an unrestricted allocation as well as to be able to draw on funds allotted for 
specific programmes. 
In the past, the Commission has alternately played a very dynamic role and a rather subordinate one. 
Its limited internal institutionalization has impeded its performance, hence its external institutiona-
lization. If the President and the members of the Commission are capable of exploiting their auto-
nomy, are willing to devote their resources to strengthening the internal complexity of the Commis-
sion and to exploit all the opportunities provided by the Draft Treaty (which, admittedly, must be 
given shape and sanction by the organic law), then the Commission will definitely acquire a dynamic 
position in the overall institutional design. We believe that the Draft Treaty creates very favourable 
conditions for this evolution. Moreover, since an institutional arrangement takes shape through a 
dialectical confrontation among the different institutions which comprise it, we must not forget that 
the Commission will have plenty of opportunities to enlarge its role vis-à-vis the other institutions. 
Most important, by forging an alliance with the European Parliament it may be able to strengthen 
the Parliament, at the same time legitimizing itself. In fact, the Union's 'engine of action' is located in 
the circuit of this specific relationship. The flow of legitimacy and support from Parliament to the 
Commission and of ideas and initiatives from the Commission to Parliament is the source of most of 
the Union's supranational potential. 
There are, however, certain risks that the European Parliament must overcome. In the critical early 
period, the Parliament must develop its institutional momentum. Theoretically, the European Par-
liament may enlarge its scope of support through the activities of various parliamentary groups. The 
role of transnational parties will be particularly important. The risk, as several instances of presiden-
tial governments show, is that the executive (that is the Commission) will represent general, prob-
ably progressive, supranational interests, while Parliament might become the repository of particula-
ristic, defensive, national interests. Such a development could play against the institutionalization of 
Parliament in several ways. 
First of all, by preventing its full working autonomy through a lack of sufficient financial allocations. 
This lack of resources would also make it difficult to move towards a clear differentiation from the 
environment (national contexts and national parties, even though in several cases the dual mandates 
can be considered not simply a hindrance, but also an asset if they are utilized by their holders to 
represent 'European' issues in their respective national Parliaments). Lack of resources will also hin-
der the evolution of internal complexity. In view of the several important and technically significant 
tasks the European Parliament will have to fulfil, expertise will be critical. Moreover, through 
increasing boundary definition and complexity, in interaction with the (potentially well-equipped) 
national representations in the Council of the Union, the European Parliament will also have to go 
through a process of specialization. 
Past experiences show that relatively large, democratically-elected, representative assemblies have 
the potential for institutionalization provided their scope of support, their exercise of powers and 
their level of activities remain relatively balanced. There is no doubt that the European Parliament 
enjoys these positive elements. The Draft Treaty provides the foundations for institutionalization, 
even though many variables are not in the hands of Parliament as an institution but of the (usually 
neglected) political parties. While we have stressed that the lack of 'political will' is most of the time a 
poor explanation for strucutral phenomena — and tends to be utilized as an alibi for inaction — in 
this particular case, there is no way of denying that most of the opportunities will have to be ex-
ploited by national and transnational parties. Therefore, a major element of uncertainty remains — 
indeed, it looms large — as to the institutionalization of the European Parliament. 
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It has been remarked that 'from the mid-1960s onwards Europeans have tended to argue that major-
ity voting in the Council and direct election of the Parliament might offer the deus ex machina for the 
integration process'/2 It is appropriate, then, that after a brief analysis of the mostly unexploited 
potential of a directly-elected Parliament in light of the positive changes the Draft Treaty introduces 
for its role, we turn to the issue of voting. 
In many cases, the unanimity requirement prevalent since the Luxembourg compromise has hinde-
red, delayed or prevented important decisions, yet all Member States have refused to abandon the 
safeguard of their interests represented by individual veto powers. The persistence of unanimous vot-
ing in the workings of the Council of Ministers, however, can best be seen as less a cause than a 
reflection of the difficulties of the integration process. All this said, however, abandonment of unan-
imous voting would represent a real achievement, obliging all Member States to look for effective 
conciliation procedures. New rules of the game would automatically impinge upon the behaviour of 
the players, their expectations and their inclinations. 
In a very pragmatic and cautious way the Draft Treaty creates a series of situations in which qualified 
majorities are necessary. When obstacles appear and an issue — such as the budget — is considered 
too important to be left to a simple majority, absolute or qualified majorities are required. This 
provision will encourage the necessary conciliation of interests and opinions. Legislative deadlock is 
contemplated only in extreme cases. Even then (Art. 76: 'where one of the arms of the budgetary auth-
ority has not taken a decision within the time-limit laid down by the Financial Regulation, it shall be 
deemed to have adopted the draft referred to it'), it can be broken by one of the bodies. 
However, the Member States may apply a powerful brake. Although the Council of the Union is 
required to resort to the unanimity of representations (abstentions not counted) only when expressly 
specified by the Treaty, a major loophole remains open for the European Council. Article 32.2 expli-
citly allows the European Council to maintain the principle of unanimous voting by stating; 'the 
European Council shall determine its own decision-making procedures'. While probably unavoida-
ble, this small clause and the way it will be translated into actual procedures represents a yardstick to 
measure their willingness to go beyond the limits of the past. The acceptance of majority voting 
would represent a real breakthrough, made possible, even though not yet likely, by the several 
checks and balances that can be activated by the dissenting Member States. There is no easy solution 
to this real stumbling block, but one possibility could be a time-limit beyond which the unanimity 
principle will no longer hold. 
d. Effectiveness of institutional reform in the 
Draft Treaty 
Summing up, the Draft Treaty builds on many proposals for change and improvement formulated by 
different committees in the past. But the whole is much more than the sum of its parts (and of its 
intellectual and political debts). Indeed, the Draft Treaty is intended to redefine the objectives of 
European integration and to confer on more efficient and democratic institutions the means of 
attaining them.11 It does so in a way which can be defined at the same time as pragmatic and gradua-
list, and ambitious/4 
The strategy is pragmatic and gradualist because it does not aim at a total restructuring of the 
European institutional arrangement. It tries to provide remedies for the most serious deficiencies. In 
11 Henig, Power and Decision, supra, at p. 105. 
" As explicitly stated in the Preamble. 
14 On these aspects see P. Taylor's sensible analysis, The Limits of European Integration, supra, at pp. 26-59. 
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particular, it gives a greater role to the European Parliament, legitimized by its direct election and 
eager to exercise its muscles. It overhauls the functions of the Commission, introducing those modi-
fications necessary for the morale of its components and for the obviously pivotal role it must play 
between the Council(s) and the European Parliament. At the same time, the drafters are cautious 
about trimming drastically the powers and prerogatives of the Member States. They attempt no 
clear-cut break with the recent past, as perhaps they should have. Indeed, the drafters explicitly 
stress their intention to 'entrust common institutions, in accordance with the principle of subsidiar-
ity, only with those powers required to complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more satis-
factorily than the States acting independently'.35 Behind this simple sentence lies a wide field of discre-
tion for future initiative and action. Although still at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Member States 
(who can still resort in many instances to the channels of traditional diplomacy or to common action 
within other international organizations), EC institutions are no longer formally precluded from 
expanding their areas of intervention, as was the case under the Treaty of Rome. 
Quite clearly, the drafters are aware that they cannot start from scratch and they have taken into 
account the assets as well as the liabilities of the existing institutional arrangement. Moreover, they 
have, tried to preserve whatever institutional dynamism the existing arrangements still possess and to 
exploit it. At the same time, they have squarely tackled the critical problem, that of the balance, or 
better imbalance of powers and functions between inter-governmental bodies and supranational 
institutions. They aim to create the conditions for a gradual, but irresistible shift away from inter-
governmental bodies to supranational institutions, specifically from the Council(s) to the institutio-
nal circuit between the Commission and Parliament. 
The institutional arrangement embodied in the Draft Treaty has promise because, without any deli-
berate or manipulatory exclusion, it seeks to combine elements both of participation/representation 
and performance. Moreover, this arrangement treads the line between concentration of power in a 
single body, which would lead to decision-making paralysis were that body to prove unable to exer-
cise power, and excessive diffusion of power among competing institutions, which would lead to 
fragmentation. While some complexity is to be found in the web of relationships tying together the 
Commission, the Council of the Union, and the European Parliament, there seems to be no doubt 
that the Commission and the Parliament enjoy a fair amount of asymmetrical overlap. This is to be 
considered very positive, if Haas is right — and to say the least, he is convincing — in saying that 
asymmetrical overlap is likely to lead to further integration. Even more so if, to use again Haas' 
words, the virtuous path between the Commission and Parliament leads to 'incrementalist strateg-
ies', which 'have been considered the engine of action'/' 
4. Conclusions 
All this said, it is time to come to a global assessment of the institutional provisions of the Draft 
Treaty. In the first place, the Treaty displays a profound awareness of the past difficulties and the 
failure of more or less encompassing blueprints for change. Unlike similar past attempts, the Draft 
Treaty is the product of the only popularly-elected and representative body of the European political 
system. It cannot be shelved or put aside without provoking a major crisis. Moreover, several parlia-
mentary groups are committed to its ratification and important personalities have already expressed 
their approval. The Draft Treaty is, so to speak, a sign of the times. 
Ji Again in the Preamble. 
" Haas, supra, at p. 64. Of course, incrementalist strategies have also been criticized for allowing too much space to inter-govern-
mentalism and delaying the process of integration. 
156 
However, this does not automatically mean that a shift of powers and functions from the inter-
governmental bodies to the supranational institutions will necessarily follow. The Treaty indicates 
with all clarity the steps to be taken, the safeguards, and the goals. It is at the same time flexible, for 
instance in making room for intervention by the inter-governmental bodies at practically all stages in 
the decision-making process, and vague, for instance in the vital field of voting procedures. A num-
ber of unknowns will profoundly influence the course of the Union: the manner in which some of the 
several unspecified clauses will be filled and clarified; the interpretation of other clauses, allowing 
quite a fluctuation between inter-governmentalism and supranationalism; and, more than anything 
else, the development of the Commission and Parliament. However, it ought to be stressed that the 
Draft Treaty contains all the elements capable of leading towards supranationality in a more or less 
gradualist and pragmatic way. 
As a matter of fact, the assertion of powers by the Commission and Parliament accompanied by 
growing legitimacy,1' plus the effective institutionalization of the Council of the Union, testifying to 
the will of the Member States to accept greater supranationality, might create the premises for a 
quasi-federalist arrangement. It is possible to anticipate a gradual withering away of the European 
Council as the various Member States gain confidence in the Council of the Union. This body, 
acquiring some of the already rather limited functions of the European Council, might transform 
itself into a sort of second chamber representing the States, with some specific voting procedures. 
It is not simply that requirements of functionality will push in that direction, but the intrinsic logic of 
the institutional arrangement devised in the Draft Treaty entails such a development. The accurate 
balance of powers among the different institutions is designed to facilitate this development, even 
though there is nothing compulsory nor ineluctable in it. The institutional circuit is capable of sus-
taining a virtuous dynamic, indeed it provides the necessary incentives for the Commission and Par-
liament. At the same time, it can reach an equilibrium as it is, without any further transfer of powers 
and functions. A stalemate will be difficult to tolerate for both the Commission and Parliament and 
would probably produce strains within the Council of the Union as well if, as it is to be expected, 
role and career expectations develop among the permanent representatives of the Member States. 
Perhaps the weakest element in the overall architectural construction lies in the lack of enforcement 
mechanisms (explicitly mentioned only in Art. 44). The truth of the matter is, of course, that one 
cannot have a healthy and sound integration process founded on deterrent or blackmail measures. 
However, some disincentives against non-integrative behaviour ought to be provided. Another prob-
lematic point is the openness of the Treaty to accession by new Member States. New members, in the 
past, have slowed down the integration process (but this might be transformed into an element of 
strength: buying time in order to absorb and translate all the supranational impulses) and created 
some institutional confusion. The consolidation of the unification process will have to be postponed. 
Again, this postponement might be accepted in order to accommodate effectively and positively 
unforeseen and/or necessary modifications. It is the very manner the Treaty is drafted which would 
allow the accommodation of new Member States and the introduction of modifications. In fact, the 
Draft Treaty suggests the possibility and the desirability of an ongoing process of unification with no 
specific end in sight. 
By far the most relevant objection to be addressed to the Draft Treaty it that is leaves too many ele-
ments unspecified, too many holes to be filled. Some of these elements and holes concern important 
components of the overall construction. We have already stressed that a great deal will depend on the 
way the issues of the voting procedures, especially in the European Council, are solved. Much also 
depends upon the way the Commission and the Council of the Union structure their bodies, recruit 
their staff, provide incentives, and test the limits of their influence, authority and political imagina-
tion. Finally, and probably most significantly, many unpredictable developments may result from 
" For an assessment, see Wallace, Wallace and Webb (eds), supra. For a discussion of some fields where the challenge cannot be 
postponed and can be faced, see Albert, Una sfida per l'Europa, 1984. 
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the complex web of inter-relationships between institutions, particularly among the Council of the 
Union, the Commission and the European Parliament. It is our contention that the importance of his 
office will press the President of the Commission to exploit all his potential. This pressure ought to 
compel him (or her) to look for support from the European Parliament and to establish an alliance 
that will promote integration. This institutional circuit is a quasi-federalist structure in the making, 
capable of overcoming the foreseeable obstacles. If ratified, the Treaty contains the necessary ingred-
ients to 'continue and revive the democratic unification of Europe': institutional wisdom and politi-
cal will can produce positive outcomes. 
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PART TWO 
Implementing the Draft Treaty 




Chapter I - The creation 
of the European Union and its relation 
to the EEC Treaties 
by Joseph H. H. Weiler and James Modrall 
Article 82 of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union provides: 
'This Treaty shall be open for ratification by all the Member States of the European Communiti-
es. 
Once this Treaty has been ratified by a majority of the Member States of the Communities whose 
population represents two-thirds of the total population of the Communities, the governments of 
the Member States which have ratified shall meet at once to decide by common accord on the pro-
cedures by and the date on which this Treaty shall enter into force: ' 
By contrast, Article 236 of the Treaty of Rome provides that: 
'The Government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the Council proposals 
for the amendment of this Treaty. 
If the Council, after consulting the Assembly and, where appropriate, the Commission, delivers 
an opinion in favour of calling a conference of representatives of the Governments of the Member 
States, the conference shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of deter-
mining by common accord the amendments to be made to this Treaty. 
The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements.2 
The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union is not, of course, the first international treaty 
which foresees the possibility of only partial ratification by Member States of the European Com-
munity/ The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, however, departs dramatically from the 
The following combinations would meet the requirements of Article 82: Any combination of six States including all of the Big 
Four; any combination including three of the Big Four and Denmark; any combination including Italy, France, and Germany 
or the united Kingdom, Italy, and Germany; any combination including the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Greece or 
Belgium. If the United Kingdom, France, and Italy adhere, but not Germany, any combination must include the Netherlands or 
any of the following pairs: Greece and Denmark, Greece and Belgium, Denmark and Belgium. It is impossible for any combina-
tion of six Member States to satisfy the requirements of Article 82 unless it includes three of the Big Four. Source for population 
figures: Countries of the World and their Leaders: Yearbook 1984, 1984. 
For the sake of simplicity we shall deal only with the EEC; most issues are similar in the ECSC and Euratom. See Article 96 
(ECSC) and Article 204 (Euratom). 
One example of such a treaty is the recently concluded Law of the Sea Convention. Fora discussion of the roles of the Commu-
nity and the Member States in that treaty, see Gaja, 'The European Community's Participation in the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion: Some Incoherencies in a Compromise Solution', 5 Italian Yearbook of International Law, 1980-81, p. 110. The issues 
raised by partial ratification of the Draft Treaty have been discussed by Nickel, Le projet de traité instituant l'Union euro-
péenne élaboré par le Parlement européen, forthcoming in Cahiers de Droit Européen; Lodge, Freestone and Davidson, 'Some 
Problems of the Draft Treaty on European Union' 9 European Law Review, 1984, p. 387; Groupe d'études politiques euro-
péennes, L'Union européenne: le projet du Parlement européen après Fontainebleau, 1984; deSaint-Mihiel, Le projet de traité 
instituant l'Union européenne, RMC No 276, 1984, p. 149; Catalano, 'The European Union Treaty: Legal and Institutional 
Legitimacy', Crocodile, No 11, June 1983, p. 6; Jacqué, 'The European Union Treaty and the Community Treaties', Croco-
ite, No 11, June 1983, p. 1. 
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past practice of the Member States; it is conceived, as presently drafted, as a 'successor' to the Trea-
ties establishing the European Communities, not a subsidiary treaty existing within the framework 
of the Treaty of Rome. The High Contracting Parties are defined, in the Preamble, as the Member 
States of the European Communities, and it is difficult to envision the Union established by the Draft 
Treaty — as presently formulated — coexisting with the current EC. 
The unique character of the Draft Treaty gives rise to a formal legal problem regarding the procedure 
established for its adoption. For if, as it seems at first blush, the Draft Treaty amounts to a massive 
amendment of the EC Treaties, the adoption and entry into force of the new may be incompatible 
with the revision provisions of the old. If, in the alternative, the Draft Treaty is not an amendment of 
the Community Treaties but a new treaty replacing them, we shall see that its adoption would still 
raise problems under public international law in the event that not all Member States adhere, and 
this interpretation entails other risks to the Community acquis. 
In concrete terms, the question is whether the Member States of the Community may legally adopt 
the Draft Treaty otherwise than by the procedure laid out in Article 236 (EEC). 
Some subsidiary problems relating to Article 82 (DT) 
The terms of Article 82(DT) leave unresolved the final steps that will bring the Treaty into force. 
Article 82(DT) does not provide, as many treaties do, for automatic entry into force upon deposit of 
a pre-established number of ratifications. It provides, instead, that 'the governments of the Member 
States . . . shall meet at once to decide by common accord on the procedures by . . . which this 
Treaty shall enter into force.' The need for a new common accord before entry into force leaves the 
parties some room to manoeuvre as they seek to complete the transition from European Community 
to European Union.4 Strictly speaking, from a legal point of view, the ratifying Member States would 
not be undertaking the obligations contained in the Draft Treaty itself, but the obligation to nego-
tiate in good faith on the procedures by which and the time at which the Draft Treaty would enter 
into force. 
This provision, clearly the result of a compromise, offers an important politico-legal advantage: it 
enables governments and parliaments to ratify the Draft Treaty, or a modified version thereof, with-
out facing immediately the problem of the legality of non-unanimous adherence. Put more starkly, 
this mechanism allows proponents of the Treaty to argue, albeit legalistically, that Article 82(DT) 
violates neither Community nor international law because it does not, by itself, provide for the Draft 
Treaty's entry into force. 
After ratification by the required majority, it is possible that non-adhering States would seek to nego-
tiate an accord with the adhering States that would allow the Draft Treaty to be brought into force. 
One might even add that a Member State that ratified could refuse to bring the Draft Treaty into for-
ce, without violating the requirement of negotiating in good faith, if such an accord could not be 
reached. 
This legal construction, however, only defers the real issue. In spite of its ambiguity, Article 82(DT) 
clearly foresees the Draft Treaty entering into force pursuant to a procedure which deviates from 
Article 236(EEC) and, in theory, even against the will of up to four Member States. Apparently, the 
very procedure of entry into force of the Draft Treaty could, especially if only some Member States 
take the plunge, be tainted with illegality under Community law. 
The juxtaposition of an imperative 'shall meet at once' and the facultative 'by common accord' is a classical way of reconciling 
incompatible interests. For a similar formulation see Art. 169 (EEC). 
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1. The relevance of the issue 
The issue of the legality of the adoption procedure will arise, under one guise or another, in any 
future restructuring of the Community. In this legal sense it merits discussion regardless of the pros-
pects of the Draft Treaty. Be that as it may, to many this issue might seem in some ways politically 
irrelevant: the type of legalism which gives lawyers a bad name. After all, should the required 'politi-
cal will' to adopt the Draft Treaty — or an amended version thereof — emerge, that kind of legalism 
will probably be brushed aside. Indeed, as we shall see below, even during the life of the EEC itself 
there have been Treaty amendments which did not respect the revision procedure of Article 
236(EEC). By contrast, in the absence of the necessary 'political will', this issue might assume a cer-
tain theological air, like the question of how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. 
And yet we believe that in the Community, this seemingly hairsplitting legalism partakes of an 
important political dimension — greater perhaps than it could in other international-treaty-based 
entities. The so-called 'primacy of politics' in the issues surrounding such a dramatic shift in the 
architecture of Europe may add such a political dimension even to purely legal issues; especially in 
light of the unique role that law (and, alas, lawyers) have come to play in the Community. We pro-
pose to digress briefly to examine the origins of law's key position in the process of European integra-
tion. 
The prominence of law in the European 
Community process 
Many have noted the striking and even excessive importance which legal questions assume in the 
EEC.5 This state of affairs is due to a number of factors. In particular one may mention the following 
five considerations: 
1. At the risk of stating the obvious, the Community was and is a creature of law. When a nation-
State adopts or changes a constitution there is a more-or-less organic socio-political entity to which 
that constitution applies. There would be a 'France' with or without, say, the 1958 Constitution; 
there would be an Italy or a Germany with or without their post-war constitutions.6 
Even today, over 30 years since its inception, there would not be a European Community without 
the Treaties. Removal of a very few legal provisions would signal the end of the Community; it will 
be a long time yet before the Community assumes an organic social-economic-political identity apart 
from its legal framework. 
2. The European Court of Justice and its astute use of Article 177(EEC) introduced the rule of law 
into Community life in a manner which has no precedent in other international entities. The fact the 
national courts render final decisions based on transnational courts render final decisions based on 
transnational and uniform interpretation of the Treaties (and that governments can hardly disobey 
their own courts) has grafted onto the Member States a habit of obedience to European law which is 
more usually associated with national law. 
3. Soldiers are often told that 'I can't' is the cousin of 'I don't want to.' In the Community this maxim 
often applies when the Member States complain: 'I can't.' Legal argument has a role here. like, in his 
influential How Nations Negotiate explains: In negotiations a 
1 Ehlermann, Die Rolle der Juristen im Rechtsetzungsprozess der EG, 1983, from which we have drawn and to which we are 
indebted. 
* Though in both these cases constitutional changes altered the complexion of the nation, unifying Italy and partitioning Ger-
many. 
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'way of expressing firmness is to maintain that one's positions accord with legal or scientific 
principle . . . this is the principal function of legal . . . argument; for you do not usually make 
your proposal more attractive to your opponent by telling him that what you are proposing is in 
accordance with . . . international law. However, if you make your opponent believe that you 
think your proposal is grounded on such principles, you may have conveyed to him that your pro-
posal is firm." 
We may add that in the Community the reverse is even more true: the legal argument is a wonderful 
excuse for the claim 'I want to but I can't.' 
4. The open-textured, almost constitutional nature of the Treaty makes legal interpretation central 
to the Community's development. Policy arguments masked as legal arguments abound much as in 
national constitutional governments. 
5. Finally, the Community system displays a much higher level of constitutional-legal integration 
than institutional-political integration. Law often performs functions which in other polities may 
belong to the political sphere.8 
These factors help to explain why any legal argument in the Community, especially over controver-
sial issues, may assume a significance out of proportion to its apparent political importance. In the 
particular case of the Draft Treaty, we would single out two distinct considerations. 
Assuming that the procedure for adoption of the Draft Treaty ex Article 82(DT) could be considered 
illegal, this legal fact would in our view have important political consequences. Although it is true 
that unanimous Member State political will would remove much of the urgency from the issue of 
procedural legality, it is more likely that, at least at first, only some of the Member States, if any, will 
favour the Draft Treaty enterprise. Others may display disinterest, even hostility. The legal argu-
ment will, I expect, become one of the tools which might be used by those governments opposed to 
the venture. Even more likely, a popular movement in favour of European integration along the lines 
of the Draft Treaty, combined with the European Parliament's relatively strong support, might 
embarass hostile governments, in at least some Member States, to the point that they would feel un-
able to voice open opposition. It might be politically convenient for governments, or political parties, 
to make supportive noises while searching for excuses for avoiding decisive action. An argument 
based on the 'need to respect the legal and constitutional requirement solemnized in the Treaty of 
Rome' as an obstructionist or delaying tactic is almost tailor-made for this kind of ambivalent politi-
cal situation. 
The second political consideration inherent in the legal issue derives in a way from the first. Sensitive 
to the risk that the Draft Treaty's political opponents may hide behind legal objections to the pro-
posed implementation procedure, the Treaty's promoters tend, understandably, to go to great ana-
lytical lengths to find legal justifications for departing from Article 236(EEC), especially in situations 
where not all the Member States adhere to the new order. As we shall see, much of this discussion 
relies on international law interpretations of the Treaty of Rome. It implicitly undermines some of 
the constitutional underpinnings which the European Court of Justice has attributed to the Com-
munity.' We do not think that the battle for the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union 
should be fought at the expense of the Community. The danger here (admittedly, the word 'danger' 
betrays a value judgment) is that arguments in favour of the Draft Treaty will weaken the existing 
structure of the EEC and damage certain hard-won principles concerning the political-legal nature of 
the Community. 
7 Iklé, How Nations Negotiate, 1964, p. 202. 
' Weiler, 'The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism', 1 Yearbook of European Law, 1981, p. 267. 
' Whether the Community is an international organization subject to international law or a hybrid form of quasi-federal State, 
subject only to its own, internal constitutional law is an issue that has excited endless debate. See, e.g., Dagtoglou, 'The legal 
nature of the European Community', in Thirty years of Community law, 1983, p. 33. This is not the place for a full discussion 
ofthat issue. Suffice it to say that legal constructs t,o justify the implementation of the Draft Treaty should not carry the Com-
munity backward by stressing its foundations in international law. 
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2. The entry into force of the Draft Treaty: 
Two basic scenarios 
In this analysis of the legal-political issue of treaty revision, we will distinguish two legally and politi-
cally distinct situations. In the first scenario, all Member States decide to adhere to the Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union, or a modified version therof. In the second, not all of the Member 
States decide to adhere. The second scenario presupposes a higher degree of political controversy and 
entails some additional grounds for legal opposition. We propose to examine several legal constructs 
through which the adoption procedure as currently embodied in Article 82 may be viewed. We will 
not attempt to 'adjudicate' any of these constructs. They are presented merely as a basis for discus-
sion. 
a. The first scenario — All Member States decide to 
adhere 
Let us assume, then, that all the Member States decide to adhere to the Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union, or a modified version thereof. Under this scenario we assume that the Community 
will cease to exist when all Member States join the Union. Thus, we will not discuss, at this point, 
the relational problems of the Union and the Community; our principal concern is actually the pro-
cedure itself. 
Legal construct No 1 
Under this hypothesis, the Member States pursue the formal procedures provided in Article 
236(EEC). Legally, of course, this would be the neatest avenue for obviating the juridical issues. The 
problem is political: Article 236(EEC) envisages a pathetic role for the European Parliament — it is 
to be consulted only on the possibility of convening an inter-governmental conference. Parliament 
does not play a substantive role. Moreover, we have proof in the recent dismembering of the Gen-
scher-Colombo Draft European Act that inter-governmental negotiations, at this point in time, are 
not conducive to radical change. The Genscher-Colombo proposal, unworthy of the name of 
European Union, was far less innovative than the present Draft Treaty, yet even that proposal was 
reduced to the anemic Solemn Declaration. The possible fate of the current Draft Treaty may be im-
agined. 
It may, nevertheless, be possible to continue the current mobilization process and political negotia-
tions of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union and then, once accord is reached, have the 
Member States go through the motions of Article 236(EEC). Although this avenue is certainly open 
in principle, it is not foreseen in Article 82(DT); we must confront the legality of that provision as it 
stands. 
Legal construct No 2 
If all the Member States reach accord, it is more likely that they will proceed to ratification without 
respect for Article 236(EEC). As already indicated, political accord would take the urgency out of 
the legal argument. None the less, it is worthwhile for two reasons to discuss this construct as well: 
(a) an attack on the procedure favoured by Parliament could be based inter alia on legal arguments; 
and (b) brief analysis of the issues under this construct will shed light on other more complex ones. 
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On its face, the procedure of Article 82(DT) seems incompatible with Community law. One way of 
overcoming this difficulty is to invoke the international legal basis of the Community. In spite of its 
constitutional aspects, the Treaty of Rome arguably remains an international legal instrument sub­
ject, at least for some purposes, to the traditional rules of treaty interpretation. On this premise it is 
not difficult to find precedents in international practice for organizational revision which disregards 
the organic revision clauses.10 If we adopt the view that the Draft Treaty amounts not to an amend­
ment of the EEC Treaty but to a new treaty replacing it, we could argue that Article 236 does not 
apply (a contention we will discuss later) and the validity of Article 82(DT) need be judged only 
under public international law. In this case, the problem could be neatly solved. Article 59 of the 
Vienna Convention, which to the extent that it represents a codification of customary law is binding 
even on non­parties, provides that: 
'A treaty shall be considered as terminated if all the parties to it conclude a later treaty relating to 
the same subject­matter and: (a) it appears from the later treaty or is otherwise established that 
the parties intended that the matter should be governed by that treaty . . .' 
If, by contrast, we adopt the view that the Draft Treaty amounts to a massive amendment of the EC 
Treaties, international law once again appears to raise no doubts about the Draft Treaty's validity, 
since all Member States, under this scenario, have agreed to the amendment. 
What, however, of Community law? 
There are well­known precedents in the history of the Community itself in which amendments to the 
Community Treaties were adopted without recourse to the relevant amendment procedures." The 
force of these precedents depends on their status under Community law. It would appear that these 
precedents were more than anything else an early aberration rejected, in principle, by several com­
mentators12 and, by implication, by the Court of Justice. 
The Court of Justice, indeed, struck down a Community measure approved by the Commission and 
the Council, unanimously, for violation of a procedural requirement perhaps less important than 
Article 236(EEC).1J It goes without saying that in Roquette Frères the rights of the European Parlia­
ment were violated, and that is not the case here. Other interests, however, are involved as well.14 
Article 236(EEC) foresees a positive role for the Council and the Commission. Though the Council's 
interests may be satisfied by unanimous agreement of the Member States, the Commission's interests 
seem still to be violated. Because Article 236 requires an opinion from the Commission only 'where 
appropriate', there is some room to maintain that the Commission has no absolute rights to be viola­
ted under Article 82(DT). Furthermore, the 'citizen of the Community' has rights that must be pro­
tected, apart from those of the Member States and the Community Institutions. Courts should, in 
principle, protect such 'constitutional' rights from violation even by parliaments. Still, 
neither Article 236(EEC) nor Article 82(DT) requires a Community­wide referendum; thus, if all 
Member State parliaments ratify the Draft Treaty, the Community citizen's interests are protected as 
well under the Draft Treaty as under the Treaty of Rome. 
'° For example, the OECD supplanted the OEEC without following the organic amendment procedures contained in the OEEC. 
See Jacqué, supra, at p. 7; Pescatore, L'Ordre juridique des Communautés européennes, 2nd ed., 1973, pp. 62­63. 
" The Convention on Common Institutions was signed with the Treaties of Rome. Although it modified portions of the ECSC 
Treaty, no­one objected that Article 96(ECSC) had been breached: Catalano, supra, at p. 2. The 'acceleration decisions' of the 
1960s furnish another parallel. In Commission ν Italian Republic Case 38/69 [1970] ECR 47, Italy claimed that an accelera­
tion decision modifying the terms of the Treaty of Rome had the status of an international agreement such as those foreseen by 
Articles 20 and 220{EEC). The Court of Justice disagreed, rejecting Italy's claim that her declarations at the time of the deci­
sions operated as a reservación to an international instrument. See Pescatore, The Law of Integration, 1974, p. 67. 
12 See, e.g., Schwarze, 'Ungeschriebene Geschäftsführungsbefugnisse für die Kommissien bei Untätigkeit des Rates? Zum Fische­
rei­Urteil des EuGH v. 5. 5. 1981', 17 Europarecht, 1982, p. 133; Bernhardt, 'The sources of Community law: the "constitu­
tion" of the Community', in Thirty years of Community law, 1983, pp. 73, 80­81 (FR version). But see Lodge, Freestone and 
Davidson, supra, at pp. 393­95. 
11 Case 138/79 Roquette Frères ν Council [1980] ECR 3360. 
" In this discussion we deal only with Article 236(EEC). Another actor is involved in the Coal and Steel Community; Article 
96(ECSC) requires an opinion on proposed amendments from the Court of Justice. 
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In conclusion, within the framework of Community law, even unanimity might not suffice to legiti-
mate a procedural deviation from Article 236 (EEC). If this were not the case, each time the Member 
States jointly decided to violate the Treaty they could claim that the violation constituted a unanim-
ous amendment of the Treaty. Plainly, international law should not be allowed to prevail here. 
Legal construct No 3 
A third approach to the problem of implementing the Draft Treaty would be for all the Member 
States to withdraw from the EEC and then adopt the Draft Treaty in accordance with the terms of 
Article 82[DT). The arguments used above to explain a unanimous disregard of Article 236(EEC) 
apply with even greater force to a unanimous decision to withdraw. The Draft Treaty's emphasis on 
continuity between the Community and the proposed European Union, however, suggests that its 
authors did not envision such a tactic.15 Furthermore, it smacks of legal artificiality. Even a legal fict-
ion may serve to disarm opponents of the Draft Treaty who might use legal objections as an excuse 
for their opposition, but it cannot fully supply the moral authority we seek from the law. This 
option, in any event, will be considered more fully below, in our discussion of the second scenario. 
b. The second scenario — Only some of the 
Member States adhere 
Until now we have assumed that all the Member States of the Community decide to adhere to the 
Draft Treaty, or some modified form thereof. This hypothesis is politically unlikely, but has the 
virtue of simplifying the issues before us. If, as is probable, one or more Member States decline to 
join the European Union, the legal issues discussed above, neutralized by political agreement under 
the first scenario, will become weapons in the hands of the Draft Treaty's opponents. Moreover, 
partial adherence would raise new legal issues regarding the rights of non-adhering Member States 
under the EC Treaties and the possible coexistence of the Union and the Community. 
Let us deal first with the claim that the Draft Treaty constitutes not an amendment to the EC 
Treaties but a replacement of them, so that Article 236(EEC) does not apply. Although this inter-
pretation is appealing at first sight it raises several problems and dangers. 
In the first place it destroys the constitutionalization of the EC Treaties that the Court of Justice has 
achieved over the years in collaboration with national courts. It reconstrues the EC Treaties in purely 
international legal terms — a step that is legally dubious from the point of view of Community law 
and tetrograde from the point of view of the goals of European integration. 
Secondly, remembering that under the second scenario only a majority of the Member States want to 
create the European Union, it suggests that in the future a majority of the Member States might 
adopt another treaty abolishing the EEC or, should the Draft Treaty be adopted, the European 
Union, by claiming likewise that it 'replaces' the Draft Treaty, as finally adopted. In other words, it 
opens the possibility of withdrawal by one or more Member States from the European Community, 
a possibility we discuss and reject in legal construct No 4. Worse still, it provides the majority with a 
means to 'kick out' the minority. In addition, it may become very difficult to draw the line between 
amendment and replacement. In this context, it is interesting to note that even the Draft Treaty 
requires unanimity for amendment (Art. 84). 
Finally, and fatally, even if the requirements of Article 236(EEC) can be avoided under this construc-
tion, we must face the requirements of public international law. It is clear, for example, from Article 
The Draft Treaty's concern for continuity manifests itself especially in Article 7, entitled 'The Community patrimony'. 
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30 of the Vienna Convention, that a group of States party to a multilateral convention cannot avoid 
their obligations to other contracting parties simply by concluding a new treaty among themselves. 
Since the provisions of the Draft Treaty are clearly incompatable with the EC Treaties, this construc­
tion — that the Draft Treaty is not an amendment to but a replacement of the EC Treaties — does 
not clearly resolve our legal difficuties but demonstrably damages the Community acquis. 
Legal construct No 4 
If it would be illegal, prima facie, for only some of the Member States to adhere to the Draft Treaty, 
it might be possible for those States to withdraw from the Community before concluding the Euro­
pean Union. This solution, which would have an air of artificiality when practised by all the Member 
States together, would have enormous practical and political consequences if only six or seven Mem­
ber States withdrew. In that case, the legality of withdrawal would become much more than a legal 
quibble. 
Firstly, there is the strict legal issue. Commentators differ sharply on the legality, under Community 
law, of unilateral withdrawal. The Treaty of Rome does not provide explicitly one way or the other, 
though Article 240 declares that 'this Treaty is concluded for an unlimited period.'" Some writers 
maintain that this article necessarily precludes unilateral withdrawal;1 others note that the failed 
European Political Community Treaty was defined as 'indissoluble', a much stronger term than 'unlim­
ited period."8 Under this reading, therefore, Article 240 might indicate only the Member States' 
intention to distinguish the Treaty of Rome and the Euratom Treaty from the ECSC Treaty, which 
was limited to 50 years. Thus, the term 'unlimited period' means merely 'not limited to any specific 
duration', rather than 'perpetual'." The Court of Justice has hinted that it favours the former view, 
though it has not, of course, confronted the question squarely. In the case of Commission ν France, 
France maintained that Chapter VI of the Euratom Treaty lapsed when the Council failed to confirm 
or amend them within the time specified in Article 76. Rejecting this interpretation, the Court stated: 
'The Member States agreed to establish a Community of unlimited duration, having permanent 
institutions vested with real powers, stemming from a limitation of authority or a transfer of 
powers from the States to that Community. 
Powers thus conferred could not, therefore, be withdrawn from the Community, nor could the 
objectives with which such powers are concerned be restored to the field of authority of the Mem­
ber States alone, except by virtue of an express provision of the Treaty. 
To admit that the whole of Chapter VI lapsed without any new provisions simultaneously coming 
into force would amount to accepting a break in continuity in a sphere where the Treaty, particu­
larly by Article 2, has prescribed the pursuit of a common policy.'20 
Article 208 of the Euratom Treaty. Article 97 of the ECSC Treaty limits that Treaty to a term of 50 years. 
See, e.g., Akehurst, 'Withdrawal from International Organizations', in Current Legal Problems, 1979, pp. 143,151. Accord, 
Note, Hill,'The European Economic Community: The Right of Member State Withdrawal', 12 Ga.f. lnl'l. &L Comp. L, 1982, 
p. 335. 
Dagtoglou, 'How Indissoluble is the Community?', in Basic Problems of the European Community, Oxford, 1975, p. 258. See 
also Dagtoglou, 'The legal nature of the European Community, supra, 1983, p. 42 (FR version); Lasok and Bridge, Introduc­
tion to the Law and Institutions of the European Communities, 2nd ed., 1976, p. 25, who agree that a Member State may 
withdraw 'as long as the political integration of the economic community into a more homogeneous body politic has not mate­
rialized'. Bernhardt, supra, 1982, at p. 85 assumes that withdrawal would be legal when he remarks that withdrawal of a 
Member State that has failed to maintain a democracy would be 'desirable'. 
1 Dagtoglou, supra, at pp. 259-260. 
1 Case 7/71 [1971] ECR 1003,1018. Hill, supra. 
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In the absence of a clear provision regarding withdrawal in the Treaty of Rome, or a definitive reply 
by the Court of Justice, Article 56(1) of the Vienna Convention could come into play.21 Article 56(1) 
returns to the fundamental principle of treaty interpretation, the intention of the parties." Some writ-
ers take the position that State practice limits a right of withdrawal to cases where it is provided for 
in the treaty in question unless the parties' intent is otherwise made very clear.23 In essence, this view 
does not diverge from Article 56 of the Vienna Convention; it merely seeks to require a high degree 
of proof before a right of withdrawal will be inferred. With respect to the Treaty of Rome, the diffe-
rent interpretations of Article 240(EEC) cited above illustrate how uncertain is the evidence concer-
ning the intention of its framers. 
In summary, it is not clear whether the Member States adhering to the new Treaty could legally with-
draw from the Community. The majority of commentators appears to agree that no right of unilat-
eral withdrawal exists. It is possible to suggest that withdrawal by a majority of Member States 
should be treated differently under Community law than unilateral withdrawal. Although tempting, 
this proposal is unsupported by the case-law of the Court of Justice and would open the disastrous 
possibility mentioned above, of a majority of Member States expelling the minority from the Com-
munity. In a political sense, of course, these objections may be irrelevant, as the British referendum 
on withdrawal from the EEC demonstrates. We are concerned, however, with the legal legitimacy of 
the new enterprise, and it would be inauspicious to appeal at the outset to the irrelevance of law. 
Even if there is a right of withdrawal from the Community, moreover, it could be dangerous to 
encourage such a tactic; the Community is a bird in the hand, the European Union is very much in 
the bush. Indeed, the main weakness of this argument is not legal; it is the risk of destroying the old 
with no assurance that it will be replaced by the new. 
Legal construct No 5 
To set the stage for our discussion of the fifth and sixth constructs, let us consider the possible conse-
quences of a rigid application of Article 236(EEC). Imagine that all the Member States, except 
Luxembourg, wish to adhere to the Draft Treaty/4 Indeed, imagine that only a bare majority in the 
Luxembourg legislator opposes the move. Article 236 would, it appears, permit the representatives 
of no more than, say, 150 000 persons to thwart, legally, the desires of all other Member States and 
their peoples. The result clearly offends common sense; but this intuition must be translated into a 
legal construct that permits the non-application of Article 236(EEC) in a situation, unlike the previ-
ous constructs, where some of the Member States insist on its application. 
Some commentators seek to sidestep the legal problems of adopting a new treaty outside the amend-
ment procedures established in the Treaty of Rome by characterizing the Draft Treaty as initiating a 
new legal order, instead of an amendment to the Treaty of Rome.25 That approach is appealing 
because of its simplicity, but it does not adequately resolve the underlying issues. If we construe the 
Draft Treaty as a new agreement between the Member States rather than an amendment to the Treaty 
Article 56(1) reads: 
'A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is 
not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless: 
(a) it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or 
(b) a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.' 
By its terms, the Vienna Convention applies only to treaties entering into force after the Convention itself. As the Convention 
was conceived as largely a codification of existing international law, its provisions may still guide our discussion. 
Anide 56( 1 )(b) does not state an entirely different principle from Article 56( 1 )(a); it merely expresses in concrete form the con-
cept that the nature of some treaties may give rise to a presumption that the contracting parties intended to include a right of 
withdrawal. 
E.g. Akehurst, supra. 
This situation is, of course, purely hypothetical. It is as unlikely that only one Member State would oppose the Draft Treaty as it 
is that Luxembourg would be the one to do so. 
Nickel, supra; Catalano, supra, at p. 2; Jacqué, supra, at p. 7. 
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of Rome, we run square into another problem: that a group of Member States has no power, under 
Community law, to enter into 'private agreements' in relation to subject matters which come within 
the jurisdiction of the Community.26 
If this were not the case one would run the danger of a scenario no less disturbing than the 'recalcit-
rant Luxembourg'. Imagine six Member States regrouping to introduce a new vision for Europe 
which would, say, strengthen the role of national governments in the Community and detract from 
the acquis. (The Genscher-Colombo initiative was also termed a Draft European Act.) Could these 
six States, simply by calling their amendment a new legal order, which it might well amount to, be 
able to escape, legally, the binding effect of Article 236(EEC)? With no more, the idea of a new legal 
order seems plausible in a situation of unanimity (construct No 2) but problematic in a divided Com-
munity. 
The situation outlined above, in which a tiny minority wants to block the will of a majority or a 
majority wants to circumvent Article 236(EEC) to undermine the goals of the Community, are the 
two 'hard cases' with which we must contend. They illustrate the need for legal principles2 to diffe-
rentiate situations in which a majority should or should not be allowed to act outside the framework 
of the Treaty of Rome. 
Legal construct No 6 
The search for the principles alluded to in construct No 5 takes us into that delicate and profound 
zone where constitutional principle merges into social reality and political theory. In elaborating 
such principles, we must be careful clearly to define the situations in which a majority should be free 
of the minority veto embodied in Article 236(EEC). That veto is a safeguard designed to protect the 
Community structure from dismemberment by majorities. 
Before trying to delineate the parameters of these rare situations in which the Member States might 
legitimately consider deviating from Article 236(EEC), let us see if the 'laboratories of law', history 
and comparative analysis, offer us any insight. Our legal training instructs us to look for precedents; 
the trans-legal character of our argument forces us to look to political theory. The history of consti-
tutional reform in a nation State cannot, by definition, constitute a precedent for international law 
on the revision of international organizations. None the less, in light of the 'quasi-federal' character 
of the Community, it is instructive to examine these precedents in some detail. 
The first precedent, and the one that most closely fits the facts of recent years, is the transformation 
of the United States from a confederation under the Articles of Confederation to a federal State under 
the constitution. The Articles of Confederation were the fruit of a struggle between conservative ele-
ments who favoured a strong central government and radicals who wanted to keep the central 
government as weak as possible.2' In 1781, when the Articles were finally ratified by all the colonies, 
the radicals had clearly carried the day. The Congress established by the Articles, not unlike the 
" Insofar as the envisaged jurisdiction of the Union comprises subject matters that fall within the exclusive competence of the 
Community, the principle of pre-emption precludes the Member States from entering into agreements in those areas. To the 
extent that the new Treaty deals with matters over which the Member States have concurrent competence, the agreement 
would risk violating the principle of supremacy. We have warned all along that certain rationales for justifying Article 82(DT) 
may risk doing grave harm to the Community acquis; this legal construct, which suggests that the transfer of sovereign powers 
from the Member States to the Community may be revoked at any time, could wreak havoc on the existing Community struc-
ture. 
77 The sort of principle that we are referring to clearly straddles the domains of law, philosophy and political science. Such prin-
ciples are none the less 'legal' principles; indeed, they are essential elements of the legal edifice. The law must turn to fundamen-
tal principles when confronted by the 'hard' cases that cannot be resolved by the usual legal methods. See Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, revised ed.), 1978. 
78 The controversies leading to the final version of the articles is recounted in detail by Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, 
1948. 
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Council of Ministers, was composed of members appointed by the state legislatures, who acted on 
the states' instructions and could be recalled at will (Art. 5). The Congress' jurisdiction was sharply 
limited, and it possessed no power to coerce states that disobeyed it. The Articles, like the Treaty of 
Rome, could be amended only by unanimous agreement of the states (Art. 13). 
During the six years between the ratification of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitutional 
Convention, the limitations of this decentralized system of government became amply clear.2' The 
stage was set for a major reorganization when Virginia and Maryland entered into a commercial 
agreement, even though such agreements were forbidden by Article 6 of the Articles of Confedera-
tion/0 They called a convention in Annapolis with the stated purpose of expanding this agreement, 
using it as a springboard for calling a convention to thoroughly revise the Articles of Confederation, 
to take place in Philadelphia in 1787/' 
Worried by these unilateral initiatives, Congress ratified the call for a convention in Philadelphia. 
Both the delegates to the Annapolis Convention and Congress called expressly for a convention to 
prepare amendments to the existing Articles of Confederation, to be submitted to Congress and then 
to the state legislatures in accordance with Article 13/2 
When the Federal Convention of 1787 finally met, the delegates quickly convinced themselves that 
an entirely new constitution, not merely amendments to the Articles of Confederation, was required. 
The Constitution they produced, unlike the Articles of Confederation, was to enter into effect when 
ratified by only a two-thirds majority of the states (Art. 7). In fact, the Constitution did enter into 
effect without the states of North Carolina and Rhode Island, and the new Congress passed a statute 
imposing a tariff on goods from those states. The contrast between the relatively modest amend-
ments within the framework of the Articles, called for both by the Annapolis delegates and Con-
gress, and the Constitution, which was ratified outside the terms of Article 13, inevitably evokes the 
nearly simultaneous development in the Community of the Genscher-Colombo and the 'Crocodile' 
initiatives. 
The history of the Swiss Constitution of 1848 provides a similar, though not quite parallel, prece-
dent. The prior constitution, the Federal Pact of 1815, established a very weak central government, 
limited in its competences and without power to enforce any of its decisions against recalcitrant can-
tons. The Federal Pact, however, unlike the Articles of Confederation, contained no clause regarding 
amendment. None the less, a concerted effort to amend the Pact was made in 1832. In the 1840s, a 
series of religious conflicts led to the formation of the Sonderbund, a defensive league of seven predo-
' The classic picture of a nation paralysed by the weakness of its central government, painted by Fiske, The Critical Period of 
American History 1783-1789, 1888, has been much disputed in recent years. See, e.g. Jensen, The New Nation: A History of 
the United States During the Confederation 1781-1789, 1950; Morgan, The Birth of the Republic 1763-1789, revised ed.), 
1977. Still, the consensus survives that the Confederation was hamstrung in certain areas, especially in foreign relations and 
commercial policy, and by its lack of power to collect taxes. 
' The two states were, apparently, well aware that their agreement was illegal. Farrand, The Fathers of the Constitution, 1921, 
pp. 100-101. 
Only five states were represented at the Annapolis Convention. The failure of this convention, it has been suggested, was delibe-
rate; it highlighted the need for radical, rather than incremental, change and provided an excuse to call the Constitutional Con-
vention. Id. at pp. 101-103. 
1 Congress' resolution read, in part: 
'Whereas, there is provision in the Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, for making alterations therein, by the assent 
of a Congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several States . . . 
Resolved, — [That a convention be assembled] . . . for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles of the Confedera-
tion, and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such alterations and provisions therein, as shall, when agreed to in 
Congress, and confirmed by the States, render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of government and the pre-
servation of the Union. ' 
The Annapolis call was similar, calling for a convention: 
'to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the Constitution of the federal government ad-
equate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an act for that purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as 
when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of every State, will effectually provide for the same.' 
Quoted by Madison in The Federalist, No 40. 
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minantly-Catholic cantons. Although the Sonderbund was arguably protected unter the Federal Pact 
(Art. 6), the Diet resolved to disband the league by force. The brief civil war that followed inflamed 
national feeling to the point that a renewed effort at constitutional revision swept through the Diet 
and was adopted within a year, after ratification by a majority of the cantons. 
The Federal Pact provided no mechanism for amendment, but this lacuna has been interpreted as 
reflecting simply a tacit understanding that the Swiss Constitution could be amended only by 
unanimous consent of the cantons.33 This view is borne out by the repeated attempts at revision and 
even by the objections of Switzerland's neighbours. Metternich objected in 1848 that the Federal 
Pact could not be amended by only a majority of the cantons and warned that international recogni-
tion of Switzerland's neutrality was contingent upon the terms of the Federal Pact.34 He did not 
claim, significantly, that the Pact could not be modified at all, even though it contained no provision 
for amendment. This interpretation seemed to follow inevitably from the sovereignty of the cantons, 
as guaranteed in the Federal Pact. Thus, some delegates to the commission that prepared the 1832 
revision proposal maintained that 'le Pacte de 1815, traité d'alliance entre vingt-deux cantons souve-
rains, ne pouvait être valablement revisé que par la volonté concordante de tous ses signataires.'35 
Their objection, based on an international-law construction of a national constitution, is strikingly 
pertinent today. Adoption of the 1848 Constitution by a majority of the cantons may be seen as a 
triumph of a constitutional over an international view of the Federal Pact. 
The adoption of the American Constitution and the Swiss Constitution of 1848 furnish telling prece-
dents for the current situation. To be sure, these precedents do not establish a rule of international 
law, such as would satisfy a lawyer treating the Treaty of Rome simply as an international legal 
instrument. But they do point us to a new perspective on the Draft Treaty, regarding it as an inte-
grating step in constitutional history: a 'heroic' revolutionary act. 
Drawing on these historic examples, we would like to suggest a few principles, some negative and 
some positive, that might serve to distinguish cases in which majoritarian treaty amendment may be 
permitted. We do not want to obscure the fact that this construct involves an illegality. A revolution, 
even if'heroic', remains a rupture of the legal order. What we are aiming at is a set of guidelines that, 
while acknowledging the illegality of a proposed action, would define conditions under which it 
could be justified. While each one of these principles is necessarily somewhat ambiguous, cumula-
tively they may provide a framework for analysing this and future initiatives. 
1. The new legal order principle. The essence of this principle is not novelty, but a change so funda-
mental that it can be described as a 'legal order'. In many situations it may be difficult to specify the 
elements of a 'fundamental' change. It can hardly be denied, however, that a restructuring of the 
entire institutional structure of the Community is 'fundamental'. As we have suggested above, of 
course, it would be dangerous to allow anyone advocating a new legal order to neglect Article 
236(EEC). The principles listed below are intended to avoid including such initiatives as the Gen-
scher-Colombo proposal. 
2. The proposed change must not detract from the acquis of the Community. This principle receives 
considerable support from the law of treaties, which must be interpreted in light of their aims and 
objectives. As one of the goals of the Treaty of Rome is to foster an 'ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe' (Preamble), an amendmet that furthers that ideal, even though it deviates from 
Article 236(EEC), constitutes less of a rupture to the Community legal order/6 
3. The proposed change must not be forced on the minority. The Member States who opt out must 
have their rights under the old Community respected. This stipulation raises the issue of the relations 
between the Community and the Union, which is discussed in construct No 7. 
Gilliard, A History of Switzerland, 1978, p. 91. 
Calgari and Agitati, 2 Storia della Svizzera, 1969, pp. 216-218. 
Rappard, La Constitution Fedérale de la Suisse: 1848-1948, 1948, p. 80. 
See Bernhardt, 'The sources of Community law: the "constitution" of the Community', in Thirty years of Community law, 
1983, pp. 73, 81 (FR version). 
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4. The interests of democratic government must be preserved. In some ways, the Draft Treaty can 
lay claim to greater legitimacy than either the American Constitution or the Swiss Constitution. The 
commission that drafted the Swiss Constitution was appointed by cantonal representatives to the 
Diet; the framers of the American Constitution by state legislatures. By contrast, the European Par-
liament that provided the impetus for the Draft Treaty was directly elected by the citizens of the 
Member States. The ratification procedure established in Article 82, moreover, would confer a 
democratic authority on the Treaty equal to that of the American and Swiss Constitutions. Both 
broke from the procedures established in the preceding constitutional orders, reducing the unanimity 
requirement to some degree of majority; all three derive their authority from ratification by over-
whelming majorities in democratically-elected legislatures. 
Though comparisons of the procedure for ratification embodied in Article 82(DT) and the Swiss and 
American precedents are persuasive, the yardstick of legitimacy must ultimately be Article 
236(EEC). By this standard, as well, majority ratification of the Draft Treaty satisfies the require-
ments of democratic legitimacy. As Madison pointed out in The Federalist (No 40), the interests of 
democracy are not served when one State, representing one-sixtieth of the nation's population, can 
block the will of the rest. The unanimity requirement in the Community confers a veto on one nation 
with a population smaller than that of Florence, a country representing 0.13% of the combined 
population of the common market. As one writer puts it, a 'mutual veto . . . represents negative 
minority rule" The example of Switzerland again bears directly on the issue; the Radical authors of 
the 1848 Constitution 'se persuadaient facilement qu'en brusquant la légalité formelle du droit posi-
tif, ils ne feraient que servir la légitimité. Pour eux, la légitimité c'était la souveraineté du peuple. Il 
était donc illégitime de maintenir une confédération d'États qui était à leurs yeux la négation même 
du peuple suisse et dont ce peuple, dans sa grande majorité, ne voulait plus.'38 
To be sure, majoritarianism does not represent the sole democratic value. Constitutions protect 
minorities on certain issues from the will of the majority. Likewise, divisions of competence in a 
federal or confederal system protect the minority that inhabits a given territorial division from the 
will of the federal or confederal majority as regards certain issues,3' either because they are believed 
to be particularly local in character or because they are most efficiently managed at that level. The 
principle of minority protection, however, must be balanced against that of majoritarianism. Occa-
sionally, as in the case of freedom of speech, a minority of one must be permitted to assert his right 
against the rest of society. We believe that the kind of right protected by Article 236(EEC), however, 
should not be guaranteed to that extent. 
Article 236(EEC) gives a minority of one Member State a right to the maintenance of the particular 
institutional division established in the Treaty of Rome. The ideal division of competences in a fede-
ral or confederal system, however, is not subject to a theoretical analysis. Instead, it reflects an empi-
rical judgment in light of values that shift over time/" The relativism of each division of competences 
suggests that a given institutional structure should not be fixed immutably. This is especially true in 
the Community, where the 'democratic unit',41 the Member State, is an historical accident, not a 
rational division designed to maximize democratic values and efficiency. Since no reordering of 
national boundaries in Europe is in the offing, the Draft Treaty has tried to accommodate the con-
flicting demands of a democracy of nations and a democracy of peoples. From this vantage point, the 
unfairness of Article 236's unanimity requirement emerges. Although it may be 'undemocratic' to 
proceed from one stage of integration to another without the consent of all parties to the original 
agreement, to provide otherwise prevents the majority from reaching its own judgment on the ideal 
— for that group in that moment of time — division of competences within the federal or confederal 
17 Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies 1977, p. 36. 
" Bridei, Précis de Droit Constitutionnel Suisse, 1965, pp. 46-47. 
" See Cappelletti, Seccombe, and Weiler, introduction, Integration Through Law: Europe and the American Federal Experience, 
Vol. 1, Book 1, (forthcoming). 
<0 Dahl, 'Federalism and the Democratic Process', in Liberal Democracy, Nomos XXV 95, (Pennock and Chapman eds), 1983. 
41 Id. 
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system. The right to make such a choice is fundamental to democratic values, and should not be sub-
ject to 'negative minority rule'. 
The principles we have tried to elaborate may bear practical fruit. The authors of the Draft Treaty 
provide for unanimous amendment (Art. 84). Our construction of the European Union as a further 
move away from an outmoded view of the Community as a simple international organization 
towards a European federation suggests that we look again at the historical examples of the United 
States and Switzerland. Both the 1787 and the 1848 Constitutions, adopted against the prevailing 
legal requirements, established the possibility of majoritarian amendment.42 If the illegality of the 
Article 82(DT) procedure is to be justified on the basis of fundamental democratic values applicable 
to nation States, those values should likewise be incorporated in the Draft Treaty's amendment pro-
cedure. It would be more consistent, in this regard, to redraft Article 84(DT) to permit majority 
amendments, but this solution would clash with the requirements that certain measures be taken 
unanimously.43 It would be anomalous to permit a majority to make amendments that would be 
more important than legislation requiring unanimity. The anomaly would be mitigated by incorpo-
rating the four principles outlined above as requirements to be satisfied in addition to two-thirds (or 
some other fraction) approval. These principles, however, are not readily justiciable, and they might 
prove vulnerable to manipulation. It seems more realistic to preserve the unanimity requirement, 
recognizing that pressure may someday build towards another illegal but 'revolutionary' step in 
European integration. 
Legal construct No 7 
Whatever the legal and political justifications for a transition from European Community to Euro-
pean Union under the Draft Treaty, we may have to confront, in Europe, the possibility of two 
institutions existing side-by-side. Such a Europe à deux vitesses constitutes the most likely solution to 
the practical problem of guaranteeing the rights of Member States that do not feel ready to take the 
next step in European integration.44 It should be emphasized, however, that this practical political 
solution does not resolve the legal issue posed by a treaty that deals with fields in which the Member 
States have transferred their sovereignty to the European Community and adopted outside the 
amendment mechanisms of the Treaty of Rome. 
Europe has experimented before with parallel institutions. The practical inefficiency of this solution 
was recognized in the Merger Treaty of 1965, which abolished the redundant institutional structure 
of the three European Communities. A similar redundancy endures, however, in the separation bet-
ween European political cooperation and the European Council. While that system has led to such 
absurdities as dividing meetings between Copenhagen and Brussels, it has nevertheless survived. 
This fact suggests that, for all its inefficiency, a coexisting Community and Union may prove a viable 
transitional solution.45 Of course, we realize that the difficulties in coordinating the Union and the 
42 Art. V, US Constitution; Arts 104-107,1848 Swiss Constitution. The failed 1832 amendment to the Federal Pact also permitted 
amendment by a majority of the cantons. 
43 See, for example, Article 68.2(DT), under which the Council of the Union, by unanimous vote, can authorize a Member State to 
derogate from measures taken by common action. 
44 This assessment does not mean that we neglect the complexities of the 'two-speed' concept, elaborated by Ehlermann, 'How 
Flexible is Community Law? An Unusual Approach to the Concept of "Two Speeds"',82 Mich. L. Rev., 1274,1984. See also 
Langeheine, Abgestufte Integration, 18 Eur. R., 227, 1983; Grabitz and Langeheine, 'Legal Problems Related to a Proposed 
"Two-Tier System" of Integration Within the European Community', 18 Common Mkt. L. Rev., Ì3 1981. If, as Ehlermann 
suggests, a 'two-speed Europe' would only be workable under an amended Treaty of Rome, we would be back once more to 
Article 236(EEC). The political forces surrounding the technical amendments necessary to implement a two-speed Europe 
would be different than those that might prohibit implementation of the Draft Treaty via Article 236(EEC). The most obvious 
reason is that unanimous approval of the Draft Treaty, in its present form, would leave no options for Member States that wish 
to 'stay behind', while such technical amendments would be designed precisely to provide those options. Moreover, the politi-
cal objections raised above to implementation — albeit unanimously — by Article 236(EEC) would net apply to such amend-
ments. 
41 In any case, these precedents show that coexistence cannot be dismissed as 'inconceivable'. See Nickel, supra, at p. 30. 
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Community would be far greater than those encountered so far in the Community's experiments 
with parallel institutions. Substantial revision of the Draft Treaty would be required, and even then 
it is difficult to imagine what mechanisms might be required. Ehlermann46 suggests that the Treaty of 
Rome is flexible enough by itself to accommodate two speeds, and that incorporation of the deux 
vitesses idea in a separate treaty is therefore unnecessary. He may be right; but the Treaty provisions 
he points to may also be taken as proof that drafting the technical provisions for coordinating two 
institutions is feasible. 
The other solution that has been suggested,47 to negotiate some form of association between the 
Union and the diminished Community, offers both advantages and disadvantages. It is appealing 
because it would eliminate a great deal of duplication of effort and obviate the danger that nations 
which were members of both the Community and the Union might someday be subject to conflicting 
obligations. The association solution is risky, however, even as a theoretical proposal, because it 
presupposes that the Union members could withdraw from the still-extant Community. As noted 
above, we must avoid at all costs arguments that put at risk the already consolidated gains of the 
Community. 
3. Conclusion 
Throughout this discussion we have tried to be sensitive to the distinction between the legal and the 
political issues surrounding the implementation procedure envisaged by the Draft Treaty establishing 
the European Union. We realize fully that the legal issues we have examined are liable to be sub-
sumed in a political accord or lost in the shuffle of political controversy; still, analysis of legal argu-
ments at this stage of the game may prevent them from becoming political weapons. Ironically, 
however, perhaps the most fruitful legal construct for interpreting and justifying the Draft Treaty's 
departure from the terms of Article 236(EEC) has proved to be precisely the one that draws most 
heavily from political theory. This is true for two reasons. The other possible constructs we have dis-
cussed, especially those that apply to the probable scenario of partial ratification, entail serious risks 
to the Community should they be accepted in principle. Second, a political analysis is intuitively 
more appropriate to the revolutionary nature of the enterprise at hand. It is fitting, when considering 
an effort as great as that of proceeding from a 'European Confederation' to a 'European Union', to 
recall the basic values underlying federalism and democracy. 
' Supra, 
¡acque, supra, at p. 8; Groupe d'études politiques européennes, supra, at pp. 17-22. 
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Chapter II - Belgium and the 
Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union 
by Jan De Meyer 
1. Constitutional aspects 
a. Compatibility of the Draft Treaty with the 
Belgian Constitution 
Until 1970 there were no provisions in the Belgian Constitution explicitly concerning international 
or supranational organizations. 
There was just one article concerning treaties. It still exists at this time, and it has not been amended 
since its adoption in 1831. 
Article 68 of the Belgian Constitution provides that the King concludes 'treaties of peace, alliance 
and commerce', and that he gives notice of them, with proper information, to Parliament, as soon as 
that may be permitted by the State's interest and security. It also provides that 'commerce treaties', 
'treaties which can burden the State or oblige Belgians individually' and treaties modifying the bound-
aries of the State's territory require the consent of Parliament, and that the secret clauses of a treaty 
never can be destructive of the patent ones.' The existing European Community Treaties were con-
cluded by the King's Government and approved by Parliament according to that article. 
Debates over the ECSC and EDC Treaties 
At the time of the conclusion of the ECSC Treaty, and, somewhat later, of the ill-fated EDC Treaty, 
constitutional objections were raised in Belgium against those Treaties, on the one hand by people 
who did not favour them and who were, of course, eager to fight them with legal arguments as well 
as with other ones, and on the other hand by jurists of the old school who believed that the participa-
tion of Belgium in supranational organizations was incompatible with the Belgian Constitution as it 
Full French text of Article 68: 'Le Roi commande les forces de terre et de mer, déclare la guerre, fait les traités de paix, d'alliance 
et de commerce. Il en donne connaissance aux Chambres aussitôt que l'intérêt et la sûreté de l'Etat le permettent, en y joignant 
les communications convenables. Les traités de commerce et ceux qui pourraient grever l'Etat ou lier individuellement des Belges, 
n'ont d'effet qu'après avoir reçu l'assentiment des Chambres. Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire ne peut 
avoir lieu qu'en vertu d'une loi. Dans aucun cas, les articles secrets d'un traité ne peuvent être destructifs des articles patents.' 
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then stood and that Belgium could not enter into such organizations without first amending its con-
stitution/ 
The Belgian Council of State' and four of the six professors then in charge of constitutional law at the 
Belgian universities4 appeared to be ofthat opinion, which was, however, strongly opposed.' 
The views of those who thought that the Treaties concerned were incompatible with the Belgian 
Constitution may be summarized as follows. They deduced from its Article 25, according to which 
'all powers stem from the Nation' and 'have to be exercised in the manner prescribed by the Constitu-
tion',6 and also from a rather absolute interpretation of State sovereignty and national independence, 
that Belgians could only be subject, in their own country, to Belgian authorities established by, or 
according to, the Belgian Constitution. They found that any transfer of sovereignty to authorities 
not so established, and in particular to authorities like those of the ECSC and of the EDC, was an 
unconstitutional delegation of State power and an infringment upon national independence. Looking 
in detail at the powers actually transferred by the Treaties concerned to those European authorities, 
which were even described in certain comments as 'foreign', they pointed out that many of these 
powers had to be exercised, according to the Belgian Constitution, by the authorities established by, 
or according to, it and that they could not, without violating the constitution, be exercised by any 
other authority: they referred, in particular, to the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the 
ECSC and of the EDC, to the fiscal powers of the ECSC, and also, of course, to the military powers 
of the EDC, and of NATO as well." 
Against those views it was observed that Article 25 of the Belgian Constitution does only concern the 
exercise of powers within the sphere of national public law and that it is only valid within the inter-
nal legal order of Belgium. It was also observed that nothing in that article, which has a democratic, 
and not a nationalistic, meaning, nor in any other provision of the Belgian Constitution, and also 
nothing in the general spirit of that constitution, forbade the Belgian Government and the Belgian 
Parliament, being the legitimate representatives of the will of the Belgian nation, to conclude and to 
approve, in the manner prescribed by Article 68 of the constitution, treaties establishing internatio-
nal or supranational organizations. It was further observed that the conclusion and the approval of 
such treaties did not infringe national independence, since Belgium thereby integrated itself into a 
larger Community and did not subject itself to a foreign power/ 
I, for my part, stressed at that time the relativity of State constitutions and State sovereignties and the 
superiority for international law and supranational law, even in statu nascendi over national law. I 
held that a problem of'constitutionality', with respect to a national constitution, cannot even arise as 
to the contents of a treaty between States, since the constitution of a State can only be the highest 
norm within the legal order of that State and cannot, as such, govern relations between States: I felt 
that a State constitution can be relevant only to determine the formal competence of those represent-
ing that State in such relations. I pointed out that this was the more true as to treaties like the 
European Community Treaties, which established a higher legal order than the legal orders of the 
States and which were to be seen as themselves creating constitutional law for that higher legal 
order.' 
See, for a good summary of that controversy, Ganshof Van Der Meersch, 'La constitution belge et l'évolution de l'ordre juridique 
international' in Annales de droit et de sciences politiques, No 49 1952, p. 12. See also the extended relation of the considera-
tion by the Belgian Parliament of each of both treaties, in Smets, Les traités internationaux devant le parlement (1945-1955), 
1978, pp. 285-489 . 
See Doc. Ch., 1952-53, No 163. 
See Doc. CA., 1952-53, No 696. 
See, inter alia, my article 'La constitution belge et l'Europe', in Synthèses, No 69, (February 1952), and Dabin 'Note 
complémentaire sur le problème de l'intégration des souverainetés', in Annales de droit et de sciences politiques, No 51, 1953, 
p. 13. 
Full French text of Article 25; 'Tous les pourvoirs émanent de la nation. Ils sont exercés de la manière établie par la constitution.' 
Ganshof Van der Meersch, supra. 
Dabin, supra. 
De Meyer, supra. 
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Other arguments, for or against, and more or less convincing, were expounded as well. 
Notwithstanding any constitutional objections, the ECSC Treaty and the EDC Treaty were ap-
proved by the Belgian Parliament, respectively in 1952 and in 1954. So were also approved, in 1957, 
the Treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom and, later, all further Treaties concerning the 
European Communities. 
The 1970 amendment 
In 1970 an Article 25bis was inserted into the Belgian Constitution. 
It provides that 'the exercise of stated powers can be attributed by a treaty or by a law to institutions 
of public international law'.1" 
It was a belated result of the constitutional controversy about the European Communities. 
Mainly in order to appease that dispute, the introduction of constitutional provisions concerning 
international or supranational organizations was initiated already at the time of the approval of the 
EDC Treaty." It was, however, delayed by internal political difficulties,12 and also by the Congo 
problem," then forgotten for some time,14 and later taken up again, together with the internal institu-
tional reforms which were considered since 1965." 
Article 25bis might, of course, have been better phrased than it actually is. It contains wording which 
might be interpreted narrowly.16 So might be in particular the adjective 'stated' which qualifies the 
substantive 'powers': that adjective was indeed used with a rather restrictive purpose, so as not to 
include indeterminate transfer of power.' 
Article 25bis and the Draft Treaty 
This possibility of a restrictive interpretation of Article 25 bis should, however, not entail major diffi-
culties in the case of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union. The Union, as proposed in 
the Draft Treaty, certainly has the character of an 'institution of public international law', within the 
meaning of Article 25bis,1S and the competences conferred to the Union by the Draft Treaty do not 
appear to exceed the 'attribution of the exercise of stated powers', as envisaged in that article. 
' Full French text of Article 25bis: 'L'exercise de pouvoirs déterminés peut être attriubé par un traité ou par une loi à des institu-
tions de droit international public'. 
The procedure to amend the constitution on that subject was initiated by the Government on 6. 10.1953, i.e. before the appro-
val of the EDC Treaty by the House of Representatives, on 26. 11. 1953, and by the Senate on 12. 3. 1954. 
The Christian Democrats blocked the procedure in 1955, as a protest against the education policy of the then ruling coalition of 
Socialists and Liberals. The Socialists blocked it in 1959, as a protest against the economic and social policy of the then ruling 
coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals. 
Invoking that problem, the Government, at the beginning of 1960, asked Parliament to suspend further consideration of the 
matter. 
The procedure to amend the constitution, which was initiated in 1953, was prolonged in 1958. It was not continued in 1961. 
A new procedure to amend the constitution was initiated in 1965. Its principal purpose was to adopt provisions concerning the 
relations between the Belgian linguistic communities. 
This was already feared when rhe idea of such an article was put foward. Dabin pointedly observed, in his 'Note complémen-
taire' supra, 'le danger est que les précisions ne soient pas trop limitatives et qu'elles n'apportent trop d'entraves aux processus 
d'intégration nécessaire'. 
Those who wrote the article also wanted to make a difference between the attribution of the 'exercise' of stated powers and the 
attribution of those powers themselves, Such a difference can, of course, be made in theory; it appears, however, to be mean-
ningless in practice. 
Whatever they may exactly mean, the terms 'institutions of public international law' were definitely not intended to exclude sup-
ranational organizations. See Wigny, La troisième révision de la Constitution, 1972, p. 349. 
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The Draft Union Treaty does not go much further than the existing Community Treaties, which are 
certainly covered by Article 25bis: there is only a difference in degree, not in essence, between the 
powers to be exercised by the Union under the Draft Treaty and those to be exercised by the Com-
munities under the existing Treaties. 
It thus appears that Article 25bis cannot be of much help to those who would like to oppose the 
Draft Treaty on the basis of constitutional arguments. That would not, of course, prevent them from 
arguing that, in their view, the powers to be exercised by the Union under the Draft Treaty are too 
indeterminate to be covered by that article. 
If, however, any incompatibility might be deemed to exist between Article 25bis, or any other provi-
sion, of the Belgian Constitution, and the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, I would 
personally feel, in the line of my earlier writings, that even restrictively phrased or restrictively 
interpreted provisions of a national constitution cannot prohibit supranational integration, which is, 
in my view, governed by general principles transcending national law: I feel that supranational 
integration has to be seen as an aspect of 'the right of self-determination', which 'all peoples have'" 
and which cannot be denied to the people of Europe, 'anything in the constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding'/0 
b. Procedure to be followed for Belgium to be a 
party to the Draft Treaty 
The procedure to be followed for Belgium to be a party to the Treaty establishing the European 
Union, as proposed by the European Parliament, would be governed by the already-mentioned 
Article 68 of the Belgian Constitution/1 as traditionally interpreted and applied: the King's Govern-
ment would conclude the Treaty, or accede to it, and would then have to obtain its approval by Par-
liament, before ratifying it. 
The role of the King 
In so far as Article 68 concerns the King's power to conclude treaties, one might observe that it only 
mentions explicitly 'treaties of peace, alliance and commerce' and that it does not clearly cover 
treaties establishing international or supranational organizations, except, of course, to the extent 
that such treaties might somehow belong to one of the three categories so mentioned. 
The wording thus used in Article 68 may seem to be rather narrow, but it has always been under-
stood to imply the King's general and exclusive power to conduct relations with other States or with 
other subjects of international law and so as to embrace all treaties and agreements with such States 
and subjects: the conduct of external relations has indeed to be seen as one of the essential and exclu-
sive duties of the King as Head of the State, one which of course he performs, like any other of his 
duties, on the advice of his ministers, who are responsible to Parliament." 
If the European Union, as proposed by the European Parliament, is to be established by a treaty bet-
ween States, such a treaty must, as far as Belgium is concerned, be concluded, or acceded to, by the 
King's Government. 
" Article 1.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 1.1 of the International Covenant on Econo-
mic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
2" Article VI, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States of America. 
; ' See supra. 
11 See also the Decree of 22.11.1830, on the form of Government and Articles 63 and 64 of the Belgian Constitution. 
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The consent of Parliament 
Along the same lines, Article 68's requirement that Parliament consent to certain types of treaties 
does not clearly cover treaties establishing international or supranational organizations. 
It appears, however, that the spirit, if not the explicit wording, of Article 68, requires consent for 
such treaties. 
On the one hand, one may feel that treaties establishing international organizations and, still more, 
treaties, establishing supranational organizations, are, by their very nature, likely to 'burden the 
State' and to 'oblige Belgians individually' and that, in many cases, they have that effect indeed. On 
the other hand, some of those treaties, in particular the existing European Community Treaties, may 
be considered as 'commerce treaties'. It may, moreover, be held that treaties transferring powers to 
international or supranational entities are important enough to deserve a formal approval of Parlia-
ment, even if such approval is not explicitly required, as it is for treaties involving a modification of 
the State's boundaries. 
The Treaties establishing the Council of Europe,21 the ECSC,24 the EEC and Euratom 2î and also the 
European Convention on Human Rights26 were all submitted to the approval of Parliament. So were 
also the treaties and protocols additional to, or modifying them. 
Likewise, the approval of Parliament was sought, inter alia, for the Charter of the United Nations2 
and for the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Poli-
tical Rights.2" 
In practice, consent is sought for all treaties of some importance, including those concerning matters 
which in the domestic legal order would have to be, or usually are, decided by Parliament. 
Any treaty creating something like the European Union, as proposed by the European Parliament, 
would, thus, need the consent of the Belgian Parliament. 
The form and effects of consent by Parliament 
The consent of Parliament to a treaty has to be obtained from both Houses: the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate. It is normally given in the form of an act of Parliament, according to the 
procedure followed for domestic legislation.29 
In general, an act of Parliament approving a treaty only contains one atticle, according to which the 
treaty concerned shall 'have full effect'.1" It may, however, also contain other provisions. 
: ' The Statute of the Council of Europe was approved by an Act of 11. 2. 1950. 
! ' The ECSC Treaty was approved by an Act of 25. 6. 1952. 
: ' The EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty were approved by an Act of 2. 12. 1957. 
:* The European Convention on Human Rights was approved by an Act of 13. 5. 1955. 
;7 The Charter of the United Nations was approved by an Act of 14. 2. 1945. 
"" The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights were approved by an Act of 15. 5. 1981. 
! ' Strictly speaking, an Art of Parliament (in French; 'loi') is formally required only for treaties involving modifications of the State's 
boundaries (see Article 68 of the Belgian Constitution). The consent of Parliament to any other treaty might, in theory, be giv-
en in any other form, e.g. by resolutions adopted to that effect in each of both Houses, but, in practice, it is also always given 
in the form of an act of Parliament. 
"' In French: 'Le traité . . . sortira son plein et entier effet'. 
No qualified majority is required for the approval of any particular kind of treaties. Such a majority 
is specifically not required as to treaties transferring powers to international or supranational orga­
nizations." 
The approval of a treaty by Parliament does not oblige the King to ratify that treaty. It only auth­
orizes him to do so: the King's Government freely decide' whether to ratify the treaty or not, even if it 
is approved by Parliament. 
Likewise, the approval of a treaty by Parliament does not preclude the King's Government from later 
denouncing the treaty, or withdrawing from it. It would not need the approval of Parliament for 
such a denunciation or withdrawal. 
Of course, the King's ministers are responsible to Parliament for the Government's policy as to the 
ratification of treaties, and also as to the denunciation of, or withdrawal from, them: parliamentary 
control applies to such matters, as well as to all other matters of Government policy. 
The Special Act of 8 August 1980 
Complications might arise from certain provisions of the Special Act of 8 August 1980, concerning 
the institutions of the Flemish community, the Flemish region, the French community and the Wal­
loon region, and of the Act of 31 December 1983, concerning the institutions of the German­speak­
ing community. 
For treaties and agreements concerning educational, cultural, health or welfare matters belonging to 
the domestic competence of the Flemish community, of the French community and of the German­
speaking community, Article 16 of the Special Act of 8 August 1980'2 and Article 5 of the Act of 31 
December 1983" require the consent of the community councils concerned. 
Both articles are hardly compatible with the Belgian Constitution, in so far as they submit the conclu­
sion of certain treaties with other States or other subjects of international law to the consent of 
bodies other than Parliament and so infringe upon the constitutional powers of the King and of Par­
liament. 
They nevertheless exist and might be considered to apply to the Treaty establishing the European 
Union, as drafted by the European Parliament, since that treaty would indeed contain provisions on 
educational, cultural, health and welfare matters belonging, within the Belgian legal order, to the 
competence of the three communities concerned. 
It would then be necessary to obtain not only the consent of both Houses of Parliament, but also that 
of the three community councils. 
That would, of course, be rather cumbersome and perhaps not very reasonable, but it would not be 
something new. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was indeed, 
before being ratified by the King's Government, submitted to the approval of the Council of the 
11 Already since a number of years, in fact since the time of the controversy about the ECSC Treaty and the EDC Treaty, it has 
been proposed to insert into the Belgian Constitution a provision requiring a qualified majority for the approval of treaties 
transferring powers to international or supranational organizations: it was intended to amend to that effect the existing Article 
68. However, no provision ofthat kind has been adopted so far. 
12 French text of that article: 'ξ 1. L'assentiment à tout traité ou accord relatif à la coopération dans les matières visées à l'article 
59bis, § 2, Io et 2°, et § 2bis, de la constitution et aux articles 4 et 5 de la présente loi est donné soit par le conseil de la commu­
nauté française, soit par le conseil flamand, soit par les deux conseils s'ils sont l'un et l'autre concernés. § 2. Les traités visés au 
§ 1er présentés au conseil compétent par l'exécutif de la communauté'. 
" French text ofthat article: 'Les articles 5, § 2 et 8 à 16 de la loi spéciale sont applicables à la communauté germanophone'. 
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French Community and to the approval of the Flemish Council, as well as to the approval of both 
Houses of Parliament. '4 
For treaties and agreements concerning, more generally, matters belonging to the domestic compe-
tence of the Flemish community, of the Flemish region, of the French community, of the Walloon 
region and of the German-speaking community, Article 81 of the Special Act of 8 August 1980" and 
Article 51 of the Act of 31 December 1983'6 provide that the executives of the communities and reg-
ions concerned have to be 'associated' with the negotiations as to these matters. 
These articles would apply to the Treaty establishing the European Union, as drafted by the Euro-
pean Parliament, since that Treaty would indeed contain provisions on matters belonging, within the 
Belgian legal order, to the competence of the three communities and of the two regions concerned. 
The executives of these communities and regions should therefore have to be informed of, and have 
to be consulted on, the negotiations, concerning these provisions, and they should, as to these provi-
sions, have the opportunity to put forward their remarks, their wishes and their proposals. 
The procedure for obtaining the consent of the three communities 
Quite naturally, the approval of a treaty by Parliament is sought by the Government: they initiate the 
procedure with a Government Bill, which they introduce to that effect in one of both Houses, in the 
same way as they do when promoting domestic legislation. 
As far as the three Belgian communities may be concerned, the already mentioned Article 16 of the 
Special Act of 31 December 1983 explicitly provides that the consent of their councils to a treaty is 
sought by their executives. 
Thus, if a treaty establishing a European Union would be signed by the Belgian Government, the 
normal way of seeking the approval of Parliament for such a treaty would be the introduction of a 
Government Bill to that effect. Likewise, the normal way of seeking its approval by the community 
councils would be the introduction of Government Bills to that effect by their respective executives. 
Private Member's Bills 
Private Member's Bills to the effect of approving international treaties were hardly conceivable until 
recently. Such Bills had been tabled, but none of them ever proceeded much further. 
They appear to be a form of pressure on the Government to urge the putting into effect of the treaty 
concerned. That was tried, without success, as to the European Social Charter, which Belgium signed 
in 1961 but which it has not yet ratified/" 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was approved, together with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by an Act of 15. 5. 1981, as already mentioned above, was also approved separately by 
a Decree of the Council of the French Community on 6. 6. 1982, and by a Decree of the Flemish Council on 25. 1. 1983. It was 
not submitted to the approval of the Council of the German-speaking Community, since Article 5 of the Act of 31. 12. 1983 
concerning that community did not yet exist at that time. 
French text ofthat article: Dans les matières qui relèvent de la compétence du conseil, son exécutif est associé aux négociations 
des accords internationaux, le roi restant le seul interlocuteur sur le plan international, dans le respect de l'article 68 de la Con-
stitution'. 
French text ofthat article: 'Les articles 62,68 à 73,78,79, §§ 1 en 3,81 et 82 de la loi spéciale sont applicables à la communauté 
germanophone'. 
See Doc. Sénat, 724 (1980-81), No 1. 
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A Private Member's Bill to approve a treaty may also be a means to make some other point. Such was 
the avowed purpose of a Private Member's Bill to approve the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, which was introduced in the Council of the French Community, precisely 
in order to assert that Council's competence to approve treaties concerning matters within its domes-
tic competence/8 Sometime later, the Executive of the French Community introduced themselves a 
Bill to seek the approval of their Council for that Covenant and had it passed/9 
There may be some doubt as to the admissibility of Private Member's Bills proposing the approval of 
treaties, since such Bills interfere with the King's power to conduct relations with other States or with 
other subjects of international law. 
That difficulty should not, however, be taken too seriously since, even if passed and sanctioned, such 
a Bill would not oblige the Government to ratify the treaty concerned.40 
Of course, a Private Member's Bill to approve a draft treaty or a treaty not yet concluded or not yet 
acceded to, by the Government, would be senseless. 
2. Political aspects 
a. General remarks 
The European Union, in particular as proposed in the Draft Treaty adopted by the European Parlia-
ment on 14 February 1984, seems not to be a major issue in Belgium. 
There is neither serious opposition against, nor much enthusiasm for the Draft Treaty, which ap-
pears to be little known outside a rather narrow circle of people interested in European affairs. The 
Draft Treaty has hardly been mentioned or discussed by the mass media: neither the press, nor radio 
or television have given it any special attention. Parties and other similar groups are generally in fav-
our of it, at least verbally, but mostly without much zeal: some of them uttered criticism as to certain 
aspects of the Draft Treaty. 
b. The Belgian political parties and the Draft Treaty 
Belgian Members of the European Parliament 
In the European Parliament all Belgian Members41 present at the final vote on the Draft Treaty on 14 
February 1984 voted in favour of the draft and of the resolution concerning it. They included repre-
sentatives of all Belgian parties represented in the Assembly except the PRL42 (two Members belong-
ing to that party)/3 One Flemish Liberal44 and one Francophone Socialist45 were not present at the 
vote.46 
" Doc. Cons. Comm.fr., 33, (1979-80), No 1. 
J* See supra. 
w SeesHpra. 
" At the time of the vote on the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, Belgium was represented in the European Parlia-
ment by 10 Christian Democrats (7 of the CVP, 3 of the PSC), 7 Socialists (4 of the PS, 3 of the SP), 4 Liberals (2 of the PVV, 2 
of the PRL) and 3 Members belonging to 'linguistic' parties ( 1 of the VU, 1 of the FDF and 1 of the RW). 
" Chanterie, Croux, Marck, Phlix, Van Rompuy, Vandewiele and Verroken of the CVP; Deschamps, Herman and Vankerhoven 
of the PSC; Van Hemeldonck, Van Miert and Vernimmen of the SP; Glinne, Lizin and Radoux of the PS; De Gucht of the 
PVV; Vandemeulebroucke of the VU; Spaak of the FDF; and Gendebien of the RW. 
" Beyer de Ryke and Damseaux. 
" Pauweleyn of the PVV. 
, ! Dury of the PS. 
" Those four Members had, however, signed the presence list for the sitting of 14. 2. 1984. 
184 
The Belgian House of Representatives 
On 24 May 1984 the Belgian House of Representatives4 adopted a resolution in which the Belgian 
Government was requested, on the one hand, 'to take immediately the initiatives necessary in order 
to negotiate with the other Member States on the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union' 
and, on the other hand, 'to start as quickly as possible the ratification procedure, as soon as an agree-
ment is reached between Member States on the Treaty, and to urge the Governments of the other 
Member States to do the same'.48 
The resolution, which was drafted in its final form by the External Relations Committee of the 
House, resulted from the amalgamation of two motions. The first of them was moved on 22 March 
1984 by Mr Dierickx, a leader of the Belgian Greens.4' The other one was moved, also on 22 March 
1984, by a Christian Democrat, Mrs Demeester-De Meyer;'" it was also signed by the floor leaders of 
the four majority parties" and by those of two of the opposition parties as well/2 
As first drafted in the External Relations Committee, the resolution referred to 'an agreement bet-
ween the Member States', but the word 'the' was subsequently left out, so as not to exclude the 
conclusion of the Treaty between some of the Member States if not all Member States would be pre-
pared to accept it/' 
Of the 212 members of the House, 176, including members of all but one of the parties represented 
in the House," and also the two independent members, took part in the vote on the resolution. They 
adopted it unanimously." 
They included 55 Christian Democrats (41 of the CVP, 14 of the PSC), 42 Socialists (22 of the PS, 
20 of the SP), 47 Liberals (25 of the PVV, 22 of the PRL), the two Communists, 24 members belong-
ing to 'linguistic' parties ( 18 of the VU, 3 of the FDF, the two members of the RW and the one mem-
ber of the RPW), 2 Greens, the two members belonging to the UDRT-RAD and the two independent 
members. 
The debate on the resolution, which was held on 23 May was rather short. Only Mr Dierickx, Mrs 
Demeester-De Meyer, the rapporteur (Mr Grootjans, a Liberal), the Minister for External Relations 
(Mr Tindemans), one Flemish Socialist (Mr Van Velthoven), and one Francophone Christian 
Democrat (Mr Thys), took the floor. They all expressed their support for the Draft Treaty. 
Two of them, however, showed some scepticism. 
On the one hand, Mr Dierickx uttered his fear as to what the Governments might do with the Draft 
Treaty, if they would negotiate on it in the usual manner. He strongly insisted that amendments to 
the draft, which was already a compromise, should not be dealt with by diplomats but by the 
European Parliament itself.56 
In the Belgian House of Representatives, as sitting in May 1984, there were 61 Christian Democrats (43 of the CVP, 18 of the 
PSC), 60 Socialists (34 of the PS, 26 of the SP), 52 Liberals (28 of the PVV, 24 of the PRL), 2 Communists, 29 members 
belonging to 'linguistic' parties (20 of the VU, 1 of the Vlaams Blok, 5 of the FDF, 2 of the RW, 1 of the RPW), 4 Greens (2 of 
Agalev and 2 of Ecolo), 2 members belonging to the UDRT-RAD and 2 independent members. 
In French: 'La chambre, . . . demande au Gouvernment: de prendre immédiatement les initiatives nécessaires en vue de négo-
cier le projet, de traité instituant l'Union européenne avec les autres Etats membres; d'entamer le plus rapidement possible la 
procédure de ratification des que le traité aura fait l'objet d'un accord entre Etats membres et d'insister auprès des gouverne-
ments des autres États membres pour qu'ils fassent de même': Doc. Ch., 893, (1983-84), No 2, p. 6, and Ann. Ch. 1983-84, 
pp. 2929-2935 and 2975-2976. 
Doc. Ch., 892, (1983-84), Nol . 
Doc. Ch., 893,(1983-84), Nol . 
Blanckaert of the CVP, De Winter of the PVV, Henrion of the PRL and Wauthy of the PSC. 
Baert, of the VU, and Van der Biest, of the PS. 
See Doc. Ch.,%93, (1983-84), No 2, pp. 2 and 4-5, and Ann. Ch., 1983-84, p. 2929. 
The one member representing the Vlaams Blok did not participate. 
Ann. Ch. 1983-1984, pp., 2975-2976. 
He made that point again on 24 May just before the vote on the resolution. 
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On the other hand, the Minister for External Relations welcomed the resolution but expressed some 
doubts as to what might happen to the Draft Treaty. He found it a paradox that it was put forward 
at a moment of crisis in the European Communities: he mentioned the problem of the accession of 
Spain and Portugal and the financial difficulties, in particular those concerning the British contribu-
tion. He also said that he already knew that some Member States of the Communities would never 
accept the Draft Treaty as adopted by the European Parliament. He nevertheless expressed the wish 
that the House would pass the resolution, as unanimously as possible. He declared that the Belgian 
Government would accept it and that they would negotiate with the other Member States in order to 
have a text which could be adopted by a certain number of Member States without incidents. 
Before the vote on the resolution, on 24 May some reservations were expressed by one of the two 
Communist members of the House, Mr Fedrigo. He criticized what he found to be the capitalistic 
and anti-democratic action of the existing European institutions and their policy of industrial dis-
mantlement, growing unemployment, impoverishment of the working people and social regression. 
The Belgian Senate 
A motion concerning the Draft Treaty was also introduced in the Belgian Senate' on 20 March 1984 
by Mrs De Backer-Van Ocken, a Christian Democrat and former Minister;5! it was also signed by 
the floor leaders of the four majority parties'' and by those of the three principal opposition parties.6" 
Its wording was practically the same as that of the motion which was introduced two days later in the 
House of Representatives by Mrs Demeestet-De Meyer. 
The motion of Mrs De Backer-Van Ocken is still under consideration in the External Relations 
Committee of the Senate. 
The Belgian Parliament and other European Treaties 
It may be interesting to have a look at the votes of the Belgian Parliament on the existing Community 
Treaties, and on the EDC Treaty as well. It appears that on those previous occasions the Belgian par-
ties did not show the unanimity which they presently display in their votes for the Draft Union 
Treaty. 
The ECSC Treaty was approved by the Belgian Senate on 5 February 1952 and by the Belgian House 
of Representatives on 12 June 1952. In the Senate 102 Senators voted for, 4 voted against, and 58 
abstained. In the House of Representatives 165 members voted for, 13 voted against and 13 ab-
stained. 
The EDC Treaty was approved by the Belgian House of Representatives on 26 November 1953 and 
by the Belgian Senate on 12 March 1954. In the House of Representatives 148 members voted for, 
49 voted against and 3 abstained. In the Senate 125 members voted for, 40 voted against and 2 
abstained. 
In the Belgian Senate, as sitting in March 1984, there were 56 Christian Democrats (40 of the CVP, 16 of the PSC), 50 Socialists 
(29 of the PS, 21 of the SP), 43 Liberals (23 of the PVV, 20 of the PRL), 1 Communist, 25 members belonging to 'linguistic' 
parties (17 of the VU, 6 of the FDF, 2 of the RPW), 5 Greens (1 of Agalev and 4 of Ecolo) and 1 member belonging to the 
UDRT-RAD. 
Doc. Sé«., 658, (1983-84), N o l . 
André of the PSC, Gijs of the CVP, Herman-Michielsens of the PVV and Wathelet of the PRL. 
Delmotte of the PS, Wyninckx of the SP and Van der Eist of the VU. 
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The EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty were approved by the Belgian House of Representatives on 
19 November 1957 and by the Belgian Senate on 28 November 1957. In the House of Representa-
tives 174 members voted for, 4 voted against and 2 abstained. In the Senate 134 Senators voted for, 
2 voted against and 2 abstained. The votes on the ECSC and on the EDC were held under a Chris-
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: Including one Independent Catholic. 
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tian Democratic Government,61 the vote on the EEC and Euratom under a coalition Government of 
Socialists and Liberals.6' 
The voting behaviour of each of the parties then represented in Parliament is shown in the table on 
the previous page. It may be summarized as follows. 
The Communists voted against each of the three Bills of Approval, in both Houses. 
The Socialists massively abstained in the Senate on the Bill concerning the ECSC Treaty, but a very 
large majority of them approved it in the House of Representatives, with only a few others voting 
against or abstaining. They were rather sharply divided, in both houses, on the Bill concerning the 
EDC Treaty, which small majorities of them approved but which large minorities of them voted 
against. Later they massively voted in favour of the Bill approving the EEC Treaty and the Euratom 
Treaty. 
The bulk of the Christian Democrats each time voted in favour of the Treaties in both Houses. Some 
of them, however voted against, or abstained on, the Bills concerning the ECSC and the EDC. Later, 
the Christian Democrats were practically unanimous in voting for the Bill concerning the EEC and 
Euratom. 
The voting behaviour of the Liberals was very similar to that of the Christian Democrats. They even 
more massively supported the ECSC Treaty, and they were absolutely unanimous in voting for the 
EEC and Euratom Treaties. Practically all of their Senators supported the EDC, but in the House of 
Representatives relatively more Liberals than Christian Democrats voted against it, or obstained. 
'Linguistic' parties were not represented in Parliament at the time of the votes on the ECSC and on 
the EDC. There was only one Flemish Nationalist in the House of Representatives at the time of the 
vote on the EEC and on Euratom: he abstained. 
Political parties 
It appears from the voting behaviour of their representatives in the European Parliament6' and in the 
Belgian Parliament64 that the Belgian parties are generally in favour of the Draft Union Treaty. 
However, on other occasions, in particular when recently campaigning for the European election of 
June 1984, which, in fact, all Belgian parties mainly used to show their strength on the national level, 
some of them have hardly referred to the Draft Union Treaty; other ones explicity mentioned it in 
their programmes for that election or expressed their views on it otherwise, sometimes with some cri-
ticism. 
The present attitude of each of them may be summarized as follows.6' 
At that time, there were, in the Belgian House of Representatives, 108 Christian Democrats, 77 Socialists, 20 Liberals and 7 
Communists, and, in the Belgian Senate, 90 Christian Democrats, including one Independent Catholic, 62 Socialists, 20 Libe-
rals and 3 Communists. 
At that time, there were, in the Belgian House of Representatives, 96 Christian Democrats, 86 Socialists, 25 Liberals, 4 Commu-
nists, 1 Flemish Nationalist, and, in the Belgian Senate, 79 Christian Democrats, including one Independent Catholic, 72 
Socialists, 22 Liberals and 2 Communists. 
See supra. 
See supra. 
For this section of my report, 1 asked the leaders of all parties represented in the Belgian Parliament for information on the mat-
ter. Mr Ansiaux, of the VU, Mr Deprez of the PSC, Mr de Wasseige and Mr Humblet of the RPW, Mr Dierickx for Agalev and 
Ecolo, Mr Hendrick of the UDRT-RAD, Mr Massart of the RW, Mr Michel of the PRL, Mrs Spaak of the FDF, Mr Spitaels of 
the PS, Mr Swaelen of the CVP, Mr Van Geyt of the PCB-KPB, Mr Van Miert of the SP and Mr Verhofstadt of the PVV were 
kind enough to provide such information. Mr Dillen, of the Vlaams Blok, did not reply. 
In their programmes for the European election of June 1984, both Belgian Socialist parties, the 
Francophone PS66 and the Flemish SP6, have explicitly supported the Draft Union Treaty. At the 
same time they have, in terms slightly different in form, but to a large extent equivalent in substance, 
asked for reforms within the framework of the existing Community system. They both want the role 
of the European Parliament to be strengthened and extended in the fields of legislation and of finance 
and, as to the control of policy, they want it in particular to be closely associated with the appoint-
ment of the Commission. They both insist that the Council should cease to serve only national inter-
ests and that it should properly apply the majority principle. 
The SP have also insisted that the Commission should again be the driving force of the Community 
and that they should be fully independent of the national Governments: they have also advocated an 
extended right of access by individuals to the Court of Justice and more freedom of action for the 
Court of Auditors. 
On their part, the PS have asked for a direct participation of the regions and of the communities, as 
presently existing within Belgium, in the determination of policy at the European level. 
In the programme of Francophone Liberals (the PRL) for the European election of June 1984,68 two 
brief mentions were made of the Draft Union Treaty: at one point to propose its adoption by a refe-
rendum in each Member State and, at another one, to propose that it should explicitly guarantee 
human rights and democracy. They have also proposed a strengthening of the existing Community 
institutions. They have insisted that the European Council should only determine general issues of 
policy, and that the Council should implement by majority decisions the policy so decided. They 
have asked for an extension of the powers of the European Parliament and they have proposed that a 
general mandate be given to the Commission to conduct sectoral policies. They have advocated 
financial solidarity within the Community and the effective creation of a European currency, with 
ECU notes and coins. They also have asked that the regions be represented in the European Parlia-
ment. 
In their programmes for the European Election, both Green parties, Agalev and Ecolo,6' have wel-
comed the Draft Union Treaty as a first step towards a democratic Europe, but they have found, that 
it meets their demands only in part. They want full constituent and legislative powers for the Europ-
ean Parliament, and a real European Government responsible to that Parliament. They have strongly 
insisted that the present nationalistic and bureaucratic tendencies should be eliminated and that the 
existing States should be decentralized so as to give real powers to the regional and local communi-
ties: the Francophone Greens have specifically asked for a Chamber of Regions to be established in 
addition to the existing European Parliament. The Greens have also expressed some fear of a poss-
ible European centralism and they have demanded more attention for their own ecologist and paci-
fist views. 
The Francophone Christian Democrats (the PSC), when compaigning for the European election, 
described the Draft Union Treaty as an essential and important document, and pointed out that the 
Christian Democrat Members of the European Parliament had unanimously voted for it. " 
The VU (Flemish Nationalists) are not very enthusiastic about the Draft Union Treaty. They criticize 
it in so far as it appears to maintain and to confirm the veto power of the Member States and also in 
so far as it allows the European Council to restore common action fields not only to cooperation but 
even to the competence of the Member States. They mainly regret that the Draft Treaty is founded 
on the existing States and not on the regions and they would like to have the Council replaced by a 
** See Le programme européen du parti socialiste pour les élections du 17 juin 1984, 1984, pp. 4-5, 18-21. 
* See SP-programma voor de Europese verkiezingen van 17 juni 1984 , Chapter VII, 1984. 
'" See Une même foi: l'Europe, la liberté, 1984, pp. 10-11, 13, 16-17, 19-20. 
v See Agalev 8, Europees licht op groen, programma voorde Europese verkiezingen van 17 juni 1984,1984, pp. 28-29; L'Europe 
des écologistes, programme Ecolo pour les élections européenes du 17juin 1984,1984, p. 18; and a press communiqué of Ecolo: 
Ecolo, priorité à l'Europe des régions et des citoyens, 3. 2. 1984. 
" See Temps nouveaux, No 44, 1. 6. 1984, p. 2. 
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Senate of the Regions. As to the role of the European Parliament they have views similar to those of 
the Socialists and of the Liberals. ' 
The RPW (Walloon Nationalists) criticize the draft in so far as it still appears to conceive the Euro-
pean Union as a confederation of States and not as a really federal system with a real Government 
and a real Parliament, and in so far as it ignores the regions which they want to be the basic elements 
of such a system, rather than the now existing national States.: 
Both other Francophone parties, the FDF"1 and the RW, ' fully support the Draft Treaty and want 
Belgium to approve it as soon as possible. 
The UDRT-RAD (a right-wing middle-class party) are in favour of the Draft Treaty, at least in prin-
ciple. They would, however, have it examined more closely by one of their committees, which would 
report on the matter by the end of this year.J 
The other Belgian parties do not seem to have shown much interest for the Draft Union Treaty since 
its adoption by the European Parliament, apart from their participation in the introduction of, and 
in the further work on, the motions proposed on the matter in the Belgian Parliament. ' 
c. The Belgian social and economic organizations and 
the Draft Treaty 77 
The Central Council of the Economy and the National Labour Council 
In a joint plenary session on 7 June 1984 the Central Council of the Economy and the National Lab-
our Council unanimously adopted an opinion on European integration, which included a section 
dealing with institutional aspects. 
In that section of their opinion, they insisted that the existing treaty rules concerning the decision-
making process in the Communities should be properly observed, and they said that further inspira-
tion should be sought in the Draft Union Treaty proposed by the European Parliament: they noted 
with pleasure that the Belgian House of Representatives had recently resolved to support it. 
Those councils include representatives of all major economic and social organizations existing in Bel-
gium among them the Federation of Belgian Enterprises ( VBO-FEB), the Socialist, Christian Democ-
rat and Liberal Confederations of Workers Unions (ABVV-FGTB, ACV-CSC, ACLVB-CGSLB), 
and the Farmers Union (Boerenbond). 
The opinion of both councils thus appears to express, at least in general and guarded terms, the com-
mon approval, by all those organizations, of the idea of the Union proposed by the European Parlia-
ment. 
; ' Information provided by Mr Anciaux, President of the VU. 
72 Information provided by Mr Humblet, Senator for the RPW. 
73 Information provided by Mrs Spaak, MP for the FDF. 
" Information provided by Mr Massart, President of the RW. 
" Information provided by Mr Hendrick, President of the UDRT-RAD. 
76 See supra. 
For this section of my report, I asked the leaders of the main social and economic organizations existing in Belgium for informa-
tion on the views of their organizations concerning the Draft Union Treaty. Such information was kindly provided by Mr Hin-
nekens of the Boerenbond, by Mr Vanden Broucke of the ABVV-FGTB, and, with some more detail, by Mr Levsen of the 
VBO-FEB and by Mr Houthuys of the ACV-CSC. 
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The Federation of Belgian Enterprises 
In particular, the Federation of Belgian Enterprises (VBO-FBE), which has already for a certain time 
supported the idea of strengthening the European institutions, in the line of the Tindemans report of 
1976, now also appears to be very much in favour of the Draft Union Treaty. 
Being particularly in favour of the idea of differentiated application of common actions and policies 
within the existing Communities, it now appears to be specifically interested by Article 35 of the 
Draft Union Treaty: since that provision permits a differentiated application of Union Laws, it 
might, according to its views, lift the obstacle which Article 235 of the EEC Treaty seems to have 
been so far for the development of new policies. 
The ABVV-FGTB, the ACV-CSC and the Boerenbond 
The ABVV-FGTB, the ACV-CSC, and the Boerenbond have not, as such, taken a particular posi-
tion as to the Draft Union Treaty. 
They tespectively support the favourable attitude adopted towards it by the European Trade Union 
Confederation, by the European Union of Christian Democrat Workers, and by the European 
People's Party. 
d. The opinion survey of March 1984 
An opinion survey was organized in Belgium for the Commission of the European Communities by 
Dimarso in March 1984/8 
In one of its questions, the general idea of a European Union, was submitted to the respondents in 
the following terms: 'Some people say: "The Members of the European Parliament who will be elec-
ted in 1984 should, as a main aim, work towards a political union of the member countries of the 
Community with a European Government responsible to the European Parliament". Do you have an 
opinion on that point and if yes are you for (very much or to some extent) or against (to some extent 
or very much)?' 
Twenty-four percent of the respondents did not have on opinion on the question. Fourteen percent 
of them were very much for, 31% to some extent for, 25% neither for nor against, 5% to some 
extent against, and 1 % very much against the idea formulated in the question." 
Thus, about one half of the respondents had no opinion or were neither for nor against, and most of 
the other half were for, but rather 'to some extent' than 'very much', with very few people against, 
also rather 'to some extent' than 'very much'. 
Those results of the survey might confirm the general trends which I have tried to summarize briefly 
at the beginning of this part of my report. 
See Euro-Barometre, No 21 (May 1984) 
See, ibid., Table 4. 
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Chapter III - The European Parliament's 
Draft Treaty establishing 
a European Union — Constitutional 
and political implications in Denmark 
by Per Lachmann 
1. The Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union and the Danish Constitution 
a. The Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union 
The purpose of this section is not to give a legal evaluation — let alone a political one — on the 
merits of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union. It is rather to provide some preliminary 
information as to the constitutional process required in Denmark should this draft be submitted for 
approval in Denmark. 
A few general remarks may, however, be called for. From the point of view of a lawyer who has to 
check into the compatibility of the draft with the national constitution, it is striking that although the 
draft is based on clear principles and ideas it contains quite some measure of ambiguity. No doubt 
part of this is due to the inability of the present reporter to fully comprehend all the intentions behind 
the various articles and paragraphs in the draft. Part of the ambiguity is on the other hand unques-
tionably contained in the basic approach chosen by the European Parliament. 
While the draft is based on the acquis communautaire, the future legal position of the basic Com-
munity Treaties is only defined in the broadest terms. The Community Treaty provisions relating to 
the objectives and scope of the Treaties are part of the law of the Union, but only in so far as they are 
not explicitly or implicitly amended by the new Treaty. Though not formally a part of the new Treaty 
they may be amended only by the procedure governing Treaty amendments. 
All other provisions of the Community Treaties which are not incompatible with the new Treaty are 
also law of the Union, but subject to amendments through the procedure for organic laws. 
We would suggest that the determination as to which provisions of the Community Treaties concern 
their objectives and scope opens up an area of great legal uncertainty. Likewise it is impossible to 
have an exact idea as to which of those provisions that have been implicitly or explicitly amended by 
the new Treaty. 
Finally the determination of any incompatibility of the 'other' Treaty provisions with the new Treaty 
is marked by the same kind of legal uncertainty. 
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A few examples may illustrate some of the difficulties: 
(i) Does Article 235 of the EEC Treaty concern the 'scope' of that Treaty? In the affirmative should it 
be considered that the objectives in Article 9 of the draft have explicitly or implicitly replaced 
Article 2 (EEC) with respect to the objectives which may be pursued under Article 235? 
If Article 235 is applicable under the draft, it is conceivable that not only the legislature may ap-
ply it, but also the European Council with respect to cooperation matters, and if so will the 
requirement of unanimity be maintained?' 
(ii) Do Articles 30 to 36 and Article 48, par. 4 (which makes an exception for the free movement of 
workers with respect to the public administration) of the EEC Treaty concern the Objectives and 
scope' of the Treaty of Rome, and in the affirmative have these provisions been implicitly or 
explicitly amended through Article 47 of the draft relating to free movements? 
These are only a few of many questions which we feel unable to answer with any reasonable degree 
of certainty. 
It seems certain that the new draft does involve fundamental amendments of the basic Treaties with-
out, however, respecting the procedures laid down in Article 236 (EEC) and the equivalent provi-
sions of the other basic Treaties. This of course raises delicate problems which are dealt with below, 
in Section VII. 
The distinction — conceptually clear — between common action and cooperation also seems in the 
legal sphere to raise a number of questions. In particular: through what legal instruments is the co-
operation exercised and executed? The European Council — the primary centre for cooperation — 
may, pursuant to Article 32, undertake commitments in the field of cooperation. Are such commit-
ments part of the law of the Union which is directly applicable in the Member States pursuant to 
Article 42? And to what extent is the Court competent to interpret and ajudicate with respect to such 
commitments?' 
Article 10, par. 2 defines common action as all the internal and external acts of the Union including 
among other things recommendations from the Union institutions. According to Article 46, the 
Commission and the Parliament may adopt recommendations with respect to cooperation undertak-
ings regarding espace judiciaire and other enumerated matters. The European Council may adopt 
recommendations regarding all matters of cooperation pursuant to Article 32. It would logically 
seem to follow that such recommendations — unintentionally — would bring a cooperation action 
under the area of common action. 
For the purpose of this paper we will assume that cooperation matters are dealt with as inter-govern-
mental cooperation. To the extent that this assumption may be erroneous the subsequent evaluation 
of the constitutional implications in Denmark has to be reconsidered. 
b. The Danish Constitution 
The Danish Constitution in its present form was adopted in 1953. Compared to other constitutions 
it is singularly difficult to amend. Consequently, amendments to the constitution are the extreme 
exception in Danish constitutional life. In this century, the constitution has only been amended in 
1915 and in 1953. The requirements for amending the constitution are contained in Section 88. 
According to this section, a Bill to amend the constitution which has been passed by the Parliament 
— 'Folketing' — under the procedure for ordinary laws must be presented once more to a newly-elec-
ted Folketing. The new Folketing must then adopt the same constitutional text without any further 
amendments. Following the second adoption, the proposal shall be submitted for a referendum for 
' On this point see Jacqué, supra. 
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approval with a simple majority. However, the votes in favour of the amendment must in any case 
amount to at least 40% of the total electorate. 
This very cumbersome procedure (which was even more stringent prior to 1953) has in fact led to a 
kind of a politico-constitutional common wisdom that only amendments passed in unanimity by all 
major political parties and likely to be of such popular interest that a major turnout to the polls can 
be secured can be considered in Denmark. 
It was exactly this very cumbersome procedure for amending the constitution which led Professor 
Max Sørensen to suggest to the Parliament in 1952 that provisions might be inserted allowing for 
transfer of constitutional powers to international authorities without amending the constitution. 
The Danish Constitution, originally drafted in 1849 under strong influence from the Belgian Con-
stitution of 1831, was inspired by the Dutch constitutional provision with regard to transfer of sove-
reignty to international authorities. The text proposed by Max Sørensen suggested that such transfer 
of sovereignty could be decided by an ordinary Bill. However, a certain minority in the Folketing 
would have the right to request that such a Bill be ratified by the next elected Folketing prior to its 
entry into force. In the political process necessary to achieve unanimity among all major political 
parties on the constitutional amendments in 1953, however, the procedure for adoption of such a 
Bill was dramatically amended. A majority of five sixths of the total Folketing (i.e. 150 members out 
of the 179 members must vote in favour) is required. If this majority is not obtained, though a simple 
majority is secured, the Bill can only be promulgated if it has been submitted to a referendum in 
accordance with Section 42 of the constitution. Pursuant to this section, a Bill adopted by Parliament 
can be rejected by the electorate if a majority votes against and this majority constitutes at least 30 % 
of the total electorate. The provisions of Section 20 have only been used twice since 1953. The first 
time was Denmark's accession to the European Communities. The Bill for accession did not obtain 
the required five sixths and was consequently submitted for a referendum where it received the con-
sent of almost two thirds of those voting, amounting to more than 50 % of the total electorate. 
The second time of application of Section 20 was the conventions for the European patent and for a 
Community patent. The Bill for Danish accession to these conventions did not receive the five-sixths 
majority. The Bill has been considered unfit for a referendum and is therefore still on the Govern-
ment's table. 
The procedural aspects of the Danish provision regarding transfer of sovereignty to international 
authorities differ considerably from those of other Member States if not qualitatively then at least 
quantitatively. Also, the substantive provisions regarding transfer of sovereignty seem somewhat 
more strict in Denmark than in other Member States. The text of Section 20, par. 1 reads as follows: 
'Powers vested in the authorities of the Realm under this Constitution Act may to such extent as 
shall be provided by statute be delegated to international authorities set up by mutual agreement 
with other States for the promotion of international rules of law and cooperation.' 
The theoretical background for the provision is explained by Max Sørensen in the following manner 
in his textbook on constitutional law: 
'It is a fundamental principle in Danish constitutional law that legal authority vis-à-vis citizens is 
exercised by organs directly established pursuant to the constitution or which, in any case, are a 
part of the Danish constitutional system. The legislative power lies primarily in the elected 
assembly. The executive power lies with the ministers responsible towards the Folketing, with the 
elected municipal councils or with independent executive agencies which, however, are subject to 
the Danish legal system as regards the regulation of their responsibility. The judicial power rests 
with the independent courts instituted by the constitution. It is true that the legislative power may 
within certain limits delegate its competence to other organs and it may to a certain extent change 
the distribution of competence between the courts and the administration, but this does not aut-
horize it to transfer powers to organs which are outside the Danish constitutional system. Such a 
transfer of competence would not be possible without amending the constitution as it would vio-
late the said fundamental principle that authority over citizens are exercised by Danish organs. 
Any power which pursuant to the constitution is exercised by the authorities of the Kingdom may 
be transferred pursuant to Section 20. When this provision speaks of powers vested in the autho-
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rities of the realm under this Constitution Act, it is not only the specified competences in the con-
stitution, such as the King's right to cause money to be coined (in Section 26), but also the broad 
categories of constitutional competences spelled out in Section 3 of the constitution (which insti-
tutes the legislative power, the executive power and the judicial power respectively). 
The powers vested in the authorities of the Realm to which Section 20 refers do not include the 
power to amend the constitution. Pursuant to Section 88 only the legislative power and the electo-
rate in combination can exercise this power, and it is therefore not exercised by an authority in the 
sense of Section 20. It is therefore not possible to transfer to an international authority the power 
to amend the constitution, for instance to determine that the form of government should be 
republican, that foreigners be given voting rights, that a person who is taken into custody is not 
required to be brought before a judge within 24 hours or that expropriation is possible without 
due compensation. It is however obvious that the very transfer of powers provided for in Section 
20 may to a certain extent amend the constitution in the sense that the powers will no longer be 
exercised by Danish authorities as presumed in the constitution, but by the international authority 
to whom the powers have been transferred. In other words, Section 20 allows for the amendment 
of the system of competence established by the constitution, whereas the material conditions for 
or limitations in the exercise of these powers may not be changed.' 
c. Section 20 and the substantive provisions of 
the draft 
It is possible to read Article 45 in such a way that this article, which refers to Article 9 concerning the 
objectives of the Union, gives the general delimitation of the powers of the Union ratione materiae. 
According to such an interpretation, the Union would be able to legislate, take executive action and 
actions with respect to third countries covering all subject matters referred to in Article 9. The com-
petence of the Court would obviously cover the same fields. 
Given the fact that the aims of the Union in Article 9 are described in the broadest possible terms, 
such interpretation would in fact imply that the Union had unlimited competence. Under Section 20 
of the constitution, however, competence may only be transferred to an extent to be provided by stat-
ute. In his textbook on constitutional law Max Sørensen states that: 
'this condition implies that there must be a certain level of precision with respect to the powers to 
be transferred. 
Negatively, it may be said that it is excluded to transfer all legislative competence or judicial com-
petence in general, etc. Even less it would be possible to transfer all powers belonging to Danish 
authorities and thus abolish Denmark as an independent State. 
The required level of precision implies that the powers are clarified with respect to their kind — 
legislation, administration, judicial decisions, etc. — as well as with respect to their subject mat-
ter. The comparable provision in the Norwegian Constitution (Section 93) uses the words 'within 
a materially limited field'. The Danish provision must be understood in this sense. It is conse-
quently required that all decisions which may be taken by the international organ are defined with 
respect to their subject matter or object. 
On the other hand it cannot be demanded that this delimitation should be formulated in a narrow 
way. There is no quantitative criteria in the wording of the constitution. There is no basis for 
implying any demand that the transfer can only be made within a limited scope meaning within 
few subject matters or within areas of lesser importance. 
Consequently, nothing prevents powers to be transferred with respect to subject matters defined 
in broad categories such as the provisions in the Treaty of Rome concerning the European Econo-
mic Community, in particular Article 3.' 
It is obvious that under the above interpretation of Article 45, Section 20 would be inapplicable. 
Only a full-scale constitutional amendment could be used in such a case. 
On the other hand, it would seem from the general scheme of the draft that the intention has been 
that the Union may only exercise competences pursuant to the individual articles of Chapters 1 to 3 
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of Part 4 and Part 5 regarding the finances of the Union. If this assumption is correct and Article 45 
therefore could be clarified in this respect without any change in its meaning, one will have to look at 
the delimitations given in the various chapters in Part 4 and Part 5 of the draft. 
Compared to the competence of the present Communities, the Union's competence seems to be 
enlarged in different ways: 
(i) New areas of activity such as education, culture and health are added. 
(ii) The Union competence in areas where the Community has only a very limited competence, such 
as taxation and social affairs, is greatly increased. The competence to impose taxes and collect 
the revenue as 'own income' is even without limits in the draft. 
(iii) Limitations inherent in the Community Treaties with respect to the exercise of the competence 
are either set aside by the Union Treaty, or may possibly be sec aside by decisions of the Union 
institutions. As said above, in Section I, it is very unclear to the present reporter to what extent 
this may happen. 
(iv) The objectives of the Union provided for in Article 9 of the draft are considerably wider than the 
objectives in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rome. Given the impact which these objectives 
have on the interpretation of the various substantive provisions, this will also be a factor in 
enlarging the competence of the Union compared to the competence of the Communities. 
Nevertheless, nothing would in principle exclude the transfer of powers to this wider extent pursuant 
to Section 20 of the constitution. As noted by Max Sørensen, there is no requirement in the constitu-
tion with respect to the quantities of the powers transferred. 
It is not possible without a very detailed study to see if the powers intended to be transferred by 
means of the various provisions are spelled out sufficiently clearly to meet the requirement of Section 
20. This, however, would rather be a matter of drafting and clarity than of quantity. 
The clarity required does not of course imply that there can be no room for future interpretations. 
Many important questions with respect to the present text should, however, be solved prior to a pos-
sible signature of the draft. Such questions would include: 
(i) A clarification of Article 7 as discussed under Section I. 
(ii) Does Article 55, which gives the Union concurrent competence in the field of social, consumer 
protection, regional environmental education and research, and cultural and information pol-
icies give the Union a general competence with respect to these matters subject only to the indivi-
dual limitations in the following articles? 
(iii) In Articles 57 to 59 and 62, the Union is given power to encourage the attainment of various 
objectives. Does such power limit the Union to making programmes which the Member States 
may or may not choose to comply with? 
(iv) Pursuant to Article 56, the Union may take action with respect to social and health matters 'in 
particular in matters relating to' a number of specified objects. Does such wording imply that in 
fact any other action in the field of social and health policy which conforms to the broad objec-
tives in Article 9 would also be possible? 
(v) Article 4, par. 1 may be read to imply that the Union will have as one of its tasks to ensure the 
compliance of Member States with the fundamental rights of the Union. It is obvious that the 
Union will be under an obligation not to violate fundamental rights and not to legislate in a way 
which compels Member States to act contrary to the fundamental rights of the Union. However, 
if Article 4, par. 1 is also intended to grant authority to the Union to protect the citizens against 
other violations of their fundamental rights, one would have to inquire what remedies the Union 
would have at its disposal. It appears from paragraph 4 of Article 4 and from Article 44 that if 
Member States in their own right violate the human rights of their citizens, the only legal remedy 
for the Union is a partial suspension of the participation in the activities of the Union. If this 
interpretation is correct, it would seem that no powers would be transferred from Danish autho-
rities in this respect. 
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It must be kept in mind that the Union may not, pursuant to Article 20, be authorized to act contrary 
to the substantive provisions of the constitution. 
If the freedom of movement with respect to persons would include a right to all jobs in the public 
administration, i.e. if Article 48, par. 4 of the Treaty of Rome is considered contrary to Article 47 or 
if it may be amended through the adoption of an organic law, then this part of the draft would 
require a constitutional amendment. 
Article 11 of the Draft Treaty authorizes the European Council to transfer matters of 'cooperation' 
to the area of'common action'. Such transfer will inevitably imply a corresponding transfer of com-
petence to the Union pursuant to Section 20. 
However, Section 20 of the constitution does not allow the transfer of the powers contained in that 
section. In other words, the institutions of the Union may not be authorized via Section 20 to decide 
to transfer matters from national competence to Union competence. The powers which are to be 
transferred must be determined in the statute which transfer the powers to the Union. 
Theoretically, it would be possible for the Folketing to transfer powers, so to speak, in advance in all 
cases covered by Article 11. Such a construction was applied at the time of Denmark's accession to 
the EC with respect to Article 235 of the Treaty of Rome. Where others may consider Article 235 an 
instrument of gradual transfer of competence to the Community, the approach taken in Denmark 
was to transfer in the Bill of accession all powers to the Community with respect to Article 235. In 
this as in all other cases, the transfer of power is subject to the understanding that the powers may 
still be exercised by Danish authorities until such time as they are used by the Community. 
However, one may doubt whether it would be realistic to transfer in advance all powers which could 
be the subject of a decision pursuant to Article 11. 
If decisions pursuant to Article 11 will be taken by unanimity, it would on the other hand be possible 
to pass the necessary Bills pursuant to Section 20 each time a subject matter would be transferred 
from 'cooperation' to 'common action'. The Danish Prime Minister would then have to make sure, 
prior to his formal acceptance of any decision pursuant to Article 11, that the necessary Bill under 
Section 20 of the constitution had been passed. 
d. Section 20 and the supremacy of Union law over 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution 
The transfer of competence pursuant to Section 20 of the constitution does not imply that the reci-
pient institutions may act in contravention of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Danish Con-
stitution. 
The principle of the supremacy of the law of the Union even vis-à-vis national constitutions therefore 
raises a problem. The problem is, however, not new. It already exists in the Community as it stands. 
In certain other Member States having extensive catalogues of fundamental rights, a certain national 
case-law already exists in this respect. In Denmark it has been considered most unlikely that a con-
flict would ever arise due to the fairly limited scope of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Danish Constitution and the limitation of the competence of the Community. 
The practice developed by the European Court of Justice with respect to fundamental rights has fur-
ther eliminated the likelihood of any prospective conflict. 
Article 4 of the draft codifies the Court's jurisprudence with respect to fundamental rights and it 
would — even with the expanded Union competence — be most unlikely that a conflict would arise. 
A further analysis of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the constitutions of the Member States 
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might even show that all relevant fundamental rights found in the Danish Constitution would be fully 
covered by the common principles of the constitutions of the Member States, which must be protec-
ted by the Court pursuant to Article 4 of the draft. 
It would seem, therefore, that no new problems of principle would arise due to the fact that under 
Section 20 of the constitution no powers to act contrary to the fundamental rights of the constitution 
may be transferred. 
e. Section 20 and the institutionaiset up of the Union 
Under Section 20, powers may be transferred to international authorities set up by mutual agree-
ment. 
Max Sørensen writes that the most important element in this respect is that: 
'the authority shall be international. The transfer may thus not be made to the authorities of a for-
eign State. It is immaterial how the international organ is constituted and what legal position it 
has. It may be an organ composed of representatives of the Governments or Parliaments of the 
Member States. It may be a parliamentary organ elected through direct elections in the Member 
States in total, or it may be an independent organ the members of which are not bound by instruc-
tions from any side, such as for instance the Commission of the European Communities or an 
international court. 
The international authority shall be created by mutual agreement. . . . When the term 'mutual' is 
used with respect to the agreement the aim undoubtedly is not only formal in the sense that the 
agreement is made by mutual obligations on all the participating States. The aim is also, and in 
particular, that the agreement must be based on a certain principle of equality in the sense that the 
international authority must have the same powers with respect to all participating States and that 
there is no discretionary discrimination between the participating States with respect to their 
influence in the organization. This does not exclude, however, that the size of the population or 
other similar quantitative factors are taken into account in the determination of the composition 
of the individual organs or in the voting rules or with respect to definition of rights and duties at 
large.' 
In general, the draft raises no problems with respect to the institutional set up of the Union. 
It is remarkable, however, that the existing balance within the institutions between the larger and the 
smaller Member States has been dramatically changed by the draft in favour of the larger Member 
States. The fact that this change has not been explained in the various papers of the European Parlia-
ment might signify that this aspect has not been given much attention by Parliament. 
The transfer of power from the Council to the Parliament gives the larger Member States far more 
influence. This is due to the fact that the composition of the Parliament gives greater weight to the 
relative size of the population of each Member State than the voting rules of the Council. 
In a pre-federal system like the Union it seems, of course, perfectly reasonable that the 'People's 
Chamber' is composed with due regard for the relative size of the populations of the Member States. 
However, the same logic must of course imply that in the 'State Chamber' the States are represented 
with equally due respect for the principle of 'one State, one vote'. It is therefore surprising that the 
draft does not involve any steps in that direction. If the existing balance in the institutions between 
larger and smaller Member States is to be preserved, the voting rules of the Council should have been 
changed in the direction of'one State, one vote'. 
In fact, the existing voting rules for the Council are also changed in favour of the large States. Thus, 
simple majority in the Council is not necessarily a majority of Governments represented, as is now 
the case, but may in fact be a minority consisting of no more than three Governments of larger States 
out of the 10 Governments represented in the Council. 
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'Qualified majority' similarly means in fact only a simple majority of the Governments represented in 
the Council if this simple majority includes most of the larger States. 
It is clear that the influence of the smaller Member States is thus reduced both by the transfer of com-
petence from the Council to the Parliament and by the proposed voting rules of the Council. 
The result is that the smaller States will have a representation which is less than what would follow 
from, for instance, the system of the US Constitution. 
On top of this, the over-representation of the larger States in the Council may only be changed by 
amending the Treaty, i.e. by unanimity, whereas the — smaller — over-representation of the smaller 
States in the Parliament may be changed by an organic law, i.e. almost by the larger States alone. 
On basis of these facts one might expect a discussion in Denmark as to the requirement of a 'fair 
representation'. 
The composition of the Court and the Commission may also be changed by an organic law. In our 
view it would be unthinkable that the smaller Member States lost their seats in these two institutions. 
A discussion with respect to these institutions would therefore focus on the lack of any legal gua-
rantees in this respect. 
The legal instruments available to the Union are mostly clear and represent a continuation of the 
Community's legal instruments. 
The commitments and recommendation of the European Council with respect to matters of coopera-
tion may however give rise to doubts, as mentioned in Section I. The term 'commitment' is thus in the 
Danish text called forpligtelse which means obligation. We have nevertheless assumed that such 
commitments are either political in nature or at any rate not part of the law of the Union which, pur-
suant to Article 42, is directly applicable in the Member States. Under that assumption no powers 
would be transferred from Danish authotities to the European Council. 
ƒ. Section 20 and the European Union as a 
quasi-federation 
We have in the preceding chapters looked into some of the main elements in determining whether 
Section 20 of the Danish Constitution is of application with respect to the draft presented by the 
European Parliament. 
It may be expected, however, that in the event of the draft being submitted to the Folketing, an argu-
ment would be advanced to the effect that the draft involves more loss of sovereignty than is permis-
sible under Section 20 of the constitution. The combination of the very wide Union competence 
ratione materiae, the limited Danish influence in the decision-making process, the unlimited right of 
the Union to impose taxes and the strong position of the Union as a subject of international law 
might, taken togethet, be considered beyond what may be acomplished by virtue of Section 20 of the 
constitution. In favour of this view it may be argued that the Union in fact is a federal State and that 
Section 20 only covers transfer of powers to international authorities, and not to a federal State. 
Against this argument it could be pointed out that the basic meaning of the term 'international auth-
ority' in Section 20 is no doubt to exclude transfer of competence to foreign States. The federal State 
would — in our case — not be a foreign State since Denmark would be a Member State. It could fur-
ther be said that Section 20 does not use the term 'international organization' but 'international aut-
hority', thus including entities which are so sovereign that they would not be classified as internatio-
nal organizations. 
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For our part, however, we would not find it unreasonable to consider adherence to a fully-fledged 
federal State as beyond what may be accomplished pursuant to Section 20 of the constitution. How-
ever, the Union is clearly not a fully-fledged federal State. 
To go beyond this, and assume that adherence to a highly-intergrated Union which is not a fullj 
fledged federal State could in principle not be accomplished via Section 20 of the constitution wouk 
in our view not follow from the text or legislative history of Section 20. It would, however, clearly be 
within the legitimate rights of the Folketing to make such a qualitative interpretation of Section 20. 
Under such an interpretation, the application of Section 20 could be restricted to transfer of powers 
of a politico-constitutional importance, which is consonant with the requirements for adopting a Bill 
pursuant to Section 20. An interpretation of this kind would in our view imply an evaluation of the 
combined impact of all the changes proposed compared with the present situation under the Com-
munity Treaties. 
It should be noted that the Folketing did not rely on a qualitative interpretation with respect to the 
European patent conventions. A qualitative approach would clearly have resulted in an adoption of 
the patent conventions pursuant to Section 19 of the constitution (i.e. simple majority), without 
application of Section 20, as these conventions are void of any politico-constitutional importance. 
g. Procedures for adoption in Denmark 
The Danish Constitution and legal tradition with respect to international law is dualist. Pursuant to 
Section 19 of the constitution, the King (Government) negotiates and ratifies international treaties. 
The consent of the Folketing — given as a Folketing resolution or in form of a Bill — is required in all 
important cases. 
The implementation of treaties is generally subject to specific legislation in case, first of all, a Bill 
pursuant to Section 20 of the constitution. 
A Bill containing the Folketing's consent to ratification pursuant to Section 19 of the constitution and 
provisions for transfer of powers pursuant to Section 20 would be introduced by the Government. 
The Draft Treaty on the European Union obviously amends the basic EC Treaties and the Danish 
authorities are therefore obliged — on top of their own constitutional procedures — to follow the 
rules laid down in Article 236 (EEC) (and the equivalent Articles in the other Treaties). Only after 
completion of such procedures could a Bill properly be introduced nationally. 
A private member of the Folketing could introduce the drafr by a forespørgselsdebat (questions to the 
Government with a formal debate). At the end of this debate a formal motion may be adopted which 
could express the opinion of the Folketing with respect to the draft and request the Government to 
submit a Bill as described above. 
h. Summary and conclusions 
Denmark's approval of the Draft Treaty establishing a European Union would have to be made 
either through an amendment to the constitution or by a Bill adopted in accordance with the special 
procedure in Section 20 of the constitution governing transfer of powers from Danish to internat-
ional authorities. 
The procedure for a constitutional amendment being very difficult and time-consuming, the focus of 
interest lies in examining the possibility of adhering to the Draft Treaty by way of a Bill pursuant to 
Section 20 of the constitution. This procedure requires either a five-sixths majority in the Folketing 
or a simple majority coupled with a referendum. 
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The Draft Treaty sometimes uses vety broad language open to differing interpretations. The findings 
of this report are therefore subject to a number of reservations regarding the interpretations of the 
draft. 
The power of the European Council to transfer matters of cooperation to matters of common action 
is difficult to comply with under the terms of Section 20 of the constitution and will probably require 
an amendment to the constitution unless decisions by the European Council to transfer matters of 
cooperation to matters of common action are taken by unanimity. 
The enlarged competence of the Union ratione materiae is in principle compatible with Section 20 of 
the constitution. However, a number of clarifications in the text as to the extent of the new compe-
tences should be made prior to any Danish accession in order to comply with the requirement of Sec-
tion 20 that powers may only be transferred to such extent as shall be provided by statute pursuant 
to Section 20. 
Pending clarifications, it might be that at least one substantive provision of the constitution which 
reserves certain jobs in the public administration for Danish nationals would have to be amended by 
the procedure for constitutional amendments. 
The explicit provisions regarding the supremacy of Union law would most likely not give rise to new 
constitutional problems in Denmark because it is unlikely that a conflict between the fundamental 
rights of the Danish Constitution and the fundamental rights protected by the Union would occur. 
The composition and voting rules for the Parliament and the Union Council gives the smaller Mem-
ber States a representation which is less than in a fully-fledged federal State, and which could become 
even smaller if an organic law redistributed the seats in Parliament. A discussion in Denmark with 
respect to 'fair' representation, as required by Section 20 of the constitution, may be expected. 
The legal instruments available to the European Council in matters of cooperation are not clearly 
defined. A clarification may be necessary to comply with Section 20 of the constitution. 
The combined effect of all the changes contained in the Draft Treaty might be considered to be of 
such politico-constitutional importance that a constitutional amendment rather than a Bill pursuant 
to Section 20 would be considered the most correct solution, but such an interpretation is probably 
not necessary from a legal point of view. 
2. The Draft Treaty establishing a 
European Union and the political parties 
a. The Danish political parties 
The following parties are represented in the Folketing using the traditional yet sometimes erroneous 
left/right order: 
Venstresocialisterne (Leftist Socialists) 5 
Socialistisk Folkeparti (People's Socialist Party) 21 
Socialdemokratiet (Social-Democratic Party) 57 
(S) Det radikale Venstre (the Radical Party) 10 
(G) Kristeligt Folkeparti (Christian People's Party) 5 
(G) Centrumsdemokraterne (the Centre-Democrats) 8 
(G) Venstre (the Liberal Party) 23 
(G) Det konservative Folkeparti (the Conservative People's Party) 42 
(S) De frie Demokrater (the Free Democrats) 1 
Fremskridtspartiet (the Progress Party) 5 
Outside the parties (the Faeroe Islands and Greenland) 2 
Total 179 
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The four parties with a (G) added form the Government. The two parties with an (S) added in gen-
eral support the Government on domestic issues. This block has a practical majority, as the two 
members outside the parties will not both vote against the Government on a critical issue. 
The list shows that Denmark is blessed with numerous parties. We shall in the following concentrate 
on the four most important parties, which for our purpose are the Social-Democratic Party, the 
Radical Party, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party. 
b. The Folketing debate on EC questions in May 1984 
In May 1984, the two left-wing Socialist parties in the Folketing requested a debate on the following 
questions to the Government: 
'Will the Foreign Minister inform the Folketing of the Government's position on the EC policy for 
the next five years including the future financing of the EC, the plans for a Union, plans for incor-
porating new areas, such as security and culture under EC cooperation, the relation between the 
institutions and the safeguarding of the right of veto.' 
The question was part of the campaign prior to the elections to the European Parliament, and its for-
mulation gives an indication of the issues which the anti-EC parties wanted to become central in the 
campaign. 
The answer of the Foreign Minister centred on the budgetary problems and the need to develop new 
common policies for industry, technology, research and development and energy. To the Minister, 
common actions in these fields: 
'should be the centre of gravity in discussions on the future of the EC rather than long-term plans 
for a European Union, like the Draft Treaty establishing a European Union proposed by the 
European Parliament. . . Obviously, there is always room for improvements and one may always 
find some grounds for criticism, but the crux of the matter is that by and large EC cooperation is 
functioning in a way which is satisfactory and which is beneficial to Denmark.' 
This approach similarly indicates how the four governmental parties wished to focus the debate prior 
to the European elections. 
In the debate the two left-wing Socialist parties proposed a motion which was clearly designed to 
appeal to the anti-EC part of the Social-Democratic and Radical electorate. However, these two par-
ties proposed their own motion with the following text: 
'The Folketing decides, that the conservation of the right of veto and the maintenance of the dis-
tribution of powers between the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the European Parlia-
ment is the basis for Denmark's membership of the EC. 
The Folketing consequently rejects the Draft Treaty establishing a European Union as proposed 
by the European Parliament.' 
(The motion included another paragraph on the substantive EC cooperation.) 
The adoption of this motion would in all likelihood have been secured by the two left-wing Socialist 
parties once their own motion had been defeated. In this situation the four parties in Government 
chose to vote in favour of the motion. 
The fotmal Danish position on the Draft Treaty is thus quite clear. The draft is unequivocally rejec-
ted by both the opposition and the Government. 
The most fundamental issue related to the European Union is no doubt the question of the 
approach. With the possible exception of the Centre-Democrats all pro-EC Danish parties are clearly 
functionalists. In their view, the best and in fact only possible way towards a Union is to make new 
common policies and strengthen the existing ones. Such endeavours are supported by all major parti-
es. We would suggest that in this respect Danish political parties are as integrationist as parties in 
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most other Member States. Increases in the 'own resources' of the Community to this end are also 
favoured by the major parties. This is not to suggest that proposals to this end would always be 
favoured blindly. Special national interests as well as party interests may of course call for special 
positions. The fundamental point, however, remains that there is a genetal consensus among the 
major political parties in Denmark that new policies in the central areas of EC cooperation are both 
desirable and necessary, and that Denmark as a small State is vitally dependent on the successful out-
come of such policies. 
As regards the institutional set-up a broad consensus likewise exists among Danish political parties 
that the existing Treaties must remain the centre and basis for a Union to come. 
It is a very widespread feeling among Danish politicians that progress in the essential fields of techno-
logy and industrial policy, energy policy and economic cooperation has in fact been prevented to a 
large extent by some of the same Governments to whom this lack of progress is taken as a proof of 
the need for a major institutional reform. In this Danish view organs like those proposed by the draft 
will meet the same resistance as the existing institutions have met and will consequently be unable to 
adopt — or even worse — to ensure enforcement by the Member States of programmes which these 
Member States have so far persistently been determined to oppose. 
Major institutional reforms would therefore be a greater danger to the political authority of the 
institutions than the present too-slow decision-making process. 
It is obvious that the Draft Treaty presented by the European Parliament, with its strong emphasis 
on revising the institutions and the fundamental absence of any attempt to define the future common 
policies, must be felt as problematic and counterproductive by the major Danish political parties. 
The interventions by the Foreign Minister and the various spokesmen of the political parties in the 
Folketing debate referred to above confirms this. With the exception of the Centre-Democrats the 
Government parties were clearly embarrassed by the draft which 'is a matter for our children to 
decide upon once they grow up' as the spokesman for the Liberal Party put it. Any identification with 
the draft was clearly seen as unhelpful in the general contest for seats in the European Parliament. To 
the Social-Democrats and Radicals a firm rejection of the Union was undoubtedly a way to appeal to 
that part of their electorates to whom the EC membership is disagreeable. 
The Folketing motion of May 1984 certainly is a true reflection of the fundamental and contempor-
ary Danish position with respect to the Draft Treaty. We would, however, suggest that the motion 
does not give a nuanced picture of the position of the political parties voting in favour of the motion. 
Certain features of the Danish political scene, which we shall examine below, may explain why. 
c. The fundamentals of Danish politics in 
EC matters 
It is the rule and not the exception that Danish Governmments are minority Governments. Danish 
domestic politics are therefore based on short-term political alliances. In foreign policy — including 
EC policy — the major parties have, however, traditionally maintained a more or less permanent 
alliance. Danish foreign policy has in this way largely been unaffected by any domestic instability. 
This alliance implies that even in opposition the alliance parties exercise influence on Danish foreign 
policy. It also means that while in opposition the parties cannot — as in most other countries — 
exploit their lack of responsibility to recapture votes lost due to foreign-policy decisions. 
Over the last years serious rifts have shown in the alliance on external policy between the Social-
Democratic Party and the Government. This is not the place to analyse these rifts. Below we shall 
provide some information on the reasons for the rifts with respect to EC matters. Here we would 
only stress that the parties of the present Government for want of any real alternatives have accepted 
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a number of foreign policy motions by the Folketing which were clearly not to their liking. In other 
words, the nuances of opinion among the major political parties may not always be deduced from 
the Folketing motions under the circumstances prevailing in Danish political life. This is in particular 
so with respect to the Liberal and Conservative Parties, to whom no viable alternative to the big 
foreign-policy alliance has existed so far. Thus, the two non-Socialist Governments which have been 
in existence since 1973 have both had to accept Folketing motions stating that they did in fact con-
tinue the very same policy that their Social-Democratic predecessors pursued. 
The vulnerable position of the Social-Democratic and Radical Parties 
The problems facing these two parties with respect to the EC may be clearly seen from the following 
comparison of the results of the most recent elections to the Folketing and to the European Parlia-
ment: 
Leftist Socialists 
People's Socialist Party 
Other small anti-EC Parties 
Popular movement against the EC 
Total anti-EC votes 
Social-Democratic Party 
Radical Party 
The four parties in Government 
Free Democrats and Progress Party 


























The table shows that the pro-EC parties continue to dominate in the Folketing, having 83.8 % of the 
votes. However, the anti-EC share of the electorate is roughly one third of the total electorate, 
which, incidentally, is almost the same as in the 1972 referendum on Danish membership of the EC. 
The discrepancy between the electorate and the Folketing in EC matters is, however, not evenly dis-
tributed among the parties. On the contrary, it is concentrated in the two parties that moved the 
motion adopted in the Folketing in May 1984, i.e. the Social-Democratic and the Radical Parties. 
These two parties are obviously in a vulnerable position on EC issues, having an important fraction 
of their electorate disagreeing with the policy of the party. They are therefore — particularly while in 
opposition — focusing their concern on how to maintain and (re)establish the appeal to their elec-
torate. 
d. The differences among the major political parties 
While Folketing debates tend to focus on points of agreement in order to continue the big foreign-
policy alliance, the elections to the European Parliament necessarily involve a certain focusing on 
party differences. The various election manifestos adopted prior to the European elections bear wit-
ness to this. 
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The Liberal Party 
The Liberal Party manifesto for the European elections adheres to the general Danish consensus by 
stressing that the Party is basing its policy on the Treaty of Rome. However, it goes on to say that the 
Liberals accept Treaty amendments which strengthen the ability of the EC to act with respect to 
problems where common action yields the best results. According to the manifesto, the national con-
flicts in the Council of Ministers are increasingly harmful to Community interests. The manifesto 
suggests strengthening the role of the Commission to counteract this development. The right of veto 
is in this way maintained, though the manifesto explicitly proposes abolishing the widespread misuse 
of this right. 
The Liberals favour an increased influence for the European Parliament. This should be achieved on 
the basis of the existing Treaties by way of inter-institutional agreements. It is suggested that the 
European Parliament, in this way, should be given the right of veto against proposals from the Com-
mission. 
The Liberals are also in favour of closer coordination between EPC and Treaty cooperation. In par-
ticular, the Parliament should be more actively integrated with EPC. Such closer coordination bet-
ween Treaty cooperation and EPC should give the Community a possibility to speak and act on 
behalf of the Member States in otder to increase the EC influence on international peace and secur-
ity. 
While defence matters should be left to NATO, European security arrangements should be dealt 
with in EPC. 
The Liberal manifesto also speaks out in favour of a generally stronger involvement of the EC in 
education and culture, and calls for special Community initiatives in the field of education, in parti-
cular with respect to vocational training.' 
It should be stressed, however, that the major part of the Liberal manifesto is devoted to the policies 
to be pursued by the EC. The institutional sections of the manifesto are, however, important and are 
— in contrast to those of other parties — put in the beginning of the manifesto. It may easily be seen 
that the Liberal manifesto in form and to a certain extent also in substance differs in tone and content 
from the Folketing motion of May 1984, though it remains within its broad consensus as far as the 
Union is concerned. 
The Conservative Party 
The Conservative approach to the institutional questions is more prudent than the Liberal. The 
Draft Treaty is diplomatically but firmly rejected by a repudiation of 'artificial new modes of co-
operation which do not enjoy any popular support and which are therefore endangering the steady 
but slow progress of the Community'. In the Conservative view, the existing Treaties are a sufficient 
basis for cooperation, though it is emphasized that they should be used in a more complete way. 
Also, the Conservatives favour strengthening the role of the Parliament, but they, in fact, only envi-
sage a larger controlling function for the Parliament. 
While the Conservatives also favour increased cooperation with respect to education, they note that 
the subject falls outside the Treaty, and they do not call explicitly for cooperation to take place with-
in the Community institutions. 
The Conservatives differ from the Liberals as to security policy, which in the Conservative view 
should be dealt with in NATO. 
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The Radical Party 
Compared to the two foregoing manifestos, the Radical manifesto is quite defensive in its approach. 
All institutional developments and increases in competence are rejected, and the importance of sep-
arating Treaty cooperation from cooperation outside the Treaty is strongly emphasized. A political 
or military union is specifically rejected, as is an economic and monetary union. The right of veto is 
strongly stressed. 
The Radicals do not foresee any increased role for the European Parliament, and the democratic con-
trol of the Community must lie with the national Parliaments, according to this party. 
The Social-Democratic Party 
The Social-Democratic manifesto outlines the policies which the party will support in the EC. In a 
second paragraph the manifesto undertakes to oppose inter alia: 
(i) changes in the competence of the institutions; 
(ii) any erosion in the right of veto; 
(iii) any granting of rights to the European Parliament in matters of security and defence; 
(iv) the inclusion of education and culture under Treaty cooperation. 
It is obvious that the Social-Democratic manifesto — like the Radical — is designed to appease the 
important fraction of the party electorate which is critical of the EC. The rather poor showing of the 
Social-Democratic Party in the European elections is, however, sometimes explained exactly as a 
consequence of the lack of a clear profile in an election where a number of other parties both to the 
left and to the right could be either for or against further integration. In an attempt to try to clarify 
the party's policy the Social-Democrats have recently established a committee to study the role of 
Denmark in Europe and of Europe in the world. It will no doubt be of vital importance to the party, 
as well as to Danish policy vis-à-vis the EC, what this committee may achieve. 
e. Summary and conclusions 
All leading Danish parties have in a Folketing motion rejected the Draft Treaty proposed by the 
European Parliament. 
This rejection is an expression of a broad consensus on the approach to the European Union. The 
steady but slow progress of the Community is preferred to great leaps forward which cannot be 
implemented for want of popular support. 
The centre of gravity in discussions on the future development of the Community towards a Euro-
pean Union should in the view of all Danish parties be new policies in the fields of industry, techno-
logy, research and development, energy, etc. General institutional reforms are rejected by all parties 
and the right of veto is considered a necessity also in the future. 
Within this general consensus there is a clear difference between the parties with respect to smaller 
institutional amendments. This difference is often not clearly expressed, owing to the necessary 
alliance among the major parties regarding foreign policy, including EC policy. The Liberals and, to 
a lesser degree, the Conservatives are more open to such smaller reforms, while the Social-Democrats 
and the Radicals take a more defensive attitude in this respect. The Social-Democrats have, after 
their poor results in the latest European elections, set up a committee to study their position with 
respect to Europe. The outcome of this committee is difficult to forecast, yet important for the party 
and thereby for Denmark. 
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Chapter IV - The Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union: 
Report on the Federal Republic of Germany 
by Carl Otto Lenz 
1. Constitutional questions 
a. The ratification process 
The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, is, in the terminology of the Basic Law, a treaty 
'with foreign States'. It is therefore to be concluded by the federal President (Art. 59.1). To be valid, 
the relevant act of the federal President requires a counter-signature by the federal Chancellor or the 
appropriate federal Minister (Art. 58.1). From these provisions, and from their position in Section 5 
of the Basic Law, headed 'the Federal President', one may conclude that not only the competence to 
conclude treaties, but also the preparation of the conclusion of the treaty, is a matter for the execu-
tive, i.e. for the federal Government, responsible to Parliament. 
Since the draft regulates the political relationships of the federation, and furthermore relates to 
objects of federal legislation, it requires the agreement or collaboration of the bodies competent for 
federal legislation, in the form of a federal law. This means that the federal Government must first 
submit the draft to the 'Bundesrat', in the usual procedure. The 'Bundestag' and 'Bundesrat' may of 
course call upon the Government to bring the Draft Treaty before them for debate, but this call does 
not teplace submission by the federal Government. The draft goes back with the Bundesrats opinion 
to the federal Government, which has a chance to comment on the opinion. It then goes to the Bun-
destag for the so-called First Reading, in which the federal Government and spokesmen for the par-
liamentary groups would set out their basic attitude towards the Treaty. It is then referred to the 
commitees; it may be taken that the Foreign Affairs Committee will draw up the decisive report for 
the Bundestag, while a dozen or so other committees will be called on to give opinions to the Foreign 
Affairs Committee (so-called joint consultation). A special problem is presented by the participation 
of the Europe Committee, which the Bundestag has formed. This committee, consisting half of Ger-
man Bundestag members and half of German Members of the European Parliament, was set up in 
1983 to advise the German Bundestag on fundamental questions of European policy. According to 
the procedure developed for this matter, the relevant report of the Europe Committee would go not 
to the full House, but only to the Foreign Affairs Committee, which is competent, and to certain 
other committees for joint consultation. The Europe Committee would thus not be on the same level 
as the classical committees of the German Bundestag, but subordinate to them ; nevertheless, through 
it there would be a possibility of letting the views of German members active in the European Parlia-
ment be included in the discussions. 
On the basis of the Foreign Affairs Committee's report containing the opinions of the other consulta-
tive committees and the result of the consultations on the views of the Europe Committee, the second 
(and last) debate in the German Bundestag on the law agreeing to the Draft Treaty would be held. 
No motions for amendments to the Draft Treaty are admissible. The Draft Treaty may only be 
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accepted in toto, or rejected. If the act of acceptance is adopted, it is transmitted to the Bundesrat. 
The act of acceptance is passed if the Bundesrat consents to it or another of the conditions laid down 
in Article 78 of the Basic Law is met. It is not passed if an objection by the Bundesrat is not overrid-
den by the Bundestag, or if necessary consent is not secured. Going into detail here would exceed the 
bounds of this paper. If the act of acceptance is passed according to these provisions, it is then, after 
counter-signature by the appropriate members of the federal Government, signed by the federal Pre-
sident and published in the Federal Law Gazette. 
Summarizing, it may be said that the joint action of the federal Government, Bundestag, Bundesrat 
and federal President is necessary to pass an act of acceptance of the Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union. 
b. Is amendment of the Basic Law necessary 
in order to implement the Treaty 
in the Federal Republic of Germany? 
Preliminary remarks 
The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany is a very pro-integration constitution. Even the 
Preamble states that 'the German People' is 'animated by the resolve . . . to serve the peace of the 
world as an equal partner in a united Europe'. Again, Article 24 says that the Federation may by 
legislation transfer sovereign powers to inter-governmental institutions, may enter a system of 
mutual collective security for the maintenance of peace, and in doing so will consent to limitations 
upon its rights to sovereignty. 
The text of the Preamble, which designates equal partnership of the Federal Republic of Germany 
in a united Europe as the appropriate form of the promotion of peace expected of the Federal 
Republic, constitutes not only an encouragement but also an empowerment for the federal Govern-
ment, Bundestag and Bundesrat to advance along the path towards the unification of Europe, inso-
far as the goals of the Draft Treaty do not contradict those of the Basic Law. On a reading of the 
relevant articles of the Basic Law, particularly the Preamble ('to serve the peace of the world'), 
Article 1.2 (human rights as the basis of peace), Article 9.2 (ban on associations directed against 
the concept of international understanding), Article 24.2 (maintenance of peace through entering a 
system of mutual collective security), Article 24.3 (peaceful settlement of disputes between States), 
Article 26 (ban on acts tending to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, Government 
responsiblity for armaments production), Article 87a (armed forces only 'for defence') and the cor-
responding provisions of the Draft Treaty: Preamble ('resolved to strengthen and preserve peace and 
liberty by an ever closer union'), Article 9, 3rd and 4th indents, Article 63.1 and 63.2, the similarity 
of objectives and of language leaps to the eye. From the viewpoint of promoting peace, then, the 
Basic Law and the Draft Treaty are not in contradiction. 
The Draft Treaty and German unity 
The Draft Treaty does not contradict the duty of the constitutional bodies of the Federal Republic of 
Germany to maintain the national and political unity of the German people and to achieve the unity 
and freedom of Germany in free self-determination, nor does it withdraw this obligation from them. 
The existing legal position is to that extent maintained, in particular Article 7 of the Germany Treaty 
of 1952, whereby the three Western occupying powers undertake to support the reunification of the 
Germans in a democratic State. Britain and France are co-signatories ofthat Treaty, and at the same 
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time members of the European Communities. The other Member States have, to the extent that they 
belong to the North Atlantic Alliance, joined in assuming these obligations.' 
Ratification of the Draft Treaty would presumably not change anything in this legal position. There 
are, however, voices in the Federal Republic of Germany calling for this aspect to be incorporated in 
the Draft Treaty. 
Transfer of sovereignty 
Article 24 empowers the Federation to transfer the exercise of individual sovereign powers by mere 
federal legislation, but does not allow abandonment of the Federal Republic of Germany's existence 
as a State in favour of a European State. It is true that the Draft Treaty provides for the transfer of 
far-reaching powers in important areas of national life to the European Union, within the limits pro-
vided therein and according to the procedures provided for. That this would end the member's exis-
tence as States is, however, neither deducible from the text nor the declared intention of its authors. 
A far-reaching transfer of powers ought, however, in view of the Basic Law's attitude towards 
European unification, seeing the Federal Republic as an equal partner in a united Europe, to be cove-
red by Article 24, which except for the inadmissibility of transferring the core of State power, con-
tains no other limitations in its wording. 
The same conclusion is arrived at by Everling,' Hilf and Schwarze.' Moreover, the Draft Treaty 
allows the Member States, as such, far-reaching participation through the European Council and 
through the Council of the Union within the framework of the European Union. In the case of, for 
instance, the formation of the Commission, these go beyond the rights allowed the Bundesrat in the 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Again, the area of direct control by the European 
Union seems not to go beyond the stage already reached in the European Communities: the Europ-
ean Union will have specific administrative competence in the coal and steel, agriculture and com-
petition sectors, while all other administration will, as before, continue to lie in the hands of the 
Member States. 
On the whole, then, the advancement and intensification of European integration provided for in the 
Draft Treaty can be seen as integration maintaining the existence as States of the Member States and 
therefore also of the Federal Republic of Germany. Moreover, the fundamental structures of the 
Federal Republic of Germany ought not to be affected, since this is not possible even by a law amend-
ing the constitution (Art. 79.3). Here, however, the finding must be that the structures of the 
European Union not only do not contradict those of the Basic Law, but largely correspond to them. 
This is true as regards both the promotion of peace and respect for human rights (Preamble and 
Article 1 of the Basic Law, 3rd indent of the Preamble and Article 4 of the Draft Treaty). Likewise, 
the precept of democracy is further realized than the extent hitherto achieved in the European Com-
munities (see Article 20.1 and 20.2 of the Basic Law, Articles 14-19 of the Draft Treaty). The same 
is true for the principle of the social State (Article 20.1 of the Basic Law). Again, the principle of con-
stitutionality, or, better, the rule of law and judicial control (Articles 19.4, 20.1 and 20. 3 of the 
Basic Law) has its correspondence in the Draft Treaty (Preamble, 3rd indent, and Articles 41-44). 
The idea of division of powers, too, both between legislature, executive and judiciary and between 
Union and Member States, is reflected in the Draft Treaty (see, in particular, Part 3 (Institutional 
provisions), and Part 2 (The objectives, methods of action and competences of the Union), Articles 
9-13, which deal in particular with delimiting the powers of the Union and those of the Member 
See, e.g., the final communiqué of the 16th session of the North Atlantic Council in Paris, 9-11. 5. 1955, when rhe Federal 
Republic of Germany took part for the first time; Europe-Archive, 1955, p. 7927, and finally, the Washington Declaration of 
the North Atlantic Council of 31. 5. 1984, point 7, Federal Government Bulletin, 1984, No 65, p. 574. 
integration, 1/84 at pp. 12-23, esp. p. 15. 
Eine Verfassung für Europa, (Schwarze and Bieber eds), 1984, pp. 265, 32 et seq. 
211 
States). The principle of the federal State is likewise maintained. It is not impossible that some 
powers of the Union will detract from those of the Länder, but in this context one can hardly speak 
of a 'voiding of the Lander's existence as States'/ It has already been pointed out that the application 
of Union law remains overwhelmingly a matter for the Membet States and therefore, in accordance 
with the distribution of powers pursuant to Articles 30, 83 et seq. of the Basic Law, largely a matter 
for the Bundesländer. 
c. Conclusion 
From the viewpoint of the Basic Law, no constitutional objections to the overall conception of the 
Draft Treaty or the main features of its elaboration can be raised. 
2. Prospects for the Draft Treaty 
The Draft Treaty's prospects of becoming law naturally depend on the attitude of important political 
and social groups. These can at the moment be described as follows: 
a. Parliaments and parties 
Members of the European Parliament 
The German Members of the European Parliament have taken the following positions on the Draft 
Treaty: 
(i) The German Members of the European Parliament, like those of Italy, Belgium and the Nether-
lands, have agreed to the Draft Treaty by a large majority. To be sure, in the German delegation, 
too, consent declined between the first and second votes. Though the CDU/CSU managed to 
raise the number of ayes by two, so that 37 out of 42 CDU/CSU members voted for the draft, in 
the second vote, of the SPD members 20 voted aye ( - 8), none voted no, and 5 abstained ( + 3). 
In the FDP too, the number of ayes fell from 4 in the first to 2 in the second vote. 
(ii) The Bundestag has had two debates on the Draft Treaty. The following picture can be drawn 
from this: 
All groups in the German Bundestag, including the Greens, have welcomed the Draft Treaty and 
referred it to the committees, with instructions to deliver the opinion asked for by the European 
Parliament within one year; i.e., the German Bundestag is prepared to enter into the debate on 
the Draft Treaty and not put the matter in the pending file. According to Bundestagspräsident 
Jenninger, the Bundestag will come to a positive conclusion.5 
The German Bundestag has held two debates on the Draft Treaty; moreover, the group leaders 
have dealt with the topic, in response to the enquiries by the Association of Former PÒWs and 
the 'Europa Union'. The positions of parliamentary groups apparent from this can be summari-
zed as follows: 
CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP welcomed the European Parliament's initiative, without dwelling in 
detail on the Draft Treaty. The representatives of the Greens, too, welcomed the debate on the 
Draft Treaty, but 'because it gives a chance to sound the alarm publicly' they want to 'engage in a 
constitutional debate only once the time is ripe for introducing the counter-model to the present 
Tomuschat, Commentary on the Bonn Basic Law, Article 24, No 68 a. 
See speech by Dr Jenninger at the convention of the Union of European federalisms and the Europa Union, in Cologne on 9.12. 
1984 Bulletin of the Fed. Gov't's Press and Information Office, 14. 12. 1984, p. 1363. 
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European Community'.' Similar statements were made in the Bundestag debate on 7 July 1984 
and on 7 December 1984. 
Minister for State Mertes has declared on behalf of the federal Government, without prejudicing any 
later detailed opinion, that he 'finds a number of important principles of our own Europe policy in 
the European Parliament's Draft Treaty.7 
In view of this basically positive attitude on the part of federal Government and the groups that have 
Government experience, it can be reckoned that any difficulties in the parliamentary debate, which 
can never be ruled out, would be overcome to result in a positive opinion from the Bundestag. 
The same may also be assumed of the Bunderat, since the German people would fail to understand 






























35 (28 + 7) 










































CDU: Christian Democratic Union. 
CSU: Christian Social Union. 
FDP: Free Democratic Party. 
SPD: Social Democratic Party of Germany. 
Criticism of the Draft Treaty 
This report would, however, be incomplete if it did not cite a few critical voices. The Draft Treaty 
did not play the role in the European election campaign that its authors had wished. The view has 
even occasionally been put forward that Europe's problems cannot be solved by 'grand political pro-
jects'. In the period leading up to the elections, there were critical voices in the press about the 
European Parliament. Of many examples I shall quote only two: 'Imagine there's an election and 
nobody goes' [Stern, 14 June 1984) and 'I am not going to vote today' ( Welt am Sonntag, 17 June 
1984). It would be astonishing if the authors of these articles showed any more sympathy for the 
European Parliament's Draft Treaty than for the second direct elections to that Parliament. 
There were also critical voices from the academic community. I refer here in particular to the papers 
and discussion contributions at the international congress of the Institute for the Study of Integration 
of the Stiftung Europakolleg, held in Hamburg from 3-5 November 1983. Of many examples I shall 
quote here only Professor Werner von Simon of Freiburg. He quoted former Federal Chancellor Hel-
mut Schmidt with approval:'So we have to identify ourselves with Europe now . . . I don't believe in 
Mr Vogt, Bundestag Member for Kaiserslautern, at the 68th session of the German Bundestag, Friday, 13. 4. 1984, pp. 4788 
and 4790. 
68th session, 13. 4. 1984, p. 4791. 
Eine Verfassung für Europa, supra, at p. 98. 
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Such statements, of course, did not go unchallenged, as the report of the ensuing discussion shows/ 
But scepticism at the draft's ambitions and its chances of realization seem to me to run like a red 
thread through the whole book. 
The same is true of the contributions published in the magazine Integration (1/84) on the European 
Parliament's Draft Treaty. Here too I quote only one example: under the heading 'A European Con-
stitution for Visionaries?' Werner Weidenfeld, professor at Mainz University, writes: 'The basically 
important and good idea of working out a European constitution has been given concrete form by 
the European Parliament in a way that is questionable as regards both content and procedure'.10 
b. The attitude of public opinion in general 
The attitude of public opinion in general to the European Parliament's project for a European Union 
is hard to establish, since this question played no part in the election campaign. The problem must 
therefore be approached by roundabout ways. The Parliament's draft provides, roughly speaking, 
for the inclusion of new areas of activity among the competences of the European institutions, for 
increased recourse of majority decisions and for greater power for Parliament. Opinion surveys on 
these topics do exist. 
Firstly, on the Eutopean Parliament: in late 1983, 83% of all those questioned knew of the existence 
of the European Parliament, as against 76% in 1979, with men at 93% being almost 20% ahead of 
women, at 75%. Similar figures to those for women are recorded for people with only elementary 
education and for workers, while people with leaving certificates, civil servants and the self-empl-
oyed show figures even higher than those for men. 
The increase in familiarity has not helped, however, to improve Parliament image. The number of 
people who had a good impression of the European Parliament's work practically halved between 
1979 and 1983 (42% against 23%). The number of people with a poor impression almost tripled 
(from 10% to 29%). The number of those with no opinion remained almost constant (48% against 
46%). 
Against this background, it is hardly surprising that more than half those surveyed took the view that 
the ultimate decision should lie not with the European Parliament but with the Member State 
Governments. Nevertheless, 44% took the view that the European Parliament should take binding 
decisions for all member countries in a few important areas. The difference between men and women 
is considerable. Fifty-two percent of men are in favour of more powers for the Parliament. Forty-six 
percent wish to leave decision-making power to the governments, while 60% of women want this. 
Only 36% of women want more powers of decision for the Parliament. Against this background it is 
hardly astonishing that the majority of all those surveyed rejected an all-Furopean government 
(56%), while only something over a quarter, namely 27% were in favour. Among men the figures 
were 35% for, 50% against. Among women, rejection is more than three times as strong as agree-
ment (61% against 19%). 
In line with this is the fact that more than half of those surveyed are not prepared to accept economic 
disadvantages in order to support poorer countries in the European Community, while 46% are pre-
pared for this. Among men, the figures are equal (49% against 49%). Among women, readiness to 
accept sacrifice is smaller (44% for, 53% against). 
Id. at pp. 110-13, esp. pp. 111-12. 
Weidenfeld, 'A European Constitution for Visionaries?', Integration, 1/84 at p. 37. 
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As against this, environmental protection in Europe should where necessary be imposed compulsor-
ily. Ninety-four percent favour this, with only 5% against. There are no significant differences bet-
ween men and women here. 
As far as German reunification is concerned, some two thirds are of the opinion that Western 
European unification has no effect on this, i.e. that it neither impedes (as between 16% and 19% 
believe) nor facilitates (15%) this process. This fits in with the general picture that only 53% of the 
population regarded the European elections as very important and only 62% intended to take part. 
The actual electoral participation lay between these two figures, namely at 56.8%. 
There are, however, also figures conveying a different picture. Thus, two thirds of German feel 
themselves to be 'European', with European consciousness being especially marked among the mid-
dle age-groups, from 30 to 59. It rises with degree of education and professional qualification. 
People with leaving certificates or higher education, civil servants, the self-employed and professio-
nals feel most European. In line with this, two thirds of Germans regard membership in the Europ-
ean Community as a good thing. Only 6%, not even one tenth, regard it as a bad thing. Likewise, the 
break-up of the European Community would be explicitly regretted by 72% of those surveyed, only 
6% would welcome it and the rest are indifferent. 
These figures are based on two representative surveys carried out by the Sociological Research Insti-
tute of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in October 1983 on 2 000 and in March 1984 on 3 082 Ger-
man citizens entitled to vote. As the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung itself admits, the results are contra-
dictory. It writes: 'Against the background of large numbers of bad reports of the European 
Community . . . the image of Europe among the Federal German population in March 1984 is split. 
On the one hand, the general agreement with the European Community and identification with the 
European idea has strengthened, but on the other, in Germany too it is disappointment and 
anger . . . that determine the assessment'. The report continues: 'But these two trends are only appa-
rently contradictory. In fact, anger and disappointment at economic developments on the one hand 
seem to lead to increased support for the process of European integration on the other. The prevalent 
mood can perhaps be summed up by the slogan: "high time too!".' 
In a more recent assessment of public opinion in Germany Bundestagspräsident Philip Jenninger said 
the initiative taken by President Mitterand and Federal Chancellor Kohl had been well received by 
German public opinion and he concluded: 'This example shows us that the feeling for European 
unity is just sleeping. It is immediately revived by every concrete step in the right direction." 
In such a situation, characterized by contradiction, the future of the project will depend on the deter-
mination of the political leadership to make the European Union a reality. The Federal Government 
and the great majority of the Bundestag have never left any room for doubt that they are resolved to 
advance along this path. 
Supra, at p. 1363. Translation by the author. 
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Chapter V — Ratification and implementation 
of the Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union: constitutional and political 
implications for France1 
by Jacques Genton 
If we are to be realistic we have to admit from the start that, in France, the exercise we have been 
asked to embark upon partakes somewhat of political fantasy. The Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union does not, for all the great hopes pinned on it, inspire the interest it merits. 
The politician, however, must not take the pessimistic view: we should rather consider the matter as 
a future possibility. 
The written sources on which we have been able to draw in presenting this paper are few in number. 
They come primarily from the conclusions of the Senate and National Assembly Committees on the 
European Communities (the present writer has the honour to chair the Senate Committee), from cer-
tain answers published in the Official Journal, from the French Government, from European Parlia-
ment debates, from the campaign for the European elections held on 17 June 1984 in France, and 
from occasional articles — all too rare — in specialist publications. 
1. Constitutional aspects 
With regard to constitutional rules, the Draft Treaty raises a number of questions, to some of which 
there is as yet no clear-cut answer. 
a. The power to negotiate 
Article 52 of the French Constitution confers the power to negotiate (and ratify) international trea-
ties upon the President of the Republic. But in writing into the Draft Treaty such a novel machinery 
for its entry into force (Article 82), the European Parliament clearly wanted to get away from the 
inter-governmental negotiating procedure. 
The question then arises whether Parliament's procedure is compatible with French constitutional 
provisions concerning international treaties and agreements. Four observations may be made here: 
' Annex: Information report by the Senate Committee on the European Communities. 
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1. International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions are not drawn up within an inter-govern-
mental agency pure and simple but in the context of the ILO's tripartite conference. They are then 
submitted to national authorities for ratification. 
2. The existence, in general terms, of accession procedures whereby countries can become parties to 
an agreement without having played any part in its drafting demonstrates that negotiation and 
ratification are not inextricably linked. 
3. The conference that the President of the French Republic suggested might be convened after the 
Brussels European Summit at the end of March 1984 could, if it addressed itself to the Draft 
Treaty, constitute this inter-governmental negotiating body. It is even conceivable that the confe-
rence might consider a Draft Treaty already amended by the European Parliament to take account 
of the initial reactions of the national parliaments, according to the procedure it wished to follow; 
these amendments might be based on the comments of the national governments. 
4. Since the Fontainebleau Council (June 1984)) we have had a Committee on Institutional Affairs 
(the Dooge Committee, or 'Spaak 2') that might also constitute this inter-governmental negotiat-
ing body. It does not seem, however, that the text adopted by the Committee will be based dir-
ectly on the Union Treaty or that it will propose that it be submitted for ratification. 
b. Opinion of the French Parliament 
The second paragraph of the resolution on the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, also 
adopted on 14 February 1984, calls on the European Parliament to solicit the national parliaments' 
'opinions and comments' on the draft. 
However, since the resolution procedure has disappeared from the parliamentary system of the Fifth 
Republic, there is no means of establishing what the majority view of the Draft Treaty is in the 
National Assembly and the Senate. The question then arises how views can be formulated — even if 
they cannot be regarded as reflecting those of the French Parliament as a whole. 
There are a number of possibilities: 
(i) the conclusions of the Parliamentary Committees on the European Communities; the Senate 
Committee presented its conclusions on 5 April 1984 (No 120/84, rapporteur: Mr Noël Ber-
rier), the National Assembly Committee reporting on 5 June 1984 (No 11/84, rapporteur: Mr 
Charles Josselin, Committee Chairman); 
(ii) questions for oral answer with debate (12/13 November 1984); 
(iii) a fact-finding mission at the request of a Committee (Foreign Affairs or Legal). 
In any event, however, it will not be possible to bring these procedures to a close by means of a vote 
in open session. 
c. The test of constitutionality 
The general rule is that only laws may be referred to the Constitutional Council (Article 61 of the 
Constitution). Laws to ratify international agreements, however, are a special case: they may be exam-
ined while still at the bill stage if they involve an international commitment which might contain a 
clause contrary to the constitution (Article 54 of the Constitution). 
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In these circumstances: 
(i) if the traditional parliamentary procedure of authorizing ratification is followed (Article 53 of the 
Constitution), examining the compatibility of the Draft Treaty with the constitution carries with 
it the risk that the Constitutional Council's ruling will lead of necessity to the difficult course of 
amending the constitution (Article 54); its ruling will be binding on all concerned; 
(ii) if the referendum procedure is chosen to authorize ratification (Article 11 of the Constitution, see 
below), there would seem to be nothing to prevent the Constitutional Council from giving a rul-
ing on the consistency of the Draft Treaty with the constitution, provided that this takes place 
before the vote. 
d. Ratification by referendum 
Authorizing the ratification of the Draft Union Treaty by means of a referendum clearly falls within 
Article 11 of the Constitution. 
Legal considerations aside, politically this procedure would undoubtedly be the best way of estab-
lishing whether the French people are 'European' enough to respond to what strongly resembles a 
call from a constituent assembly. Besides, the most recent referendum organized in France was also 
on a European theme (enlargement of the Community to include the United Kingdom in 1973). 
Quite apart from the above-mentioned difficulty of testing the constitutionality of the Draft Treaty 
in advance, however, to opt for this procedure would be a politically difficult and courageous deci-
sion in view of the controversy surrounding referendums in France in the summer of 1984. 
e. Transfer of sovereignty 
The question of transferring sovereignty from the State to the Union only arises in the event — still 
highly hypothetical — of the Union Treaty actually being put into effect. 
It would seem unlikely that there should be any transfer of sovereignty immediately after ratification, 
since the general philosophy of the Treaty is that the Union will gradually become what the Member 
States in time wish it to be. 
In fact, transfer of sovereignty has already occurred under the present Treaties, not least as regards 
agriculture, transport and foreign trade, where, according to Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome (25 
March 1957), common policies were to be adopted. 
In point of fact, therefore, the question of sovereignty would arise at the time of the decision to trans-
fer it rather than at the time of ratification of the Union Treaty. 
There are three comments to be made here: 
1. In general terms, the inclusion of a new area in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union is the 
responsibility of the Union's legislative bodies (Article 11 of the Draft Treaty). Such a transfer of 
powers would be carried out on the initiative of the European Council — that is to say, repre-
sentatives of the national governments — and would therefore elude supervision by the national 
parliaments. 
2. As regards the powers of the Union in the field of taxation, the creation of new own resources 
would also be a matter for the Union's institutions. Here, too, the national parliaments, whose 
authority to raise taxes dates furthest back into history, would be deprived of it. The transfer of 
sovereignty would then be clear. 
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3. If foreign policy, and therefore defence policy, were to be placed in the hands of the Union, what 
would the national authorities have left in terms of the typical characteristics of the exercise of 
sovereignty? And France's special position as a nuclear power wishing to protect its independence 
must not be overlooked. 
These comments should be examined in the light of the decision given by the Constitutional Council 
on 30 December 1976 on the election of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. There 
the Council takes a restrictive view of the progress of European integration and implies that a 
European constitution which conferred new powers on the Union, notably in the fields of foreign 
policy or defence, would come into conflict with French constitutional requirements. 
Under Article 86 of the Draft Treaty, the Member States may not make their ratification subject to 
reservations. This binding provision will do nothing to encourage acceptance of the Treaty. 
2. Political aspects 
The least one can say, in all objectivity, is that ratification of the Union Treaty presupposes a 
remarkable change of heart not only on the part of public opinion but also among the political part-
ies. Indeed, the latter have been amazingly circumspect with regard to the draft, as though it were an 
embarrassment to them or had appeared on the scene prematurely. 
Four indicators may be used to illustrate this general impression of indifference to the European Par-
liament's draft. 
a. Voting and explanations of vote by French Members 
of the European Parliament, 14 February 1984 
In the ballot on the Draft Treaty the French Members of the European Parliament voted as follows: 
the Liberals and the EPP, plus one Socialist and one EPD member, voted in favour; the Communists 
voted against; and the Socialists, with one exception, abstained. All but one of the French members 
of the EPD took no part in the ballot. 
Some information can also be gathered from explanations of vote and earlier statements. 
1. The UDF, corresponding in part to members of the EPP ( = Centrist) and Liberal groups, came 
out in favour of the Draft Treaty, though there was some criticism of the institutional structure it 
would set up. Madame Veil, for example, saw the Treaty as an ambitious but realistic enterprise. 
Her detailed criticisms were directed inter alia at the mechanism whereby, for the ten-year transi-
tional period during which the individual Member States would have a veto within the Council, 
the right to exercise the veto would be subject to the Commission's approval. Mr Edgar Faure, in 
an interesting ex tempore speech, regretted that the draft did not go far enough: he wanted the 
Union to have an elected president from the outset. 
2. The RPR — that is, the members of the EPD group — declared its loyalty to the idea of European 
Union but challenged the institutional route chosen for bringing it about. The chairman of the 
EPD group considered the draft inappropriate, unrealistic and ill-timed; he also contested the legi-
timacy of Parliament's acting as a constitutent assembly. There may be signs already that this 
might become a highly divisive issue between the present-day opposition parties in France. 
3. The French Socialists reiterated their commitment to European integration but dismissed the 
Draft Treaty as ill-timed and irrelevant to political realities which would have to be coped with in 
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the most effective way possible. Fearing that the institutional framework was an alibi, and pre-
ferring real progress to even the noblest of ideas, the spokesman for the French Socialists asked 
that priority should be given to what was possible and mundane in Europe. The institutional 
aspect would then be the complement to, or rather the culmination of, a pragmatic approach con-
ducted with patience and tenacity. What would be the position of the Socialist Party after Mr Fran-
çois Klitterrand's statements in Strasbourg? 
4. The French Communists took the view that the present Treaties offered untapped potential and 
warned against trusting a short-lived piece of wishful thinking. Preferring purposeful pragmatism 
to an idealism deserving of respect, they wanted to see a change in policy rather than in institu-
tions (which, incidentally, represents a somewhat surprising volte face by the Communist Party 
with regard to the Treaties of Rome). 
b. The European election campaign 
of 17 June 1984 
Observers of French politics all agree that the Union Treaty was hardly mentioned by candidates for 
the European elections in June 1984. 
The ERE (Entente Radicale Ecologiste), led by Mr Doubin, Mr Stirn and Mr Lalonde, was the only 
party to make the Treaty one of the main planks in its campaign platform; its poor showing {3.3% 
of votes cast) suggests that the theme of European Union was not exactly a vote-catcher. 
Specifically European themes were, in fact, conspicuous by their absence in the European election 
campaign, except fot some of the 'minor' parties. It seemed as though the 'major' parties were pre-
occupied with the stakes of domestic politics. 
c. Speech by Mr François Mitterrand in his 
capacity as President of the European Council before 
the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 24 May 1984 
The speech delivered in Strasbourg by the President of the French Republic on 24 May 1984 was 
interpreted by many observers as a dramatic gesture of approval for the Draft Treaty. 
While this was rightly regarded as an important speech, however, it does call for a more sophistica-
ted interpretation than that — without entering into polemics. 
First of all, the President referred, in order to explain how he intended to revitalize European integra-
tion, to the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart (June 1983) and the Spinelli draft. But the objectives of 
the Stuttgart Declaration are infinitely less ambitious than those of the Draft Treaty, so there is some 
ambiguity as to the precise means of promoting the emergence of a political Europe. 
Also, Mr Mitterrand made frequent references to the existing Treaties and their untapped potential, 
thus, logically, demolishing the justification for introducing new institutional arrangements. He con-
cluded one of his bursts of oratory on institutional questions with the words: 'This is why it is vital to 
consolidate the main Treaty that binds the European countries together and constitutes their funda-
mental law — the Treaty of Rome.' 
Finally, while Mr Mitterrand may well have referred to the Draft Treaty in glowing terms, he did not 
say that he accepted it as it stood or in the immediate future. Asserting that 'a new situation calls for 
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a new treaty', he added that such a treaty 'must not, of course, be a substitute for existing treaties, 
but an extension of them to fields they do not currently cover'. Now, a careful examination of the 
Spinelli draft will make it quite clear that the institutions set up by the present Treaties could scarcely 
co-exist with those featured in the Draft Union Treaty. Besides, it is the inspiration behind the Draft 
Treaty — not the instrument itself— which, in the President's speech, suits France's purpose. France 
is prepared to set about building a political Europe, but not necessarily by the ways and means con-
tained in the Union Treaty drafted by the European Parliament. 
d. Political life since 1945 
There have been a number of constants in French political life since 1945 as regards schemes to 
advance European integration. 
Traditionally, the heirs of Gaullism are hostile to them — or in some cases merely cautious. The 
extreme Left is openly opposed to them. The Christian Democrat and Social Democrat schools of 
thought, on the other hand, are favourably disposed and have consistently demonstrated their com-
mitment to the idea of European integration. 
Paradoxically, then, we see that attitudes towards Europe do not correspond to the Left-Right split 
of French politics. This is true as between parties, and it is also true of the various tendencies within 
each party. Because views do differ inside each political grouping with regard to the European idea. 
The low turnout for polls on European issues (1972 referendum, European elections from 1979 to 
1984) is evidence that public opinion, that the French electorate, sets little store by Community 
affairs. The political parties are largely responsible for this. 
As for whether the implementation of the Treaty on European Union would lead to the emergence of 
new parties or new political alliances, it would be a risky and entirely futile undertaking to construct 
scenarios for the future on this point. 
The feeble response in France from the public and the political parties to the Draft Treaty establish-
ing a European Union, the uncertainty of its standing in French constitutional law, and the confiden-
tial proceedings at Community level of the Dooge or Spaak Committee, make it impossible to specu-
late on how much time will elapse before the ratification procedures are completed. For, while we 
must refuse to give in to pessimism, we should also be realistic. 
For the moment, a constructive approach would be to look at the actual content of the draft and exam-
ine ways of improving the institutional mechanisms involved. A number of suggestions could be 
made here. For instance, the powers of the Union could be defined more clearly, or the European 
Council could be given the right to dissolve the European Parliament. Both of the French Parlia-
mentary Committees on the European Communities have stressed these particular points. 
But it was not the purpose of this paper to go into these matters. 
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Annex 
Information report by the Senate 
Committee on the European Communities 
Senate of the French Republic: Annex to minutes of the sitting 
of 7 November 1984, Vol. II pp. 3-19, Doc. No 62 
CHAPTER ONE: Institutional affairs 
Draft Treaty establishing the European Union 
Rapporteur: Mr Noël Berrier, Senator 
The origins of the Draft Treaty 
The method of preparation selected: 
I — The new legal framework and new fields of action 
II - The new institutional balance 
III — The procedure for bringing the Treaty into force 
IV — The committee's conclusions adopted on 5 April 1984 
The patient work done by the European Parliament, at the instigation of Mr Altiero Spinelli (Communist, Italy) 
and his associates in the 'Crocodile Club', on a Draft Treaty establishing the European Union has little in com-
mon with the Solemn Declaration on European Union, the successor to the Draft European Act (the Genscher-
Colomboplan),1 signed by the Heads of State or Government in Stuttgart on 19 June 1983. 
Although the signatories to the Solemn Declaration did contemplate change — within existing rules and practices 
— the Spinelli Report is revolutionary in that it paves the way for a confederation, if not a federation of Euro-
pean States. What it is proposing is that Member States of the Community should ratify a new Treaty embodying 
a European constitution. 
The approach to the revitalization of European integration is 'constitutionalist rather than 'functionalist'; or to 
use another classic distinction, it is 'maximalist' rather than 'minimalist'. The authors of the Draft Treaty have 
abandoned the pursuit of integration through action to solve the concrete economic, monetary, financial and 
social problems confronting the Ten and believe that the establishment of a new institutional balance is the only 
way of getting Europe moving again. The Draft Treaty is not an end in itself: the hope is, rather, that by creating 
a new decision-making mechanism and outlining new fields of action, it will provide a means of creating an auth-
entic political power in Europe, the federal authority which the existing Community institutions have failed to 
become. 
Although they do not discount achievements under the Community Treaties, the authors of the Draft Treaty 
consider that the institutions set up by them have revealed their limitations and that there is therefore a need for a 
See the Committee's conclusions (No 83/82) on the report by Mr Jacques Genton. 
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new contract to redistribute power by defining the competences and institutions of the European Union. The 
European Union will not, however, be created by a radical revision of the basic Treaties. Article 7 of the Draft 
Treaty states that the Union will take over the Community patrimony: in other words the Union Treaty will not 
replace the old Treaties but will rather be additional to them. 
The origins of the Draft Treaty 
Even before the first European elections, Parliament had frequently criticized the separation of powers within the 
Community and censured the all too frequent impotence of the Council and the Member States, accusing them of 
lacking Community spirit and reducing common problems to inter-governmental agreements. The 1979 electo-
ral campaign reflected these views and certain newly-elected members, of varying nationalities and political per-
suasions, joined Mr Spinelli in preparing proposals for institutional reform. 
These led in July 1981 to the setting up of a Committee on Institutional Affairs, which was instructed to prepare 
a plan for reform to be presented to Parliament in stages. 
A year later, in July 1982, Parliament approved the initial guidelines on the reform of the treaties and the 
achievement of European Union. 
In September 1983 the work of the coordinating rapporteur and his six co-rapporteurs was presented to Parlia-
ment, which approved the content of the preliminary Draft Treaty establishing the European Union by a large 
majority. 
The draft finally completed its last stages before Parliament on 14 February 1984 with the adoption of a resolu-
tion and the actual text of the Draft Treaty, which had been prepared with the help of a committee of lawyers/ 
The method of preparation selected 
It may appear paradoxical that Parliament should have embarked on a course of institutional reform designed to 
lead to a European Union just when the Council was engaged in a similar exercise as a result of the Genscher-
Colombo initiative. 
There were two main reasons for its decision. 
The first was that the objectives were so ambitious that it seemed impossible to achieve them through mere 
reform of existing treaties and agreements. In Parliament's view, redefinition of the competences and powers of 
the institutions and establishment of an organic link between the Communities, Political Cooperation and the 
European Monetary System was so complex that a reform through amendment of the original Treaties was out 
of the question. 
The second was the gap in Parliament's legal powers, which do not allow it to exert any real influence on the 
draft texts placed before it. Amendments to the Treaties would have been made under Articles 236 EEC, 96 
ECSC and 204 Euratom, which give Parliament no powers of decision. 
It would therefore have been unable to exert any effective influence on the amendments discussed at the confe-
rence of representatives of governments of the Member States provided for in the revision procedure. It would 
have been prevented from acting by a procedure which it saw as the main reason why institutional reform had 
been blocked for more than 30 years. It preferred parliamentary debate to negotiations between national repre-
sentatives, being convinced that the inter-governmental process would be sterile and the parliamentary one fer-
tile. Both reason and necessity led to rejection of revision of the Community Treaties as the way forward: it cor-
responded neither to Parliament's objectives nor to its legal capacity. 
Buttressed by its democratic legitimacy and aware, as it said itself, of its political duty, Parliament therefore 
decided to act without reference to the Council and propose a new political entity which would encompass all 
The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union was adopted by 231 votes to 31 with 43 abstentions. French Members voted as follows: Liberais 
and EPP (centre), one Socialist and two members of the EPD (from the RPR) voted in favour, the Communists voted against and all but one of the 
Socialists abstained. Altogether 130 Members, including all but two of the French members of the EPD group, were absent when the vote was taken. 
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that the Community had achieved on the legal, political and economic fronts and develop and expand these suc-
cesses by methods of its own. 
The Draft Treaty suffers from this method of preparation. The text takes the form of an international treaty 
which has not been negotiated by governments; indeed, governments have been extraordinarily reticent about it. 
It can come into force only after ratification by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutio-
nal requirements. Clearly, Parliament has neither the legal nor the political power to establish a European Union 
by promulgating what is in fact its constitution. All it can do is propose the ratification of a treaty establishing 
the union to the Member States. 
The legal impact will therefore remain nil until national governments and parliaments espouse the political will 
of the European Parliament and, more precisely, until it has been ratified by 'a majority of the Member States of 
the Communities whose population represents two-thirds of the total population of the Communities' (Article 82 
of the Draft Treaty). 
The Draft Treaty put forward by the European Parliament is a highly ambitious proposal which constitutes a 
remarkable act of faith in the European idea. As we shall see, one of its characteristics is its internal consistency 
and the involvement of a committee of lawyers on the drafting side has certainly contributed to the high quality 
of this important text. 
During preparatory work on the Draft Treaty, certain groups in Parliament vigorously contested the undertaking 
on grounds of both timing and realism and, as can be seen from the outcome of the final vote, this came to a head 
during the debates leading to adoption of the proposal in February 1984. What matters now is to assess the cred-
ibility of the Draft Treaty. Although it sets out to be the crowning achievement of the first directly-elected Parlia-
ment, the silence with which governments have so far greeted it would indicate that they have little enthusiasm 
for this path to European Union. Indeed, to judge from the welcome which the Heads of State or Government 
gave the Genscher-Colombo draft at Stuttgart in June 1983, when they adopted a watered down version with lit-
tle binding force in a statement described as 'Solemn' but without political or practical impact, they are simply 
not ready for the great leap forward which Parliament is proposing. 
However, if we are to reach a conclusion on Parliament's ambitious proposal to the Member States, without 
going into it in too much detail, the content of the Draft Treaty must be analysed, initially by examining the new 
legal framework and the new fields of action which it advocates, then by assessing the new institutional balance it 
seeks to establish and finally by looking at the suggested procedure for bringing the European Union into being. 
I. The new legal framework and new fields of action 
The Draft Treaty challenges some of the present Community rules with the aim of furthering European integra-
tion, either through the means of action used or the fields in which action is taken. 
A. The principle of subsidiarity 
One of the principles underlying the institutional system and the separation of powers in the Union is the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity. 
The explanatory statement to the Draft Treaty defines 'subsidiarity' as the principle 'under which the Union may 
on the one hand take action only in those cases where its intervention is likely to be more beneficial than that of 
the Member States acting in isolation, and is on the other hand endowed with clear instruments and procedures 
for initiating and furthering the appropriate action in such cases.' Put more simply, this seems to mean that the 
Union will act only in those areas where common action by the Member States would be more efficient than 
separate action. This is confirmed by the last recital of the preamble, which states that the Member States intend 
'to entrust common institutions, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only with those powers requi-
red to complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfactorily than the States acting independ-
ently.' 
The Union will have two ways of carrying out these tasks and achieving these objectives: common action and 
cooperation between the Member States. 
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Common action means that all the acts of the Union (laws, implementing regulations, executive decisions, judi-
cial acts, international treaties, programmes and recommendations) will be directly applicable to and binding on 
the institutions of the Union, the Member States and their citizens, since Union law will take precedence over the 
municipal law of the Member States. 
Where cooperation applies, by contrast, decisions will be taken by the European Council (not the Commission, 
Parliament or the Council) and implemented by the Member States or the institutions of the Union, in accor-
dance with procedures laid down by the European Council. Cooperation therefore means the commitments 
undertaken by the Member States within the European Council (Article 10 of the Draft Treaty). 
The Draft Treaty specifies the areas to be subject to these methods but makes provision for the European Coun-
cil transferring matters subject to cooperation to common action. Article 11 suggests that moves could be in this 
direction only but Article 68(3) allows exceptions to the rule. 
Comments: 
We might well ask why subsidiarity was preferred to complementarity. To the authors of the Draft Treaty, subsi-
diarity appears to exclude any competition or jockeying for position between the Union and the Member States 
so that their work will be untainted by any form of rivalry. This could have been achieved by making their com-
petences and action complementary, enabling them to work together rationally and harmoniously. The notion of 
subsidiarity, by contrast, implies that some areas would be regarded as major while others would be secondary, 
playing no more than a supporting role. 
Subsidiarity is an obscure concept. It is also rather ambiguous, no doubt because of the very flexible dividing line 
between common action and cooperation, a line which the European Council would probably move, if at all in 
the direction of greater integration. 
B. The three types of competence 
In relation to common action the Union will have two types of competence, exclusive and concurrent, in applica-
tion of the principle of subsidiarity. The Draft Treaty also makes provision, though not in express terms, for 
'potential competence', in other words matters falling within the competence of the States which could be trans-
ferred to the Union. 
Where the Union has exclusive competence, only the institutions of the union, particularly the Commission, may 
act and national authorities may legislate only to the extent laid down by the law of the Union. The main areas of 
exclusive competence are the internal market and freedom of movement (Article 47), competition (Article 48) 
and commercial policy (Article 64). In these sectors the legislative authority will establish precise and binding 
timetables for the creation of a genuine internal market, as a precondition for restoring a healthy and competitive 
European economy. A further aim is to strengthen the European position in international negotiations. 
Concurrent competence means that the Member States may continue to act so long as the Union has not legisla-
ted; the Union would have the right to intervene, without displacing national competence, in areas where 
European cooperation was considered to be inadequate. For a limited time concurrent competence would be 
exercised jointly by the Member States and the institutions of the Union in agriculture, transport, telecommu-
nications, research, energy and industry (Article 53). Interventions, henceforth specified in the Treaty, could 
take a number of forms, varying from one sector to another: recommendations to the Member States, firms or 
local authorities, project financing or the setting up of specialized European agencies. 
Besides these sectoral policies, the Union would have concurrent competence for a 'policy for society', including 
social policy in the broad sense of the term, consumer policy, regional policy, environmental, education and 
research policy, and cultural and information policy (Article 55). Concurrent competence would also apply to 
conjunctural policy (Article 50) and monetary and credit policies (Article 51), with an eye to the gradual achieve-
ment of full monetary union (Article 52). This means that the Union would be entitled to oversee the monetary 
and budgetary policies of the Member States. 
What may be described as 'potential competence' covers areas which will remain within the competence of the 
Member States for the time being but which may be transferred to the exclusive or concurrent competence of the 
Union by the European Council with Parliament's approval. Initially, such areas would be managed under co-
operation pending their transfer to common action; the main areas are the international relations of the Union 
and, more particularly European security. 
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These areas deserve special mention. Title III (of Part Four) of the Draft Treaty goes into the rules governing the 
Union's international relations in some detail. These are highly representative of the possible combinations bet-
ween common action and cooperation and between exclusive and concurrent competence. 
In general, as we have seen, commercial policy would fall within the exclusive competence of the Union and 
would be dealt with by common action. Development aid would become a matter for common action after a ten-
year transitional period (Article 64). With the exception of those matters earmarked for common action, the 
Union would, subject to certain conditions, conduct its international relations under cooperation, particularly as 
far as the political and economic aspects of security are concerned. Article 68 of the Draft Treaty would allow the 
European Council, in a second phase, to extend cooperation to armaments, sales of arms to non-member States, 
defence policy and disarmament. At a later date, such matters could even be dealt with by common action, since 
the European Council may, to the extent required by the principle of subsidiarity, transfer a matter from co-
operation to common action, for an experimental period if appropriate. 
Comments: 
The separation of powers outlined in the Draft Treaty provides great flexibility; it is progressive and open to 
development. Despite the derogation in Article 68(3), it is also irreversible, since no area made part of the compe-
tence of the Union can subsequently be returned to the Member States. 
The flexibility of the system lies chiefly in the fact that it may be changed without amendment of the Treaty, that 
is to say, without a separate agreement by the Member States. The revision procedure, laid down in Article 84, is 
much more cumbersome since it requires ratification by the Member States in accordance with their respective 
constitutional procedures following approval by the two arms of the legislative authority acting in accordance 
with the procedure applicable to organic laws (i.e. by a qualified majority). The system provided by the Draft 
Treaty could, if the institutions of the Union and the European Council in particular so desired, lead to consi-
derable progress along the road to European integration. 
There is, however, some ambiguity, not to say confusion, in the mechanisms provided for in the Draft Treaty, 
since the rules are extremely precise on certain points but somewhat vague on others. This is particularly true of 
the distinction between exclusive and concurrent competence: in some cases, it is not clear which will finally 
apply-
Other areas, particularly the cultural aspects of the 'policy for society' and European security, raise the question 
of the Union's relations with the Council of Europe and the Western European Union. Although Article 65 pro-
vides for cooperation with the Council of Europe, there could be a danger of the work of the two overlapping. 
Finally, the common agricultural policy, the main stay of the acquis communautaire, has no special place in the 
draft. It is merely one of the sectoral policies listed in Article 53. 
C. The finances of the Union 
The Union will have a large degree of financial autonomy since it will be free to create new revenue or alter its 
own resources without ratification by the Member States. Initially, the Union will have the same revenue as the 
Communities, VAT revenue being calculated as a fixed percentage. New sources of revenue may be created and 
existing ones amended by means of an organic law. 
After a ten-year period, the Union may adopt framework laws on the harmonization of taxation to the extent 
necessary for the purposes of economic integration. In principle, the authorities of the Member States will collect 
revenue but this task may be transferred to the Union's own revenue-collecting authority set up by a law of the 
Union. 
The distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure will disappear and all expenditure made 
subject to the same budgetary procedure on which Parliament, acting by an absolute majority, will have the last 
word on second reading (Article 76). 
Every five years, at the beginning of each Parliamentary term, the balance between resources and requirements 
will be reviewed and resources adjusted accordingly. This multiannual financial plan, revised each year, will 
establish the probable trend of revenue and expenditure in the light, in particular, of changes in the allocation of 
tasks and financial burdens between the Union and the Member States. 
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A financial equalization system, covering both revenue and expenditure, will be introduced to alleviate excessive 
economic imbalances between the regions (Article 73). Procedures for applying the system will be laid down in 
an organic law. 
Comments: 
The Union's ability to create new own resources without reference to the national institutions is an important 
innovation and symptomatic of the considerable degree of autonomy which Parliament's draft bestows on the 
Union. 
The desire to ensure the transfer of financial resources corresponding to each transfer of competence from the 
Member States to the Union is inspired as much by logic as by wisdom. 
Particular attention should be paid to the provisions on financial programmes (Article 74), designed to spare the 
Union the financial problems currently besetting the Communities and blocking any attempt at a fresh start. It 
remains to be seen however how reliable these financial planning techniques will be and to what extent budgetary 
choices can be rationalized: national experiments in this area have not always lived up to expectations. 
D. Sanctions against the Member States 
Another important innovation which deserves a mention is the provision for sanctions against the Member States; 
there is no comparable mechanism in the Community Treaties. 
If a Member State seriously and persistently violates democratic principles, fundamental rights or the provisions 
of the Union Treaty, the European Council, following establishment of this violation by the Court of Justice at 
the request of the Commission or Parliament, and may, with the approval of Parliament, suspend rights deriving 
from the application of all or part of the Treaty provisions to the Member State in question and suspend parti-
cipation by the Member State in the institutions of the Union (Article 44). 
Comments: 
It appears that temporary exclusion would be applied in two situations: (a) a change of regime in a Member State 
whereby democratic rules and practices were no longer followed by its institutions or with regard to individuals 
and (b) failure by a Member State to meet its obligations, notably its financial obligations, to the Union. 
The first hypothesis is similar to that considered in Article 4, which deals with fundamental rights. The system of 
sanctions refers to this article, which explicitly mentions the dignity of the individual, economic, social and cultu-
ral rights and all the values which derive from the constitutions of the Member States, the European Social Char-
ter and the European Convention on Human Rights. The reference to democratic principles links up with the 
conditions for accession in Article 2, which states that only democratic European States may join the Union. 
The second hypothesis is temporary exclusion to force a Member State to meet its obligations, whether in respect 
of common policies or — and this was no doubt the primary consideration — in respect of its financial contribu-
tions to the Union budget. Aware of the Community experience, the authors of the Draft Treaty wished to 
ensure that the integration process would not be blocked by budgetary disputes, even though sanctions are sub-
ject to very strict conditions, namely 'serious and persistent' violations of the Treaty by a Member State. 
This comparatively onerous provision, which was absent from the Community Treaties, could be a useful way of 
preventing default by the Member States and ensuring trouble-free operation of the Union. 
It can be seen that the competences of the Union are very broad. But they will extend no further than the Member 
States wish, since both the new legal framework and the areas of Union intervention are flexible and open to 
development. 
The Draft Treaty takes over rather than discards the acquis communautaire by bringing extensive fields of action 
under the authority of the Union. The listing of these sectors in the Treaty is an innovation, since some of the 
Community's policies and actions are now carried out on the fringes of the existing Treaties. 
The Union would thus exercise the existing competences of the Community in the fields covered by common 
policies. Its new competences will cover both economic and social matters, notably the achievement of monetary 
union by a suitable institutional method, a 'policy for society' with a wide range of components, and internatio-
nal relations, which will be integrated into the Union's own activities, gradually developing into a common for-
eign policy far removed from the political cooperation between foreign ministers that we are familiar with today. 
As already stated, the political and economic aspects of European security will be dealt with by cooperation but 
other facets of security could be handled by the institutions of the Union acting on a decision of the European 
Council. Hence, without resorting to the comparatively cumbersome procedure for amending the Treaty, the 
Union will be a political structure with the Treaty as its constitution, capable of accomodating all aspects of 
foreign policy and security of concern to all the peoples of the Union. 
This is not the least important of Parliament's aims in advocating this reform. 
II. The new institutional balance 
While the new legal framework and the new fields of action of the Union are intended to deepen and broaden 
Europe, an integration, the new institutional balance proposed in the Draft Treaty should do away with bottle-
necks and facilitate decision-making by the institutions of the Union. The institution which gains most from this 
new institutional balance is the European Parliament. 
The authors of the Draft Treaty set out to strengthen institutional democracy and increase institutional effic-
iency. The existing institutions of the Community would be retained but their competences and modus operandi 
would change considerably. The Council would no longer be the sole legislative body and the directly-elected 
Parliament would have joint decision-making power in all the areas of Union competence. Its powers, at present 
limited to the budgetary aspects of decisions, would increase considerably. The Commission, whose position in 
the institutional system is strengthened by the Draft Treaty, would have executive power. 
A. The European Parliament 
Parliament is the first of the institutions of the Union to be mentioned. In name as well as composition it will 
remain the Parliament of the European Communities pending adoption of an organic law to bring in a uniform 
electoral procedure. 
Parliament, like the Council, will become, a fully-fledged legislative body and so take on the attributes of a classi-
cal parliamentary assembly both in terms of powers and practices. Parliament, like the Council and the Commis-
sion, will have the right to initiate legislation. It will give a first reading to all draft laws, which it will consider in 
a manner spelled out in the Draft Treaty (see below). 
The Parliament of the Union, like that of the Communities, will adopt the budget jointly with the Council 
according to a procedure which is just as complex as that used at the moment. However, as with legislation, the 
aim here is to prevent bottlenecks and encourage the institutions to reach a decision (see below). Parliament will 
also have the power to ratify treaties, to conduct investigations and to receive petitions addressed to it by citizens 
of the Union. 
The Council will constitute one arm, and Parliament the other arm, of the legislative and budgetary authority of 
the Union. In addition Parliament will have greater political control over the Commission because, in addition to 
its present power of censure it will have power of investiture, enabling the Commission to take office following 
approval of its programme. 
Comments: 
The Parliament of the Union will differ from the Parliament of the Communities in its attributions (complete 
legislative power and greater political control over the Commission) rather than in its rules of procedure (length 
of term, majorities, etc.). Here too the Draft Treaty is very flexible and open to development since it leaves the 
Union considerable scope to shape its own institutions by specifying that amendments or additions (electoral 
system, investigative powers, petitions) can be laid down in an organic law, that is, with no need to resort to the 
much more cumbersome and restrictive revision procedure. The same could well apply to the Statute of Members 
of Parliament, on which the Draft Treaty is silent. 
A more fundamental question is whether the very wide powers conferred on Parliament should not be balanced 
by the possibility of dissolution. It is difficult to see which institution other than the European Council could dis-
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solve Parliament. In the dyarchy set up by the Draft Treaty, Parliament representing a 'House of the People' and 
the Council a 'Council of States' with no real power of political control, there is a considerable danger of the 
smooth functioning of the Union being disrupted by an all-powerful Parliament. 
The Draft Treaty refers only to Parliament's relations with national parliaments. The present treaties go no fur-
ther into this aspect. Indeed, it is practice, encouraged by parliamentary leaders, which has led to informal rela-
tions being established with national parliaments. The Draft Treaty could have institutionalized procedures for 
consultation and maintaining contacts. Without them the European Parliament runs the risk of isolation to its 
own cost, and to the detriment of an understanding of national and European problems by parliamentarians in 
general. 
B. The Council of the Union 
The second arm of the legislative authority, now called the 'Council of the Union' instead of the 'Council of 
Ministers', loses many of its powers to the other institutions, as if the authors of the Draft Treaty wanted to clip 
the wings of this institution which has acted as a brake on Community decision-making. 
As we have seen, the chief innovation is that the Council no longer has a virtual monopoly of legislative and bud-
getary power. The traditional legislative role will be shared with Parliament, and exercised 'with the active parti-
cipation of the Commission', as specified in Article 36 of the Draft Treaty. 
The Council is to be composed of representations of the Member States appointed by the governments, each 
representation being led by the minister permanently and specifically in charge of Union affairs — which imposes 
a new obligation on Member States in defining the composition of their governments. The votes of the repre-
sentations will be weighted in accordance with Article 148 of the EEC Treaty. 
Voting by simple majority will be the rule, except where expressly specified in the Draft Treaty, when voting may 
be by absolute or qualified majority or by unanimous decision (Article 23). 
Although the right of veto is not abolished, very strict conditions will apply and, in any case, will be retained for 
10 years only. Where the Union has concurrent competence, a Member State considering that its vital national 
interest is jeopardized at the point when the Union takes over responsibility for an area in which it has hitherto 
acted independently, must state why it considers this to be so. The matter will then be referred to the Commis-
sion for judgment. This is one of the ways in which national sovereignty is eroded to prevent bottlenecks in the 
Union's decision-making process. The provision has been widely criticized, even by Members of Parliament who 
voted for the text as a whole. 
C. The Commission 
The composition and operation of the Commission of the Union will be the same as that of the Commission of 
the Communities until an organic law determining its structure and operation and the statute of its members 
comes into effect. In the initial stages it would therefore be subject to the same mechanism as Parliament, 
although at a later date the institutions of the Union would be free to dictate their own form and identity without 
revision of the Treaty. 
The Commission would retain its executive powers and its role as guardian of the Treaty but it would play a 
much expanded role in relation to that of the Commission of the Communities. It would programme and manage 
common actions and initiate the resulting legislative and financial acts. Once it had set out the guidelines for 
action by the Union and taken appropriate steps to implement them, it would issue the regulations needed to 
apply the laws and prepare and implement the draft budget. It would also exercise executive power by ensuring 
that laws were observed and it would represent the Union internationally. 
As already stated, it could not take office until it had appeared before Parliament to secure approval of its politi-
cal programme and obtain investiture. 
A further innovation is that once the President of the Commission has been appointed by the European Council, 
he would be free to constitute the Commission, a matter formerly left to governments. This would undoubtedly 
enhance the President's standing within the Commission. 
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D. Legislative and budgetary procedures 
Common action would be governed by the laws of the Union, which would replace the present regulations, deci-
sions and directives. The most important of the Union's legal instruments would be the 'basic law', the constitu-
tion of the Union contained in the Treaty itself. 
The laws of the Union, which would be general and abstract, would be of three different types: ordinary, bud-
getary and organic. Organic laws — an innovation — would deal with topics fundamental to the life of the 
Union, paticularly the organization and operation of the institutions. From a formal point of view, approval of 
an organic law would require a qualified majority (in Parliament, a majority of its members and two-thirds of the 
votes cast; in the Council, two-thirds of the weighted votes cast comprising a majority of the representations). 
The content, aim and extent of the power to issue regulations and decisions, — a matter for the Commission 
(Article 40) — would be determined by law. 
The legislative and budgetary procedures are interesting innovations too. They are designed to facilitate decision-
making and, despite the precautions taken, suggest that there might be some arm-twisting to achieve a conclusive 
result. 
a. Legislative procedure (Article 38 of the Draft Treaty) 
Under the Community Treaties, draft texts of regulations, directives and decisions are sent by the Commission to 
the Council, which then consults Parliament. Under the Union Treaty, draft laws would be referred to Parlia-
ment in the first instance. Parliament would then have six months to take a decision. The draft, with or without 
amendment, would then be sent to the Council with the Commission's opinion where appropriate. The Council 
too would have six months to take a decision. 
The procedure would be terminated by the Council approving the draft by a majority, or by the Council rejecting 
it unanimously or, where the Commission had given an unfavourable opinion, by a qualified majority. A quali-
fied majority would likewise be required in the case of an organic law. 
If a draft law was neither approved nor rejected in this fashion, a Conciliation Committee, a sort of Joint Com-
mittee, consisting of a delegation from the Council and a delegation from Parliament would be convened. The 
conciliation procedure could end in one of two ways: 
(i) agreement, in which case the text would be submitted to Parliament and the Council for final approval; 
(ii) disagreement, in which case the Council's text would be submitted to Parliament for approval, together with 
any amendments by the Commission and the Commission alone. The Council could reject Parliament's text 
by a qualified majority within three months. 
b. Budgetary procedure (Article 76 of the Draft Treaty) 
Article 76 of the Draft Treaty details a budgetary procedure which is every bit as complex as that now laid down 
in Article 203 of the EEC Treaty. However, in addition to abolishing the distinction between compulsory and 
non-compulsory expenditure, it reverses the roles of the two arms of the budgetary authority. 
Parliament would adopt the budget by an absolute majority; the rejection of amendments adopted by the Coun-
cil on second reading would call for a qualified majority. This is the reverse of the present situation, where the 
Council can reject amendments adopted by Parliament on first reading by a qualified majority. 
Comments: 
The directive has disappeared from the panoply of the Union's legal instruments and the recommendation is now 
confined to the European Council (Article 32). The acts of the Union, to be known as laws instead of regula-
tions, decision and directives, will take on a decidedly more binding character. 
However, Article 35 opens the door to a 'two-or-more-speed' system by allowing differentiated application of 
laws. Where the particular situation of some of the addressees is likely to create specific difficulties, implementa-
tion of the law could be accompanied by time limits or transitional measures. This provision will do much to 
mitigate the rigour inherent in the legal impact of the acts of the Union. 
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It is to be feared that the extension of the right to initiate legislation to three institutions — Parliament, the Com-
mission and the Council — could lead to a proliferation of draft laws. This would be detrimental to the smooth 
operation and efficiency of the institutions. Despite the in-built precautions, the new legislative procedure is 
rather peremptory: any arm of the legislative authority which fails to act within the time allowed, loses the right 
to intervene. In the case of Parliament or the Council, failure to act within the time allowed, is construed as 
acceptance of the draft law. This means that a decision to accept or reject must be taken no later than one year 
after the draft law is first tabled, (i.e. on expiry of two periods of six months). This procedure may seem some-
what hurried but this is perhaps the price of preventing bottlenecks in the decision-making process and enabling 
integration to proceed. 
As far as the budgetary procedure is concerned, it is to be feared that giving the Commission, which has the right 
of initiative, the power to propose amendments and exercise its right to oppose amendments could hinder the 
smooth operation of a procedure which sets out to be efficient and streamlined. 
E. The European Council 
The European Council, which would comprise the Heads of State or Government of the Member States as now, 
plus the President of the Commission, would become an official institution of the Union. Its role would be to 
develop action through cooperation — which it would direct and for which it would take responsibility — and 
take decisions on the transfer of certain matters from cooperation to common action. In the last resort, therefore 
it would be for the European Council to determine Union competence and to initiate new common policies. 
The European Council would also be responsible for designating the President of the Commission and taking 
action against defaulting Member States (Article 44). 
Comments: 
Paradoxically although the European Council becomes an institution and retains its function as the dynamo of 
Union policies, the authors of the Draft Treaty have tried to contain, indeed minimize, its influence and role in 
the new institutional structure. The European Council appears last in the list of institutions and the statement 
that it expresses the 'identity of the Union' (which appeared in the first revision, adopted in September 1983) has 
been dropped. What is more the European Council can send only communications to the other institutions. It 
loses its present function of issuing directives to the other institutions and acting as a 'court of appeal' when the 
decision-making machinery grinds to a halt. It would in fact be reduced to playing second fiddle to the other 
institutions, where real decision-making power would lie. The Draft Treaty is silent on the question of a perma-
nent secretariat for the European Council and leaves it to the Heads of State or Government to determine their 
own decision-making procedures. 
F. The Court of Justice 
Half the members of the Court of Justice would be appointed by Parliament, the other half by the Council of the 
Union. At present this is the sole prerogative of governments (Article 167, EEC). The Court's powers would be 
wider than at present, since it would be responsible for ensuring uniform interpretation of the law and the pro-
tection of fundamental freedoms. It could annul acts of the Union, deal with appeals against decisions of natio-
nal courts and hear cases brought by individuals who felt that their rights or interests had been adversely affec-
ted. 
The Court would guarantee respect for a series of fundamental rights listed in the Draft Treaty, including civil 
and political rights, particularly the right of asylum and the right to freedom of education, and economic, social 
and cultural rights, such as the right to work and protection against unemployment, the right to strike, worker 
participation in management and the rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities. 
We have already seen that the Court would be competent to impose sanctions on Member States, even to the 
extent of temporary exclusion, with the agreement of the European Council (Article 44). 
Comments: 
The organization and operation of the Court will be determined by an organic law, the Court being free to adopt 
its own rules of procedure. Here too, the Draft Treaty is flexible and open to development, giving the Union a 
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large measure of autonomy to deal with its own internal affairs. As elsewhere, Parliament's position in the insti-
tutional system is strengthened by its power to appoint half the members of the Court, plus a further member if 
there is an odd number. 
HI. The procedure for bringing the Treaty into force 
The procedure for ratifying the Union Treaty and bringing it into force includes a number of unusual and origi-
nal features which are worth considering. 
The procedure is set out in Article 82 of the Draft Treaty and provoked criticism during the debate in Parliament 
on 14 February 1984. Further comments on the 'preliminaries' to ratification are contained in the resolution 
adopted on the same day which, like the Draft Treaty, is an amended version of the draft submitted by the Com-
mittee on Institutional Affairs. 
The work preparatory to ratification falls into two phases: presentation of the Draft Treaty and consultation 
with national parliaments. The Treaty will enter into force once it has been ratified by a majority of the Member 
States of the Communities whose population represents at least two-thirds of the total population of the Com-
munities. 
A. Presentation of the Draft Treaty 
The first paragraph of the resolution approving the text of the Draft Treaty instructs the President of Parliament 
to submit it to the parliaments and governments of the Member States. The first version of the draft resolution 
envisaged the President being accompanied by a delegation from the Committee on Institutional Affairs but this 
was dropped from the final text. Parliament's Enlarged Bureau had been asked to settle this point, apparently a 
detail but one with considerable political implications to judge from the debates to which it gave rise. 
The fact that the resolution uses the word 'submit' rather than the word 'send', normally used in Parliament's 
resolutions, suggests that the procedure for presenting the Draft Treaty to the Member States should have a cer-
tain solemnity. This view is reinforced by the fact that the provision appears in the first paragraph of the resolu-
tion, rather than in the last, as is normal. 
So far, only the Italian authorities have received the Draft Treaty from the President of Parliament, accompanied 
by the chairman and rapporteur of the Committee on Institutional Affairs (both of them Italian). It should be 
noted that the Italian Parliament had voted in favour of the draft and asked the government to ratify it on the day 
that Parliament adopted the final text. 
B. Consultation with national parliaments 
The second paragraph of the resolution 'calls on the European Parliament which will be elected on 17 June 1984 
to arrange all appropriate contacts and meetings with national parliaments and to take any other useful initia-
tives to enable it to take account of the opinions and comments of the national parliaments.' 
This would appear to be the first time that Parliament has made provision for such an operation. It is to be wel-
comed since there is no doubt that contacts, and even arguments, between French and European Members of 
Parliaments will clarify the discussion and eventually lead to useful results. 
The formulation finally adopted by the European Parliament is more flexible and less hectoring, less ritualistic 
and more realistic, than the first version, which simply asked the next Parliament to meet national parliaments 
'with a view to facilitating the adoption of the Treaty establishing the European Union.' 
It is now for national parliaments to debate the Draft Treaty and give their opinions prior to the ratification pro-
cedure proper, which in France is initiated by the government. Stress is laid on the response to be given to the 
positions and comments of national parliaments since the purpose of the planned consultations is to allow the 
newly-elected European Parliament to take account of their views. 
The Draft Treaty should be debated in the French Parliament in the near future. Acceptance of the novel proce-
dure which the European Parliament was pleased to propose in no way implies acceptance of the institutional 
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reforms which it believed it right to advocate. A preliminary parliamentary debate — which might be the end of 
the matter — would also reveal the position of the French Government, which has been extremely reluctant to 
show its hand. 
C. Ratification 
The reform proposed by Parliament is not a revision of the existing Treaties, which would have had to be ratified 
by all the Member States of the Community of Ten, but a draft of a separate treaty, which therefore lies outside 
the procedures for revision of the Community Treaties. As stated above, it will come into force when a majority 
of the Member States whose population represents two-thirds of the total population of the Communities have 
ratified it and the governments, meeting immediately afterwards, have decided by common accord on the proce-
dures by and the date on which the treaty will enter into force and on 'relations with the Member States which 
have not yet ratified'. 
This second provision, which is absent from the initial draft of the treaty, is the result of a compromise amend-
ment inspired by the desire of a majority in the European Parliament not to exclude countries which, although 
long-standing members of the Communities, are not yet prepared to commit themselves to the Union. 
A singularity of the mechanism for bringing the Treaty into force is that it is addressed exclusively to the Member 
States of the Community, although any democratic European State may apply to join the Union at a later stage 
(Article 2). 
Ratification by a majority of the Member States, subject to a demographic qualification, is the middle way cho-
sen by Parliament to press ahead with a reform which it favours. The formula appears flexible but in fact applies 
considerable pressure since it is difficult to see how two separate institutional systems — the one set up by the 
Community Treaties, the other by the Union Treaty — could exist side by side for any length of time. The Draft 
Treaty makes no explicit reference to the disappearance of the institutions of the Ten. But in practice the result 
would be the same because those Member States which had not ratified the new treaty would be too isolated and 
'marginalized' to survive under the Community Treaties. 
This is precisely what Parliament intends when, in the last paragraph of the resolution, it hopes that the treaty 
'will ultimately be approved by all the Member States'. Similarly in the explanatory statement, the rapporteur 
says that the date of entry into force will be fixed by governments — not by the Treaty itself — to enable the 
ratifying States 'to move to practical action so as to encourage a decision on the part of other States who might 
still be hesitant'. The Committee on Institutional Affairs is clearly convinced that there is no alternative to rati-
fication. 
Despite the hopes of the European Parliament, the Draft Treaty will have no legal standing until it has been rati-
fied by the constitutionally competent authorities of a majority of the Member States. In this context it should be 
noted that the French Constitution provides for a referendum procedure for the ratification of international 
treaties with implications for the functioning of institutions. 
If the European elections of 17 June 1984 are not regarded asa suitable means of measuring popular support for 
reform of the type proposed by Parliament and if it is assumed that European integration cannot proceed without 
a clear mandate from the electorate, perhaps Article 11 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 could be used at 
some point in the future to ratify the Draft Treaty. 
This approach, which would be politically difficult and daring, might be the best way of establishing whether 
there is a 'European constituency' in France which is ready to respond to what, in many ways, resembles the call 
to set up a constituent assembly. 
IV. The conclusions of the committee adopted on 5 April 1984 
The committee has considered the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union adopted by the European Par-
liament on 14 February 1984. It wishes to pay tribute to the patient work put into designing an ambitious institu-
tional reform designed to get the Community moving again and press ahead with European integration. 
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It welcomes the initiative taken by Mr Spinelli and the Committee on Institutional Affairs as an act of faith in the 
European idea and it is grateful to the first directly-elected Parliament for having completed a project which will 
certainly prove to be one of its crowning achievements. 
It notes that the text of the Draft Treaty forms the substance of a constitution which could lead to a real confe-
deration, or even a federation, of the United States of Europe. 
Although it recognizes the pressing and irreversible nature of some of the provisions of the Draft Treaty, it notes 
that the proposed institutional system and mechanisms are sufficiently flexible and open to development for the 
European Union to be what the Member States want it to be. 
The timing and realism of the Draft Treaty 
The Committee considers that the question of the timing and realism of the Draft Treaty can be considered only 
in the light of the political will of the Member States to press ahead with European integration. 
It recognizes the need to assess how far this ambitious project is a dream and how far a reality. It appreciates that 
given the present state of the Communities there is little likelihood of the Union Treaty becoming an accomplished 
fact in the near future. 
Although it has doubts about the real chances of the Draft Treaty being adopted in the near future, it would not 
deny the value, interest and importance of the work done by Parliament. 
It notes that the institutional approach to progress is infinitely more difficult and hazardous then simply reinforc-
ing past achievements. But the bottleneck in Community decision-making is such that the possibility of progress 
through the institutions is as worthy of study as the possibility of progress through the development of common 
policies within the present legal framework. 
It notes that many of the provisions of the Draft Treaty, for example those dealing with the finances of the Union 
and the differentiated application of laws, reveal a realistic approach based on experience of the Community and 
considers that the charge of utopianism would be justified only if the Draft Treaty had deliberately abandoned 
the Community institutions in favour of a purely federal scheme. 
At all events, it asserts that approval of the Draft Treaty should not be used as an excuse for refusing to revitalize 
common policies and give priority to 'Everyday Europe', the 'Europe of the possible'. 
On the competences of the Union 
The committee notes that from the beginning the Union would be given wide-ranging competences encompas-
sing the existing common policies, new policies in the economic, social and cultural sectors, and activities now 
carried out under the European Monetary System and political cooperation. 
It notes that the Union would have considerable autonomy in extending its fields of action since transfers from 
cooperation to common action, that is to say, from concurrent to exclusive competence, would not call for revis-
ion of the Treaty. 
It approves of internal policies being extended into the field of external relations but notes that one of the aims of 
the Draft Treaty is to extend Union competence to the broad aspects of international relations, with particular 
reference to security. 
On the institutions of the Union 
The committee notes that the institutional system advocated for the Union would lie somewhere between the 
Communities and a confederal system and that the new institutional balance would strengthen Parliament at the 
Council's expense. 
It finds the proposed structures and procedures ingenious and consistent, despite certain ambiguities, and it con-
siders that the proposed mechanisms could well prevent bottlenecks forming in the decision-making process. 
235 
It emphasizes that the Draft Treaty would turn the European Parliament into a fully-fledged parliamentary 
assembly with complete legislative and budgetary powers. 
It notes that Parliament's political control of the Commission, the executive body of the Union, would be consi-
derably strengthened by the addition of power of investiture, to power of censure. 
It considers that Parliament's wide-ranging powers should be offset by a dissolution provision since submission 
to the electoral process every five years is not enough to rule out malfunctions arising from an all-powerful Par-
liament. 
It approves the authors' desire to make recourse to the right of veto in the Council exceptional, but has reserva-
tions about the wisdom of abolishing this expression of national sovereignty after a ten-year transitional period. 
It also has reservations about the provision which would make the Commission the sole judge, during this 
period, of whether or not a vital national interest was at stake. 
It considers that the Draft Treaty should contain an appeal mechanism or some other arrangement to soften the 
effects of this provision. 
It notes that in any event a vital national interest could be invoked by a Member State only if it was closely and 
incontestably connected with the subject under discussion. 
It considers that the Draft Treaty should institutionalize information and consultation procedures with the aim 
of increasing mutual understanding between national and European Members of Parliament and fostering 
awareness of the implications of the subjects with which they are dealing. 
On the procedure for consulting national parliaments on the Draft Treaty 
The committee is pleased that Parliament wishes to consult national parliaments on the Draft Treaty and secure 
their comments and reactions. 
It notes that Parliament intends to take account of criticisms and suggestions made by national parliaments. 
It hopes that the meetings and contacts which the European Parliament intends to arrange for this purpose will 
be fruitful. It therefore considers that the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and the Armed Forces 
should react favourably to representations made to it. 
It considers that everything possible should be done to ensure that the Senate organizes the wide-ranging debate 
which an issue as important as the Draft Treaty merits. 
On the procedure for bringing the Draft Treaty into force 
The committee draws attention to the novel arrangements for bringing the Draft Treaty into force and wonders 
whether these are compatible with the provisions of the French Constitution governing treaties and international 
agreements. 
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Chapter VI - Greece and the Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union 
by Dimitrios Evrigenis 
1. Legal questions 
1. When the 1975 Greek Constitution was drafted and adopted the decision to apply for member-
ship of the European Community had already been accepted by most of the political forces repres-
ented in Parliament. It included a law-making mechanism which could be regarded as a sound consti-
tutional basis for Greek accession to the Community. Commentators representative of all legal and 
political persuasions are unanimous in maintaining that, all things considered, Article 28 of the Con-
stitution,' a totally new provision in terms of Greek constitutional law, not only makes accession 
legally possible, but also provides a basis for the permanent functional relationship created by Com-
munity membership. The only point debated for any length of time was whether paragraph 2 or 
paragraph 3 of Article 28 was applicable in this particular case.' The problem was a minor one: the 
controversy was, as it were, internal to the constitution, and did not question the capacity of the 
basic law to provide a sufficient legal basis for accession. 
2. The constitutionality of accession has yet to be challenged in the courts. Greek courts — admit-
tedly in a very small number of cases — have applied the provisions of Community law or made refe-
rence to them but have never been called upon to rule on the constitutionality issue. Nor have the 
courts raised the matter on their own initiative, as they are entitled to do. 
3. Compared with the corresponding provisions in the constitutions of the other Member States, 
paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 28 of the Greek Constitution appear to provide a broader, more flexi-
ble and more certain basis for accession. Read together these provisions deal in general and abstract 
terms with Greek accession to and membership in international agencies in whom powers can be 
vested under the Constitution. This formula allows Greece to join any Community-type internatio-
nal organization with no restrictions as to its identity or its powers. In theory it would be constitutio-
nally possible for Greece to join a Community with wider competences both in quantitative and qua-
litative terms and with a different institutional structure and geographical composition than that of 
the present Community. The proposed competences of the European Union as set out in the Draft 
Treaty fall well within the limits set by Article 28 of the Greek Constitution. 
There are of course limits to the transfer of national competences. They take two forms: firstly, the 
limits inherent in the (by definition) inalienable sovereignty of the applicant State, and, secondly, in 
the case of Greece, the limits imposed by paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 28 since these provisions only 
1 See Annex 'page 239). 
; See on this problem and on the whole of the constitutional basis of the accession of Greece to the Community: Evrigenis, Com-
mon Market Law Review, 1980, p. 157 et seq. and the quoted bibliography at p. 162, notes 1, 2 and 3. 
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allow the delegation of government powers or limitations on national sovereignty (i.e. accession) 
where this serves an important national interest, promotes international cooperation, does not 
infringe human rights or the foundations of democratic government, and is effected on the basis of 
the principles of equality and under the condition of reciprocity. The general feeling was that these 
basic conditions, which can be variously regarded as political, legal or a mixture of the two, had 
been met in the case of accession to the Community. We think that much the same would apply to 
Greek participation in the conclusion of the European Union Treaty or accession to it. Indeed it 
might even be said that, since fundamental rights and democratic principles are better protected in 
the Union than in the present Community, Greek membership in the Union would be more readily 
welcomed, from this point of view, in constitutional terms. 
4. Greek participation in the conclusion of the European Union Treaty or Greek accession to this 
Treaty would of necessity be subject to the approval and ratification procedure generally applied to 
international instruments. This is normally divided into three stages: firstly, signature of the instru-
ment; secondly, approval by Parliament of the law sanctioning the instrument by the majority speci-
fied in paragraph 2 of Article 28 of the Constitution; and, thirdly, ratification. This mechanism 
implies participation by the executive and above all a government initiative. Legally, it is the govern-
ment's responsibility to initiate the procedure for concluding or acceding to an international treaty. 
2. Political considerations 
Although there would be no legal obstacles to Greek participation in the conclusion of the European 
Union Treaty, the political outlook is far from favourable. The majority government which emerged 
from the 1981 elections was initially hostile to Community membership and later vacillated between 
withdrawal and the negotiation of a bilateral economic cooperation agreement instead. It has finally 
reconciled itself to the status of Member State, while pursuing a course of action which is hardly a 
shining example of Community solidarity. Although it has taken part in the various attempts to 
streamline the Community institutions, the present government is opposed in principle to a radical 
transformation of the structures of European cooperation along the lines proposed in the draft 
European Union Treaty. More openly hostile to the Community and, by extension, to the proposed 
Union, is the Communist Party. On the other hand, the opposition parties, currently representing 
approximately two-fifths of the legislature, and other minor political groupings in the centre and on 
the left, have an open mind on the prospect of a strengthening of European institutions. According to 
the opinion polls, their political line enjoys much wider support among the general public. Neverthe-
less, the political die is not yet cast. 
Greece's attitude will be shaped not only by a balance of political forces still in the making, but also 




1. The generally acknowledged rules of international law, as well as international conventions as of the time 
they are sanctioned by law and become operative according to the conditions therein shall be an integral part of 
domestic Greek law and shall prevail over any contrary provision of the law. The enforcement of the rules of 
international law and of international conventions to aliens does always depend on the condition of reciprocity. 
2. To serve an important national interest and promote cooperation with other States authorities under the 
constitution may be vested by a convention or agreement in agencies of an international organization. A majority 
of three-fifths of the total number of Members of Parliament shall be necessary to vote the law sanctioning the 
treaty or agreement. 
3. Greece shall freely proceed by law voted by the absolute majority of the total number of Members of Parlia-
ment, to limit the exercise of national sovereignty, in so far as this is dictated by an important national interest, 
does not infringe upon the rights of man and the foundations of democratic government and is effected on the 
basis of the principles of equality and under the condition of reciprocity. 
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Chapter VII ­ The Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union 
and the Member States: Ireland 
by John Temple­Lang 
1. Introduction 
This paper begins by summarizing the constitutional aspects of Ireland's accession to the existing 
Eutopean Community Treaties, insofar as they have implications for Ireland's ratification of the pro­
posed Treaty setting up the European Union. It then considers how far the Treaty setting up the 
Union may be inconsistent with the constitution of Ireland as it is at present, and how the inconsis­
tency should be resolved. It describes the procedures, under the Irish Constitution, for amending the 
constitution, and for ratifying a treaty such as the Treaty setting up the Union. Lastly, it assesses the 
elements likely to influence public opinion in Ireland at the various stages of these procedures. 
2. Constitutional aspects of Ireland's accession 
to the existing Treaties 
Before Ireland's accession to the three existing European Community Treaties, it was clear that the 
powers of the Community institutions were incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution of 
Ireland of 1937 dealing with legislative, executive and judicial powers.' 
Briefly, these provided that the sole power of making laws for the State belonged to the Oircachtas 
(the President and the two Houses), although subordinate legislatures were permitted. Justice was to 
See the Irish Government publications: Membership of the European Communities: Implications for Ireland, 1970, and The 
Accession of Ireland to the European Communities, 1972, of which extracts are given in Chubb, A Source Book of Irish 
Government, 1983, Ch. 11; Temple Lang, The Common Market and Common Law, 1966, Ch. 3; Lynch, 'The Republic of 
Ireland and the EEC — The Constitutional Position: Γ, and Temple Lang, 'The Republic of Ireland and the EEC — The Con­
stitutional Position: IF, in Legal Problems of an Enlarged European Community, ( Bathurst, Simmonds, Hunnings and Welch, 
eds), 1972; Temple Lang, 'Legal and Constitutional Implications for Ireland of Adhesion to the EEC Treaty', 9 Common Mkt. 
L. Rev., 1972, p. 167; Kelly, The Irish Constitution, (2nd ed.), 1984, section on Article 29 (international relations); Murphy, 
'The European Community and the Irish Legal System', in Ireland and the European Communities, (Coombes ed.), 1983, 
pp. 29­37; Keatinge, 'Ireland and the World' in Unequal Achievement: the Irish Experience 1957­1982, (Litton ed.), 1982; see 
also Hederman, The Road to Europe: Irish Attitudes 1948­61, 1983; Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, 1971, pp. 543­551; 
Lee, Reflections on Ireland in the EEC, 1984. 
The adopt;on by referendum of the Constitution of Ireland in 1937 offers a precedent for at least a partial solution to the prob­
lem of establishing the Union and making it compatible with the Community Treaties, discussed in the paper by Weiler and 
Modrall, this volume. 
The previous Irish Constitution of 1922 was adopted, according to Irish constitutional theory, by the Irish assembly or Dáil 
which had proclaimed itself the legislature of an independent Irish State. In British eyes the 1922 Constitution was conferred on 
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be administered only by judges appointed as provided by the constitution, and the Supreme Court 
was to be the court of final appeal. Judges were to be appointed by the President. The executive 
powers of the State, including those in connection with external relations, were to be exercised only 
by or on the authority of the government, which was to be responsible to the Dáil (the lower house). 
The 1937 Constitution stressed that only the bodies established by the constitution could exercise 
governmental powers, to exclude any remnant of British imperial power. The effect was to exclude 
also the possibility of transferring any such powers to any international body such as the Community 
(no such body existed, of course, in 1937). The measures to grant the Community appropriate 
powers in Irish law constituted a transfer of powers and could not have been regarded, under Irish 
constitutional law, as a permissible delegation of powers.2 The reasons why the 1937 Constitution 
was incompatible with the Community Treaties are also applicable to the proposed European Union 
Treaty. 
To make it possible for Ireland to ratify the Community Treaties in 1972, some amendment to the 
constitution was necessary. Instead of a series of amendments altering each article of the constitution 
thought to be inconsistent with the Treaties, a single amendment was adopted by the Oireachtas and 
approved by a large (83%) majority of the people in the 1972 referendum. The amendment, in the 
form of an addition to Article 29 of the constitution (on international relations) provides: 
'The State may become a member of the European Coal and Steel Community (established by 
Treaty signed at Paris on the 18th day of April 1951), the European Economic Community 
(established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March 1957) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March 1957). No 
provision of this constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State 
necessitated by the obligations of membership of the Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts 
done or measures adopted by the Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of 
law in the State.' 
Several points must be made. Firstly, the provision is limited to the existing three Communities, as 
established by Treaties specifically mentioned. It would not, therefore, apply to a wholly new Com-
munity, though it might apply to the existing Communities if they came to be based on new Treaties. 
The amendment is therefore narrower than the corresponding provisions of the constitutions of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and (perhaps surprisingly) Nor-
way.1 
Secondly, the amendment wisely avoids listing the articles of the constitution which are, or might be 
thought to be, inconsistent with the powers of the institutions of the existing Communities. This 
means that no clarification or development of those powers under the Treaties could give rise to diffi-
culties merely because the draftsman had failed to foresee its future incompatibility with the constitu-
tion. For example, it is now clear that the Community's powers in the areas of commercial policy" 
and fisheries5 and in the expanding areas dealt with by Community legislation which come within 
Community competence under the principle stated in the AETR judgment,' are all exclusive powers, 
and that no corresponding powers remain with Member States. The exclusive nature of these powers 
was less clear in 1972 than it is today. This is important because omission of any list of constitutio-
the Irish Free State, with its dominion status, by an act of the UK Parliament. The 1922 Constitution was a compromise betwe-
en Irish and British wishes. The 1937 referendum was therefore arranged to enable the people of what is now the Republic of 
Ireland to give an unambiguously Irish basis to a constitution drafted wholly by Irishmen. See Temple Lang, The Common 
Marketand Common Law, 1966, pp. 57-64. This prompts the idea that the Union Treaty might be the subject of a simultane-
ous referendum in all the Member States of the Community, so that the peoples of the entire Community could vote on the 
same question on the same day, on the basis that those States in which a majority of the people were in favour would join the 
European Union. This would be very democratic, and because the will of the people is the ultimate source of law in a democ-
racy, the best possible basis for a 'legal revolution'. 
2 Temple Lang, The Common Market and Common Law, 1966, pp. 40-42, 46-51. 
1 Temple Lang, op.cit. 9 Common Mkt. L. Rev., 1972, pp. 167, 167-168. 
4 Article 113 (EEC). 
5 Case 804/79 Commission v United Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045. 
6 Case 22/70 Commission v Council (AETR) [1971] ECR 263. 
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nal provisions affected made it possible to avoid having to decide whether the Treaties were, or 
might through the development of Community law, become inconsistent with Article 5 of the con-
stitution: 'Ireland is a sovereign, independent democratic state'. A State which has no powers in the 
fields of commercial policy, fisheries, or a variety of other spheres on which the Community of which 
it is a member has legislated is obviously less sovereign, if the phrase is permissible, than one which 
still retains powers in those spheres. Any list of the articles of the constitution and the Treaty provi-
sions which might prove incompatible with them would also have to make some provision to cover 
the unforeseeable developments under Article 235 (EEC). A general, all-purpose amendment to the 
constitution was the only practical approach to the problem. 
The wording of the amendment was narrow in another respect, which has given rise to doubt and 
some practical difficulty. It authorizes Irish legislation which would, but for the amendment, be 
incompatible with the constitution only if the legislation is 'necessitated by the obligations of mem-
bership of the Communities'. The question has arisen whether the Convention on a European Com-
munity Patent' was a measure ratification of which was 'necessitated by the obligations of member-
ship'. Although negotiated under Community auspices, it is a convention, not a regulation or a direc-
tive. Some Irish lawyers have therefore doubted whether ratification is obligatory for Member States 
under Community law, even in spite of the Council declaration8 which says that it is obligatory. 
These doubts are due to a narrow and, in the present writer's view, incorrect interpretation of Article 
5 (EEC), rather than to a particular interpretation of the amendment to the Irish Constitution. 
Clearly, the question whether Member States have an obligation to ratify the convention is ultimat-
ely a question of Community law, not a question of Irish constitutional law. It seems highly unlikely 
that the Court of Justice, which has interpreted Article 5 widely' on a number of occasions, would 
rule that ratification was not legally necessary. However, even if that is correct, it does not follow 
that ratification of all conventions drafted under Community auspices, in some sense, is obligatory 
for Member States under Community law: the European Monetary System agreement is proof that 
some very important arrangements are 'optional'. 
a. The Treaty setting up the European Union 
The first question that arises is whether the Treaty setting up the European Union (herein called 'the 
Union Treaty') would be covered by the 1972 amendment to the constitution of Ireland. If it was, no 
further constitutional amendment would be necessary. However, it seems clear that the Union 
Treaty could not be thought of as a mere amendment of the three existing Community Treaties, or as 
merely reconstituting the existing Communities under a new name. Any such interpretation is exclu-
ded by the broad scope of the new Treaty: by Article 1, which speaks of setting up the European 
Union; by Article 6, on the legal personality of the Union, which would be unnecessary if the Union 
was merely taking over the legal status of the existing Communities; by Article 7, on the acquis com-
munautaire; by Article 82, which provides for the possibility that not all of the Member States of the 
existing Communities may initially ratify the new Treaty; and by the broader explicit scope of the 
new Treaty. 
If the 1972 amendment to the Irish Constitution does not cover the new Treaty, the next question is 
whether the provisions of the new Treaty are compatible with the rest of the constitution. It is clear 
Convention for the European Patent for the Common Market, OJ L 17, 26. 1. 1976. 
Council declaration concerning the Convention on a European Community Patent. The question mentioned in the text arises 
because the Convention gives the Court of Justice power to interpret the Convention by a procedure similar to Article 177 
(EEC): this would be incompatible with the articles in the Irish Constitution on judicial powers unless it is covered by the 1972 
amendment. 
See Temple Lang,'European Community Law, Irish Law and the Irish Legal Profession — Protection of the Individual and Co-
operation between Member States and the Community', The Second Frances E. Moran Memorial Lecture, in Dublin U. L. j . , 
1983, pp. 5, 11-18. 
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that they are not, for reasons essentially similar to the reasons which made an amendment to the con-
stitution essential in 1972. 
The new Treaty provides (Art. 36) that the legislative powers of the Union are exercisable by the Par-
liament and the Gouncil, acting essentially on the initiative of the Commission. Under Article 42, the 
law of the Union is directly applicable in Member States, and prevails over national law. In addition, 
the Commission would have implementing legislative powers (Art. 40). These articles are not com-
patible with Article 15 of the Irish Constitution which (subject to the amendment to Article 29 to 
allow legislative powers to be given to the existing Community institutions) says that the exclusive 
power of making laws for the State is vested in the Oireachtas (the President and the two Houses of 
the legislature). 
Under the new Treaty powers which are classified as executive by the Irish Constitution would be 
exercised by the Council and the Commission. Article 21 says that the Council would exercise 
powers in the field of international relations: whatever powers exactly might be conferred on the 
Council, they would include powers of the kind now exercised by the Community institutions, 
which in Ireland are exercisable (except in so far as the Community is concerned) only by the 
Government, under Article 29 of the constitution. The powers of the Commission are to be laid 
down by the basic law {loi organique) on that institution, but in the meantime it would have the same 
structure and operation as the Commission of the Communities whose executive powers, as already 
mentioned, would be inconsistent with the constitution of Ireland if it were not for the 1972 amend-
ment. Specifically, Article 28 of the new Treaty says the Commission would adopt implementing 
regulations and take the necessary executive decisions to put Union laws into operation, would carry 
out the budget, represent the Union in external relations, and supervise the application of the new 
Treaty and the laws of the Union. These powers, however they might be subsequently defined, could 
not be reconciled with the Irish Constitution. Nor would it be possible for Ireland to ratify the new 
Treaty in the hope of being able to ensure subsequently that the basic laws governing the powers of 
the institutions of the Union were so drafted as to be consistent with the constitution as it stands. 
The constitution of Ireland classifies governmental powers as 'legislative, executive and judicial'.'" 
Monetary powers, if they had to be fitted into this classification, would be 'executive' powers. 
Monetary powers therefore may be exercised only by or on the authority of the Irish Government, 
unless their exercise is authorized by either the existing provision dealing with the European Com-
munity or the future provision dealing with the European Union. However, no express mention of 
monetary powers would be needed in the new Irish constitutional provision dealing with the Euro-
pean Union, if it is drafted broadly enough. 
The new Treaty says very little about judicial powers. Article 30 provides briefly that the Court is to 
ensure that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the new Treaty, and of all acts 
adopted under it. It provides briefly for appointment of judges by the Parliament and the Council, 
and says that other matters are to be dealt with by a basic law [loi organique). Article 43 provides for 
judicial control, on the lines of existing Community law, and completed by a basic law. This basic 
law would extend the rights of individuals to challenge legal acts adopted by the Union, give the 
Court express jurisdiction in fundamental rights cases involving the Union, and jurisdiction in a pro-
cédure préjudicielle i.e. by reference or case stated from national courts. The Court would have 
power to review the failure of national courts to refer questions of Union law to it, and to 'sanction' 
the failure of Member States to fulfil their obligations. All this would involve a very substantial 
increase in the jurisdiction (and the volume of work) of the Court. The Court's overall powers, there-
fore, however exactly they might later be defined, would be incompatible with the articles of the con-
stitution of Ireland on the administration of justice by judges appointed by the President of Ireland, 
unless authorized by a new constitutional provision. 
10 Article 6 of the constitution reads 'All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the 
people . . .' 
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Some other comments may be useful. 
Firstly, the scope of the activities of the Union, as expressly envisaged, is wider than those provided 
for by the existing Treaties. The new Treaty refers explicitly to citizenship (Art. 3) of the Union, fun-
damental rights (Art. 4), the power of enquiry of the Parliament (Art. 18), sanctions on Member 
States (Arts 43, 44), international crime (Art. 46), credit policy and the European Monetary System 
(Arts 51, 52), policies on telecommunications, research, and energy (Art. 53), health, consumers, 
regions, the environment, education and culture, and information (Arts 56-62, passim). It is more 
explicit about international relations than the existing Treaties (Arts 9, 63-69). It is true that much of 
this is little more than the existing Communities are already doing, but express provisions must in-
evitably result in wider and increased powers. More directly relevant to the subject of this paper, 
Article 68 provides that the Council may enlarge the field of cooperation to cover armaments, arms 
sales to third countries, defence policy, and disarmament, and may transfer a sphere from the area of 
cooperation between Member States to the field of common, i.e. Union, action. Less controversially, 
the Union is to supervise the consistency of the international policies of Member States (Art. 67) and 
is to use its influence to promote peaceful settlement of conflicts, security, discouragement of aggres-
sion, détente, and mutual reduction of military forces and arms on a balanced and controlled basis 
(Art. 63). These are objectives, not powers, but they make it obvious that the scope of the activities 
of the Union would not be limited to the economic and social spheres, as a reading of the existing 
Treaties would suggest was the initial scope of the existing Communities. 
In drafting a new amendment to the constitution of Ireland to allow ratification of the new Treaty, 
the Irish Government will have to decide whether to limit it to the European Union, based on the 
new Treaty, or to make it a broader amendment permitting the Oireachtas to ratify any international 
agreement giving powers to international institutions, on the lines of the provisions of the German, 
Italian, Luxembourg, Dutch and Norwegian Constitutions. It is not clear whether, if the Irish people 
are willing to approve by referendum an amendment permitting Ireland to ratify the Treaty setting 
up the European Union, they would be significantly less willing to vote for a more general amend-
ment. Such opposition as there will be to an amendment concerned only with the new Treaty might 
not be significantly stronger if the amendment were in wider terms. 
Whether the future amendment to the constitution is drafted to cover only the European Union, or 
to cover any international or any European institutions, it is clear that, for the same reasons as in 
1972, it must be a single amendment in general words, not a list of constitutional provisions being 
modified. If that is accepted, it follows that it is not necessary to go through the new Treaty in detail 
comparing it with the constitution of Ireland. Nor is it necessary to discuss how far the clauses of the 
new Treaty dealing with the 'organs' of the Union might come into conflict with the constitution, in 
the future. A problem which did not arise in 1972 concerns the European Monetary Fund which, 
under Article 33.4, has the independence necessary to guarantee monetary stability. This phrase 
glosses over the very difficult problem of the degree of independence needed to carry out (let alone to 
guarantee) such an objective. However, whatever the future powers of the Fund may be, they could 
be made consistent with the Irish Constitution by a single amendment in sufficiently general words 
which in any case is appropriate for other reasons. 
The question of the 'organs' of the European Union, and the question of the European Community 
Patent Convention, discussed above, imply that the new amendment to the Irish Constitution should 
be worded broadly enough to cover new organs and arrangements not expressly contemplated by the 
new Treaty and not based on legislative measures adopted by the Union. Irish Governments will 
want to ensure that difficulties such as that which arose over the Community Patent Convention do 
not arise again. They are perhaps not likely to do so (the proposed Community trade mark measure, 
for example, is to be a Regulation and not a convention), but it is desirable both for Ireland and for 
the Community and the future Union that the problem should be dealt with. A constitutional 
amendment which would solve this problem would be on the following lines: 
'The State may become a member of the European Union to be established in accordance with the 
Treaty signed at . . . on . . . . No provision of this constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts 
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done or measures adopted by the State necessitated by obligations undertaken under arrange-
ments made by the Union or under its auspices, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures 
adopted by the Union or under its auspices or by institutions thereof, from having the force of law 
in the State.' 
b. Sovereignty 
Even if the amendment is in the form of a general clause substantially similar to the 1972 amendment 
the question will be raised, in a political if not necessarily in a legal context, whether ratification 
would be consistent with the 'sovereign' status of Ireland provided for in Article 5 of the constitution. 
Without attempting a definition of 'sovereignty' or trying to give an exhaustive reply to the question, 
some points may be made." Firstly, legally Ireland's sovereignty would be limited precisely as much 
as, but no more than, the sovereignty of every other Member State of the European Union. Political-
ly, a small State with relatively little influence on its own gains more, on balance, by having a vote in 
the Council of the European Union than it loses by limiting or giving up certain powers. If, as seems 
likely, Ireland's economic interests would depend on it becoming a member of the European Union, 
then the point should be made that a State has more real sovereignty if it is prosperous than if it is 
not. 
Secondly, sovereignty is not a precise concept, and the new Treaty is (even more than the EEC Trea-
ty) a traité-cadre, a constitutional framework, not a static traité-loi. It is not possible to say, if the 
political integration of Europe proceeds on the lines envisaged by the new Treaty, at what point in 
the process Member States would cease to be 'sovereign', because they would transfer their sove-
reignty gradually to the Union, and no one act of transfer would be decisive, politically or legally. 
Having said that, however, since the new Treaty contemplates (notably in Art. 68) enlargement of 
the sphere of cooperation and transfer of particular fields from cooperation to common action, in 
areas including foreign policy and defence, it would be impossible to say that Member States of the 
Union would still be 'sovereign' after all the transfers of powers visualized by the new Treaty had 
been fully carried out. The history of federations suggests that they do not remain at a stage of par-
tial integration: they either progress further, or they separate again. 
Sovereignty defacto, as distinct from sovereignty de jure, depends on how far economic and political 
realities allow the State concerned to control its own destinies. In the case of a small country with a 
very open economy (i.e. external trade represents a very high proportion of GNP) which is heavily 
dependent on foreign capital, control over its economy is strictly limited. Ireland's experiment with 
import-substitution lasted from the 1930s until the 1950s, by which time it was obvious that its use-
fullness had ended. 
In spite of the 'framework' nature of the new Treaty, and its reliance on lois organiques to fill in even 
very important matters, and in spite of the fact that many of its other provisions state aims and not 
legal powers, the new Treaty looks more like the constitution of a federation, or at least a confedera-
tion, than the existing Treaties do. This is partly because the most conspicuous change proposed is 
the conversion of the European Parliament into one chamber (admittedly, with limited powers) of a 
bicameral legislature. It is also because the new Treaty speaks explicitly of exclusive and concurrent 
powers (e.g. Arts 12,47,48,50-53) and of the primacy of Union law (Art. 42). The 'federalist' ethos 
is unmistakable, although the powers which would belong exclusively to the Union as soon as the 
Treaty came into force would be no more extensive, at first sight, than the exclusive powers of the 
existing Communities. Article 64.2, for example, merely declares the existing law.12 Article 32, 
" Temple Lang, The Common Market and Common Law, 1966, pp. 39-40, 74-7'5. 1¡ Article 113 (EEC); Opinion 1/75 Local Cost Standard, [1975] ECR 1355; Case 41/76 Donckerwolcke [1976] ECR 1921; 
Opinion 1/78 international Agreement on Natural Rubber [1979] ECR 2871; Case 70/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 1453. 
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however, which contemplates the enlargement of the competences of the Union, does not (as Art. 
235(EEC) now does) limit the enlargement to cases where it is shown that it is 'necessary to attain, in 
the course of the operation of the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Community'. 
In spite of this, the new Treaty retains, in Article 23, a modified version of the'Luxembourg compro-
mise', under which, during a transitional period of 10 years, a Member State may invoke a 'vital 
national interest' and, if the Commission recognizes that the interest in question comes into this 
category, no vote takes place and the matter is reconsidered. This clause preserves a significant ele-
ment of sovereignty as long as it is in force, although its operation depends on the Commission 
accepting the importance of the matter for the Member State in question. 
It must be clearly said that 'sovereignty' is not a precise concept, either in Irish constitutional law or (I 
suspect) anywhere else. It is a political concept, not a legal concept. There is no definition of sov-
ereignty in Irish constitutional law, and no Irish case-law to clarify the concept. The Irish Constitu-
tion does not embody a hierarchy of rules or principles, so sovereignty is not, legally, a concept or a 
principle with higher status under the constitution than any other principle. (No doubt it has a higher 
status politically in Ireland than many other concepts or principles.) 
Reading the draft European Union Treaty, it is possible to imagine that, if the Member States do 
what the Treaty contemplates, they will gradually move along a spectrum, beginning with the exis-
ting situation under Community law, towards a situation in which their sovereignty, insofar as it 
would still exist, would be very limited indeed. The Treaty contemplates the transfer, to the Union, 
of some at least of each of the kinds of powers which are transferred to a federation by its member 
States. One cannot now say how many of these powers will in fact be transferred, or in what order, 
or on what conditions. One therefofe cannot say at what point in the future Member States would 
cease to be 'sovereign', even if there was a precise concept of sovereignty, which is far from being the 
case. 
There has never previously been, as far as my knowledge extends, a treaty between independent States 
which contemplated transfers of governmental powers great enough to establish a federation, but 
which did not at once transfer those powers. Since the extent of the powers of members of a federa-
tion may vary widely, the key question in connection with the issue of sovereignty at first sight 
appears to be at what point the members would cease to be full subjects of public international law. 
But even this question is not really a useful one: States which already have no treaty-making power in 
the field of external trade are not fully sovereign in the conventional sense. The reality is that the con-
cepts of 'independence' and 'sovereignty' are not appropriate to the situation created by the existing 
Community Treaties, or to the Union Treaty. Member States would no longer be 'sovereign' in the 
normal sense when foreign policy and defence had been entirely transferred to the Union, but it 
seems unlikely that even the transfer of these powers, assuming it occurs, would be made in one 
single step. Sovereignty is a bundle of powers, and so it is divisible. In the Community it is divided 
between the Member States and the Community itself," and the same will be true in the Union. 
If one asks the more practical question: 'how may a small country with an open economy best safe-
guard its interests in an increasingly interdependent world?', it is obvious that its interests may be 
better protected by the rights and safeguards for Member States of a federal or near-federal system 
than by 'sovereign' statehood without close ties by treaty or otherwise. The important question to 
ask is how the rights and safeguards for the interests of each Member State compare with those 
which would be available to it if it was neither a member of, or closely associated with, the Com-
munity or the Union. For example, Ireland, which has not been represented at international 'summit' 
meetings, would have greater influence at those meetings through the Community or the Union than 
it is ever likely to obtain in any other way. 
" On the divisibility of sovereignty, see Pescatore, The Law of Integration, 1974, p. 30; Pescatore, L'apport du droit 
communautaire au droit international public, 1970, Cahiers de Droit européen (C.D.E.), pp. 501, 502-507. 
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c. Bringing the law of the European Union 
into force in Ireland 
An amendment to the constitution of Ireland must, under Article 47 of the constitution, be made by 
referendum. An amendment is approved if a majority of the votes cast at the referendum are in 
favour. There is no requirement that a certain minimum of the electorate should have voted. Voting 
in Ireland is not compulsory. 
Every proposal for the amendment of the constitution must be initiated in the Dáil (Art. 46, Con-
stitution). When passed (or deemed passed, under Article 23, in the case of disagreement between the 
two Houses) by both Houses of the Oireachtas, it is submitted to the electorate by referendum. It is 
signed by the President and becomes law only after the referendum has approved it. 
Private Members' Bills are permitted in the Dáil, but they are extremely rare, and it is inconceivable 
that a Bill of such importance would be introduced by anyone except the Government. Under Article 
28 of the constitution, Ireland has a system of cabinet government, in which the government norm-
ally has the support of a majority of the members of the Dáil. 
An amendment to the constitution on the lines of the 1972 amendment would make it possible for 
Ireland to join the European Union, but would not make Ireland a member. Ratification of the new 
Treaty could take place only after the amendment to the constitution had been signed by the Presi-
dent and so passed into law. Ratification of any treaty is an act of the Government under Article 28 
of the constitution and no treaty (even one expressly mentioned in an amendment to the constitution) 
becomes part of the domestic law of the Irish State except by an act of the Oireachtas. After the con-
stitution had been amended, therefore, it would be necessary for the new Treaty to be enacted into 
law by an act similar to the European Communities Act 1972. 
In that act, which is simpler and more direct than the corresponding legislation in the UK, the most 
important clause is s. 2, which provides: 
'From the 1st day of January 1973, the Treaties governing the European Communities and the 
existing and future acts of the institutions thereof shall be binding on the State and shall be part of 
the domestic law thereof under the conditions laid down by these Treaties.' 
This clause, because it embodies a renvoi to Community law, ensures that in any case of conflict bet-
ween Irish law and Community law, the latter prevails. It also ensures that Community measures 
have, in Irish domestic law, whatever direct effects are given to them by Community law, no more 
arid no less. The amendment to the constitution of course ensures that Community measures (and 
Irish measures necessitated by the obligations of membership) are immune from challenge on consti-
tutional grounds. As between non-constitutional measures of Irish domestic law the normal rules 
apply (acts prevail over delegated legislation, later legislation prevails over prior legislation enacted 
by the same authority) so that express powers have to be given to enable e.g. the Government or a 
minister to amend an act, even in order to bring it into line with Community law. This was done by 
the 1972 Act, s. 3. 
Ratification by Ireland of the new Treaty setting up the European Union would be possible only after 
an act essentially similar to the European Communities Act 1972 had been adopted. (Some drafting 
improvements could be imagined.) 
The rules of Irish law concerning the supremacy of Community law, and the effects of rules of Com-
munity law which are not directly applicable, would be the same under the new Treaty as in the case 
of the Community Treaties,14 unless the constitutional amendment or the implementing legislation 
were differently drafted. There is no reason to think that they would be. 
14 Temple Lang, op. cit., 9 CMLR, 1972, pp. 171-176; Murphy, 'The European Community and the Irish Legal System', in 
Ireland and the European Communities, (Coombes ed.), 1983, pp. 29-37, who also describes the work of the Oireachtas Joint 
Committee on the secondary legislation of the European Communities. This Committee concerns itself with both Community 
secondary legislation and with Irish secondary legislation implementing Community directives and supplementing, where 
appropriate, Community regulations. 
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The Irish constitutional rules just stated appear to deal with the question, which might arise, whether 
the Union had exceeded its own powers. If the new provision in the constitution of Ireland corres-
ponds to that already discussed, and if the legislation giving effect to the Union Treaty in Ireland 
contained a clause corresponding to that in the European Communities Act of 1972, a determination 
by the Community Court that the Union had, or had not, exceeded its powers, if that question was 
raised before it, would be binding on the Irish courts. Unless Irish public opinion altered greatly, it 
would be most improbable that the provisions would be deliberately drafted so as to make the Irish 
Supreme Court, rather than the Court of Justice, the ultimate arbiter of whether, in the view of Irish 
law, the Union had exceeded its powers. The only practical result of drafting the provisions in that 
way would be to make it possible (though no doubt it would be unlikely) for the two courts to give 
conflicting decisions on the question, if it ever arose. Irish public opinion is not so concerned about 
the possibility of the Community exceeding its powers, and is not likely to be so concerned about the 
possibility of the Union exceeding its (much wider) powers, that the possibility of such a conflict 
would be intentionally created, for the purpose of protecting Irish sovereignty or otherwise. As is 
explained below, Irish public opinion is not as sensitive as public opinion in certain other Member 
States about enlargement of the powers of the Community. 
For the reasons given below in the socio-political part of this paper, it is impossible to imagine a refer-
endum being held to allow Ireland to join the Union unless at least one of the present two large politi-
cal parties was in favour. However, once the referendum was passed by the people, no further diffi-
culty would arise unless a new government came into office which was opposed to Ireland joining the 
Union. Unless this happened, (which would be unlikely if the referendum had been passed by the 
people) the government which had promoted the referendum would be able to ensure that the legisla-
tion needed for accession was enacted. 
d. Neutrality — Not a legal question in Ireland 
The question of Irish neutrality is discussed below, as a political question. There is nothing in the 
constitution of Ireland, or in any Irish legislation or Irish law, or in any treaty, on the question of 
Irish neutrality. It has been suggested that a provision stating Ireland's neutrality should be added to 
the constitution, but this suggestion seems to have no significant public support. Such a provision, if 
it were seriously considered, would necessitate a definition, or would at least provoke a discussion, 
of what is meant by Irish neutrality. A provision in the Irish Constitution stating Ireland's neutrality 
would ultimately be incompatible with Ireland's membership of the European Union. Once this is 
understood, and once the long-term economic costs of staying out of the Union have been realized, it 
is improbable that any movement to have such a provision added to the constitution would make sig-
nificant progress. 
e. A new Irish Constitution? 
For completeness, another possibility should be mentioned. It has been suggested from time to time 
that a whole new constitution should be drawn up and adopted by referendum. This would certainly 
be one possible way of making certain changes in the existing constitution which might not be passed 
by referendum if they were put to the voters separately. If, for any reason, a whole new constitution 
was drawn up and put to the voters in a referendum, the issues concerning Ireland's accession to the 
European Union (assuming that the new constitution was so drafted as to permit accession, which 
presumably it would be) would be combined with the issues, whatever they were, about the relative 
merits of the new constitution and the existing constitution. This in turn would mean that, if the new 
constitution was adopted, the issues concerning accession to the Union would not be decided by refe-
rendum: Ireland uses referendums only when it is necessary to amend the constitution, or to adopt a 
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new one, and not on policy questions, however important. The decision on accession would there-
fore be made by the legislature. This is not the place to discuss the desirability or otherwise of exten-
sively altering the present constitution. It may simply be mentioned that one of the main reasons why 
the idea has been suggested in recent years is that it has been felt that extensive changes would be 
necessary to make the constitution more attractive to those people in Northern Ireland who are 
opposed to reunification of Ireland. However, it is obvious that constitutional changes, however 
extensive, might be a necessary condition but could never be a sufficient condition for reunification 
and that the other conditions, whatever they may turn out to be (not to mention economic and other 
matters) are more important. 
3. Political aspects 
This part of this paper assesses some of the elements which are likely to influence public opinion in 
the Republic of Ireland at the time of the referendum which would be necessary to enable Ireland to 
ratify the Treaty setting up the European Union. 
Ireland is the only Member State of the Community which was a colony within living memory. 
(Legally Ireland was a province of the UK between 1800 and 1922, but most Irish people regarded its 
status as substantially that of a colony.) National independence is therefore not taken for granted as 
much as in other countries. Ireland is also the only Member State in the position of having part of 
what it regards as its national territory under the jurisdiction of another Member State. On the other 
hand, Ireland is a small country, and never had an empire. It does not feel itself to have, or to have 
had, a world-wide political influence which it would be reluctant to see merged into a European 
group of States, although there is a strong sense of fellow-feeling with Irish emigrants outside 
Europe, notably in the USA. Irish people are accustomed to the idea that important decisions affect-
ing their interests are taken outside Ireland, whether in London, Washington or Brussels. They are 
not annoyed, as I feel that English people are often annoyed, by the thought of decisions affecting 
their interests being taken by 'foreigners' (even when the UK has a vote and a veto). Most Irish people 
are not prejudiced against the idea of the existing Community extending its powers, in the way that 
many Danes and English people are prejudiced against it. The 1972 referendum campaign in Ireland 
did not need to concern itself with reassurance against exaggerated or irrational fears. Irish people 
are not prejudiced against foreigners. In the 1972 referendum, no less than 83% of those voting were 
in favour of joining the Community, a remarkably high proportion in a country which did not exper-
ience invasion during World War II and therefore which is not greatly influenced by the argument 
that such a war must never be allowed to happen again. 
However, there is relatively little interest in the 'European ideal' in Ireland. Only one leading Irish 
politician has a reputation, in Ireland or elsewhere, as being really communautaire. This is not mere-
ly because Ireland is not large enough to feel that Europe cannot be built without her, or to feel that 
she has an important responsibility in international relations. It is also because of the extent to which 
Irish opinion was preoccupied with the problem of Northern Ireland, even before the present 
troubles began there 15 years ago, in 1969. 
For these and other reasons, Ireland has not played a role in the Community which has been suffi-
ciently influential and constructive to give Irish public opinion confidence and satisfaction compara-
ble to that derived from Ireland's involvement, in the less recent past, in the United Nations. This is 
partly because the activities of e.g. Ireland's first two Presidencies (during which, inter alia, the first 
two Lomé Conventions were concluded) were too complex and not conspicuous enough to be widely 
appreciated in Ireland. 
Irish attitudes towards the Community have been primarily concerned with economics. Initially the 
Community was, correctly, regarded as likely to benefit Ireland economically in various ways, and to 
250 
a very important extent. More recently, there has been a tendency to criticize the Community, some-
what unfairly, for its inability to prevent or surmount world recession, increased oil prices, and 
unemployment in Ireland and elsewhere. This disillusionment has coincided with the unpleasant 
effects of (very necessary) measures taken to put Irish government finances and the national economy 
in order, and to reduce budget and balance-of-payments deficits, overspending, and excessive for-
eign borrowing. Even the very large economic benefits (especially in agriculture) which Ireland has 
unquestionably obtained from Community membership have not prevented these difficulties from 
arising, but the difficulties have caused public opinion to underestimate the benefits. However, it is 
important to emphasize that in Ireland, unlike some other Member States, dissatisfaction with the 
working of the Community does not imply opposition to the Community or to its aims, and shows 
no signs of developing into opposition to them. 
a. The significance of Northern Ireland 
As already mentioned, the problems of Northern Ireland, and of Ireland's relations with the UK in 
the light of the Northern Ireland problem, have occupied the attention of many Irish people who 
would otherwise have been thinking about Community affairs. However, it has been a Northern Ire-
land politician, John Hume, who has done most to involve the Community constructively in North-
ern Ireland. Many people in Northern Ireland realize that they would get greater benefits from the 
Community if they were part of the Republic of Ireland, or if they could be treated in the same way 
as the Republic. But the Community has not been able to make the border between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic wither away. 
So far, progress towards European integration is not regarded as a way (certainly not an adequate 
way) of solving Northern Ireland's difficulties. One of the papers written for the New Ireland For-
um15 points out that 'the structure of agriculture in the North has moved closer to that in the South 
although the use of MCAs has increased the cost and complexity of cross-border trade . . . member-
ship of the Community has facilitated cooperation on issues such as cross-border development. . . . 
However, in 1979 economic cooperation between North and South was inhibited by the decision of 
the UK to stay out of the European Monetary System . . . Membership of the European Community 
has. . . benefited both parts of the island but the South, because of its independence, has been able 
to make greater use of it. . . there would be more advantages to the North if a specific agricultural 
policy could be developed rather than one on a UK basis'. Another Forum paper16 pointed out that 
the use made by the Ireland of Community loan instruments, mainly from the European Investment 
Bank, has been enormously greater than the use by the North. The New Ireland Forum paper on the 
legal systems in Ireland17 pointed out that Community law is likely to be a significant harmonizing 
factor in legal development in both jurisdictions. 
However, the main report of the Forum says very little about the Community, merely mentioning18 
that an integrated economic policy for the whole country would be in the interests of both parts, 
since both have common interests in areas such as agriculture and regional policy which diverge from 
the interests of Britain. 
An improvement in the situation in Northern Ireland would allow Irish people to turn more of their 
attention to Community affairs. More important, the more the Community can play a useful and 
constructive role in Northern Ireland, the more favourably public opinion in both parts of Ireland 
New Ireland Forum, The Economic Consequences of the Division of Ireland Since 1920, § 7.1-7, 1984. 
New Ireland Forum, A Comparative Description of the Economic Structure and Situation, North and South, § 11.1-4, 1983. 
New Ireland Forum, The Legal Systems North and South, Part 5, 1984. 
New Ireland Forum, Report, § 6.8,1984. For a view of Northern Ireland by the European Parliament see the Haagerup report, 
European Parliament, Documents de Séance 1983-84, Doc. 1-1526/83; see also Lyons, Ireland since the Famine, 1971, pp. 
682 et seq. 
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will regard it. Northern Ireland therefore is both a reason why Irish politicians, with the notable 
exception of John Hume, have given less time than they might have given to Community affairs, and 
is also an opportunity for the Community to make a real contribution which would not only be 
worthwhile in itself but would significantly increase its popularity in both parts of Ireland, and no 
doubt in Britain as well. Northern Ireland's problems are costing the UK some UKL 1 300 million 
each year, and though the corresponding cost to Ireland is less in absolute terms, it is greater in rela-
tion to the size of the country's budget. An imaginative and constructive involvement of the Com-
munity in Northern Ireland would be perfectly possible, if the UK would agree to it, and would offer 
a much better hope of a real long-term solution than anything which anyone has yet suggested. 
b. Irish attitudes to European political cooperation 
European political cooperation, though useful, has so far been so modest that it is difficult to deduce 
much from Irish attitudes towards it. When, as in the Tindemans report in 1976, it was suggested 
that defence matters might be included within the sphere of political cooperation, or when it was 
suggested in the European Parliament that defence procurement should be dealt with by the Com-
munity, the Irish reaction was negative, but not primarily on grounds of principle. In fact Irish politi-
cians have seen no difficulty in advocating Irish neutrality and giving at least verbal support for 
European integration. While avoiding publicity, successive Irish governments have cooperated prag-
matically in EPC activities so far. 
In a speech in the Dáil on 22 October 1981, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Professor Dooge (Fine 
Gael) said: 
'When we acceded to the Community in 1973 the position was that we not only accepted the 
acquis communautaire established by the various Treaties, we also undertook a political commit-
ment in the context of progress towards European Union, to consult and coordinate with our 
partners on foreign policy in the non-Treaty inter-governmental framework of European political 
cooperation . . . Ireland, in common with other Member States, has been quite satisfied with the 
way political cooperation has developed within this framework . . . Of course, there are some 
issues where positions still diverge and this is how one would expect it to be, given the varying 
interests and traditions of the Member States and the essential flexibility and pragmatism of the 
way political cooperation works. Notwithstanding such divergences, the experience of all of the 
Ten, including Ireland, has been that to the extent the views of the Ten coincide, we have oppor-
tunities to play a far more significant and influential role and serve our interests more effectively 
on many issues, acting together with our partners in the Ten, than we would have as individual 
States acting alone . . . the London report of 13 October 1981 on European political cooperation 
. . . reiterates the political commitment of the Member States to consult on foreign-policy ques-
tions. An important element is the recognition that the report gives to the importance of the 
Treaties as the basis for further integration, and the maintenance and development of Community 
policies in accordance with the Treaties, before further steps can be taken to strengthen political 
cooperation . . . Political cooperation is concerned with coordination of foreign policy. Within 
that context discussion has taken place from an early stage in political cooperation of foreign-
policy matters that have a security dimension . . . This has not presented a problem for Ireland 
. . . it is useful and important that in the London report it is clear that the scope of political co-
operation on these matters is confined to political aspects of security and that defence or military 
issues as such are excluded . . . The relevant paragraph in the report, far from being an extension 
of the scope of political cooperation, is in fact an explicit re-statement, in a form acceptable to Ire-
land, of the practice established under successive Irish governments . . . the Federal German 
Government recently endorsed Mr Genscher's ideas on establishing a new framework for evolu-
tion to European Union . . . It is right and appropriate that we should debate those proposals on 
their own merits . . . in our view the commitment to political cooperation is based upon, and 
indeed flows from the commitment to economic integration set out in the Treaties establishing the 
Communities . . . it is hard to see how political cooperation can respond effectively to external 
problems unless internal cohesion and common interest within the Community are first of all 
increased and developed.' 
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The Irish Times of 27 October 1984 commented that the current Western European Union meeting 
took place partly because of Ireland's reluctance to go along with the original proposals of Genscher-
Colombo which included regular meetings of Defence Ministers of EEC Member States, although 
Ireland was not the only country to object. 'The Government here, and politicians of most parties, 
clearly accept the WEU revival with some relief. It seemingly removes the issue of security from the 
forum of European political cooperation among the Ten, sparing Irish ministers the embarrassment 
of deciding when the political aspects of security end, and the compromising of Irish neutrality 
begins . . .' Having pointed out that this was a superficial view which evaded the issue, the paper 
went on to say that 'politicians here adopt a very jealous stance on neutrality when it is a matter of 
public debate at home, but manage to maintain admirable flexibility on the same topic in the context 
of the EEC . . . Such discrepancies are explicable only if neutrality is regarded as a matter of expe-
diency, related to circumstances, and not a keystone of foreign policy, permanent and non-nego-
tiable. Mr Cooney (the Irish Minister for Defence) had the courage and frankness to say so."9 
c. Irish attitudes to increased Community powers 
The attitudes of Irish politicians and of public opinion do not display the automatic objection to any 
increase of Community powers, or even to the full use of existing Community powers or to specific 
examples of Community powers such as the direct effect of Community law, which are conspicuous 
in some other Member States. Irish people in general are not opposed to increases in the powers of 
the Community. Only a very small minority in Ireland share the attitudes, summed up in the emotive 
word 'sovereignty', which are common in Denmark and in the United Kingdom. It has been said20 
that 'Britain, like Denmark and Greece, joined [the Community] not because it wanted to be in but 
because it feared to be out'. Without discussing this rather severe statement, one can say that 
although Ireland certainly would have been unwise to stay out once the UK joined, Irish people have 
never felt any of the ambivalence, to put it no more stronly, which is felt in the UK about the Com-
munity. There is no widespread or general prejudice in Ireland against the Community. The popular 
attitude is quite different from that in Britain. 
On the other hand, proposals to increase substantially the powers of the European Parliament could 
give rise to objections which have not been made so far. These objections might be based on instinc-
tive reluctance to change, or to criticisms of the way in which the European Parliament has so far 
used its powers. There might also be objections to a large-scale transfer of powers from national 
legislatures to the Council of the Union, i.e. to governments. There might certainly be objections to 
any provision which created exceptions to the Commissions's exclusive right to initiate measures 
since, once the veto has been ended, the Commission's exclusive right to initiate represents the princi-
pal safeguard for ensuring that the interests of smaller Member States will be adequately taken into 
account. Article 37.2 of the Draft Treaty might therefore give rise to criticism. 
d. Irish neutrality 
Irish neutrality has never been defined. As already mentioned, it is not mentioned in the constitution. 
It is not the subject of any treaty. It has never been fully or authoritatively articulated. It is therefore 
See also D. Kennedy, 'Neutrality Stance has Changed', Irish Times, 15.11. 1984, who comments that'no real attempt has been 
made to reconcile this enlarged [i.e. 'far-reaching'] view of neutrality with the dominant thrust of Irish foreign policy, that is, 
commitment to the EEC and to European integration . . . This poses a danger to Ireland — that of being relegated to the 
periphery of Europe moving towards.. . a two tier Europe'. 
The Fianna Fail European Progressive Democrats election document A Strong Voice in Europe, 1984, stated that 'Fianna Fail 
supports the process of European political cooperation . . .' but also drew a distinction between 'security' and 'military' mat-
ters, saying 'it has been suggested that European political cooperation should be extended to military affairs. Fianna Fail is 
totally opposed to this idea. While Member States may discuss certain foreign-policy questions touching on the political aspects 
of security, Fianna Fail is opposed to any involvement in either military or defence matters by Community institutions. This 
opposition is rooted in our status as a Member State which does not belong to any milirary alliance'. 
International Herald Tribune, 14. 7. 1984. 'When will Britain be European?' 
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not easy to describe, although it has been the subject of a valuable book by my colleague in Trinity 
College, Dublin, Patrick Keatinge.2' In practical terms, it has merely meant that Ireland is not and 
has not been a member of NATO, the Western European Union, or of any military alliance. Apart 
from that, it is an attitude, and not really a policy. The elements which have contributed to that atti-
tude are as follows. 
The idea of Irish neutrality has been associated with independence from the UK. The Irish people did 
not wish to be involved in 'England's wars'. They have a certain distrust of major powers. Ireland's 
geographical position made it possible to stay out of conflicts in Europe without having to maintain 
armed forces adequate to resist invasion: Irish neutrality has been relatively cost-free. In 1938, Ire-
land negotiated the closing of British naval bases on Irish soil, and this made possible Ireland's neu-
trality in World War II. 'By 1945 the basis for a national tradition of neutrality, both as a value and a 
policy, had been laid'.22 After Ireland joined the UN in 1955, and in the 1960s, the Irish Government 
worked for disarmament measures and progressive withdrawal of armed forces in Europe. These 
efforts were regarded with approval in Ireland as demonstrating an independent and constructive 
foreign policy, although Ireland's voting record in other respects in the UN was not very different 
from that of other Western European countries, or those of the other European neutrals, Austria, 
Finland and Sweden. Ireland never joined NATO. One reason suggested for this was that NATO 
member States' commitment to respect each others' territories might imply recognition of the legi-
timacy of British rule in Northern Ireland. However, a stronger if less explicit reason is that, for 
geographical reasons, the Irish people do not feel threatened by Eastern bloc forces, and so see less 
need for military preparedness than peoples further east. The feeling that Ireland's neutrality is in 
some sense morally preferable to involvement in the East-West conflict or even to membership of a 
defensive military alliance has been strengthened by Ireland's contributions to UN peacekeeping 
forces, and by the view of Irish people that peacekeeping, neutrality, and aid to developing countries 
are related. What can best be described as insularity has also played a role. 
Ireland applied to join the European Communities in 1961. During the previous two years, and sub-
sequently, Sean Lemass, then Taoiseach (prime minister) made a series of public statements to the 
effect that Ireland would involve itself in European integration without any reservations as to how 
far it might go in the areas of foreign policy and defence, and that in due course Ireland would cease 
to have a policy of neutrality. In the discussion before the referendum on Irish accession, in May 
1972, the two major political parties both advocated accession, and both took the view that mem-
bership of the Community would not compromise Irish neutrality in the foreseeable future. Since the 
corresponding view was not held by Austria, Finland, Sweden or Switzerland, the Irish view implied 
(no doubt correctly) that Irish neutrality was different from the neutrality of those countries. In 1979 
Jack Lynch said that Ireland had no traditional or permanent policy of neutrality, and that in the 
Community Ireland would ultimately cease to be neutral. In a debate in the Dáil in 1981 Charles 
Haughey, then Taoiseach and leader of the same political party as his two predecessors just mentio-
ned, accepted that full political union in the Community would ultimately involve an end of Irish 
neutrality. Lemass had probably thought more carefully about neutrality than either of his succes-
sors, and it is clear that he did not believe that neutrality should be a brake on Ireland's participation 
in European integration. 
Irish neutrality therefore has been an attitude which Irish people have been able to take for granted, 
for geographical reasons, without analysis and virtually without economic or other sacrifices. (Ire-
land has never had compulsory military service.) It has certainly been a less clear position than those 
of the four recognized European neutral States, Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. Keatinge 
identifies two points of view. The first is a 'moderate' or 'pragmatic' view of what national pros-
perity, security and independence make appropriate. This is the view of at least a majority of the two 
Keatinge, A Singular Stance: Irish Neutrality in the 1980s, 1984; Bowman, De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917-1973, 
1982, Ch. 6. For some comments on the historical reasons for Sweden's neutrality, see 'Sweden: a survey', The Economist, 
6-12. 10. 1984. 
Keatinge, op. cit., p. 20. 
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major political parties, and the essence of it is non-membership of any military alliance. This view 
would imply that Irish neutrality might be lessened or given up if other national interests or aims jus-
tified doing so. The second is a more 'far-reaching' view, expressed by the small Labour Party23 
(which has been in government only as the junior partner in a coalition, and which does not seem 
likely to achieve power alone in the foreseeable future) and by others, mostly outside the Oireachtas. 
This view regards neutrality as a basic, immutable, moral principle of national policy. 
Since neutrality is highly regarded by Irish opinion, but has never yet conflicted with any recognized 
national interest or made necessary any significant economic sacrifices, it is impossible to be certain 
which of these two views would be closer to Irish public opinion after careful consideration of Irish 
accession to the proposed Treaty on European Union. However, those who clearly advocate the 
second, more inflexible version of Irish neutrality are in general less representative of Irish opinion 
than the two major parties, though their articulate and indeed emotional advocacy of a more 
extreme concept of neutrality might win some public sympathy. It seems unlikely that either concept 
would ultimately prove enough to produce a majority of the electorate opposed to accession to a 
European Union. Neither of the major parties has had occasion to explain the reasons for weakening 
or giving up Irish neutrality for the sake of the economic and political advantages of participating in 
a European Union, but such an explanatory campaign by both the large parties, when the time comes, 
would certainly have a considerable influence on public opinion. One significant sign is that, 
although the Labour Party suggested in 1980 that neutrality should be written into the constitution, 
there is no other substantial body of opinion which wishes this to be done. However, in Ireland and 
elsewhere many people hope that neutralist attitudes and military weakness might enable them to 
avoid being involved in any possible future conflict in Europe, and the wish to avoid such involve-
ment is an understandable one. 
It should also be said that, although the Irish like to regard themselves as neutral, no Irish politician 
ever makes the kind of criticisms of the USA or of other European countries which have often been 
made by Swedish politicians, or speaks as favourably of Communist regimes as leading Greek politi-
cians have done. Since the end of World War II hardly any action has been taken by any Irish 
Government in the foreign relations sphere which would have caused surprise if it had been taken by, 
say, the Netherlands. 
e. Economic issues 
Economic questions formed a large part of the debate in Ireland on accession to the Communities. 
They would probably be important in the debate on accession to the Treaty on European Union. 
How they will be considered will depend on economic developments in the Community and in Ire-
land, in particular during the period between now and when Ireland's accession to the European 
Union has to be decided. We do not know how long that period will be, or how the economies will 
perform during it. The economic advantages of joining the European Union would also have to be 
compared, presumably, with (i) remaining outside the European Union but inside the Community, 
and (ii) leaving the Community entirely. Neither alternative is likely to be economically attractive, 
but neither can usefully be discussed here. 
Irish public opinion would obviously be more favourable to the European Union if the Community 
proves itself successful economically in the coming years. It is impossible to isolate the effect of the 
Community on the Irish economy in 1973-84 from the effects of e.g. the energy crisis, global reces-
sion, the Northern Ireland problem and its huge cost to the Dublin Government, and Irish economic 
and financial policies followed during the same period. However, it is clear that membership of the 
Notably in the Labour Party booklet, Ireland — a Neutral Nation, 1981. 
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Community has given Ireland very large economic benefits, notably in improved access to markets 
on the continent, higher prices for agricultural products, and receipts from the EAGGF and the 
Social and Regional Funds. Ireland could have benefited more if its problems of farm structure and 
land-use policy, and of getting more efficient industry and public administration, had been solved. It 
is probable that the economic advantages for Ireland of joining the European Union and obtaining 
the full economic benefits of membership will be strong. 
ƒ. Ireland's role in the Community 
The Irish people would be more interested in and more favourable to the proposal for European 
Union if Ireland was playing a greater role in the Community. One major Irish initiative in the Com-
munity, if successful, would go far to convince Irish opinion that Ireland could make an important 
contribution. The kind of measure which would most interest Irish opinion would probably be the 
adoption of a Community policy, proposed and worked out by Ireland, on trade with developing 
countries, or of course on Northern Ireland. Irish attitudes on neutrality (quite apart from other 
States' views) might discourage Irish politicians from suggesting that the Community should take any 
major initiative to reduce international tension. Irish-inspired measures to eliminate barriers to intra-
Community trade, if they were effective and far-reaching, would also help to persuade Irish opinion 
that European integration could bring important benefits. (Indeed, if under the present Irish Presi-
dency the negotiations for the accession of Spain and Portugal and for the third Lomé Convention 
can be brought to a successful conclusion, or if a useful package of measures on intra-Community 
barriers were pushed through, thorough coverage by the Irish media of these achievements would 
have some of the effects under discussion.) Like most European peoples, the Irish tend to be exasper-
ated with the Community not because it is too integrationist but because it is not moving fast 
enough, and is too often obstructed by short-sighted disputes over petty issues. The Irish would be 
pleased by statesmanlike leadership in the Community, especially if an Irish Government had contri-
buted to it or provided it. 
g. The attitudes of the main political parties 
As very few considered comments have been made by Irish politicians on the Draft Treaty, it is 
appropriate to summarize their attitudes to European integration generally. 
Reference has been made already, in the section on Irish neutrality, to statements by the three leaders 
of the largest political party in Ireland, Fianna Fail. More recently, Mr Haughey has made more 
inflexible statements, but he has never argued against the principle of European political integration 
or of Ireland's involvement in it, and it seems likely that his statements were more influenced by 
short-term party-political tactics than by long-term thinking. Neutrality is popular enough in Ireland 
to tempt politicians to accuse their opponents of failure to preserve it. On the other hand, Fianna Fail 
is more old-fashioned in its outlook than the other parties and is more likely than the others to 
oppose, or at least to be ambivalent about, Ireland's becoming involved in European political 
integration. One or two Fianna Fail members of the Dáil have made comments more consistent with 
the 'far-reaching' version of Irish neutrality than with the 'pragmatic' version. There is some risk that 
Fianna Fail politicians may, for short-term tactical reasons, make statements which imply a less 
pragmatic version of neutrality than their party has previously held. There is a risk that they may do 
this without adequate awareness of the economic costs of a neutrality sufficient to keep Ireland out 
of the European Union, if their statements were to lead so far. 
Of the three main political parties, the second largest, Fine Gael, now led by Dr Garret FitzGerald, is 
probably the most favourable to European integration. That party holds the more moderate and 
more pragmatic view on neutrality identified by Keatinge, and Dr FitzGerald is the most Com-
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munity-minded politician in Ireland. Mr Cooney, the Minister for Defence, has recently confirmed 
this attitude. 
The attitude of the much smaller Labour Party is less easy to summarize. The Labour Party argued 
against accession to the Community in 1972, though perhaps not all its members argued with con-
viction. It loyally accepted the verdict of the 1972 referendum. In the 1980s the Labour Party pub-
lished several policy papers.21 The paper on the European Community unreservedly supports the 
Community and Ireland's involvement in it (while naturally calling for more socialist policies), say-
ing 'Labour . . . has sought, since Irish entry in 1973, to contribute fully and positively to the deve-
lopment of the institutions, policies and programmes of the Community, and to its overall progress.' 
It adds that 'Ireland's neutrality must not be compromised'. The paper on European political co-
operation stressed 'the vital importance of neutrality in all of this country's international dealings'. 
'Creating a socialist basis for the future of the Community does not imply any diminution of Ireland's 
long-standing neutral position'. European political cooperation is a 'threat to Irish neutrality' and 
Ireland should adopt 'a non-aligned position'. The question of what Ireland's attitude should be if the 
Community were to discuss military issues is left open, and the non-aligned position was undefined. 
The apparent implication is, however, that the Labour Party would be opposed to Ireland being 
involved in any developments which compromised Ireland's freedom to be 'non-aligned'. Keatinge 
however considers that since neither Fianna Fail nor Labour has repudiated the commitment to even-
tual European Union, implying involvement in collective defence, their real position, as distinct from 
their rhetoric, may ultimately be essentially similar to Fine Gael's. 
The attitudes and uncertainties of the three main Irish political parties were shown at the time of the 
vote in the European Parliament on the final Spinelli report. The Fine Gael MEPs voted for the 
report. Of the three Labour Party MEPs, one voted for and two voted against. The Fianna Fail 
MEPs had signed the register on the day of the vote but, presumably deliberately, were not present, 
and so took no position, not even abstaining. 
h. Trade unions and employer organizations 
The attitude of Irish trade unions towards Ireland's accession to the European Union Treaty is likely 
to be a result of two elements, the relative strength of which it is difficult to assess in advance. These 
two elements are, firstly, the economic advantages of joining the Union, compared with the econo-
mic results of not joining, and secondly, the extent of the feeling among trade unionists against join-
ing, on political grounds primarily concerned with neutrality. In the short term, the economic conse-
quences of joining will presumably be, in substance, simply a continuation of the existing situation 
within the Community. It is now, and may well be when the question arises, very much more diffi-
cult to say what the economic consequences of staying out of the Union would be for the Member 
States of the Community, if any, which decide not to join the Union. Presumably these consequences 
would depend, in part, on whether their reluctance to join the Union was thought to be temporary or 
permanent. In the case of Ireland, the economic consequences of both joining and of not joining 
would be affected (though much less than in 1972) by whether the UK joins or not. Probably, as in 
1972, the majority of trade-union members would vote in accordance with their economic interests, 
as they saw them when the time came, and the leaders of the trade-union movement would tend to 
adopt the attitude adopted by the Labour Party, and indeed would probably largely determine that 
attitude. 
The attitude of the employer organizations in Ireland (the Confederation of Irish Industries and the 
Federated Union of Employers) is almost certain to be based on their view of the economic results of 
: ' Various Labour Party publications: Ireland — a Neutral Nation, 1981 ; The European Community, 1984; European Political 
Cooperation' 1984. 
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joining or not joining, and to be uninfluenced by (or little influenced by) political considerations. 
They would, however, be more influenced than trade unions by the argument that Ireland's interests 
would be better protected if Ireland continued to have the maximum influence available to it in 
European affairs, which would imply that Ireland should join the Union when it comes into 
existence. 
i. Public opinion and the media 
In the light of what has been said above, the probable attitude of public opinion and media opinion 
can be summarized briefly. The media in Ireland are mostly moderate and middle-of-the-road on 
most issues, and do not often diverge significantly from public opinion in general on issues relevant 
to the European Union. Of course, different newspapers, for example, represent different tendencies 
within public opinion, but all the national newspapers and all, or almost all, of the provincial and 
local papers are, and are likely to remain, moderately 'pro-European'. 
Television, which is influential, is, although State-run, not significantly government influenced on 
issues directly relevant to the European Union (measures have been in operation for years to prevent 
television from giving publicity to the IRA). However, there is a minority in the media which adheres 
to the more far-reaching view of Irish neutrality, and which therefore, as in 1972, will be opposed to 
Ireland joining the European Union, even if the economic consequences of not joining were clearly 
unattractive. Such minorities are vocal, and the controversies they arouse excite public interest and 
are therefore good media material. In 1972 what can now be seen to have been a small but vocal 
minority of anti-EEC opinion obtained a considerable amount of publicity, and the same viewpoint 
will no doubt be thoroughly aired (as indeed it should be, in view of the importance of the issues at 
stake) when the occasion arises. Both public opinion and the media will no doubt give a great deal of 
attention to the question of neutrality, both because it has been a vague concept, taken for granted 
rather than analysed in the past, and because it is more likely to arouse discussion and controversy 
than the economic issues. It will by now be clear that the writer believes that the majority attitude to 
Irish neutrality is the 'moderate' or 'pragmatic' one, and that although Irish public opinion supports 
this attitude, it is not likely to prevent Ireland from following what presumably will be its economic 
interests and joining the European Union. 
j . The Catholic Church 
For completeness, mention should be made of the influence of the Roman Catholic Church in Ire-
land. Although it is less strong than it was, it is still greater than in most other European countries. 
Approximately 95 % of the population of the Republic of Ireland are Catholics. The 1937 Constitu-
tion 'recognized' the 'special position' of the Church as that of 'the great majority of the citizens', but 
this clause, which had never been considered as having any practical or legal effects or as being more 
than a statement of the obvious, was removed from the constitution, by referendum and without any 
opposition from the Church or from any significant body of opinion, several years ago. However, 
Irish Catholicism is somewhat conservative, and there was a majority in favour of the referendum to 
add a provision to the constitution designed to prevent both the legislature and the courts from lega-
lizing abortion. 
It seems unlikely that the Church or Catholic opinion in Ireland would take any position for or 
against Ireland joining the European Union. No real view of this kind emerged in the discussion 
before the referendum in 1972 on joining Community. 
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k. Irish opinion in a referendum on accession 
to the European Union: Conclusion 
It is not easy to foresee the circumstances most likely to lead governments to advocate ratification of 
the European Union Treaty. This might result from an economic crisis which only a more united 
Europe could surmount, or it might result from accumulated public impatience with the pettiness of 
national politicians and civil servants who are now obstructiong the operation of the Community. 
Or it might result primarily from creative leadership from European statesmen. 
Irish public opinion would almost certainly support a major initiative in European integration if it 
was led by an Irish politician. In the absence of such an initiative, the result of a referendum on Ire-
land's accession to a European Union would depend on the attitudes of the two large Irish political 
parties. Accession would be impossible unless at least one of those parties was in favour of it. Either, 
in power, would seek the support of the other, to obtain a bipartisan attitude, as in 1972. If both 
were in favour, the referendum would almost certainly approve accession. If one of the two large 
parties opposed accession, the outcome could be doubtful. Much would depend, if the two parties 
disagreed, on the campaign to explain the purpose of the referendum and the reasons for joining the 
European Union. Of the two big parties, Fine Gael would be more likely to be in favour of joining, 
and Fianna Fail would be more likely to oppose it. In the Republic of Ireland, the Labour Party 
would certainly be concerned by the implications of joining for Irish neutrality, but it is not clear if 
they would go so far as to oppose joining if the economic arguments for it were strong, as they 
almost certainly would be. Apart from the question of neutrality, Ireland and Irish opinion would 
not be as opposed to the incipient federalism of the European Union as the United Kingdom and 
Denmark would probably be. Irish opinion is not sensitive about the Community institutions having 
greater powers. 
Fine Gael in particular has supported majority voting in the Council, strengthening the Commission, 
and direct elections for the European Parliament. Fianna Fail have been less explicit, but by coinci-
dence Fianna Fail have only once been in power when Ireland held the Presidency (and at that period 
were distracted by internal questions) and so have never had occasion to see its political potential. 
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Chapter VIII - The Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union 
from an Italian viewpoint 
by Giorgio Gaja 
1. In considering the likelihood of Italy's accepting the Draft Treaty establishing the European 
Union or a similar text under a political perspective, one cannot help being struck by the strong sup-
port expressed for the draft. All the major political parties are in favour of European federalism; this 
is reflected by the media; the high percentage of voters in both direct elections of the European Par-
liament may also be taken, at least in part, as a sign that the electorate shares the same attitude. 
With regard to the Draft Treaty, its appeal for Italian political parties is no doubt increased by the 
fact that it is perceived as being essentially the work of Italians: Altiero Spinelli, an independent per-
sonality who was elected on the Communist list, is justifiably considered as the 'father' of the Draft 
Treaty; Mauro Ferri, a Socialist, was the chairman of the Institutional Committee when the draft 
was approved; the Italian Christian Democrats were among its strongest supporters within the 
European Parliament. All the Italian members of the European Parliament, who were present when 
the resolution approving the Draft Treaty was adopted in February 1984, voted in favour. 
When the Italian Parliament discussed the Draft Treaty, it was given overwhelming approval and 
hardly any criticism was voiced.' Parliament requested the Italian Government 'to approve within a 
short time the Draft Treaty, submit it to Parliament for ratification and take all the adequate steps 
for securing acceptance on the part of the other Member States of the European Community'. This is 
the gist of the almost identical operative parts of two resolutions adopted by the Senate on 10 May 
1984 and by the Chamber of Deputies a month later respectively.2 More recently, on 28 November 
1984, a joint meeting of the Constitutional and Foreign Affairs Committees of the Chamber of 
Deputies led to a resolution requesting the Italian Government to show its 'real intention to put the 
Treaty establishing a European Union into force' and also to take steps for 'convening within a short 
time an inter-governmental conference for the adoption of a Treaty establishing a European Union 
on the lines of the Draft Treaty approved by the European Parliament'. The more recent resolution, 
while no longer advocating a unilateral acceptance of the Draft Treaty by Italy, omits to refer to any 
other text in spite of the results of the Fontainebleau European Council and the preliminary discus-
sions in the Dooge Committee. 
However, the overall impression of strong support for the Draft Treaty in Italy needs to be some-
what toned down. The Draft Treaty represents more a symbol than a text whose meaning is fully 
appraised. It would be hard to find any reference to specific provisions in the Draft Treaty in the 
lengthy debates concerning it which were held in the Italian Parliament. Moreover, the negative atti-
tude taken by some Member States is increasingly perceived as giving the Draft Treaty no real pros-
1 Some criticism of a very general nature was expressed in the Senate by a MSI (neo-fascist) representative, Mr P. Romualdi 
(Senato della Repubblica, IX legislatura, 110a seduta, Resoconto stenografico, p. 16 et seq. 
' The text approved by the Senate referred to the 'greatest possible number of Member States' rather than to 'the other Member 
States'. The date of the Chamber of Deputies' approval was 6 June 1984; the Chamber had already voted a resolution on simi-
lar lines as early as 14 February 1984. 
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pect of ever becoming a binding text: in spite of lip-service paid to the Draft Treaty, no significant 
pressure appears to be exerted by Parliament for its formal approval. 
2. Formal acceptance by Italy of a Treaty establishing the European Union would require, under 
Article 87 of the constitution the ratification, or an equivalent act, on the part of the President of the 
Republic — and this implies the Government's consent — and also, under Article 80, whenever there 
is, among other cases, a 'politically important Treaty', a law authorizing ratification approved by 
Parliament. In Article 80 ratification is generally understood as covering any form of acceptance of a 
binding text: otherwise the requirement of an authorization to be given by Parliament could easily be 
circumvented.1 
In practice, Parliament occasionally discussed some draft treaties in general terms, but gave a formal 
authorization only in relation to treaties which had already been adopted. However, it could be 
maintained that Parliament's authorization may also concern a draft text — the President of the 
Republic could then ratify a treaty once it has been formally adopted, if the text corresponds to the 
draft treaty or arguably also if some unsubstantial changes are made. The reason why Parliament 
refrains from authorizing ratification of draft treaties seems to lie in the risk of a law being useless 
under the circumstances. The same reason explains why Parliament waits for a government bill relat-
ing to a treaty, as the existence of a government bill gives some indication that, once authorization is 
given, the treaty is likely to be ratified. However, there is nothing in the constitution preventing the 
approval of a private member's bill relating to a treaty. The approval of a law could then represent 
an instrument of pressure on the government1 — whether the treaty has been formally adopted or 
not. 
With regard to Parliament's role in authorizing ratification of a Treaty corresponding to the Draft 
Treaty, another problem arises. Article 82 of the Draft Treaty provides that, once the Treaty 'has 
been ratified by a majority of the Member States of the Communities whose population represents 
two-thirds of the total population of the Communities, the governments of the Member States which 
have ratified shall meet at once to decide by common accord on the procedures by and the date on 
which this Treaty shall enter into force'. The momentous decision concerning whether the Commun-
ity should be dissolved and replaced by the Union is thus left to an agreement to be concluded by the 
governments of the Member States concerned. 
Would a law authorizing ratification of the Treaty also cover the international agreement envisaged 
in Article 82? If there is no specification either way in the law, a difficult question would arise. The 
fact that Article 82 mentions only 'governments' gives no clear indication, since the Draft Treaty 
manifestly does not intend to regulate the respective role of governments and parliaments under the 
relevant constitutional systems. In Italian constitutional practice laws authorizing ratification have 
often been construed as applying also to implementing and subsidiary agreements yet to be conclu-
ded.' However, the case of Article 82 of the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union is argu-
ably different. The decision that governments should take by agreement, may imply solving the most 
fundamental question with regard to the Union and is likely to take place under circumstances that 
cannot be reasonably foreseen by Parliament when the law authorizing ratification is adopted. 
3. The next consideration is whether any substantive provision in the Italian Constitution facilit-
ates the conclusion of a Treaty establishing the European Union or puts any obstacle thereto. 
There is no provision in the constitution that specifically concerns the European Community or 
Union. Under Article 11, Italy consents to limitations to its sovereignty which are necessary for 
! For this view see especially T. Perassi, Scritti giuridici, vol I, Giuffrè, Milan (1958), p. 423 and A. Cassese, in G. Branca (ed.), 
Commentario della Costituzione, Arts 76-82, Zanichelli, Bologna, Soc. ed. 11 Foro italiano, Rome (1979), p. 159 et seq. 
4 A former leader of the PLI (liberal party), Mr G. Malagodi suggested that Parliament should discuss the Draft Treaty in its gene-
ral terms in order to create pressure on European public opinion, on other Parliaments and on governments. See 'Roma rilancia 
l'Europa', Il Sole-24 ore, 21. 2. 1984. 
1 For a critical comment see A. Bernardini, 'Funzione del Parlamento italiano nella conclusione di accordi internazionali', 34 
Comunità internazionale (1979), p. 577, at 591. 
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maintaining peace and security among nations, and favours the establishment of international orga­
nizations designed to pursue these ends. This text was written in 1947 with the United Nations in 
mind, but has been used in parliamentary debates and in the Constitutional Court's case­law mainly 
with regard to the European Community. While Article 11 could easily be interpreted as referring 
also to non­universal organizations, it is more difficult to read in the provision a reference to orga­
nizations that pursue the maintenance of peace and security only indirectly. However, the Constitu­
tional Court implicitly held in 1964 in Costa ν E«e/6 and expressly stated in 1973 in Frontini7 that 
Article 11 also applies to the European Community. A politically tighter and more comprehensive 
organization such as the European Union would no doubt come a fortiori under the same 
constitutional provision. 
One of the consequences of the applicability of Article 11 of the constitution to an organization is 
that Italian institutions should endeavour to promote its establishment and make Italy one of its 
members. All this is not very meaningful, given the difficulties in enforcing this type of obligation. A 
more significant consequence was drawn by the Constitutional Court in Frontini* a limitation to Italy's 
sovereignty may be accepted, when it comes under Article 11, by means of an ordinary law, even if 
this involves breaking some constitutional provisions — and thus, under ordinary circumstances, a 
constitutional law, adopted by a two­thirds majority and a double reading, would be required. The 
Court said that Article 11 'would appear to be deprived of its normative content were one to main­
tain that one needs a constitutional law for any limitation to sovereignty therein provided. On the 
contrary, it is clear that the said provision has a substantive and not only a procedural value, to the 
effect that it allows limitations to sovereignty under the conditions and for the purposes therein stated, 
thereby freeing Parliament from the need to make use of its power for revising the constitution'. This 
applies so far as 'fundamental principles of Italian constitutional law and basic human rights' are not 
at stake.' In 1973 the Court found that no such problem existed with regard to the European Com­
munity. 
A similar approach could well be taken in respect of the European Union. Participation in the Treaty 
establishing the Union would not necessarily entail anything more than 'limitations to sovereignty' 
and would thus be consistent with the 'fundamental principles of Italian constitutional law'.10 How­
ever, under the Treaty the Union system may evolve towards the establishment of a quasi­federal 
State. According to the Draft Treaty, legislative competence of Member States in many areas, their 
treaty­making power in even wider areas and their financial resources could be significantly curtailed 
through the adoption of Union acts. ' ' The Constitutional Court's view in Frontini was that an assess­
ment of the consistency of the Community system with the fundamental principles of Italian consti­
tutional law has to be made in the existing circumstances, although one could hypothetically reach a 
different result in the future;'2 the same approach would have to be taken with regard to the Union. 
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to consider a Treaty in terms not only of the immediate 
effects under the same Treaty but also of those which are likely to come in a longer span of time. 
6 Decision No 14 of 7. 3. 1984, 47 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1964), p. 295 etseq, at 296. 
7 Decision No 183 of 27. 12. 1973, 57 Rivista di diritto internazionale (1974), p. 130 etseq, at 134­135. 
1 Supra, note 7, at 136. For a critical comment see especially G. Sperduti, 'Sulle "limitazioni di sovranità" secondo l'art. 11 della 
Costituzione', 28 Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico (1978), p. 473 etseq, at 482­483. 
' This part of the Frontini decision [supra, note 7, at 136) was recently restated by the Constitutional Court in Granita (Decision 
No 170 of 8. 6.1984). An English translation of the relevant part of this decision may be found in 21 CML Rev. ( 1984), at p. 763 
et seq. 
'° According to P. Barile, 'Rapporti fra norme primarie comunitarie e norme costituzionali e primarie italiane', 21 Comunità inter­
nazionale (1966), p. 14 et seq, at 24, Italian institutions should not be entirely deprived of their competence, nor should the 
inter­institutional equilibrium be affected. 
" Reference is made here especially to Articles 11,12, 64, 66, 68 and 71 of the Draft Treary. For instance, under the latter provi­
sion, 'the Union may, by an organic law, amend the nature or the basis of assessment of existing sources of revenue or create 
new ones' (par. 2, first sentence); this could seriously affect Member States' ability of raising funds for their own needs. 
" According to the Court (supra, note 7, at 136) if Community law violated the 'fundamental principles of Italian constitutional 
law or basic human rights', the 'persisting consistency of the Treaty with fundamental principles' could be again assessed by the 
Court. 
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Accordingly, an assessment of the guarantees provided by that Treaty for the permanence of the 
sovereignty of Member States and also an evaluation of the developments which are likely to take 
place under the Treaty would have to be made. 
Also with regard to Article 11 of the Italian Constitution a special problem arises concerning the 
decision that may have to be taken on whether the Treaty establishing the European Union should be 
put into force among fewer States than the members of the Community. Article 11 appears to require 
that the various options should be considered in the light of which one better serves the ends stated in 
the constitution, namely the maintenance of peace and security in international relations. The ans-
wer would depend on political circumstances, including the type of links which are likely to be formed 
between the Union and the States which are members of the Community but do not intend to partici-
pate in the Union. If under Article 11 the permanence of the Community had to be viewed as the bet-
ter proposition participation in the Union could be effected only through a revision of the constitu-
tion. On the other hand, the legality of the transition from the Community to the Union would not 
be relevant under the Italian Constitution, since there is no general requirement in the constitution 
that Treaties should be respected. 
4. As a final remark, it may be wise to add that the importance of constitutional arguments should 
not be overestimated. This type of argument is frequently invoked in parliamentary debates, but 
rarely has much political significance. Constitutional questions tend to be settled according to the 
wishes of parliamentary majority. Were the constitutionality of a law approving ratification of the 
European Union ever tested by the Constitutional Court, this would happen only some time after 
ratification and participation in the Union would by then be a fait accompli. Under the circum-
stances, the Constitutional Court would no doubt exert some measure of judicial self-restraint. 
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Chapter IX -
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
and the Draft Treaty establishing 
the European Union 
by Jean-Marc Hoscheit 
Introduction: Luxembourg and 
the European Community 
The international position of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has since its creation been deter-
mined by its small size. Weak in military terms, dependent on foreign markets for the export of its 
main products, the Grand Duchy has always had to rely on international agreements and integration 
into larger economic entities to ensure its national survival and prosperity. From the Germanic Con-
federation and the Zollverein to the Belgian-Luxembourg Economic Union and the Benelux, the 
international political and economic status of Luxembourg has always been defined in terms of inter-
national cooperation and economic integration.' 
This emphasis explains the positive attitudes taken by successive Luxembourg governments and the 
population towards further integration in a European context. Economic and political integration 
has always been considered as an important way to stabilize the relevant international environment 
of the country, to maintain the openness of foreign markets and to maximize its capacity to influence 
and have a say in international decision-making. In this sense 'its European commitment has allowed 
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to preserve its individuality while reinforcing its political presence 
on the international scene and its economic tissue.2 
Being a founding member of the ECSC and the EEC,' the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg has gener-
ally adopted a position which is very favourable for deepening and extending the experience of the 
EEC and progressing towards continuing political integration. This general pro-integration stance 
has been and is based on a consensus of the main political and social forces. This also reflects the 
opinion of a large majority of the Luxembourg population: in a recent opinion poll, 55% of the 
' For a discussion of the situation of small European States, see: M. Hirsch: La situation internationale des petits Etats: des 
systèmes politiques pénétrés — l'exemple des pays du Benelux', Revue Française de Sciences Politiques, 1974, pp. 1026-1055 
and J.M. Hoscheit: Les petits Etats dans les relations internationales: Le cas de la Communauté européenne, Maastricht, 
European Institute of Public Administration, 1985 (mimeo). 
2 J.F. Poos, Minister for Foreign Affairs in: Europerspectives, 1984, No 3 (own translation). 
' See: J. Wurth-Retier: 'Du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg et de la construction européenne', in: Numéro spécial de Studia diplo-
matica, Le rôle des Belges et de la Belgique dans l'édification européenne, Vol. 34, 1981, Nos 1-4, and: J.F. Poos: Le Luxem-
bourg dans le Marché Commun, Lausanne et Luxembourg, Centre de Recherches européennes, 1961. 
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people expressed their support for accelerating the pace of European integration. This is the second 
highest figure in the EC, following Italy/ 
It is against this background, defining the longer term tendencies characterizing the European policy 
of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, that the political-institutional change introduced by the Draft 
Treaty establishing the European Union must be evaluated. 
In the following pages, attempts will first be made to identify a few problem areas specifically for 
Luxembourg (1.). After this, the constitutional and procedural aspects of the implementation of the 
Draft Treaty will be examined (2.). In conclusion, some of the more political perspectives will be 
highlighted. 
1. The Draft Treaty and Luxembourg 
It must be acknowledged that against this background of a generally favourable stance towards the 
progress of European unification, which corresponds to a secular emphasis on international co-
operation, the Draft Treaty, in its present form, includes a number of issues which are of vital impor-
tance for the future of our societies. In the Luxembourg context, three main problem areas can be 
identified concerning the Draft Treaty; 
(i) the links between European Union and national sovereignty; 
(ii) the power structure in the proposed decision-making procedures; 
(iii) the seat of the Union. 
a. European Union and national sovereignty 
The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is a small State in the middle of western Europe. Its history as an 
independent entity has been closely linked to major developments in its relevant international envi-
ronment. This geopolitical situation and the historical developments since 1839, the date of its for-
mal independence, have heightened the sensitivity of the Luxembourg population to any evolution 
that may have a potential or real impact on the survival of the national community as an autonom-
ous entity.' 
This socio-psychological phenomenon must be linked to the strong cultural and economic interde-
pendence characterizing the situation of the Grand Duchy. The antinomy between the subjective exi-
stence of a national community and the objective factors endangering the coherence of this entity was 
provisionally resolved after the Second World War by a number of courageous integrative steps in 
the security (abandonment of neutrality, membership of NATO) and the economic fields (ECSC, 
EEC,. . .). 
These evolutions established a sort of dialectical relationship between the nation State, whose core 
areas are stabilized, and the European level which provides the framework for this collective man-
agement of interdependence.6 The paradoxical conclusion therefore has been: 'national indepen-
* Eurobarometer No 22 (October 1984), reproduced in EG Magazin No 3, 15 April 1985, p. 9. 
1 See: Nos Cahiers: Du sentiment national des Luxembourgeois, Luxembourg, Impr. St. Paul, 1984 and the critical article by M. 
Hirsch: Un patriotisme de circonstance — A propos d'un débat sur l'identité nationale des Luxembourgeois', d'Lctzeburger 
Land, No 32,11 August 1978, pp. 6-7. 
* Ch. Calmes: Du sentiment national des Luxembourgeois, in Nos Cahiers, op. cit., p. 67: 'L'Europe et l'Etat national sont con-
damnés à se valoriser l'un l'autre pour échapper à leur déclin'. 
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dence by economic and political integration'. In this perspective, 'the national consciousness as it 
developed within a small community is, so to speak, legitimized, weighed, balanced and compensa-
ted by a reasoned adhesion to the building of Europe in the form of a confederate State'.7 
The implicit dialectic between nation State and European level is based on a definition of the boun-
daries between these two systems, a definition which is not static, but the content of which can ulti-
mately be determined by the Member States themselves. This control of the scope, level and pace of 
the integration process has been further enhanced as a consequence of the 1965 crisis and the 
'Luxembourg compromise', leading to the defacto predominance of decision-making by unanimity. 
In this context, the concept of 'vital national interests' symbolizes the possibility for each State to pre-
vent any encroachments into the national realm which might be perceived as threatening the survival 
of the national collectivity. 
The question must be raised of whether the Draft Treaty in its present form leaves enough room for 
the legitimate articulation of national identities, the protective hard shell of which has so far been the 
State. 
As Dr John Temple Lang points out 'it is not possible to say, if the political integration of Europe 
proceeds on the lines envisaged by the new Treaty, at what point in the process Member States 
would cease to be 'sovereign', because they would transfer their sovereignty gradually to the Union, 
and no one act of transfer would be decisive, politically or legally'/ It is precisely this uncertainty 
concerning the longer term consequences of the workings of the European Union and its compatibil-
ity with the preservation of legitimate interests of national entities concerning the protection of their 
identities, which raises a major problem that has not yet been fully addressed in the present discus-
sion. Basic problems of political theory concerning citizenship, legitimacy, nation and State in the 
context of a future European Union cannot be ignored. 
b. Decision-making procedures 
Closely linked to the question of the preservation of core interests of the nations of the Community, 
and especially of the smaller Member States, is the question of the design of the decision-making pro-
cedures in the Draft Treaty. 
Starting from the conclusion that the present state of EC policy-making which gives every Member 
State ample opportunities to block decisions is highly ineffective and costly in economic and political 
terms, the drafters of the Treaty on European Union have developed a sophisticated decision 
mechanism to overcome these problems. 
For a State like Luxembourg, participation in supranational organization, based to some extent on 
the principle of equality of states, has meant an unprecedented opportunity to influence its fate, as 
internationally determined, by participating actively in the Community decision-making procedures. 
What is the situation now in the proposed European Union, as compared to the present state of 
affairs? 
The Draft Treaty is based on the principle of co-decision between, on the one hand, the Council of 
the Union and the European Council and, on the other hand, the European Parliament. At these two 
levels, the situation of Luxembourg, considering its impact on decision-making, is considerably wor-
sened. 
Ch. Calmes, idem, p. 68 (my translation). 
John Temple Lang, in the present volume. 
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(a) At the level of the Council of the Union (Articles 20-24), the principle of simple majority voting is 
introduced (Article 23; 1). Qualified majorities or unanimity are necessary only in a limited num-
ber of cases specified in the Draft Treaty. 
A major innovation is introduced by the fact that the voting principle will not be 'one State — one 
vote', but that the votes will be weighed according to the dispositions of Article 148, para. 2 of 
the EEC Treaty. This means that in the new system, it would only be left with two votes out of 
63, whereas in the present system, in the case of simple majority voting, Luxembourg has one 
vote out of 10. This marks a substantial decrease in the influencing and bargaining power of 
Luxembourg and of smaller Member States generally. 
On the other hand, Article 23, para. 3 which structures the use of the 'vital national interest' con-
cept by stipulating a numer of conditions is only applicable for a transitional period of 10 years. 
After this period no reference to this concept will be possible. 
(b) At the level of the European Parliament, the decision-making powers of which are greatly streng-
thened, the six Luxembourg MEPs will have little chance of voicing effectively the legitimate 
interests of a small country in an institution composed of more than 400 MEPs. The concern that 
these interests may be more or less automatically outvoted is real. 
In conclusion, the relative weight and influence that a country like Luxembourg can have on Europ-
ean policy-making will be, according to the dispositions of the Draft Treaty, drastically reduced both 
in the Council and in the European Parliament. In this context, this abolition of a rationalized use of 
the concept of 'vital national interests' after a transitional period of 10 years may prove to be detri-
mental to securing the support of smaller Member States for the Draft Treaty. 
c. The seat of the Union 
A provision which causes considerable concern in Luxembourg is Article 85 of the Draft Treaty 
which says: 
'The European Council shall determine the seat of the institutions. Should the European Council 
not have taken a decision on the seat within two years of the entry into force of this Treaty, the 
legislative authority shall take a final decision in accordance with the procedure to organic laws.' 
Seen the political sensitivity of the debates around the seat of the European Parliament' this article 
can be interpreted as an attempt by the EP to get the control over a decision which, according to 
Article 216/EEC is the sole competence of the Member States. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Deci-
sion of April 1965, which was used as a legal basis in recent proceedings before the European Court 
of Justice, says that 'the General Secretariat of the Assembly and its departments shall remain in 
Luxembourg'. This legal position, the political and economic connotations of which are of great 
importance for the Grand Duchy, is vigorously defended by the Luxembourg Government.10 
Add to this the political symbolism attached to the question of the seat, and it seems unlikely that the 
Luxembourg Government and public opinion will easily accept a move in the direction indicated by 
Article 85 of the Draft Treaty. 
In conclusion, it seems essential therefore to clarify in the political debate the issues concerning the 
question of sovereignty, the input into the policy-making process and the seat of the Union in order 
to broaden the base of support in Luxembourg for any move towards European Union. 
' See: D.J. Earnshaw: 'The European Parliament's quest for a single seat'', journal of'European Integration, 8, 1984,1, pp. 77-
93. 
'" See: Mémorandum du Gouvernement luxembourgeois sur l'adaptation des structures institutionnelles des Communautés eur-
opéennes, Bulletin de Documentation (Luxembourg), No 9, 1983, pp. 21-25. 
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2. The Draft Treaty and 
the Constitution of Luxembourg 
In this part, two major questions will be asked: 
(i) the issue of the compatibility of the Draft Treaty with the constitution; 
(ii) the procedural mechanisms organizing the introduction of the Treaty into the domestic legal 
order. 
This assumes that we are in a situation where agreement has been found at an inter-governmental 
conference on the content and objectives of a new Treaty on European Union, and that a solution 
accommodating most of the worries analysed above has been found. 
a. The compatibility of the Draft Treaty 
with the constitution 
During the negotiations of the ECSC and the European Defence Community, the question arose of 
how far the transfer of rights of sovereignty to a supranational body can be covered by the Luxem-
bourg Constitution. 
This question was taken up during the constitutional revision of 1956. After heated debates," the 
following article was included in the constitution: 
'Art. 49A. The exercise of the powers reserved by the constitution to the legislative, executive and 
judiciary may be temporarily vested by treaty in institutions governed by international law'.12 
The prudent formulation of this article is due to the deep split in opinion between, on the one side, 
the government, favourable to a more internationalist solution, and parts of the Parliament and the 
Council of State (Conseil d'État) that adopted a more restrictive attitude, on the other side. The 
article does not mention a transfer of sovereignty rights, it speaks only of the temporary alienation of 
the exercise of powers; thus introducing a shatp distinction between the sovereignty of the Luxem-
bourg State which cannot be abandoned, and the mere exercise of powers which can be temporarily 
transferred. In its Opinion of 10 April 1956 on the revision of the constitution, the Council of State 
elaborated this theme: 
'It is important to stress that the constitution clearly distinguishes between the origin and the exer-
cise of sovereignty. The powers (exercise of the sovereignty) originate from the nation (which 
holds sovereignty). It (the sovereignty) remains indivisible, whatever may be the number, quality 
or scope of the powers exercised in its name. It is not modified in its essence, if the exercise of 
powers is freely conceded to national or international organs. In the last analysis, a habilitation of 
international organs does not question sovereignty itself, but the exercise of sovereignty by the 
national powers.'13 
To a large degree, this view was adopted in 1956. Obviously, the question must be raised whether 
this approach was based on a realistic analysis of the EEC and of the extent to which the develop-
Sce: Compte rendu de la Chambre des Députés, session 1955-56, and L. Schaus, Les fondements du statut international du 
Luxembourg: 1944-57, Livre jubilaire du Conseil d'Etat, Luxembourg, 1957, esp. pp. 296-298. 
For an English translation of the Luxembourg Constitution, see: P. Majerus: The Institutions oj the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg, Luxembourg, Press and Information Service, 1976. 
Quoted in: P. Majerus, L'Etat luxembourgeois, Luxembourg, Impr. St. Paul, 1977, p. 139. '11 importe de relever que la Con-
stitution distingue nettement entre l'origine et l'exercice de la souveraineté. Les pourvoirs (exercice de la souveraineté) émanent 
de la Nation (détentrice de la souveraineté). Celle-ci reste indivisible, quels que soient le nombre, la qualité ou l'ampleur des 
pouvoirs qui s'exercent en son nom. Elle n'est pas modifiée dans son essence, si l'exercice des pouvoirs est concédé librement 
soit à des organes nationaux, soit à des organes internationaux. En définitive, une habilitation des organes internationaux ne 
met pas en cause la souveraineté, mais l'exercice de la souveraineté par les pouvoirs nationaux.' 
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ment of the EC was going to have an impact on the substance of national sovereignties. Seen the fact 
that opting out from the EC is not foreseen in the Treaties and that the EC is instituted without any 
temporal limitation, it must also be questioned in how far these transfers of powers can be consid-
ered temporary. 
In the context of the earlier discussion on the relations between Eutopean Union and national sove-
reignty, and considering the evolution of the EC after 1958, the question is open to discussion whe-
ther Article 49b of the Constitution is still adequate for, on the one hand, the present day Commun-
ity and, on the other hand, the prospective European Union. 
It can be argued that, in spite of the relatively restrictive formulations of the constitution, both the 
diplomatic history of the Grand Duchy and the realistic assessment of its position in the world would 
allow for more flexibility in the interpretation than the actual wording of the constitution would 
allow one to believe. In 1952, already, the existence of a constitutional custom was accepted to just-
ify constitutionally the limitations of sovereignty introduced by the Paris Treaty. 
In conclusion, it may thus be said that, provided the basic political consensus on the Draft Treaty is 
secured, the compatibility with the Luxembourg Constitution will be less of a problem. Neverthe-
less, the problem stands whether it will not be necessary in the context of the discussion on a global 
revision of the constitution, to adapt Article 49bis to the new evolutions that have determined the 
international position of the Grand Duchy since 1956. 
b. Procedural aspects14 
The transposition of the Draft Treaty into the internal legal order will be analysed in two steps: 
(i) first, by elaborating on the general principles and procedures conditioning the adoption of inter-
national treaties; 
(ii) second, by examining the special case of treaties transferring the exercise of sovereignty rights to 
international organizations. 
General principles 
The major dispositions organizing the treaty-making power and the procedures to be followed are 
the paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 37 of the Constitution: 
'Art. 37. The Grand Duke shall make treaties. These shall not come into effect until they have 
been sanctioned by law and published in the manner laid down for the publication of laws. 
The Grand Duke shall make the regulations and orders necessary for carrying the treaties into 
effect in accordance with the procedure governing measures for the execution of laws and with the 
effects attaching to such measures, without prejudice to matters reserved to the law by the 
constitution . . .' 
Concerning the Draft Treaty, we will leave aside the considerations concerning the treaty-making 
power proper (the external phase) and we will concentrate on the legislative adoption of the treaties, 
which is an essential condition of its effectiveness (internal phase). 
" The basic reference concerning the different aspects of international law and the Luxembourg legal system are the works of 
P. Pescatore, and especially the book: P. Pescatore: Conclusion et effet des traités internationaux, selon le droit constitutionnel, 
les usages et la jurisprudence du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Luxembourg, Office des Imprimés de l'Etat, 1964. See also: 
P. Majerus, op cit., pp. 164-170 and 233-234. 
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Any treaty negotiated and ratified by the Grand Duke and the government must be submitted to the 
Parliament for approval before it can produce its full effects. This approval takes the form of a law, 
adopted according to the normal legislative procedures. This means that the government must secure 
a stable majority in favour of the adoption of the treaty already at the negotiation stage. 'This politi-
cal responsibility of government — which expresses itself by the necessity to have a majority in par-
liament — linked to the specific control procedure created by Article 37 of the constitution, has as a 
consequence that international treaties can only be negotiated in a spirit of trust and responsibility in 
relation with parliament: the parliamentary control organized by Article 37 thus has also a preven-
tive action, an orientation function, in the sense that government cannot negotiate treaties without 
anticipating the reactions of the organs of the legislative power, Council of State and Parliament. '5 
The adoption procedure can be briefly summarized as follows: the draft bill is submitted by govern-
ment to the Council of State which drafts an advice. The revised draft bill (projet de loi) is then 
sent to Parliament which discusses it according to its internal regulations (discussion in standing 
committee(s) and in the plenary; voting procedures . . .). The official representatives of certain inter-
ests touched by the treaties (chambres professionnelles) are also consulted. 
After the approbation of the adoption bill expressed by a positive vote of Parliament, the treaty is 
ratified and promulgated by the Grand Duke and published, together with the text of the Treaty, in 
the Official Journal of Luxembourg (Mémorial). 
Transfer of the exercise of sovereignty rights 
In the context of the constitutional revision of 1956 and the discussions around the ECSC and the 
European Defence Community, a special disposition concerning the limitation of sovereignty en-
tailed by the transfer of certain powers to international organizations was included, the second para-
graph of Article 37 that says: 
'The Treaties referred to in Chapter III, § 4, Art. 49A, shall be sanctioned by a law voted under 
the conditions laid down in Article 114, 5.' 
As we have seen above, Article 49A deals with institutions governed by international law to which 
the exercise of certain sovereignty rights is transferred. Although it is not clearly indicated who is 
competent to determine whether a treaty fits into this category, it is accepted that Parliament decides 
itself by a simple majority vote whether to activate this special procedure. Use of this article has been 
made for the approbation of the Rome Treaties. 
The reference to Article 114, 5 is in fact a reference to the procedure for constitutional revision. The 
article says that in the context of an amendment procedure: 
'. . . the Chamber shall not proceed to the vote unless at least three-quarters of the members com-
prising it are present, and no amendment shall be adopted unless it is backed by at least two-thirds 
of the votes'. 
This means that treaties having a substantial impact on national sovereignty must be adopted 
according to the reinforced quorum and majority rules foreseen for constitutional revision. Accord-
ing to P. Pescatore, the justification for this disposition is evident, 'the devolution, to international 
organizations of prerogatives inherent to national sovereignty affects the independence of the State 
and the constitutional equilibrium. Therefore the approbation of such treaties must be submitted to 
conditions similar to those applicable to the vote of constitutional revisions'.16 
It seems clear that, seen the important changes introduced by the Draft Treaty in the working of 
institutions and in the role played by the Member States, it falls within the category of treaties to be 
P. Pescatore, op.cit., p. 50. 
P. Pescatore, op, cit., p. 68. 
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adopted according to the special procedure organized by Article 37 para. 2. This obviously reinfor-
ces the pressure on the government to secure a consensus on the dispositions of the Draft Treaty. It 
must be noted that in the present political set-up, the support of the three main political parties repre-
sented in Parliament, the Christian Democrats (CSV), the Socialists (LSAP) and the Liberals (DP), 
would be sufficient to ensure a three-quarters majority. 
Conclusions 
So far, the European discussion around the Draft Treaty adopted in 1984 by the European Parlia-
ment has received relatively little public attention in Luxembourg, in spite of the efforts of the 
European Movement to mobilize support for this effort to unblock the process of European integra-
tion.17 
It is generally acknowledged that the present political-institutional set-up of the EC is no longer ade-
quate in view of the important problems to be solved at a European level (convergence of economic 
policies; development of advanced technologies and management of the industrial restructuring pro-
cess). It is also clear that the necessary political and economic economies of scale can only be produ-
ced through the strengthened solidarity between the Member States of the Community which are link-
ed in a 'communauté de destin'. 
The growing realization of the precariousness of both values and prosperity of western Europe in a 
turbulent international environment has prompted an acute awareness of the need for a profound 
institutional reform allowing the Community to regain its policy-making capacity, even if there is 
less agreement on the ways to proceed.'8 
In this context, the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union provides an important perspective 
about which objectives are to be achieved. In the vote on 14 February 1984 on the adoption by the 
European Parliament of the Draft Treaty, all six Luxembourg MEPs, representing the three major 
parties, voted in favour of the proposed text. This positive vote symbolizes less an adhesion to all the 
individual stipulations contained in the Draft Treaty than a political support for the realization of the 
middle term objectives to be achieved." Identically, the electoral programmes for the 1984 European 
elections of the three parties represented in the EP have indicated the willingness of these parties to 
support the realization of the European Union. 
In a recent article, Prof. J-P. Jacqué explains why, in the view of the drafters of the Treaty, the Mem-
ber States should not feel threatened in their substance by the reform proposal of the European Par-
liament. In this view, 
'the Union is not seen as an entity which should replace the Member States. On the contrary, the 
Member States retain their sovereignty, granting the Union only a limited transfer of competen-
ces. The division of competences between the Union and the Member States is arranged according 
to the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. that interventions of the Union are subsidiary to those of the 
States. The competence of the Union is limited to those spheres where its intervention is more 
effective than that of the States acting independently, notably where the scope or effects of the 
actions in question go beyond national boundaries'.20 
" See: 'Le Mouvement Européen place ses espoirs dans le Traité d'Union Européenne', Luxemburger Wort, 28 April 1985. 
" See also: J-M. Hoscheit: Réforme institutionnelle et présidence, in: J-M. Hoscheit (ed.): The Impact oj European Affairs on 
National Administrations — the case of the Presidency, Maastricht, European Institute of Public Administration, 1984, Work-
ing Document 84/03. 
" See the interview with the Luxembourg member of the Institutional Committee of the EP, Mr N. Estgen, Luxemburger Wort, 
22 April 1985, 'Wenn ich, wie alle meine Luxemburger Kollegen, für den Text als Ganzes gestimmt habe, so weil ich als mittel-
fristige Lösung keine andere Alternative sehe'. 
2" J-P. Jacqué: The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, Common Market Law Review, 22, 1985, p. 27. 
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Be it as it may, the anxiety persists, especially in smaller Member States, that the Union, once institu-
ted and working according to the procedures designed by the EP, would develop a dynamic of its 
own, over which these States would not retain any substantial measure of control. This uncertainty, 
if it does not entail a fundamental rejection of the Draft Treaty in Luxembourg, nevertheless contri-
butes to some prudence at the official level. The Luxembourg Foreign Minister, Mr J.F. Poos, poin-
ted out, while receiving the Institutional Committee of the EP, that the Grand Duchy would be ready 
to support the Draft Treaty as far as it would harm in no way the vital interests of the country.21 
As the discussions concerning the issues addressed in the Draft Treaty have started with renewed 
impetus only quite recently, it is certainly too early to judge whether it will be possible to convince 
the Luxembourg population that potential costs in terms of losses in sovereignty will be outweighed 
by political and economic gains as a consequence of the deepened solidarity in a European Union. 
Certainly, as former Prime Minister Pierre Werner points out, 'the improvement of the institutional 
aspects of the Union supposes a political doctrine which takes into due consideration the national 
realities while transcending them in the common interest'.22 Whether this synergy between national 
aspirations and common interests can be created in the context of the European Union designed by 
the European Parliament remains an essential question to which convincing answers must be given in 
the public debate on the Draft Treaty and its ultimate objectives. 
;' La Commission institutionnelle du P.E. à Luxembourg: Beaucoup d'interrogations, Tageblatt, 7 April 1985. 
: : P.Werner: Idéalisme et réalisme européens, Echos de l'Europe, Nos 10-11,1984.'L'amélioration des aspects institutionnels de 
l'union suppose une doctrine politique tenant compte des réalités nationales, mais les dépassant dans l'intérêt commun'. 
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Chapter Χ ­ The Netherlands and the 
Draft Treaty establishing the European Union 
by Ernst M. H. Hirsch Ballin and Cécile J. M. Verklei] 
Introduction 
This contribution is in three parts. In Part I we consider whether the Draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union (adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984) is compatible with 
Dutch constitutional law. Our conclusion is that from this point of view there are no major obstacles 
to the Netherlands becoming a party to the proposed Treaty. In fact, for more than 30 years Dutch 
constitutional law has been unequivocally open to the development of the international legal order; 
and progress in this sphere has been greatest in the European context. In Part II we examine the reac­
tions to the Treaty in the Dutch political arena. In general, the response has been favourable, even 
though the feasibility of the project is viewed with some scepticism. 
1. Constitutional aspects 
a. Basic principles 
A large part of Dutch constitutional law is codified in the Constitution,1 and it is here that the rules 
governing the relationship between international and Community law and Dutch law are laid down. 
Specifically, these rules are set out in Articles 90 to 94, the first of which stipulates that: 
'The Government shall promote the development of the international legal order.' 
This provision has figured in the Constitution since the 1953 revision2 and was not substantially 
affected by the complete revision of 1983. At first sight it appears to amount to no more than an 
exhortation to the Government to concern itself with the international legal order. However, 
although it certainly can be read as such, its implications go much further: for it can be regarded as 
the guiding principle behind Dutch foreign policy in the sense that foreign policy is directed primarily 
towards the development of the international legal order. ' Only shortly after the principle was writ­
ten into the Constitution in 1953, this pursuit of an international legal order, which is paramount in 
' Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, 24 August 1815, as last amended by Decree (Besluit) of 17 February 1983, 
Stb. 1983, 70. Hereafter referred to as Grondwet. 
: Second paragraph of Article 58, Grondwet 1953, Stb. 1953, 295. 
' T. Koopmans, 'De Europese Gemeenschappen en het Nederlandse Staatsbestel', RM Themis 4/5 (1980), at 364. 
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Dutch thinking about international questions in general, took on real substance with the drafting of 
the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy 
Community.4 The Netherlands has also been an active member of the Council of Europe and has played 
a leading role over the past decades in the protection of human rights at the international level. For 
the Netherlands the most concrete and far-reaching instance so far of the development of the interna-
tional legal order is European integration, in particular as it has progressed under the Community 
Treaties, and Article 90 of the Constitution can serve as the basis for its active involvement in further 
progress in this field. In the course of the debate on the revision of the Constitution the Government 
noted, à propos of this guiding principle, that: 
' . . . the proposed arrangements allow for the possibility of further development of the European 
Community'.5 
The Draft Treaty establishing the European Union is an instance of such further development, and 
the Dutch Constitution is fully capable of accommodating this under the terms of Article 90. 
Article 90 has to be read in conjunction with Article 92, which can be regarded as an amplification of 
Article 90 in that it specifies a method for developing the international legal order. Article 92 reads: 
'Legislative, executive and judicial powers may be conferred on international organizations by or 
pursuant to a treaty, subject, where necessary, to the provisions of Article 91 (3).' 
This reference to conferring 'legislative, executive and judicial powers' was introduced under the 
1953 revision of the Constitution.6 Although the underlying principle was presumably the traditional 
three-way separation of powers, the nature of the task or tasks to be conferred is passed over in 
silence. Indeed Duynstee writes in his commentary on Article 67 of the 1953 Constitution (the first 
paragraph of which was incorporated substantially unchanged in Article 92 of the 1983 Constitu-
tion): 
'There is a whole range of "powers conferred" on international organizations that can most defi-
nitely be classed as "legislative, executive and judicial"; this is a classification which happens to 
apply to the performance of almost any task.' 
Article 92, then, allows a new international organization to be assigned not only the normal execu-
tive powers which any international organization enjoys but also more substantial governmental 
powers;8 it can be said to provide for both substantial and non-substantial powers to be conferred." 
Inherently, Article 92 is of fundamental importance only in respect of substantial governmental 
powers. It implies that the development of the international legal order referred to in Article 90 may 
result in the transfer of sovereign powers to international organizations. It can, of course, be argued 
that substantial powers could have been conferred on the European Communities without any 
express provision in the Constitution. However, where powers as far-reaching as those provided for 
in the Draft Treaty are to be conferred, it is very important that the Dutch Constitution should con-
tain the specific provision of Article 92. The same view was expressed by the Netherlands Govern-
ment during the preparatory stages of the 1983 constitutional revision: 
'The Cals-Donner Royal Commission (Staatscommissie), following the example of de Proeve, 
proceeds from the assumption that legislative, executive and judicial powers can be conferred on 
international organizations even without any such provision in the Constitution. 
4 Together with the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community they will be referred to as the Community 
Treaties. 
5 TK 1979-80, 15049 (R 1100), No 7, at 2.; TK 1979-80, 15049 (R 1100), No 10, at 1. 
6 First paragraph of Article 67, Grondwet 1953. 
' Duynstee himself preferred to speak of the transfer of'sovereignty in the true sense'. See F.J.F.M. Duynstee, Grondwetsherzien-
ing 19S3, De nieuwe bepalingen omtrent de Buitenlandse Betrekkingen in de Grondwet 8 (Deventer: Kluwer, 1954). 
* P.J. Oud, Het constitutioneel recht van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Part II, at 343 (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 2nd ed. 
1970). 
9 C.A.J.M. Kortmann, De Grondwetsherziening 1983, at 256 (Deventer: Kluwer, 1982). 
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The view is that the power to do so can be derived from the provisions relating to treaties contai-
ned elsewhere in the Constitution. Although we do not reject this view as such, we should like to 
point out that the relevant article was included in the Constitution in 1953 precisely because the 
powers to be conferred on international organizations might well assume such proportions in the 
future that the constitutionality of conferring them could be challenged if no express provision 
existed. In our view this consideration is no less important today than it was in 1953'10 
Since the Draft Treaty involves conferring extensive powers on the institutions of the Union, it is 
reassuring to note that this is compatible with the Dutch Constitution. 
b. The Dutch Constitution and the 
incorporation of international law 
The incorporation of international law into Dutch law is governed by Articles 93 and 94 of the Con-
stitution. The procedure which they prescribe could be termed monistic, which is to say that interna-
tional law is directly incorporated without transposition into Dutch legislation. The rules of interna-
tional law thus have 'internal effect' in Dutch law." 
The articles in question read as follows: 
'Article 93 
Provisions of treaties and of decisions by international organizations which may be binding on all 
persons by virtue of their content shall have binding effect upon publication. 
Article 94 
Where the application of any legal provision in force in the Kingdom is incompatible with the 
provisions of treaties or of decisions by international organizations which are binding on all per-
sons, that provision shall not apply.' 
The monistic manner of incorporation is apparent in Article 93, whereby the provisions of interna-
tional law apply in Dutch law immediately upon their publication without the need for specific natio-
nal legislation. Besides this internal effect, these two articles also reveal two further features of the 
Dutch system: first, that the monistic principle applies only to provisions of treaties or of decisions 
by international organizations 'which may be binding on all persons' (Article 93); and second, that 
international law takes precedence over Dutch law where the two conflict, although again only in the 
case of 'provisions which are binding on all persons' (Article 94). Such provisions are those which are 
so worded that they may be relied upon in the national courts, in other words they are 'self-execut-
ing' treaty provisions.12 
The Netherlands is the only Member State of the European Communities whose constitutional 
system expressly provides for international law to take precedence over national law where the two 
are in conflict. 
To what extent is this significant for the incorporation of Community law into Dutch law? The ans-
wer depends on what is held to constitute the essential basis for such incorporation and will be equal-
ly valid for the incorporation of the law flowing from the Draft Treaty; hence its importance in the 
present context. 
There are two views on this question in the Netherlands. The first is that Community law, and inter-
national law in general, is subject to Dutch constitutional law and consequently has effect by virtue 
10 TK 1977-78, 15049 (R 1100), No 3, at 9; see also P. J. Oud, supra, at 336 and 341. 
" F.C.L.M. Crijns, Het Europese perspectief van het Nederlandse staatsrecht 16-17 (Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 1984). 
" Cf. H.G. Schermers, judicial Protection in the European Communities § 156, at 76 (Deventer: Kluwer, 2nd ed. 1980). 
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of the fact that Articles 93 and 94 give it internal effect.13 Advocates of the second view, on the other 
hand, argue, that Articles 93 and 94 are not necessary for Community law to have effect in Dutch 
law, but that Community law has internal effect by virtue of the autonomous legal order brought 
into existence by the Community Treaties.14 This has been the view taken by the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities." 
The contradiction between the two positions is, in our view, apparent rather than real. For Com­
munity law to have effect in its own right in national law" implies that the national constitution — 
which, after all, is what ultimately governs the national legal order — makes some provision for it to 
have internal effect. Whether this occurs by virtue of an express amendment to the Constitution or 
by virtue of a change in unwritten constitutional law flowing from accession to the Community 
Treaties is of secondary importance. From the standpoint of Community law the essence is that the 
existence of the Community legal order has this (Community) effect, while from the point of view of 
national constitutional law the weightier consideration will naturally be the constitutional change 
involved. And in the case of the Netherlands the Constitution had already undergone the change that 
would otherwise necessarily have resulted from accession to the EEC. 
The law that may flow from the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union is, at all events, not 
dependent for its incorporation on transposition into Dutch law. In this respect the Dutch Constitu­
tion poses no obstacle to the exercise of the powers which the Draft Treaty proposes to confer on the 
institutions of the Union. 
c. Approval of treaties under the Dutch Constitution 
Since legislation is not required for international law to be incorporated into Dutch law, the Dutch 
Parliament (States General), as co-legislator, is not involved in the process of incorporation. How­
ever, this does not mean that Parliament has no part to play where international law affects the 
Dutch legal order. Its role lies in the approval of treaties.' This is governed by Article 91 of the Con­
stitution, the first paragraph of which reads: 
'The Kingdom18 cannot be bound by treaties nor can these be denounced without the prior appro­
val of the States General. The cases in which approval is not required shall be laid down by law." 
This means that treaties which require ratification cannot be ratified until approval has been obtain­
ed and treaties which do not require ratification can be concluded only subject to the (required) 
approval being granted.2" 
The Draft Treaty will of course have to receive the approval of Parliament. 
This can be done in two ways. They are dealt with in Article 91(2), which reads: 
'The manner in which approval is to be granted shall be laid down by law, which may provide for 
implied approval.' 
" D.H.M. Meuwissen, De Europese Conventie en het Nederlandse recht 61-71 (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1968); D.H.M. Meuwissen.'De 
Europese Conventie en het Nederlandse recht', in 73 Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Internationaal Recht 
52 (Deventer: Kluwer, 1976). The Government and some Members of the Second Chamber also seem to incline towards this 
view; see TK 1979-80, 15049 (R 1100), No 7, at 16-17. 
14 Crijns, supra, at 5 and 23-24, and authors, cited; Duynstee, supra, at 17. 
11 Case 6/64 Costa ν ENEL 1964 [ECR 585], 593-594; Case 26/62 van Gend en Loos ν Nederlandse administratie der 
belastingen, 1963 [ECR 1], 12; Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze delio Stato ν Simmenthal, 1978 (ECR 629] 644. 
" Which is what Artide 42 of the Draft Treaty, expressly provides. 
" Treaties are deemed by the Government to be'all agreements which, regardless of their form, are binding on the State in accor­
dance with the criteria of international law': TK 1977-78, 15049 (R 1100) No 3, at 6. 
" Kingdom in the sense of Article 3 of the Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden; TK 1977-78,15049 (R 1100), No 3, at 
6. 
" See TK 1977-78, (R 1100), No 3, at 6. 
!" Kortmann, supra, at 253; TK 1977-78, 15049 (R 1100), No 3, at 7. 
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Provision is thus made for implied approval and express approval with only the former specifically 
mentioned, as an alternative to the latter.21 
As no law of the kind referred to has yet been passed, the relevant article of the 1972 Constitution 
(Article 61) remains in force, but only in respect of implied approval.22 A treaty is deemed to have 
been approved if, within 30 days of its having been laid before Parliament, no request is made by or 
on behalf of either Chamber or by at least one-fifth of the members of either Chamber (i.e. 30 mem-
bers of the Second Chamber or 15 members of the First Chamber) that it should be expressly app-
roved. 
However, the Constitution contains no specific rules governing express approval, since Article 61 of 
the 1972 Constitution has ceased to apply in this respect and no other relevant provisions exist. Dur-
ing the debate on the amendment of the Constitution the Government stated that the substance of the 
law governing the manner of approval to be adopted pursuant to Article 91(2) would not be mark-
edly different from the existing arrangements2' laid down in Article 61 of the 1972 Constitution, 
whereby express approval must be given by an Act of Parliament.24 
In view of the profound effect that the Treaty will have on Dutch law and the Constitution, it is thus 
clear that express approval will have to be given in the form of an act of approval. 
Such an Act goes through the same parliamentary procedures as any other bill, in accordance with 
Article 82 of the Constitution. Under the terms of the first paragraph of that article, a bill for appro-
val of a treaty may be introduced 'by or on behalf of the Crown25 or by the Second Chamber of the 
States General'. In the case in point, then, a bill for approval of the Draft Treaty can be introduced 
by the Government or by one or more members of the Second Chamber — the latter provision being 
contained in Article 82(3). In fact, the Second Chamber has never yet made use of its right of initia-
tive in respect of such a bill; and there is little need for it to do so. All of this presupposes that the 
Draft Treaty will not conflict with the Constitution. Approval of a treaty that does conflict with the 
Constitution is dealt with in Article 91(3), which reads: 
'Where a treaty contains provisions that conflict with the Constitution or which will inevitably 
lead to conflicts with it, approval by the Chambers shall require at least a two-thirds majority of 
the votes cast.' 
When the Treaties establishing the European Communities were approved26 no conflict was held to 
exist between their content and the Constitution,2' since the latter allows for legislative, executive 
and judicial powers to be conferred on international organizations. The special requirement for a 
two-third majority28 did not, therefore, apply. In fact, the only occasions when this procedure has 
been used were for the abortive Treaty of 27 May 1952 for the establishment of a European Defence 
Community and the Treaty concluded on 15 August 1962 in New York between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia regarding Western New Guinea.2' 
TK 1977-78, 15049 (R 1100), No 3, at 7: 'It was thought advisable to mention implicit approval specifically in the second 
paragraph in order to remove all possibility of doubt as to its admissibility'. Apparently no such doubt was felt to be possible in 
respect of explicit approval. 
Subparagraph (a) of the first paragraph of Additional Article XXI, Grondwet. 
1 I.e. existing at the time when the 1972 Constitution was still in force. 
TK 1979-80,15049 (R 1100), No 10, at 3; TK 1979-80, 15049 (R-1100), No 7, at 7 and 8. 
The 'Crown' means the inviolable part of the Government, which is covered by ministerial responsibility. See A.W. Heringa 
and T. Zwart, Grondwet 1983, at 111 (Zwolle; Tjeenk Willink, 1983). 
Act of 21 February 1952 approving the Paris Treaty of 18 April 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community and 
the accompanying Annexes, Protocols and the Convention on the Transitional Provisions, Stb. 1952, 83; Act of 5 December 
1957, approving the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and the accompanying Annexes, Protocols and 
Convention, Stb. 1957, 493; Act of 5 December 1957 approving the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity and the accompanying Annexes and Protocols, Stb. 1957, 494. 
TK 1956-57, 4725, No 9, at 17; TK 1956-57, 4725, No 14, at 8. 
At the time when the EEC and Euratom Treaties were approved this was governed by Article 63, Grondwet 1956. 
Approved by the Act of 22 January 1954 (Stb. 25) and the Act of 14 September 1962 (Stb. 363) respectively. For the applica-
tion of this special approval procedure, see TK 1979-80,15049 (R 1100), No 7, at 11 ( = Naar een nieuwe Grondwet), Docu-
mentatiereeks Vol. 26, at 69. 
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Under Artide 81 of the Constitution, acts are passed jointly by the Government and Parliament; at 
present the Constitution does not make any provision for referendums on legislation."1 Most bills are 
brought in by the Government, although this right is also enjoyed by the Second Chamber under the 
first paragraph of Article 82. In theory, therefore, it is possible for an Act approving a treaty to be 
passed on a proposal from the Second Chamber. In practice, however, this provision is of very little 
significance, since only the Government can conclude a treaty and a parliamentary initiative is likely 
only if, after signing a treaty, the Government judges that it need not be ratified but fails to convince 
Parliament that there are sound reasons for not doing so. Moreover, bills introduced by the Second 
Chamber, like any others, have to win acceptance by the First Chamber and the Government. 
To sum up, then, the Netherlands can become a party to the Treaty establishing the European Union 
only if it is approved by both the Government and Parliament. 
d. Concurrent powers under the Draft Treaty 
and Article 91 of the Constitution 
Following these general reflections on the relationship between the Draft Treaty and Dutch constitu-
tional law, we propose to examine in this next section a number of specific questions raised by the 
Draft Treaty. The first point to note is that the Union is to enjoy considerable 'concurrent compe-
tences' under the Treaty (Articles 53 and 55, for example). Article 12(2) of the Treaty sets out a 
number of general provisions regarding such powers. They are governed by the principle of subsi-
diarity, which is meant to serve as a brake on the exercise by the institutions of the Union of the con-
current powers provided for. However, it is doubtful whether this brake can be effective since the 
first sentence of Article 12(2) stipulates that the Member States may not act where the Union has 
already legislated. Taken together with the principle of supremacy of Union law (Article 42 of the 
Treaty), this means that concurrent powers may grow into exclusive powers; at the very least, they 
contain the seeds of omnicompetence [potentielle Allzuständigkeit)" and open the way to centralist 
tendencies in the running of the Union.'2 Consequently, the national legislators who will have to 
decide whether or not to approve the Treaty — in the case of the Netherlands this means the Govern-
ment and Parliament acting jointly — cannot assess precisely what powers they will be handing over. 
If a Parliament is to exercise its powers of approval in respect of the Treaty's substance, it must have 
some reasonably clear picture of the extent of the powers to be conferred on the Union. This is all the 
more true since the exercise of these very broadly defined concurrent powers may, in certain circum-
stances, lead to a conflict with the Constitution within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 
91 (see C above). In particular, this is liable to occur where concurrent powers of the Union affect 
basic rights anchored in the Dutch Constitution; an example is Article 60 of the Treaty, application 
of which could entail a restriction on the freedom of education guaranteed under Article 23 of the 
Constitution. Although the concurrent powers do not, in general, conflict with the Dutch Constitu-
tion, we share the view put forward by Wolfgang Wessels (and this would seem to apply to the Par-
liaments of all the Member States of the Community): 
'After approval of the Union Treaty the national parliaments will not play any further role in the 
transfer of powers in further areas of State activity. Given the scope for wide interpretation offe-
red by the subsidiarity clause, the extent of the concurrent legislative powers specified in particu-
lar fields and the scope for action open to the European Council in view of its virtually unlimited 
foreign policy powers, the Treaty makes the Union omnicompetent without providing sufficient 
A Royal Commission, established by the Royal Decree of 17 May 1982, Stcrt. 1982, . . . under the chairmanship of former 
Prime Minister Biesheuvel is considering proposals for introducing referendums. 
Ingolf Pernice, 'Verfassungsentwurf für eine Europäische Union', Europarecht, Vol. 2, 1984, at 131. 
Wolfgang Wessels, 'Der Vertragsentwurf des Europäischen Parlaments für eine Europäische Union', Europa-Archiv 8 /1984, at 
242. 
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guarantees for national parliaments, particular if the Court of Justice of the Union . . . should 
put a broad construction on the powers of the highest tier.'" 
This means that if the Treaty is approved in its present form, the institutions and organs of the 
Union would be able to exercise powers under it whose extent was not envisaged at the time of 
approval by (among others) the Dutch Parliament. This is scarcely reconcilable with the purpose of 
parliamentary approval. The definition of the concurrent powers specifically provided therefore 
needs to be re-examined in detail. 
e. The European Council and the position of the 
Dutch Prime Minister 
Under Article 8 of the Treaty the European Council, in which the Netherlands is represented by the 
Prime Minister, is to become one of the institutions of the Union. Article 32 of the Treaty confirms 
the present composition of the European Council, namely the Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States. 
The European Council has changed the traditional division of responsibilities between the Prime 
Minister and the Foreign Minister in that the Prime Minister has to concern himself directly with 
European and foreign policy by virtue of his being a member of the European Council. 
The Foreign Minister is the member of the Government responsible for coordinating foreign policy, 
including European policy. He thus has responsibility for ensuring optimum interdepartmental pre-
paration of foreign and European policy. European policy is prepared and formulated at three inter-
departmental levels: 
1. the CEIA: the Coordinating Commitee on European Integration and Association, which is made 
up of officials; 
2. the REZ: the Raad voor Europese Zaken (Council for European Affairs), which comes under the 
Cabinet; 
3. the Cabinet itself. 
The Prime Minister chairs both the Cabinet (Article 45 of the Constitution) and the Cabinet commit-
tees (first paragraph of Rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure of the Cabinet). The Foreign Minister is 
responsible for coordination on any matter raised in the REZ. The substance of decisions is dealt 
with by the REZ and only rarely in the full Cabinet." 
The Prime Minister, as presiding member of the Cabinet, is in charge of coordinating general govern-
ment policy. He bears the prime responsibility for such coordination vis-à-vis the outside.35 
Considering the respective tasks of the Prime Minister (coordinating general government policy, 
including foreign and European policy) and the Foreign Minister, it would appear essential that the 
latter should also be present at meetings of the European Council. 
However, the institutionalization of the European Council under the Draft Treaty implies a more 
independent position for the Prime Minister in relation to the Cabinet and to the Foreign Minister in 
particular. This is hard to reconcile with the Constitution, which does not confer on the Prime 
Minister any power of independent action vis-à-vis the outside apart from his portfolio of Minister 
for General Affairs." His position cananot be compared with that of the German Chancellor, who 
" ¡bid. 
" M. Kwast-van Duursen, 'De Minister-President en de Europese Raad', Internationale Spectator, November 1984, at 658. 
" TK 1978-79, 15424, No 1, at 2 and 3. 
" Kortmann, supra, at 166 and 167; E.M.H. Hirsch Ballin, 'Reglement van Orde voor de Raad van Ministers', Ars Aequi 28 
(1979) 10, at 606. 
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has the power to issue general instructions to his ministers [Ricbtlinienkompetenz) and can appoint 
ministers to his Cabinet,37 nor with that of the British Prime Minister, who also appoints and dis-
misses ministers, and decides on the date for dissolution of the House of Commons,3S or that of the 
French President, who has a direct mandate from the electorate by virtue of separate elections." The 
way the European Council now operates — made up as it is of the Heads of State or Government 
together with the President of the Commission, assisted by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and a 
Member of the Commission40 indicates the difficult position in which the Foreign Minister is placed. 
If this were to be anchored in the Treaty, it would imply a shift in the division of responsibilities bet-
ween the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. However, the problem is not insuperable, provi-
ded that both ministers understand that in matters dealt with by the European Council they may 
exercise their powers only in joint agreement. Any differences between them that they cannot clear 
up themselves will have to be settled by the Cabinet in accordance with its Rules of Procedure. 
2. Political aspects 
a. The current state of debate 
In the Dutch Parliament discussion of the Draft Treaty was slow to get under way. The Italian 
Chamber of Deputies gave its backing to the project on the very same day that it was adopted by the 
European Parliament, while the Belgian Chamber of Representatives followed suit shortly after-
wards. The Danish Folketing also took little time in making up its mind, but there opinion ran in the 
opposite direction and on 29 May 1984 the draft was rejected by a large majority. 
It was not until November 1984 that the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Second 
Chamber opened the procedure for examining the Treaty. After preparatory written proceedings the 
Committee, together with its counterpart in the First Chamber, held a hearing on 1 February 1985 at 
which members of the European Parliament's Committee on Institutional Affairs and members of 
the European Movement testified. This hearing is to be followed in March by a written and oral 
exchange of views with the Government. The time will then be ripe for a possible debate in the 
House. 
In the meantime a number of statements have been made on the Treaty, both from government quar-
ters and from individual members — notably during a debate held on 6 December 1984 on the Dub-
lin meeting of the European Council. Other bodies such as employers' and workers' organizations 
have so far taken no more than preparatory steps towards a final decision on their position in 1985. 
b. Attitudes of the political parties 
The Dutch Members of the European Parliament have, in general, vigourously supported the prepa-
ratory work on the Treaty. In the main, the attitude of politicians active in the domestic political 
T. Koopmans, Vergelijkend Publiekrecht 186 (Deventer: Kluwer, 1978). 
Ibid., at 167-168. 
/¿/d., at 181. 
Solemn Declaration on European Union, signed by the European Council at its meeting in Stuttgart on 17-19 June 1983, and 
the statement regarding the definition of responsibilities made by the Dutch Foreign Minister; see Kwast-van Duursen, supra, 
at 660. 
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arena is also positive, although expectations among them as to its chances of becoming reality do not 
run very high. 
The Prime Minister, Mr Lubbers (Christian Democrat), speaking in the First Chamber on 21 
November 1984, said that, apart from the odd defect, the Treaty had many good points.41 
In this connection G.J. Schutte — a member of the Gereformeerd Politiek Verbond, one of the small-
est political parties, but a highly respected parliamentarian — remarked during a debate in the 
Second Chamber on the interim report by the Dooge Committee: 'In my view, Dooge is to Spinelli as 
reality is to Utopia . . . Is it not a waste of time and effort for the Dutch Parliament to devote its 
attention to the Spinelli draft, when it seems to have not the slightest chance of success among the 
Heads of Government, particularly in the newer Member States?42 
The major political parties (the Christian Democratisch Appel, the Social Democratic Partij van de 
Arbeid and the Liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie), like the centre-left D'66 party, 
seem to be prepared to come down in favour of the Treaty. This, at least, is the direction in which the 
statements by party politicians and the party manifestos point. The parliamentary parties will set out 
their formal positions when the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs considers the matters (see 
A). On 21 May 1984 Mr Voorhoeve, in the Second Chamber, spoke in favour of the Treaty on 
behalf of his parliamentary party (WD), adding that the Netherlands should 'continue in its role as 
an advocate of closer European cooperation and contribute to the speedy ratification of this Treaty'. 
However, he also indicated some reservations regarding 'the problem of a two-speed Europe' raised 
by Article 82 and the section of the Treaty dealing with 'Policy for society'. The Liberal party's critic-
ism here centred on the fact that, in its view, too many tasks were assigned to the Union in this 
sphere, which goes against the liberal ideal of deregulation.4' 
The general expectation is that the Dutch Second Chamber will aprove the Draft Treaty establishing 
the European Union by a comfortable majority, even though there may be some criticism on points 
of detail. 
However, this is more likely to be with a view to lending weight to the argument for strengthening 
the European institutions, in particular the European Parliament and the Commission, than because 
the Treaty is expected to become reality in the near future. 
3. Conclusions 
A final assessment of the Dutch position on the Treaty — from both the constitutional and the politi-
cal point of view — reveals a certain degree of ambiguity. On the one hand the Treaty is perfectly 
compatible with Dutch constitutional law, as express provision has existed since 1953 for the trans-
fer of sovereign powers to international organizations and the development of the international legal 
order is one of the prime aims of Dutch foreign policy under the Constitution. In the political sphere, 
too, there is still a willingness to venture along new paths of European cooperation. On the other 
hand, there is an unmistakable tendency to give way to resignation as European integration marks 
time. Our impression is that this is at least partly reflected in the rather unhurried pace of the deli-
berations on the Treaty. The feeling is that a consensus on a substantial increase in powers for the 
Community institutions will be almost impossible to achieve between the governments in the enlar-
ged Community. There is much greater willingness in this area among the six original Member 
States, but it is realized that opting for closer integration between only some of the Member States 
" Hand. Ek 1984-85, at 177. 
' ; Hand. TK 1984-85, at 2162 (6 December 1984). 
" UCV97 (Vaste Comm. voor Buitenlandse Zaken), at 79-9 (21 May 1984). 
2SÌ 
would cause enormous complications. In addition there is a feeling that the Netherlands should go its 
own way on the problems that are of greatest general concern to the public — employment, peace 
and international security, and the distribution of wealth. This perhaps explains why a recent Euro-
barometer opinion poll showed that the Dutch — despite their traditional pro-European attitude — 
are now more sceptical towards the idea of a United States of Europe than people in the other origi-
nal Member States, although they still remain much more positive than the Danes or the British.44 
The crucial issue for the creation of a European Union is, in our view, the question raised by Article 
82 of the Treaty: the choice between stagnation or only slow-moving integration by a Europe of 10 
or 12 members on the one hand and a closer Union of some of the Member States on the other. Giv-
en the wording of Article 82, it is left for the course of events to determine which option will be chos-
en. However, it is our impression that the countries which would be inclined per se to accept the 
Treaty are unlikely to wish to upset their relations with certain other of the present Member States. 
And the latter will be understandably reluctant to have to deal with a powerful bloc, such as would 
be formed by the European Union, within an otherwise unchanged Community. In these circum-
stances we are unable to see any great prospect of success for the Treaty, however favourably we 
may look on it. Its importance lies, in our view, in the fact that it gives form and substance to an 
ideal. It holds up to the governments and leaders of the Member States the goal that Europe's first 
parliament expects them to work towards, however, slow and laborious the process may be, an ever 
closer union. 
" NRC Handelsblad, 18 January 1984. 
2X4 
Chapter XI - The Draft Treaty 
establishing the European Union -
Report on the United Kingdom 
by David Edward, Richard McAllister and Robert Lane 
1. Introduction 
This report is in three parts. Part I deals with the question whether, assuming that the necessary poli-
tical will exists, there are any strictly legal or constitutional obstacles to the United Kingdom's acces-
sion to the European Union. Our conclusion is that there are no such obstacles. 
In Part II, we consider whether the political will exists. Our conclusion is that, for the time being at 
any rate, it does not. The United Kingdom Government has not yet taken a policy decision on the 
Draft Treaty, either in principle or in detail, but it is already reasonably clear that the government's 
position is likely to be unfavourable. Apart from the Liberal-SDP Alliance we have been unable to 
identify any substantial body of opinion, in Parliament or in the country generally, which favours the 
proposal or is even prepared to take it seriously. 
Part II also considers the ways in which the Draft Treaty might reach 'the political agenda' in the Uni-
ted Kingdom. 
In Part III, we try to explain the negative character of British attitudes, and we express some reserva-
tions of our own about the Draft Treaty. 
One of the misfortunes of those who comment on European affairs in the UK is that they run the 
risk, if they appear enthusiastic, of being called 'Euro-fanatics' at home or, if they do not, of being 
called 'anti-communautaire' elsewhere in Europe. Our report may appear negative in tone and may 
therefore disappoint those who look for a more positive response from the United Kingdom. But we 
feel that it is more important for us to state the problems, as we see them, frankly and realistically 
than to refrain from critical comment as a kind of personal pledge of loyalty to the Community. We 
believe that the cause of European Union will not be promoted, and may indeed be hindered, by 
sweeping the difficulties under the carpet. 
2. Legal and constitutional implications 
For the United Kingdom, the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union, like the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome, presents few problems of accession or incorporation. The constitutional diffi-
culties, stemming from a largely unwritten constitution and the doctrine of the absolute supremacy 
of Parliament, concern entrenchment of the Treaty as an autonomous and paramount legal order. 
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a. The power to enter into the European Union 
It is almost sufficient to say that, in relation to external affairs, the United Kingdom remains a 
monarchy. The external treaty-making power is a prerogative right of the Crown, which cannot be 
impugned within the Kingdom in or by the courts.' As a corollary of the doctrine of Parliamentary 
supremacy, however, treaties are not directly applicable within the Kingdom, and the courts cannot 
take judicial notice of them until they are embodied in statutes enacted by Parliament. It has recently 
been indicated that English courts will recognize principles of customary international law as form­
ing part of English law,2 but this does not include treaty obligations; for these, legislation is necess­
ary. 
The legal situation was best summed up by Lord Atkin, sitting in the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (then the 'Supreme Court' of the British Empire): 
'Within the British Empire there is a well-established rule that the making of a treaty is an execu­
tive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing domestic 
law, requires legislative action. Unlike some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly rati­
fied do not within the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law. If the national 
executive, the government of the day, decide to incur the obligations of a treaty which involve the 
alteration of law they have to run the risk of obtaining the assent of Parliament to the necessary 
statute or statutes. To make themselves as secure as possible they will often in such cases before 
final ratification seek to obtain from Parliament an expression of approval. But it has never been 
suggested, and it is not the law, that such an expression of approval operates as law, or that in law 
it precludes the assenting Parliament, or any subsequent Parliament, from refusing to give its 
sanction to any legislative proposals that may subsequently be brought before it." 
Thus, the power of accession to the European Union is exclusively that of the Crown (i.e., defacto, 
the government) independent of Parliament. But the power of implementation, or of incorporation, 
belongs exclusively, in turn, to Parliament. 
b. The power to implement the European Union 
The honouring of treaty obligations in the United Kingdom is both facilitated, and at the same time 
imperilled, by the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy. According to that docttine, there is no law 
which Parliament cannot enact, or repeal, in its ordinary legislative capacity; it can make or unmake 
any law whatsoever. 
In elucidating the doctrine, Dicey formulated three central propositions: 
'First, there is no law which Parliament cannot change . . . acting in its ordinary legislative cha­
racter. A Bill for reforming the House of Commons, a Bill for abolishing the House of Lords, a 
Bill to give London a municipality, a Bill to make valid marriages celebrated by a pretended 
clergyman, who is found after their celebration to be not in orders, are each equally within the 
competency of Parliament, they each may be passed in substantially the same manner, they none 
of them when passed will be, legally speaking, a whit more sacred or immutable than the others, 
for they each will be neither more nor less than an Act of Parliament, which can be repealed as it 
had been passed by Parliament, and cannot be annulled by any other power. Secondly, there is 
under the English constitution no marked or clear distinction between laws which are not funda­
mental or constitutional and those laws which are fundamental or constitutional . . . Thirdly, 
' See, for example, Rustomjee ν The Queen [1876] 2 QBD 69, per Lord Coleridge, CJ, at p. 74 (CA). On the treaty-making 
power, and the Community Treaties in particular, see Blackburn ν A-G [1971] 1 WLR 1037; 2 All ER 1380; CMLR 784 (CA), 
and McWhirter ν A-G [1972] CMLR 882 (CA). 
2 Trendtex Trading Corp ν Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529; 1 All ER 881 (CA). See the earlier doctrine as enunciated by 
Lord Atkin in Chung Chi Cheung ν The King [ 1939] AC 160 at p. 167 (PC): '. . .so far, at any rate, as the courts of this country 
are concerned, international law has no validity save in so far as its principles are accepted and adopted by our own domestic 
law.' 
1 Α-G Canada ν Α-G Ontario (Labour Conventions), [1937] AC 326 at pp. 347-8 (PC). 
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there does not exist . . . any person or body of persons, executive, legislative or judicial, which 
can pronounce void any enactment passed by the British Parliament on the ground of such enact­
ment being opposed to the constitution, or on any ground whatever, except, of course, its being 
repealed by Parliament.'4 
Herein lies both the strength and the weakness of the United Kingdom constitution. The law recog­
nizes no difference between constitutional laws, organic laws or ordinary laws. There is no hierarchy 
of norms; no law is 'a whit more sacred or immutable' than another. A Bill seeking the most funda­
mental constitutional change encounters no greater procedural obstacles than does one seeking to 
unite two or three English parishes. Indeed, a statute implementing the European Union could com­
mence its Parliamentary progress as a Private Member's Bill, however unlikely that may be. 
Nor are there substantive difficulties: if Parliament is supreme, it may delegate, or disable itself of, 
any particular power or powers it wishes. Such is the design and force, for the present Communities, 
of Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972, which incorporated the Treaties of Paris and 
Rome.5 But owing to the absence of any distinction between different types of laws, there exists in 
the United Kingdom constitution no means of entrenching legal norms. This is what Lord Scarman 
calls 'the helplessness of the law in the face of the legislative sovereignty of Parliament" and it consti­
tutes the apparently insurmountable problem for those who seek to draft and entrench a British Bill 
of Rights.7 
The European Communities Act successfully incorporates the Community legal order in the United 
Kingdom for the time being but, at least according to the traditional theory of British constitutional 
law, it does not and cannot entrench it. The theoretical possibility of abrogation of the Community 
norm, by simple Parliamentary majority, remains constitutionally valid whatever the breach of 
Community law, and the threat of such a course from some British quarters is one of the causes of 
continued discomfort in viewing the commitment of the United Kingdom to the Communities. 
The rigours of strict adherence to the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy have been mitigated, in 
the view of some judges, by British membership of the present Communities. Lord Denning, Master 
of the Rolls, suggested in an obiter dictum in 1979 that the doctrine of implied repeal (lex posterior 
derogat lege priore) no longer operates in English law to nullify Community obligations in the face of 
unintentionally inconsistent subsequent statute law; for Parliament to abrogate the Community 
Treaties it must do so intentionally and expressly.8 Implied support for this proposition is indicated 
in a more recent judgment of Lord Diplock in the House of Lords.' But it seems to be the case that, if 
Parliament chose to legislate explicitly, the courts could not refuse to give effect to its will. So long as 
Parliamentary sovereignty is indestructible by legislation or by any other means, constitutional theory 
can accommodate no more. 
There is one possible procedure, as yet not fully tested in the courts, by which laws may become 
entrenched in the United Kingdom. It was not attempted in the enactment of the European Commu­
nities Act, but might be considered if the government sought to implement the European Union. 
What are called 'manner and form' statutes impose procedural restraints upon the future activities of 
Parliament in the manner prescribed by the statute. The area of sovereign power, as distinct from 
procedure, remains limitless; but by this theory, sovereignty is divisible between Parliament as ordi­
narily constituted and Parliament as constituted under the entrenched provisions of the manner and 
form statute. 
Thus, according to this theory, Parliament could by statute incorporate the obligations of the 
European Union within the domestic system of the United Kingdom, and provide within the statute 
* Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 1965, 10th ed., pp. 88-91. 
1 20 & 21 Eliz. II, c. 68. 
* English Law — The New Dimension, 1974, p. 15. 
See, for example, Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals, 1980, pp. 22-40; Stacev, A New Bill oj Rights for Britain, 1973, 
" Macarthys Ltd ν Smith [1979] 3 All ER 325 at p. 329; 3 CMLR 44 at p. 47 (CA). 
" Garland ν British Rati Engineering Ltd [1983] 2 AC 751 at p. 771. 
287 
itself that it may not be amended or repealed save by recourse to some specific procedure — say, a 
weighted majority in Parliament. Any ordinary (purported) statute subsequently seeking to abrogate 
the Union by repeal of the incorporating statute (or parts of it) would then be a nullity. 
There has been some judicial recognition of manner and form restraints, particularly in the Com­
monwealth,10 although some opinion denies their existence." There is also some debate as to what 
may legitimately constitute such a restraint. Nevertheless, such a device might fruitfully be incorpo­
rated into any enabling statute for the European Union, and if successful would more closely align 
British constitutional adherence to Community norms to that of other Member States. 
Subject to that, the question of United Kingdom accession to the European Union is ultimately a 
question of political reality rather than constitutional or legal theory. It would depend on the politi­
cal will of the government of the day and the size of its Parliamentary majority. The risks for a 
government seeking to accede to the Union and to incorporate its provisions in domestic law are 
illustrated by the history of accession to the present Communities. 
The election manifesto of the Conservative Party in 1970 and, after the election, the Conservative 
Government's White Paper. 'The United Kingdom and the European Communities', contained a 
commitment to entry if the terms were acceptable. After negotiation, the Government secured a 
majority of 102 in the House of Commons on a motion approving the principle of entry. On the 
second reading of the European Communities Bill, however, the Government's majority was re­
duced to 8, and the majority on third reading was only 17. Thus, notwithstanding accession, the 
obligations arising from accession were incorporated in domestic law by, but only by, the slimmest 
of margins. 
Finally, we should briefly mention the theoretical possibilities of legislation by Private Member's Bill 
or by a Bill introduced in the House of Lords rather than the House of Commons. 
The Government could not be compelled, against its will, to accede to the Union by a Private Mem­
ber's Bill; nor would a Private Member's Bill seeking to incorporate the law of the Union in domestic 
law have any prospects of success against the will of the Government. The same applies to a Bill 
introduced in the House of Lords, where the Government does not necessarily command a majority, 
since the legislation would have to pass the Commons. The only usefulness of a Private Member's 
Bill would be as a means of stimulating debate. 
It is possible that, if the Government were anxious to legislate and were uncertain of its majority in 
the House of Commons, a European Union Bill would be introduced first in the House of Lords, 
where it might receive more sympathetic consideration, so blunting the edge of opposition in the 
House of Commons. This is not probable. In the absence of a clear majority in the House of Com­
mons, a Government would not be likely to attempt to legislate at all. 
"' See Α-G New South Wales ν Trethowan [1932] AC 526 (PC); Harris ν Minister of the Interior [ 1952] 2 SALR 428 (SC); Bribery 
Commissioner ν Ranasinghe [1965] AC 192 (PC); but Kashavananda ν State of Kerala [1973] 1 SCR 231 (Indian SC). 
" See, for example, Dicey, supra, at pp. 64-70; Wade, 'The Basis of Legal Sovereignty', Camb.L.J., 1955, p. 172. See also Ellen 
Street Estates ν Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590. The traditional view of Parliamentary sovereignty was most recently upheld 
in Manuel ν Attorney-General [1983] Ch. 77. The case concerned the competence of Parliament in the patriation of the 
Canadian Constitution, and was not directly concerned with the validity of a manner and form restraint. In the course of his 
judgment Sir Robert Megarry, V-C, said (at p. 86), 'If I leave on one side the European Communities Act 1972 and all that flows 
from it, and also the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, which do not affect this case, 1 am bound to say that from first to last I have 
heard nothing in this case to make me doubt the simple rule that the duty of the court is to obey and apply every Act of 
Parliament, and that the court cannot hold any such Act to be ultra vires. Of course there may be questions about what the Act 
means, and of course there is power to hold statutory instruments and other subordinate legislation ultra vires. But once an 
instrument is recognized as being an Act of Parliament, no English court can refuse to obey it or question its validity'. 
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3. Socio-political assessment 
This part of the report is divided into seven sections. Section 1 sets out the public reactions of 
Government ministers and, in summary form, the points made to us in informal discussion with 
Government sources. Section 2 deals with the political (as opposed to strictly legal) difficulties for a 
Government seeking to promote a Treaty for European Union, and with the ways in which the 
present Draft Treaty might reach the political agenda in Parliament. Section 3 deals with attitudes of 
the major UK political parties. It discusses in turn: the present attitudes of the four main parties; the 
likelihood of any significant changes of attitude in the near future; and the relationship of the views 
of MEPs on the one hand, and those of MPs and home-based party research departments and acti-
vists on the other. Section 4 sketches the views, in so far as they have been formulated, of leading 
interest groups. Section 5 deals with the European Movement. Section 6 comments on the attitudes 
of the media. Section 7 deals with public opinion as a whole. 
a. The Government 
Public attitudes 
At the time of writing, the United Kingdom Government had not adopted a definite policy on the 
Draft Treaty. But a good indication of the Government's initial reaction has been given by Mr Mal-
colm Rifkind, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and UK representative on 
the ad hoc ('Dooge') committee on institutions of the Community set up at the Fontainebleau Sum-
mit. 
Answering a Parliamentary question in the House of Commons on 27 June 1984, Mr Rifkind said: 
'Although there are some aspects of the Spinelli report to which we do not object, we have made it 
clear that there are some proposals that we cannot support. I draw special attention to the propo-
sal to phase out the national veto after 10 years and the proposal to increase the powers of the 
European Parliament. We have made it clear that those are the two main recommendations that 
we cannot support'12 
In answer to other Parliamentary questions, both Mr Rifkind and the Prime Minister have stressed 
the scope available under the existing treaties: 
The Prime Minister: 'We are not convinced of the need for a new treaty since the existing treaties 
provide plenty of scope for the further development of the Community.'" 
Mr Rifkind: 'Our view is that the existing treaties provide for the further development of the 
Community and we are not persuaded of the need for a new treaty."4 
At the time of the first debates in the European Parliament on the new treaty (September 1983), Mr 
Rifkind gave a yet more general view of the Government's approach: 
'The European Parliament has focused our attention on the issue [how the Community can be 
improved]... in its debate on [the Spinelli] report which argues for a more elaborate Community 
structure with greater powers for its central institutions. That is not our approach. To us, institu-
tions must be subservient to policies. Closer cooperation should not be forced but must grow out 
of practical ways in which as a Community we can work together for our common good. Sub-
stance and reality must come before form.'15 
He went on to list some of the concrete areas where 'working together can pay real dividends.' 
11 Answer to Mr Proctor, Hansard, 27. 6. 1984, col. 988. 
" Answer to Mr Body, Hansard, 14. 5. 1984, col. 1. 
14 Answer to Mr Lofthouse, Hansard, 21. 3. 1984, col. 452. 
" Speech by Mr Rifkind to Scottish CBI members, Dundee, 23. 9. 1983. 
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Informal indications 
The public pronouncements quoted above show that the United Kingdom Government is likely to be 
opposed in principle to two to the fundamental features of the Draft Treaty: the phasing out of the 
veto and the increase in the powers of the Parliament. In informal discussion, other areas of concern 
have been identified, some of them no less fundamental. We set out the points as they have been 
made to us in summary form: 
1. Relationship with the Community Treaties: There is nothing to ptevent the parties to the Com-
munity Treaties agreeing to a new Treaty which would supersede the existing treaties. But such 
agreement must be unanimous. The provision in the Draft Treaty whereby it would take effect once 
ratified by Member States representing two-thirds of the population of the Community is contrary to 
international law (Articles 41 and 54 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties). 
2. Competence: Articles 11 and 12 have the effect of making it considerably easier than it now is to 
give competence to the Union rather than proceed by cooperation among the Member States. It is 
not clear what sort of majority in Council would be required to make the step from cooperation to 
common action. 
3. Appointment of the Court of Justice: Article 30 gives the Parliament the function of appointing 
half of the members of the Court, the other half being appointed by the Council. Not only would this 
destroy the convention that the Court of Justice is composed of judges representing each of the natio-
nal law systems of the Community, but it is inherently objectionable for the legislature to appoint the 
judiciary. There is nothing comparable in the procedure for appointment of international tribunals. 
The nearest parallel is the nomination of candidates for judges on the European Court of Human 
Rights by the national groups in the Council of Europe Assembly — but those nominations are in 
effect made by the States parties. It is an almost universal constitutional practice in domestic law for 
the executive to appoint the judiciary, which, once appointed, is entirely independent. This provi-
sion would politicize the appointment of the judges in a most undesirable way. 
4. Legislation: The effect of Article 38(4) seems to be that a Council draft amended by the Commis-
sion and adopted by the Parliament will pass into law unless the Council can muster a qualified 
majority to reject it. 
5. Budget: The effect of Article 71(2) is that the procedure for adopting organic laws applies to 
amendment of the present system of own resources or creation of any new system to replace it. That 
gives the Parliament a substantial role in a decision which at present is in the hands of the Council 
and Member States (on a proposal by the Commission) under Article 201(EEC). Article 72 effective-
ly abolishes the present distinction between obligatory and ijon-obligatory expenditure. Article 76 
changes the present budgetary procedure and, as a result of the change brought about by Article 72, 
gives Parliament powers in relation to obligatory expenditure far beyond what it now has. By Article 
76(2)(f) Parliament may on second reading reject by a qualified majority amendments adopted by the 
Council. This gives Parliament the last word on all budgetary issues and, in effect, the power to force 
the Member States to increase domestic taxation. 
6. The Commission: In addition to its role in tabling amendments to legislation under Article 39, 
Article 40 gives the Commission the exclusive power to issue regulations and decisions required for 
the implementation of laws. It only has to inform Parliament and the Council. The Commission is 
also given the right to oppose amendments approved by Council or by Parliament to the budget on 
its fitst reading, such opposition having the result that the relevant arm of the budgetary authority 
must take a fresh decision by qualified majority on second reading. On the other hand, the Commis-
sion loses its exclusive right to initiate legislation: by Article 37(2) it must introduce a draft if asked 
to do so by Parliament or Council, or if it fails todo so, Parliament or Council may introduce a draft. 
7. Judicial review: Article 43 extends the powers of review by the ECJ considerably. One point 
(which could be an improvement on the present situation) is that an equal right of appeal and equal 
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treatment is given for all the institutions before the Court of Justice. This would appear to have the 
effect of giving a right of action against the Parliament, which does not now exist in a number of 
instances. The article gives the Court jurisdiction to impose sanctions on a Member State 'failing to 
fulfil its obligation under the law of the Union'. Similar power is given to the European Council in 
cases of persistent violation of fundamental laws, by Article 44. In relation to fundamental laws, 
under Article 4 the Union is to take a decision on its accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and the UN Covenants. The UK Government has hitherto strenuously 
opposed the idea of Community accession to the ECHR and would have similar objections to its 
accession to the covenants. 
8. Monetary matters: The Draft Treaty envisages radical moves towards monetary union under its 
provisions on the European monetary system and fund. Participation would be obligatory as would 
the partial election of national reserves to the EMF. The role of the ECU would be expanded to that 
of a reserve currency. 
9. Defence: The objectives of the Draft Treaty refer to security and defence matters. These are not 
elaborated in any coherent manner but there are references to cooperation in fields ranging from 
arms sales, MBFR and disarmament to general security (Article 9). These aims are unlikely to be 
acceptable to all the Member States. 
10. Forms of cooperation: The Draft Treaty proposes two levels of combined action by Member 
States: common action and cooperation, the former referring to areas where the Union has exclusive 
compentence. Political cooperation itself is implicitly covered by cooperation but both headings 
remain obscure at key points in the Draft Treaty. 
11. General: The Draft Treaty attempts to codify a far wider range of activities than is currently 
covered by the Community Treaties but without sufficient detail to make for consistency or clarity. 
In addition, it allows for operational practices to be decided by institutions and other bodies at a 
later stage. This presumably means that the ultimate power to determine the shape of Union institu-
tions would rest with the Parliament. 
b. Parliament 
We have suggested in Part I that when a Government has made up its mind and has a reasonable 
majority in the House of Commons, it can do almost whatever it wishes. However, in the 1970s and 
1980s, it has become less clear that this is so. Situations have arisen where a Government has needed 
to rely on the support or benevolent neutrality of other groups, the 'Lib-Lab Pact' of 1977/78 being 
one notable example. While this is not in itself unprecedented, the European Community has 
become a new and separate ideological issue in British politics, and has already been responsible for 
upsetting what were once thought to be the 'normal' processes of government in the United King-
dom. 
It is worth recalling that, after accession in 1973, the issue of membership did not vanish from the 
political agenda in the United Kingdom: instead, new precedents were set which might be followed 
again over this or any other proposal for European Union. In particular, in 1974 the Labour Party 
committed itself in its election manifesto to renegotiate the terms of entry and to hold a referendum 
on them. After the election the Labour Government declared itself bound by the result of the referen-
dum. This, it has been held,"' had the effect of usurping the sovereignty of Parliament. It certainly 
makes it even more difficult to define with any precision where the law stops and politics begin! 
It may well be that, even if a futute Government were committed to a Treaty for European Union 
and secured the approval of Parliament, it would now also feel bound to submit to a binding referen-
'" Budge, et al, The New British Political System, 1983, p. 139. 
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dum. Thus, Government support for accession to a new treaty is still a necessary, but perhaps not a 
sufficient, condition of accession. 
The 1975 referendum campaign also marked another departure from 'normal' UK practice — this 
time over collective Cabinet responsibility. Labour ministers were seen to oppose one another in the 
referendum campaign. Again, this happened after accession had been accomplished by a relatively 
united (Conservative) Cabinet, relatively sure of its Commons majority. The events of 1975 were a 
way of getting the Labour Party 'off the hook' of its own deep divisions on the issue: but such prob-
lems could recur over European Union, whatever the party of Government. 
As to the ways in which the Draft Treaty now proposed might be brought to Parliament's attention, 
the following possibilities exist. (It is important to emphasize that they are not equivalent to one 
another, in the sense that, if followed, they would lead to the same result. Some might be inappro-
priate in the circumstances, and more than one might be followed concurrently. Except in the last 
case, we concentrate on what might be done in the House of Commons). 
(i) Government motion. We think this unlikely, unless considerable pressure were generated from 
the Dooge Committee and/or there were evidence of consensus on modification of the Draft 
Treaty such as to render it more to the Government's liking. 
(ii) Opposition motion (on an 'Opposition Day'). This would have to be thought to have political 
benefits for the Opposition outweighing any embarrassing revelation of differences. The Libe-
rals have one such day at their disposal, half of which they have made available to the SDP. 
(iii) Private Member's (Monday or Friday) Motion. This would normally be easy for the Govern-
ment to neutralize or defeat. If taken in Private Members' time, whatever was said would not 
have the status of definitive consideration of the text of the Draft Treaty by the House. 
(iv) A 'Ten Minute Rule' Bill.TKis is usually regarded as a useful method of ventilating the ideas 
which such a Bill contains; it is perhaps not a likely channel for consideration of the Draft 
Treaty. 
(v) Questions. See the previous section. 
(vi) Consideration by a select committee of the House of Commons. Potentially, three committees 
might be involved: the European Legislation, etc. Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
and the Treasury and Civil Service Committee. The terms of reference of the European Legisla-
tion Committee are to 'consider draft proposals by the Commission of the European Commu-
nities for legislation, and other documents published for submission to the Council of Ministers 
or to the European Council, and to report whether these raise questions of legal or political 
importance . . .', etc. At present the Draft Treaty does not come within these terms of reference; 
but if, for example, it or its substance became a discussion document at a European Council, 
then it would come within the terms of reference and be a candidate to be recommended for 
debate, at which stage the Government would have to arrange for the House to debate it. A final 
report of the Dooge Committee would also be a candidate. 
Both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Treasury and Civil Service Committee have shown 
considerable interest since the latter part of 1983. 
[v\\)Consideration by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities. The 
terms of reference of this committee are different from, and wider than, those of the equivalent 
Commons committee: 'to consider Community proposals, whether in draft or otherwise, obtain 
all necessary information about them, and report on those which, in the opinion of the commit-
tee, raise important questions of policy or principle and on other questions to which the commit-
tee consider that the special attention of the House should be drawn . . .'. The Draft Treaty is 
clearly within the terms of reference of the Lord's Committee; and the committee, and individual 
members of it, have already been involved in deciding how best to proceed, and are at the time of 
writing (January 1985) involved in further steps. 
The committee is expected to decide in late January or early February 1985 whether to set up an 
ad hoc Committee on the Draft Treaty [ad hoc because the Draft Treaty does not fall neatly into 
one of the Lord's subcommittee categories). Members of the committee are to visit the Institu-
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tional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in February. EP Members, in turn, will be 
in the UK in April 1985 as part of their general tour to each national Parliament. 
c. The political parties 
As mentioned in the introduction, we have been unable to identifiy any substantial body of opinion 
in the UK, outside the Alliance parties (Liberals and Social Democrats), which favours the Draft 
Treaty or is even prepared to take it seriously. A very good indicator of the importance attached by a 
British political party to a particular issue in any year is its place in the agenda of the Party Confe-
rence in September/October. In 1984, even the Liberal Party, the most enthusiastic for the Union, 
only held a debate on the '1984 Euro elections'. The motion for debate lamented the party's perfor-
mance, along with that of its SDP Alliance partner, in the EP elections; and was highly critical of its 
EP partners in the Federation of European Liberals and Democrats (ELD). There was hardly a men-
tion of the Draft Treaty. 
The Conservative Party 
As the party of Government, having no need to take account of any coalition considerations, the atti-
tude of the Conservatives is crucial for at least the next three years. It is, however, necessary to dis-
tinguish 'the Government' from the Conservative Party at large in the UK; and to distinguish both 
from Conservative MEPs. 
The attitudes of the Conservative Party as a whole have been summarized by the Party's Research 
Department as follows: 
Firstly, 
There is a belief that the time is not ripe for European Union, although this does not diminish the 
support in principle for the general idea in due course (emphasis added). 
Such qualifications speak volumes. The project is firmly in the category of 'not for today'! Secondly, 
There is the strongly held view that, since the UK has an unwritten constitution unlike most of the 
rest of our Community partners, . . . an 'evolutionary' process towards European Union is more 
desirable than a 'revolutionary' approach (by means of a Treaty). 
Whilst the line of reasoning here may not be obvious, it probably reflects unease that there would be 
no constitutional 'bulwark' against progressive erosion of UK 'sovereignty'. 
Many of these reservations are shared by several Conservative MEPs. This is so despite the votes cast 
in favour of the Draft Treaty by many of them. (The group voted on 14 February 1984: 22 in fa-
vour, 5 abstentions, 6 against, 28 not voting.) A free vote was allowed despite a certain amount of 
resistance to it by party managers back home. 'Explanations of vote' followed soon after. A fairly 
typical example of the true meaning of a vote in favour came from Christopher Jackson, MEP: 
'Undoubtedly some of the ideas in the Draft Treaty are controversial, for example its recom-
mendations concerning the veto. I was among those who voted for the draft as deserving further 
discussion yet made clear the importance they attach to the continuation of the veto . . ,'17 
At the time of the free vote in the EP (14 February 1984) Derek Prag, MEP, explained the EDG's 
stance thus: 
'The essential difference within the group — and it is a fair and legitimate difference to anyone 
who knows the history both of the United Kingdom and of Denmark — is between those who 
Letter to The Times, London, 12. 6. 1984. 
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believe that written treaties are necessary in a voluntary union or community of peoples and those 
who believe in organic development, the evolutionary process, gradualism and pragmatism.'14 
Thus, if there appears to be a degree of ambiguity about Conservative attitudes to the Draft Treaty at 
present, it is not one which affords much comfort to the Treaty's promoters. Any House of Com-
mons vote on the Draft Treaty will see most Conservatives vote as they are told by the party mana-
gers — reflecting the ministerial views already quoted. A few would break ranks; rather more might 
abstain. 
The Labour Party 
According to a party research officer, the Labour Party has 'to the best of my knowledge . . . never 
made a formal statement on the question of European Union'. Commenting on the absence of sub-
stantial documentation, he added 'That might of itself be a significant reflection of the importance 
attached to the issue by the Labour Party'. 
There appears to be no great difference between the Party's stance in the EP and its stance at home; 
and no likelihood of Labour supporting the Draft Treaty. At Community level, in the 1984 mani-
festo of the Confederation of the Socialist Parties, Labour entered a reserve stating that it 'did not 
support' the sections on 'Institutional improvements in favour of the EP' and 'An improved financial 
system'. Labour is also absent from the annex declaring PSI and PSDI support for the Draft Treaty.'" 
Indeed, Labour's own national manifesto for the 1984 European elections was careful to leave open 
the 'withdrawal' option. It stated that 
'[EEC] rules may stand in the way of a Labour Government when it acts to cut unemployment. It is in 
this context that we believe that Britain, like all Member States, must retain the option of withdrawal 
from the EEC.' 
This is of course a careful compromise: but the compromise operates in reverse as well. Those most 
in favour of 'full-hearted' UK membership of the EC do not wish to expose themselves too far by any 
open support for the Draft Treaty. 
The Liberal Party 
The Liberals have been unequivocal in their support for the Draft Treaty. They have, however, no 
voice in the EP and only a very small voice in the UK House of Commons. From their point of view, 
much the most promising place in which to fight for a debate on the Draft Treaty is the House of 
Lords. They have more representatives there (including such 'elder statesmen' as Lord Gladwyn). 
numerous and often influential SDP allies, and independent 'cross-bench' sympathizers. A debate in 
the House of Lords could be no more than an attempt to 'show the flag', undertaken without any 
expectation that a majority for the Draft Treaty in the Lords (itself unlikely) could 'shame' the Com-
mons into agreement. 
The 'Liberal Programme for Europe' (1983) declared 'We have been fully committed to the goal of 
political and economic union for the peoples of Europe since . . . 1958'. The document closed by 
emphasizing 'the importance of working towards European federation' but, perhaps significantly, it 
did not mention the Spinelli proposals, which were due for debate in the European Parliament imme-
diately after its publication. 
The next step was the drafting of the;'oz'ni Liberal-SDP Alliance manifesto for the 1984 EP elections. 
In Chapter VI ('An Effective Democratic Europe') the parties had an opportunity to 'go firm' on the 
EP Debates, No 1-309/32; 14. 2. 1984. 
Labour Manifesto, 9. 3. 1984, pp. 31-32. 
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Draft Treaty. They did not. Indeed, one person actively involved in the drafting had the impression 
that, even at this level of attention and awareness, almost no-one had heard of the Draft Treaty. 
Chapter VI itself is delphic at crucial points: 
'We want to streamline the Community's structure and its methods of decision-making. This can 
be done without changing the Treaties . . . 
The use of the veto in the Council must be severely restricted . . . . Alliance MEPs will seek to join 
with like-minded MEPs . . . in the construction of an ever-closer union among the peoples of 
Europe.20 
Equally significant was the absence of debate on the Draft Treaty at the party's assembly in the late 
summer of 1984. Attention was focused instead on the party's unhappy relations with the ELD, and 
its delicate relations with the British SDP, to which we now turn. 
The Social Democrats 
Michael Gallagher of the SDP was the sole Alliance MEP until June 1984. Voting for the Draft 
Treaty, he said, 
'I wish to put it beyond doubt that the Alliance is solidly behind the development of European co-
operation along the lines set out in this preliminary Draft Treaty.' 
Party sources have indicated, however, that they have been under little pressure so far to justify their 
position on the Draft Treaty, although they have on occasion been attacked by the Conservatives 
about it. It has caused some, though not serious, strain in their relations with the Liberals. There is 
more than a hint of difference in the approaches of some of the SDP's own leaders. 
The generally favourable orientation of the SDP should not conceal two qualifications. Firstly, Dr 
David Owen (now leader of the party) is clearly less enthusiastic about the Draft Treaty than either 
the Liberals or his own predecessor, Mr Roy Jenkins. Secondly, the SDP is not at all likely to expose 
itself to any political risk, or 'high profile' in favour of the Draft Treaty. It is regarded as a good idea 
in the long term, but at present as a 'non-starter' in UK terms. 
On the veto, the SDP's consistent line has been to argue for reduction rather than abolition; they suc-
ceeded in getting this written into the Alliance manifesto. Beyond this, there has been no detailed 
statement that can be regarded as authoritative since an article by Mr Jenkins in The Guardian in 
1982. 
d. Interest groups 
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
The CBI has not, to date, produced any detailed reaction to the Draft Treaty, and does not appear to 
have plans to do so. Its reactions to parts of the Draft Treaty, and to its general thrust, may be infer-
red from such documents as the 1983 conference note, 'Making the EC Work Better: Managing 
Recovery'; and more especially the short pamphlet issued just before the 1984 EP elections, 'Making 
Europe Work Better: how MEPs can help British Business'. Under the heading, 'No to a two-tier 
Community', the CBI says: 
'. . . unification of the internal market . . . must be the major policy objective. Proposal for a 
Community policy which would divide the Member States into two . . . are inconsistent with this 
objective and must be opposed.' 
Alliance Manifesto, Let's Get Europe Working Together, 1984, pp. 24-26. 
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And on decision-making: 
'Better decision-making will not be achieved without moving towards majority voting where the 
Treaty (of Rome) allows it. Insistence on unanimity for everything blocks progress towards a true 
Common Market.' 
The CBI's insistence was on thorough consultation in early stages of Community legislation ('There 
must be no recurrence of the "Vredeling rabbit" pulled out of a hat . . .'). Heavy emphasis was 
placed on the completion and simplification of the internal market, ending non-tariff barriers and 
establishing full liberalization for services. On many individual policy areas, the CBI said things very 
similar to the Draft Treaty, but its complete silence on the Draft Treaty itself indicated the CBI view 
that it should be possible to accomplish most that is desired through the existing Treaties, with only 
piecemeal change. There is no indication that the CBI intends to make the Draft Treaty a major 
issue, or that it is prepared to go to the barricades or push the Government on behalf of it. 
The Institute of Directors 
The attitude of the British Institute of Directors very closely parallels that of the CBI and those other 
employers' organizations in the Community. In its submission to the incoming Commission21 (Janu-
ary 1985), the Institute set the achievement of a 'genuine common market' for goods, services and 
transport as the overriding priority, to be achieved by 1988, and warned of the irreversible shift in 
the economic centre of gravity to the Pacific rim. 
The Institute warned specifically against allowing any talk of a Draft Treaty for European Union to 
distract from this immediate, practical and priority task. Interestingly, however, the Institute was 
prepared to envisage suspension of the right of veto in the Council of Ministers, but on proposals 
'which are clearly designed only to develop the internal market': a formula close to that of the CBI 
quoted above. 
The Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
The TUC has, at the time of writing, not yet discussed the Draft Treaty in General Council, and thus 
has no formal 'corporate' view. It is clear however, that the TUC has 'no love for Spinelli', though it 
is quite favourably disposed to certain specific orientations of the Draft Treaty. 
The attitudes reported here are therefore those of TUC researchers, who have read the Draft Treaty, 
rather than its members, most of whom have not. They are in favour of retaining 'unanimous 
voting', i.e. the veto. They are against the grant of additional powers to the EP in general. They do 
not favour notions of defence and security policy at Union level. They respond 'more positively' to 
political cooperation, and feel there should be 'more of it', without specifying the mechanics. Co-
operative (pluri-national) industrial projects are viewed as 'very important to us', as is the extension 
of policy in the social field, particularly as concerns workers' rights and conditions. However, they 
question whether a change in the institutional arrangements is needed to generate the political will to 
carry through such policies. They note, with dissatisfaction, that the 'primacy of the CAP' is not cal-
led into question in the Draft Treaty. 
:1 The Common Market: An Agenda for jobs and Economic Growth. 
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e. The European Movement 
We have stressed the striking lack of position of many UK bodies on the Draft Treaty at the time of 
writing. Much the same could have been said before the referendum on 'renegotiation': the relatively 
high turnout of voters was due in no small part to 'propagandizing' groups, for and against. The 
European Movement acted then, and would probably act again, as a main umbrella organization for 
those wishing to 'go forward'. It is an inter-party body, drawing support from as wide a spectrum as 
possible, as is well reflected in its list of office-bearers, patrons and presidents. It is notable, however, 
that it can count on few prominent Labour figures, mainly from the right of the party. 
The European Movement has over 30 'associated organizations', several of which have a degree of 
influence over policy in one or other of the political parties. It has, more than any other body in the 
UK, given both prominence and a relatively positive press to the Draft Treaty. (Substantial articles 
by, for example, Dr Roy Pryce (March-April 1984) and Mr Derek Prag (July-August 1984) have 
ensured, at least, that none of these associated organizations has any excuse for not having con-
sidered the Draft Treaty rather fully). 
It remains the case that the European Movement to date has not been galvanized into action on 
behalf of the Draft Treaty. It proved, over the 1975 referendum, a highly effective body once en-
gaged; and it might do so again. Without it, certainly, the Draft Treaty would have much less of an 
audience and less exposure in the UK. 
ƒ. The media 
The British media gave the Draft Treaty their usual, sporadic attention. This can be gauged from the 
press: there were flurries of interest in September 1983 and February 1984 when the votes were due. 
Even these were mainly confined to the 'quality' newspapers, whose reaction might best be described 
as darkly sceptical. Later, they ignored it. The popular press, when it did not simply ignore the Draft 
Treaty, was scathing. 
'Visionary' was probably the commonest of the polite epithets used to describe the Treaty. First, 
some examples from The Times and The Guardian beginning in September 1983: 
'The vision . . . will be one step nearer reality. Except that it will not happen. Not in the next 
couple of years and probably not for many more years to come . . . . Tomorrow's proposals . . . 
have simply become worthy attempts to keep the idea of unity alive amid the yawns of the public 
and most politicians.'22 
'The Draft Treaty will probably remain for many years little more than a theoretical nudge in the 
direction of unity . . . . National governments . . . are in no mood for handing over significant 
powers to a supranational body.'" 
'Federal union likely to remain just a vision.';4 
'[I]ts chances of being implemented in the foreseeable future are remote in the extreme. The Par-
liament recognized this in agreeing to send its resolution direct to the 10 national parliaments for 
consideration, rather than sending it to the Council of Ministers . . . . Several countries, including 
Britain, would certainly veto any proposal which would do away with the right to a veto.'" 
The Economist was a little more positive. Its headline (18. 2. 1984) read: 
'The EEC speeds up from a snail's pace to a crawl.' 
11 Clough, 'European Union: an Impossible Dream?', The Times, London, 12. 9. 1983. 
21 The Guardian, 14. 9. 1983. 
2' Headline, The Guardian, 15. 9. 1983. 
25 The Times, 15. 2. 1984. 
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If British attitudes are hard to understand, it should not be forgotten that this is the diet on which 
'informed' opinion has been fed. 
The Financial Times was kinder, but still tended to play down the practical importance and likeli-
hood of implementation of the Draft Treaty. It is perhaps worth quoting at greater length as a fairly 
accurate reflection of sympathetic but agnostic opinion in the UK: 
'The Draft Treaty is a political statement and not a blueprint which puts the Community in immi-
nent danger of fundamental change. Governments are not even obliged to take much notice of it, 
although it is to be submitted to national parliaments for ratification . . . 
But its actual relevance is more likely to derive from the way it feeds into the growing debate over 
how to make the Community more effective — or rather, how to preserve it from impotence and 
disarray . . . 
[T]he Draft Treaty . . . gives some expression to popular demands for a more effective Commun-
ity.'26 
g. Public opinion 
In the light of the foregoing, it might be expected that public opinion in the UK would be universally 
hostile to Draft Treaty. Unfortunately, most of the questions posed in leading surveys are not of a 
form to enable us to say whether this is so or not. The evidence is best described as, first, inconclu-
sive and, second, paradoxical. 
As was pointed out by the tireless Mr Prag, the Eurobarometer poll carried out in October 1983 in 
the UK indicated that 70% of those questioned were 'in favour of the unification of western Europe.' 
Further, this percentage has not dropped much below 60 in the years that the polls have been carried 
out, whatever the state of opinion at the time about the common market. The difficulty with such 
questions is obvious: they are so vague and high-sounding that to oppose them is akin to oppo-
sing virtue. They in no way evaluate views concerning the form and scope of 'union' nor what inter-
viewees would be prepared to forego to attain certain objectives. 
It is possible to make much or little, in regard to the Draft Treaty's prospects, of such data as the 
October 1983 Eurobarometer study (published December 1983). The general picture was a some-
what more positive (or at least less negative) attitude toward the European Community in the UK in 
1982 and 1983 (after something of a nadir in 1980/81). This general picture emerges from the three 
'basic' questions regularly asked.27 
Narrowing down to the role of the European Parliament, Eurobarometer indicated middle-of-the-
range views in the UK about the present effectiveness of the EP, and a fairly significant shift between 
April and October 1983 in favour of an increase in its role in future. 
















Again, this question in no way investigated the problems of modality, quid pro quo, implied 'costs' 
and consequences from the UK's point of view. The newly-introduced questions in the 1983 survey 
sought to explore 'what sort of EP for what sort of Europe' — thus edging closer to the issues which 
" 1984, at p. 3. 
27 Eurobarometer, December 1983, No 20, at p. 46 et seq. 
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the Draft Treaty seeks to address, but still evidence of, at best, an indirect and unreliable kind. The 
three questions sought to evaluate: (a) the EP's technical function: its powers to control the way the 
Community functions and the budget; (b) its perceived remoteness from people's problems; (c) its 
'constituent' role — how far the new (post-1984) EP should 'work towards a political union of mem-
ber countries, with a European Government responsible to the EP'. 
In brief, Eurobarometers findings here were that the UK was third lowest on the 'enhanced control' 
question, but not by very much; was highest of the 'remoteness from people's problems' question; 
and was middle of the range in degree of positive support for a 'constituent' role for the EP (Yes 
60%; No 18%; Don't know 22%). 
Direct elections were perceived as an 'event with important consequences' by 44% of the UK 1983 
sample, a modest decline from 47% in the period 1976-78; this again put the UK in the middle of the 
range, and was one of the smallest losses of support. One reason for scepticism about the data is the 
famous 'propensity to vote' question. Responses that interviewees were 'certain' or 'probable' to vote 
were used as a predictor of the level of actual turnout: the UK percentage of 'certain + probable' was 
said to be 69% — hardly, in the light of events, the 'excellent indicator of voting propensity' claimed 
by Eurobarometer.ls 
One might indeed point to the dismal level of turnout in the 1984 EP elections as a better indication 
of public opinion. But it may be replied that this in part reflects disillusion with exactly the shortcom-
ings to which the Draft Treaty addresses itself; this too appears unconvincing. 
The basic point is that most — even supposedly 'well-informed' — people in the UK have so far not 
even heard of the Draft Treaty; still fewer have the slightest notion of its content, status or modali-
ties. And if these were conveyed to them in the form of such questions as 'Would you favour the end-
ing of the UK veto?', or in terms of taxation powers, there is little doubt what the answers would be. 
h. Conclusion 
On present evidence, there is no prospect of the UK House of Commons voting in favour of the Draft 
Treaty in this Patliament. The likelihood of the House of Lords doing so is greater, but not much 
greater, than zero. The Prime Minister's personal opposition to such notions is legendary. 
It is just conceivable that the issue could arise in the event of an inconclusive result at the next general 
election. But this too is most unlikely. Only if one or both of the Alliance parties (improbably but 
successfully) made it a condition for participation in a pact with another party; or if, against present 
evidence, the Alliance parties were to make sweeping gains, might this happen. It is fair to point out 
that an extra 10%, say, of the popular vote would have produced such gains for the Alliance at the 
last election. It is fair to reply that even in an election whose outcome was in little doubt, that extra 
10% failed to materialize. 
4. Personal assessment 
The attitude of the United Kingdom must seem, and indeed is, very discouraging. But the promoters 
of the Draft Treaty should perhaps bear three things in mind. 
Id. at p. 76. 
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Firstly, membership of the Community was 'sold' to the British public primarily as an economic 
benefit. The political advantages of European integration were — perhaps wisely at the time — 
underplayed, except to sophisticated audiences. British accession was followed almost immediately 
by severe economic depression; and the problems of adapting to a completely new type of political 
and judicial system — 'foreign' in every sense to British preconceptions and ways of working — were 
acute. The result is that the Community ideal has failed to capture the British imagination and, more 
fundamentally, that closer political integration is not seen as the natural development of the existing 
Communities. 
Secondly, the fact that the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution, and seems to have 
no machinery for entrenchment of treaty obligations, is indicative of an important feature of the Bri­
tish temperament and outlook. There is little awareness of 'the State' or its 'institutions'. Personal 
loyalty is more to the person of the monarch than to the monarchy as such. Most citizens are far 
more aware of the fact that they are English, Scottish or (despite partition) Irish than that they are 
British or that they are citizens of 'the United Kingdom' (which is hardly more than a term of art for 
the purposes of international relations). There is an innate preference for allowing institutions to 
develop, as the failure of all attempts radically to reform the second chamber of Parliament (the 
House of Lords) shows. The idea that important political ends can be achieved by creating new 
institutions, and the symbolic significance of creating them, are not regarded as self-evident. 
Thirdly, the British approach to legislation and, in the commercial field, to the making of contracts 
involves looking carefully at the 'small print' and leaving as little to chance as possible. Every fore­
seeable eventuality must be provided for in advance. There is therefore an inherent unwillingness to 
agree the principles and allow the details to look after themselves. The close attention already given 
by the UK Government to the small print of the Draft Treaty is simply a natural instinct. And it has 
not gone unnoticed that, when politicians in other countries have expressed enthusiasm for the 
European Union, the small print of their speeches contains many of the same reservations on essen­
tial points. 
We do not therefore find it surprising that the British attitude to this Draft Treaty, coming at this 
time, is negative. Indeed, we have serious reservations of our own, which we mention in a moment. 
We do, on the other hand, detect a growing awareness — at least amongst those who are directly 
involved — of the urgent importance of finding a way to make the Communities work better, and of 
the benefits that closer European integration can bring. The attitudes of the CBI and the Institute of 
Directors reported in Part II are particularly significant in this respect. 
In support of the view that proposals for European Union could have the effect of diverting attention 
from the urgent task of making the existing Communities work better, it can be argued that the most 
significant step towards integration of the United States was neither the Declaration of Independence 
nor the framing of the constitution, but the decision in the 'Steamship Monopoly Case' [Gibbons ν 
Ogden, 1824) when the Supreme Court vigorously, extended the Commerce Clause. In the Com­
munity we have, as it were, started with the Commerce Clause, //the existing Communities and their 
institutions are capable of being made to work, the practical benefits seen to be produced by them 
would lead naturally to greater enthusiasm for the next step towards European Union. At this stage, 
the European Union could simply be a new and unwelcome apple of discord. 
For our own part, we are particularly concerned about four features of the Draft Treaty: 
(i) The proposed constitution of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and the exercise of 
judicial control; 
(ii) The proposed constitution of the legislature and, specifically, the proposal for a unicameral Par­
liament; 
(iii) The extent to which the Draft Treaty provides for the effective exercise of executive power; 
(iv) The droits acquis of non-acceding Member States. 
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a. The Court of Justice 
The Court of Justice (like the Supreme Court in the United States) has made a spectacular contribu-
tion to the process of European integration. One of the reasons why it has been able to do so has 
been that the objects of the Communities are, in important respects, both limited and clearly defined 
by the Treaties. In particular, the EEC Treaty sets out with some precision the ends to be achieved 
and, expressly or by implication, the social and economic theory underlying these prescriptions. 
The specific prescriptions of the existing Treaties, the doctrine of direct effect and the machinery of 
Article 177 have all made it possible for the Court to treat what are essentially social and economic 
issues as legal issues. Further, the Court has been able, on the basis of the Treaties, to define with 
some precision the line of demarcation between the competences of the Communities and those of 
the Member States. We must, however, question whether this dynamic role of the Court would have 
been tolerable, in British eyes at least, if the jurisdiction of the Court had not itself been limited by 
the scope of the Treaties. 
The Draft Treaty offers no clear definition of the jurisdiction of the Court, of the ends to be achieved 
or of the underlying social and economic theory. It is, at any rate, not clear to us which of the 'prin-
ciples' of the EEC Treaty (far less the detailed rules of later articles) are to be regarded as 'expressly 
or implicitly amended by this Treaty' (Art. 7.2(DT)). To what extent, for example, could the legisla-
tive organs of the European Union lawfully adopt a dirigiste competition policy in place of the exist-
ing free-market policy, permit restrictive trading agreements or encourage the creation of public or 
private cartels or monopolies? 
The choice between a regulated economy and a free-market economy is clearly a political choice 
about which, as is evident, the governments of Member States may differ. Nevertheless, for the 
EEC, the choice has been made in the Treaty and the Court can give effect to the political choice by 
applying the Treaty. We do not, at the moment, see how the Court could do so if it had first to 
decide whether or not the political choice had in fact been made. 
The difficulty would be all the greater if the Court were forced to decide between the interests of a 
majority of Member States which had ratified the Treaty for the European Union and those of a 
minority which had not. Suppose, for example, that a European Union consisting of seven of the exist-
ing Member States were to legislate in favour of greater State aids for ailing industries, abandoning 
the strict controls on State aids under the existing Treaties; and suppose that this were seriously to 
affect the competitive position of undertakings in the non-acceding Member States who would 
(unless they are to be deprived of droits acquis) continue to be members, together with the acceding 
majority, of the existing Communities. Would the legislation of the European Union be lawful or 
not? 
It is not enough to say that this question would be decided by the Court of Justice in the light of all 
the Treaties, since the question then is 'Which Court of Justice?' Article 30 of the Draft Treaty pro-
vides for the reconstitution of the Court of Justice of the Communities under an organic law of the 
European Union, and for the appointment of at least half of its members by the Parliament. That 
being so, the Court of Justice of the European Union cannot be the same as the Court of Justice of 
the Communities. Would the Court of Justice of the Communities continue to exist? If so, how 
would a conflict between that Court and the new Court of the European Union be resolved? 
We offer this example, not as a juridico-philosophical conundrum, bur because it seems to us to be a 
serious possibility that a minority of the existing Member States would not be prepared to ratify the 
Draft Treaty. The problems created by such a situation are problems which, in our opinion, the pro-
moters of the Draft Treaty must face. 
Further, even if all the existing Member States were to ratify the Draft Treaty, one must ask whether, 
given the extensive competence of the legislative organs of the European Union, the Court of Justice 
could continue to exercise the same sort of judicial control as it exercises at present. As Professor 
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Jacqúe has pointed out in his general report to the recent FIDE Congress on 'The Principle of Equality 
in Economic Law' (p. 16), judicial control presents less difficulty in the context of compétence liée 
than where a wide margin of appreciation is left to the administration. While the point is not precisely 
the same, there is already some evidence that, as the application of the existing Treaties proceeds fur-
ther into the margin of appreciation, the Court finds it increasingly difficult to be 'adventurous'. One 
of the reasons, we would suggest, is that judicial control must, if it is to be acceptable, itself be con-
trolled. 
b. The Parliament 
The Parliament envisaged in the Draft Treaty is a unicameral Parliament, and it is proposed that it 
should have legislative powers. A bicameral legislature is characteristic of federal constitutions, and 
experience shows that a second Chamber can play a valuable role in preserving the precarious equi-
librium of federal structures. 
It has been suggested that a bicameral legislature is achieved for the European Union by sharing the 
legislative function between the Parliament and the Council — the Parliament being the Lower 
Chamber (or popular assembly) whose will should ultimately prevail, and the Council the Upper 
Chamber representing the 'regions' or 'provinces' (the Member States). It seems to us, however, that 
the suggested analogy between the legislative system proposed in the Draft Treaty and existing bica-
meral legislatures is unsound for three reasons. 
Firstly, although Article 14 of the Draft Treaty purports to make the Parliament a popular assembly 
of the traditional type, its composition is left to be determined later. In the meanwhile, 'the proce-
dure [for its election^ shall be that for the election of the Parliament of the European Communities.' 
The structure of the existing Parliament is related only indirectly to the distribution of population 
and is weighted in favour of the smaller Member States. The Draft Treaty offers no guarantee of 
change in this respect and it is most unlikely that the smaller Member States would consent to remo-
val of the weighting in their favour. This is all the more improbable because Article 22 of the Draft 
Treaty provides for voting in Council to be weighted, as at present, in favour of the larger Member 
States. 'Regional' weighting in both Chambers of the legislature and, in particular, weighting in fav-
our of the smaller and less powerful regions in the Lowet Chamber, and in favour of the larger and 
more powerful regions in the upper, is not found in any other bicameral system known to us. 
Secondly, the Council is, by its nature, representative oí government — of executive power. The 
interests of the executive organs of government are not necessarily, and certainly not always, identi-
cal with the interests of the legislator. This does not become any the less true where the executive of 
the Member States is given a legislative function within the wider context of the Community, as 
experience has shown. In some bicameral system the members of the Upper Chamber are nominated 
or appointed by the executive (e.g. Canada and, to a large extent defacto, the United Kingdom), but 
this is wholly different from a system in which the executive itself performs the legislative function of 
the Upper Chamber. 
Thirdly, the Council does not represent the 'regions' or 'provinces' of the Community. It represents 
the central governments of 10 or 12 nation States as they happen to exist in the late twentieth century 
after more than a millennium of historical development. Some States can be said to represent a single 
'people' or at least a virtually indissoluble union of peoples; others are much more fissile. In some 
States government has become highly centralized and is frequently criticized for being insensitive to 
the claims of the regions; in others a careful balance between the conflicting claims of the regions is 
maintained, either formally or by convention, by the constitutional system. There is, at most, a limi-
ted value in comparisons between the nation States of Europe and the States or provinces of the Uni-
ted States, Austrialia or even Canada (probably the closest analogy). The European situation, histo-
rically and in other respects, is infinitely more complex. 
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We therefore suggest that it is not possible, even theoretically, to justifiy the legislative system pro-
posed in the Draft Treaty by analogy with existing bicameral systems. The fact that the system pro-
posed in the Draft Treaty is different does not, of course, necessarily mean that it is a bad system. In 
any event, any proposal for European Union must, if it is to stand any chance of success, recognize 
the claims to sovereignty of the European nation States as they exist. For that reason, if for no other, 
there must be a body such as the Council having some power in relation to legislation. But if the pur-
pose of European Union is to move towards a Europe des peuples, it seems surprising that the system 
proposed in the Draft Treaty would tend, if anything, to entrench l'Europe des états, since it does 
nothing to recognize the underlying diversity and aspirations of the 'peoples' who live within the poli-
tical map. Separatist movements already exist in several Member States and the system proposed in 
the Draft Treaty, so far from uniting peoples, might only serve to aggravate this trend. 
In the case with which we are most familiar, we cannot believe that more than five million Scots 
would be prepared to accept a situation in which they were able to elect only eight members of the 
Lower Chamber and had to rely on central government in London to represent their interests in the 
Upper Chamber, while smaller countries had (actually and/or proportionately) much greater repre-
sentation in the lower chamber and separate representation in the Upper Chamber. We are confident 
that other minorities would feel the same. 
On the other hand, a truly bicameral Parliament, with weighting in favour of minorities in the Upper 
Chamber, could enhance the attraction of European Union to such minorities as well as introducing 
a potentially useful additional institution. 
c. The executive 
As we understand it, the Draft Treaty presupposes that the Commission, deriving its mandate from 
the Parliament, would be capable of performing the functions assigned in other constitutions to the 
executive. This appears to presuppose, in turn, that the sole function of the executive is to execute 
the will of the legislature. We suggest that this is not so. 
It is an essential function of the executive to make political choices. Given the potentially vast range 
of competence of the European Union, the choices to be made would be numerous and, in many 
cases, urgent. Is it clear that a Commission enjoying no direct popular mandate would be capable, 
acceptably, of exercising such choices? We would suggest that, at any rate, it is not self-evident. 
d. 'Droits acquis' 
The provisional view of British Government sources (see Part II, Section 1 ) is that Article 82 of the 
Draft Treaty, which provides for the entry into force of the Treaty upon ratification by Member 
States tepresenting two-thirds of the population of the Community, would, if given effect, be contr-
ary to international law. For our own part, we have, to put it at its lowest, grave misgivings about 
the lawfulness of Article 82 — particularly since the existing Treaties contain express provision for 
amendment by common accord of the Member States (Arts 236(EEC), 96(ECSC) and 204(EAEC)). 
Whatever the lawfulness of the entry into force of the new Treaty without the common accord of the 
existing Member States and whatever the legal device adopted to achieve it,2' it seems to us to be 
It has been suggested, for example, that there might be a coordinated unilateral withdrawal of the ratifying Member States from 
the existing Communities before the entry into force of the Draft Treaty. The issues raised by Article 82 of the Draft Treaty are 
discussed elsewhere in this volume: see Weiler and Modrall, The Creation oj the European Union and its Relation to the EEC 
Treaties. 
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clear, as a matter both of Community law and of international law, that the majority of the parties to 
the existing Treaties cannot, by entering into a new Treaty, deprive the minority of the droits acquis 
enjoyed by them under the existing Treaties. In the case of the Community Treaties, this must be 
especially so since the Court, in Van Gend en Loos, has emphasized that the beneficiaries of the 
Community Treaties are 'peoples' and not just States. Any attempt by the majority to deprive the 
minority of droits acquis would therefore strike at the moral foundations of the Community and of 
Community law. 
It may be suggested that the Draft Treaty seeks only to preserve and enhance the acquis communau-
taire; therefore the population of non-ratifying Member States will be deprived of nothing. But is it 
not equally arguable that the Draft Treaty offers a majority of the existing Member States the oppor-
tunity to appropriate to themselves the acquis communautaire to the detriment of the non-consenting 
minority? 
The answer to this question depends on how one defines the acquis communautaire. But we would 
suggest that it consists, not simply in such individual rights as the right of free movement, but in 
acceptance of the economic philosophy and the institutional framework enshrined in the existing 
Treaties. The example given above of a situation in which the European Union sought to alter the 
legislation on State aids seems to us to illustrate that the acquis communautaire does consist, at least 
in part, in the philosophical and institutional substructure of the existing Communities. It therefore 
seems to us to be unavoidable that unanimity in bringing about the European Union in the form pro-




Draft Treaty establishing the European Union1 
— With a view to continuing and reviving the democratic unification of Europe, of which the 
European Communities, the European Monetary System and European political cooperation 
represent the first achievements, and convinced that it is increasingly important for Europe to 
assert its identity; 
— Welcoming the positive results achieved so far, but aware of the present need to redefine the 
objectives of European integration, and to confer on more efficient and more democratic institu-
tions the means of attaining them; 
— Basing their actions on their commitment to the principles of pluralist democracy, respect for 
human rights and the rule of law; 
— Reaffirming their desire to contribute to the construction of an international society based on co-
opetation between peoples and between States, the peaceful settlement of disputes, security and 
the strengthening of international organizations; 
— Resolved to strengthen and preserve peace and liberty by an ever closer union, and calling on the 
othet peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts; 
— Determined to increase solidarity between the peoples of Europe, while respecting their historical 
identity, their dignity and their freedom within the framework of freely accepted common institu-
tions; 
— Convinced of the need to enable local and regional authorities to participate by appropriate 
methods in the unification of Europe; 
— Desirous of attaining their common objectives progressively, accepting the requisite transitional 
periods and submitting all further development for the approval of their peoples and States; 
— Intending to entrust common institutions, in accordance with the priniciple of subsidiarity, only 
with those powers required to complete successfully the tasks they may carry out more satisfac-
torily than the States acting independently; 
The High Contracting Parties, Member States of the European Communities, have decided to create 
a European Union. 
1 Adopted by the European Parliament on the 14 February 1984 (OJ 77/1984, p. 33). 
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PART ONE: The Union 
Article 1 - Creation of the Union 
By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union. 
Article 2 - Accession of new members 
Any democratic European State may apply to become a member of the Union. The procedures for accession, 
together with any adjustments which accession entails, shall be the subject of a treaty between the Union and the 
applicant State. That treaty shall be concluded in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 65 of this 
treaty. 
An accession treaty which entails revision of this Treaty may not be concluded until the revision procedure laid 
down in Article 84 of this Treaty has been completed. 
Article 3 - Citizenship of the Union 
The citizen of the Member States shall ipso facto be citizens of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be 
dependent upon citizenship of a Member State; it may not be independently acquired or forfeited. Citizens of the 
Union shall take part in the political life of the Union in the forms laid down by this Treaty, enjoy the rights 
granted to them by the legal system of the Union and be subject to its laws. 
Article 4 - Fundamental rights 
1. The Union shall protect the dignity of the individual and grant every person coming within its jurisdiction 
the fundamental rights and freedoms derived in particular from the common principles of the constitutions of the 
Member States and from the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms. 
2. The Union undertakes to maintain and develop, within the limits of its competences, the economic, social 
and cultural rights derived from the constitutions of the Member States and from the European social charter. 
3. Within a period of five years, the Union shall take a decision on its accession to the international instruments 
referred to above and to the United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. Within the same period, the Union shall adopt its own declaration on fundamental rights in 
accordance with the procedure for revision laid down in Article 84 of this Treaty. 
4. In the event of serious and persistent violation of democratic principles or fundamental rights by a Member 
State, penalties may be imposed in accordance with the provisions of Article 44 of this Treaty. 
Article 5 — Territory of the Union 
The territory of the Union shall consist of all the territories of the Member States as specified by the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Community and by the treaties of accession, account being taken of obligations 
arising out of international law. 
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Artide 6 - Legal personality of the Union 
The Union shall have legal personality. In each of the Member States, the Union shall enjoy the most extensive 
legal capacity accorded to legal persons under national legislation. It may, in particular, acquire or dispose of 
movable and immovable property and may be a party to legal proceedings. In international relations, the Union 
shall enjoy the legal capacity it requires to perform its functions and attain its objectives. 
Article 7 - The Community patrimony 
1. The Union shall take over the Community patrimony. 
2. The provisions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities and of the conventions and protocols 
relating thereto which concern their objectives and scope and which are not explicitly or implicitly amended by 
this Treaty, shall constitute part of the law of the Union. They may only be amended in accordance with the pro-
cedure for revision laid down in Article 84 of this Treaty. 
3. The other provisions of the treaties, conventions and protocols referred to above shall also constitute part of 
the law of the Union, in so far as they are not incompatible with this Treaty. They may only be amended by the 
procedure for organic laws laid down in Article 38 of this Treaty. 
4. The acts of the European Communities, together with the measures adopted within the context of the 
European Monetary System and European political cooperation, shall continue to be effective, in so far as they 
are not incompatible with this Treaty, until such time as they have been replaced by acts or measures adopted by 
the institutions of the Union in accordance with their respective competences. 
5. The Union shall respect all the commitments of the European Communities, in particular the agreements or 
conventions concluded with one or more non-member States or with an international organization. 
Article 8 — Institutions of the Union 
The fulfilment of the tasks conferred on the Union shall be the responsibility of its institutions and its organs. 
The institutions of the Union shall be: 
— the European Parliament, 
— the Council of the Union, 
— the Commission, 
— the Court of Justice, 
— the European Council. 
308 
PART TWO: The objectives, methods of action and 
competences of the Union 
Article 9 — Objectives 
The objectives of the Union shall be: 
— the attainment of a humane and harmonious development of society based principally on endeavours to attain 
full employment, the progressive elimination of the existing imbalances between its regions, protection and 
improvement in the quality of the environment, scientific progress and the cultural development of its peo-
ples, 
— the economic development of its peoples with a free internal market and stable currency, equilibrium in exter-
nal trade and constant economic growth, without discrimination between nationals or undertakings of the 
Member States by strengthening the capacity of the States, their citizens and their undertakings to act together 
to adjust their organization and activities to economic changes, 
— the promotion in international relations of security, peace, cooperation, détente, disarmament and the free 
movement of persons and ideas, together with the improvement of international, commercial and monetary 
relations, 
— the harmonious and equitable development of all the peoples of the world to enable them to escape from 
under-development and hunger and exercise their full political, economic and social rights. 
Article 10 - Methods of action 
1. To attain these objectives, the Union shall act either by common action or by cooperation between the Mem-
ber States; the fields within which each method applies shall be determined by this Treaty. 
2. Common action means all normative, administrative, financial and judicial acts, internal or international, 
and the programmes and recommendations, issued by the Union itself, originating in its institutions and ad-
dressed to those institutions, or to States, or to individuals. 
3. Cooperation means all the commitments which the Member States undertake within the European Council. 
The measures resulting from cooperation shall be implemented by the Member States or by the institutions of the 
Union in accordance with the procedures laid down by the European Council. 
Article 11 — Transfer from cooperation to common action 
1. In the instances laid down in Articles 54(1) and 68 (2) of this Treaty, a matter subject to the method of co-
operation between Member States may become the subject of common action. On a proposal from the Commis-
sion, or the Council of the Union, or the Parliament, or one or more Member States, the European Council may 
decide, after consulting the Commission and with the agreement of the Parliament, to bring those matters within 
the exclusive or concurrent competence of the Union. 
2. In the fields subject to common action, common action may not be replaced by cooperation. 
Article 12 - Competences 
1. Where this Treaty confers exclusive competence on the Union, the institutions of the Union shall have sole 
power to act; national authorities may only legislate to the extent laid down by the law of the Union. Until the 
Union has legislated, national legislation shall remain in force. 
2. Where this Treaty confers concurrent competence on the Union, the Member States shall continue to act so 
long as the Union has not legislated. The Union shall only act to carry out those tasks which may be undertaken 
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more effectively in common than by the Member States acting separately, in particular those whose execution 
requires action by the Union because their dimension or effects extend beyond national frontiers. A law which 
initiates or extends common action in a field where action has not been taken hitherto by the Union or by the 
Communities must be adopted in accordance with the procedure for organic laws. 
Article 13 - Implementation of the law of the Union 
The Union and the Member States shall cooperate in good faith in the implementation of the law of the Union. 
Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Union. They shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks. They shall abstain from any measures which could jeopardize the 
attainment of the objectives of the Union. 
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PART THREE: Institutional provisions 
Title I— The institutions of the Union 
Article 14 - The European Parliament 
The European Parliament shall be elected by direct universal suffrage in a free and secret vote by the citizens of 
the Union. The term of each Parliament shall be five years. 
An organic law shall lay down a uniform electoral procedure; until such a law comes into force, the procedure 
applicable shall be that for the election of the Parliament of the European Communities. 
Article 15 - Members of Parliament 
The Member of the Parliament shall act and vote in an individual and personal capacity. They may not be bound 
by any instruction nor receive a binding mandate. 
Article 16 — Functions of the Parliament 
The Parliament shall: 
— participate, in accordance with this Treaty, in the legislative and budgetary procedures and in the conclusion 
of international agreements, 
— enable the Commission to take office by approving its political programme, 
— exercise political supervision over the Commission, 
— have power to adopt by a qualified majority a motion of censure requiring the members of the Commission to 
resign as a body, 
— have the power to conduct inquiries and receive petitions addressed to it by citizens of the Union, 
— exercise the other powers attributed to it by this Treaty. 
Article 17 — Majorities in the Parliament 
1. The Parliament shall vote by a simple majority, i.e. a majority of votes cast, abstentions not counted. 
2. Where expressly specified by this Treaty, the Parliament shall vote: 
(a) either by an absolute majority, i.e. a majority of its members; 
(b) or by a qualified majority, i.e. a majority of its members and of two-thirds of votes cast, abstentions not 
counted. On the second reading of the budget, the qualified majority required shall be a majority of the 
Members of Parliament and three-fifths of votes cast, abstentions not counted. 
Article 18 — Power to conduct inquiries and right of petition 
The procedures for the exercise of the power of the Parliament to conduct inquiries and of the right of citizens to 
address petitions to the Parliament shall be laid down by organic laws. 
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Artide 19 - Rules of procedure of the Parliament 
The Parliament shall adopt its rules of procedure by an absolute majority. 
Article 20 - The Council of the Union 
The Council of the Union shall consist of representations of the Member States appointed by their respective 
governments; each representation shall be led by a minister who is permanently and specifically responsible for 
Union affairs. 
Article 21 - Functions of the Council of the Union 
The Council shall: 
— participate, in accordance with this Treaty, in the legislative and budgetary procedures and in the conclusion 
of international agreements, 
— exercise the powers attributed to it in the field of international relations and answer written and oral ques-
tions tabled by Members of the Parliament in this field, 
— exercise the other powers attributed to it by this Treaty. 
Article 22 - Weighting of votes in the Council of the Union 
The votes of the representations shall be weighted in accordance with the provisions of Article 148 (2) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. In the event of the accession of new Member States, 
the weighting of their votes shall be laid down in the treaty of accession. 
Article 23 — Majorities in the Council of the Union 
1. The Council shall vote by a simple majority, i.e. a majority of the weighted votes cast, abstentions not coun-
ted. 
2. Where expressly specified by this Treaty, the Council shall vote: 
(a) either by an absolute majority, i.e. by a majority of the weighted votes cast, abstentions not counted, com-
prising at least half of the representations; 
(b) or by a qualified majority, i.e. by a majority of two-thirds of the weighted votes cast, abstentions not coun-
ted, comprising a majority of the representations. On the second reading of the budget, the qualified majority 
required shall be a majority of three-fifths of the weighted votes cast, abstentions not counted, comprising a 
majority of the representations; 
(c) or by unanimity of representations, abstentions not counted. 
3. During a transitional period of 10 years, where a representation invokes a vital national interest which is jeo-
pardized by the decision to be taken and recognized as such by the Commission, the vote shall be postponed so 
that the matter may be re-examined. The grounds for requesting a postponement shall be published. 
Article 24 — Rules of procedure of the Council of the Union 
The Council shall adopt its rules of procedure by an absolute majority. These rules shall lay down that meetings 
in which the Council is acting as a legislative or budgetary authority shall be open to the public. 
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Artide 25 - The Commission 
The Commission shall take office within a period of six months following the election of the Parliament. 
At the beginning of each parliamentary term, the European Council shall designate the President of the Commis-
sion. The President shall constitute the Commission after consulting the European Council. The Commission 
shall submit its programme to the Parliament. It shall take office after its investiture by the Parliament. It shall 
remain in office until the investiture of a new Commission. 
Article 26 - Membership of the Commission 
The structure and operation of the Commission and the statute of its members shall be determined by an organic 
law. Until such a law comes into force, the rules governing the structure and operation of the Commission of the 
European Communities and the statute of its members shall apply to the Commission of the Union. 
Article 27 - Rules of procedure of the Commission 
The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure. 
Article 28 — Functions of the Commission 
The Commission shall: 
— define the guidelines for action by the Union in the programme which it submits to the Parliament for its 
approval, 
— introduce the measures required to initiate that action, 
— have the right to propose draft laws and participate in the legislative procedure, 
— issue the regulations needed to implement the laws and take the requisite implementing decisions, 
— submit the draft budget, 
— implement the budget, 
— represent the Union in external relations in the instances laid down by this Treaty, 
— ensure that this Treaty and the laws of the Union are applied, and 
— exercise the other powers attributed to it by this Treaty. 
Article 29 — Responsibility of the Commission to the Parliament 
1. The Commission shall be responsible to the Parliament. 
2. It shall answer written and oral questions tabled by Members of the Parliament. 
3. The members of the Commission shall resign as a body in the event of Parliament's adopting a motion of 
censure by a qualified majority. The vote on a motion of censure shall be by public ballot and not be held until at 
least three days after the motion has been tabled. 
4. On the adoption of a motion of censure a new Commission shall be constituted in accordance with the pro-
cedure laid down in Article 25 of this Treaty. Pending the investiture of the new Commission, the Commission 
which has been censured shall be responsible for day-to-day business. 
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Artide 30 - The Court of Justice 
1. The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty, and of any act 
adopted pursuant thereto, the law is observed. 
2. Half the members of the Court shall be appointed by the Parliament and half by the Council of the Union. 
Where there is an odd number of members, the Parliament shall appoint one more than the Council. 
3. The organization of the Court, the number and statute of its members and the duration of their term of 
office shall be governed by an organic law which shall also lay down the procedure and majorities required for 
their appointment. Until such a law comes into force, the relevant provisions laid down in the Community 
Treaties and their implementing measures shall apply to the Court of Justice of the Union. 
4. The Court shall adopt its rules of procedure. 
Article 31 - The European Council 
The European Council shall consist of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the Union and 
the President of the Commission who shall participate in the work of the European Council except for the debate 
on the designation of his successor and the drafting of communications and recommendations to the Commis-
sion. 
Article 32 — Functions of the European Council 
1. The European Council shall: 
— formulate recommendations and undertake commitments in the field of cooperation, 
— take decisions in the cases laid down by this Treaty and in accordance with the provisions of Article 11 
thereof on the extension of the competences of the Union, 
— designate the President of the Commission, 
— address communications to the other institutions of the Union, 
— periodically inform the Parliament of the activities of the Union in the field in which it is competent to act, 
— answer written and oral questions tabled by the Members of the Parliament, 
— exercise the other powers attributed to it by this Treaty. 
2. The European Council shall determine its own decision-making procedures. 
Article 33 - Organs of the Union 
1. The Union shall have the following organs: 
— the Court of Auditors, 
— the Economic and Social Committee, 
— the European Investment Bank, 
— the European Monetary Fund. 
Organic laws shall lay down the rules governing the competences and powers of these organs, their organization 
and their membership. 
2. Half the members of the Court of Auditors shall be appointed by the Parliament and half by the Council of 
the Union. 
3. The Economic and Social Committee shall be an organ which advises the Commission, the Parliament, the 
Council of the Union and the European Council; it may address to them opinions drawn up on its own initiative. 
The Committee shall be consulted on every proposal which has a determining influence on the drawing up and 
implementation of economic policy and policy for society. The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure. 
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The membership of the Committee shall ensure adequate representation of the various categories of economic 
and social activity. 
4. The European Monetary Fund shall have the autonomy required to guarantee monetary stability. 
5. Each of the organs referred to above shall be governed by the provisions applicable to the corresponding 
Community organs at the moment when this Treaty enters into force. 
The Union may create other organs necessary for its operation by means of an organic law. 
Title II -Acts of the Union 
Article 34 - Definition of laws 
1. Laws shall lay down the rules governing common action. As far as possible, they shall restrict themselves to 
determining the fundamental principles governing common action and entrust the responsible authorities in the 
Union or the Member States with setting out in detail the procedures for their implementation. 
2. The organization and operation of the institutions and other matters expressly provided for in this Treaty 
shall be governed by organic laws adopted in accordance with the specific procedures laid down in Article 38 of 
this Treaty. 
3. Budgetary laws shall be adopted pursuant to the provision of Article 76 of this Treaty. 
Article 35 - Differentiated application of laws 
A law may subject to time-limits, or link to transitional measures which may vary according to the addressee, the 
implementation of its provisions where uniform application thereof would encounter specific difficulties caused 
by the particular situation of some of its addressees. However such time-limits and measures must be designed to 
facilitate the subsequent application of all the provisions of the law to all its addressees. 
Article 36 — Legislative authority 
The Parliament and the Council of the Union shall jointly exercise legislative authority with the active participa-
tion of the Commission. 
Article 37 — Right to propose draft laws and amendments thereto 
1. The Commission shall have the right to propose draft laws. It may withdraw a draft law it has submitted at 
any time until the Parliament or the Council of the Union have expressly adopted it on first reading. 
2. On a reasoned request from the Parliament or the Council, the Commission shall submit a draft law con-
forming to such request. If the Commission declines to do so, the Parliament or the Council may, in accordance 
with procedures laid down in their rules of procedure, introduce a draft law conforming to their original request. 
The Commission must express its opinion on the draft. 
3. Under the conditions laid down in Article 38 of this Treaty: 
— the Commission may put forward amendments to any draft law. Such amendments must be put to the vote as 
a matter of priority, 
— Members of the Parliament and national representations within the Council may similarly put forward 
amendments during the debates within their respective institutions. 
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Artide 38 - Voting procedure for draft laws 
1. All draft laws shall be submitted to the Parliament. Within a period of six months, it may approve the draft 
with or without amendment. In the case of draft organic laws, the Parliament may amend them by an absolute 
majority; their approval shall require a qualified majority. 
Where the majority required for approval of the draft is not secured, the Commission shall have the right to 
amend it and to submit it to the Parliament again. 
2. The draft law, approved by the Parliament with or without amendment, shall be forwarded to the Council 
of the Union. With a period of one month following approval by the Parliament, the Comission may deliver an 
opinion which shall also be forwarded to the Council. 
3. The Council shall take a decision within a period of six months. Where it approves the draft by an absolute 
majority without amending it, or where it rejects it unanimously, the legislative procedure is terminated. 
Where the Commission has expressly delivered an unfavourable opinion on the draft, or in the case of a draft 
organic law, the Council may by a qualified majority approve the draft without amending it or reject it, in which 
cases the legislative procedure is terminated. 
Where the draft has been put to the vote but has not secured the majorities referred to above, or where the draft 
has been amended by a simple majority or, in the case of organic laws, by an absolute majority, the conciliation 
procedure laid down in paragraph 4 below shall be opened. 
4. In the cases provided for in the final subparagraph of paragraph 3 above, the Conciliation Committee shall 
be convened. The Committee shall consist of a delegation from the Council of the Union and a delegation from 
the Parliament. The Commission shall participate in the work of the Committee. 
Where, within a period of three months, the Committee reaches agreement on a joint text, that text shall be sub-
mitted for approval to the Parliament and the Council; they shall take a decision by an absolute majority or, in 
the case of organic laws, by a qualified majority within a period of three months. No amendments shall be admis-
sible. 
Where, within the period referred to above the Committee fails to reach agreement, the text forwarded by the 
Council shall be submitted for approval to the Parliament which shall, within a period of three months, take a 
decision by an absolute majority or, in the case of organic laws, by a qualified majority. Only amendments 
tabled by the Commission shall be admissible. Within a period of three months, the Council may reject by a qua-
lified majority the text adopted by the Parliament. No amendments shall then be admissible. 
5. Without prejudice to Article 23 (3) of this Treaty, where the Parliament or the Council fails to submit the 
draft to a vote within the time-limits laid down, the draft shall be deemed to have been adopted by the institution 
which has not taken a decision. However, a law may not be regarded as having been adopted unless it has been 
expressly approved either by the Parliament or by the Council. 
6. Where a particular situation so requires, the Parliament and the Council may, by common accord, extend 
the time-limits laid down in this article. 
Article 39 — Publication of laws 
Without prejudice to Article 76 (4) of this Treaty, the President of the arm of the legislative authority which has 
taken the last express decision shall establish that the legislative procedure has been completed and shall cause 
laws to be published without delay in the Official Journal of the Union. 
Article 40 - Power to issue regulations 
The Commission shall determine the regulations and decisions required for the implementation of laws in accor-
dance with the procedures laid down by those laws. Regulations shall be published in the Official Journal of the 
Union; decisions shall be notified to the addressees. The Parliament and the Council of the Union shall be imme-
diately informed thereof. 
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Artide 41 - Hearing of persons affected 
Before adopting any measure, the institutions of the Union shall, wherever possible and useful, hear the persons 
thereby affected. Laws of the Union shall lay down the procedures for such hearings. 
Article 42 - The law of the Union 
The law of the Union shall be directly applicable in the Member States. It shall take precedence over national 
law. Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Commission, the implementation of the law shall be the 
responsibility of the authorities of the Member States. An organic law shall lay down the procedures in accor-
dance with which the Commission shall ensure the implementation of the law. National courts shall apply the 
law of the Union. 
Article 43 — Judicial review 
The Community rules governing judicial review shall apply to the Union. They shall be supplemented by an 
organic law on the basis of the following principles: 
— extension of the right of action of individuals against acts of the Union adversely affecting them, 
— equal right of appeal and equal treatment for all the institutions before the Court of Justice, 
— jurisdiction of the Court for the protection of fundamental rights vis-à-vis the Union, 
— jurisidiction of the Court to annul an act of the Union within the context of an application for a preliminary 
ruling or of a plea of illegality, 
— creation of a right of appeal to the Court against the decisions of national courts of last instance where refe-
rence to the Court for a preliminary ruling is refused or where a preliminary ruling of the Court has been dis-
regarded, 
— jurisdiction of the Court to impose sanctions on a Member State failing to fulfil its obligation under the law of 
the Union, 
— compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to rule on any dispute between Member States in connection with the 
objectives of the Union. 
Article 44 — Sanctions 
In the case provided for in Article 4(4) of this Treaty, and in every other case of serious and persistent violation 
by a Member State of the provisions of the Treaty, established by the Court of Justice at the request of the Parlia-
ment or the Commission, the European Council may, after hearing the Member State concerned and with the 
approval of the Parliament, take measures: 
— suspending the rights deriving from the application of part or the whole of the Treaty provisions to the State 
in question and its nationals without prejudice to the rights acquired by the latter, 
— which may go as far as suspending participation by the State in question in the European Council, the Council 
of the Union and any other organ in which that State is represented as such. 
The State in question shall not participate in the vote on the sanctions. 
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PART FOUR: The policies of the Union 
Article 45 — General provisions 
1. Starting from the Community patrimony, the Union shall continue the actions already undertaken and 
undertake new actions in compliance with this Treaty and, in particular, with Article 9 thereof. 
2. The structural and conjunctural policies of the Union shall be drawn up and implemented so as to promote, 
together with balanced expansion throughout the Union, the progressive elimination of the existing imbalances 
between its various areas and regions. 
Article 46 - Homogeneous judicial area 
In addition to the fields subject to common action, the coordination of national law with a view to constituting a 
homogeneous judicial area shall be carried out in accordance with the method of cooperation. This shall be done 
in particular: 
— to take measures designed to reinforce the feeling of individual citizens that they are citizens of the Union, 
— to fight international forms of crime, including terrorism. 
The Commission and the Parliament may submit appropriate recommendations to the European Council. 
Title I — Economic policy 
Article 47 - Internal market and freedom of movement 
1. The Union shall have exclusive competence to complete, safeguard and develop the free movement of per-
sons, services, goods and capital within its territory; it shall have exclusive competence for trade between Mem-
ber States. 
2. This liberalization process shall take place on the basis of detailed and binding programmes and timetables 
laid down by the legislative authority in accordance with the procedures for adopting laws. The Commission 
shall adopt the implementing procedures for those programmes. 
3. Through those programmes, the Union must attain: 
— within a period of two years following the entry into force on this Treaty, the free movement of persons and 
goods: this implies in particular the abolition of personal checks at internal frontiers, 
— within a period of five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the free movement of services, 
including banking and all forms of insurance, 
— within a period of 10 years following the entry into force of this Treaty, the free movement of capital. 
Article 48 — Competition 
The Union shall have exclusive competence to complete and develop competition policy at the level of the Union, 
bearing in mind: 
— the need to establish a system for the authorization of concentrations of undertakings based on the criteria 
laid down by Article 66 of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 
— the need to restructure and strengthen the industry of the Union in the light of the profound disturbances 
which may be caused by international competition, 
— the need to prohibit any form of discrimination between private and public undertakings. 
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Artide 49 - Approximation of the laws relating to undertakings and taxation 
The Union shall take measures designed to approximate the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to undertakings, and in particular to companies, in so far as such provisions have a direct effect on a 
common action of the Union. A law shall lay down a statute for European undertakings. 
In so far as necessary for economic integration within the Union, a law shall effect the approximation of the laws 
relating to taxation. 
Article 50 — Conjunctural policy 
1. The Union shall have concurrent competence in respect of conjunctural policy, with a particular view of 
facilitating the coordination of economic policies within the Union. 
2. The Commission shall define the guidelines and objectives to which the action of the Member States shall be 
subject on the basis of the principles and within the limits laid down by laws. 
3. Laws shall lay down the conditions under which the Commission shall ensure that the measures taken by the 
Member States conform with the objectives it has defined. Laws shall authorize the Commission to make the 
monetary, budgetary or financial aid of the Union conditional on compliance with the measures taken under 
paragraph 2 above. 
4. Laws shall lay down the conditions under which the Commission, in conjunction with the Member States, 
shall utilize the budgetary or financial mechanisms of the Union for conjunctural ends. 
Article 51 — Credit policy 
The Union shall exercise concurrent competence as regards European monetary and credit policies, with the par-
ticular objective of coordinating the use of capital market resources by the creation of a European capital market 
committee and the establishment of a European bank supervisory authority. 
Article 52 — European Monetary System 
1. All the Member States shall participate in the European Monetary System, subject to the principle set out in 
Article 35 of this Treaty. 
2. The Union shall have concurrent competence for the progressive achievement of full monetary union. 
3. An organic law shall lay down rules governing: 
— the statute and the operation of the European Monetary Fund in accordance with Article 33 of this Treaty, 
— the conditions for the effective transfer to the European Monetary Fund of part of the reserves of the Member 
States, 
— the conditions for the progressive conversion of the ECU into a reserve currency and a means of payment, and 
its wider use, 
— the procedures and the stages for attaining monetary union, 
— the duties and obligations of the central banks in the determination of their objectives regarding money sup-
ply. 
4. During the five years following the entry into force of this Treaty, by derogation from Articles 36, 38 and 39 
thereof, the European Council may suspend the entry into force of the organic laws referred to above within a 
period of one month following their adoption and refer them back to the Parliament and the Council of the 
Union for fresh consideration. 
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Artide 53 — Sectoral policies 
In order to meet the particular needs for the organization, development or coordination of specific sectors of eco-
nomic activity, the Union shall have concurrent competence with the Member States to pursue sectoral policies at 
the level of the Union. In the fields referred to below, such policies shall, by the establishment of reliable frame-
work conditions, in particular pursue the aim of facilitating the decisions which undertakings subject to competi-
tion must take concerning investment innovation. 
The sectors concerned are in particular: 
— argiculture and fisheries, 
— transport, 
— telecommunications, 
— research and development, 
— industry, 
— energy. 
(a) In the fields of agriculture and fisheries, the Union shall pursue a policy designed to attain the objectives laid 
down in Article 39 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. 
(b) In the field of transport, the Union shall pursue a policy designed to contribute to the economic integration of 
the Member States. It shall, in particular, undertake common actions to put an end to all forms of discrimina-
tion, harmonize the basic terms of competition between the various modes of transport, eliminate obstacles 
to transfrontier traffic and develop the capacity of transport routes so as to create a transport network com-
mensurate with European needs. 
(c) In the field of telecommunications, the Union shall take common action to establish a telecommunications 
network with common standards and harmonize tariffs; it shall exercise competence in particular with regard 
to the high technology sectors, research and development activities and public procurement policy. 
(d) In the field of research and development, the Union may draw up common strategies with a view to coordi-
nating and guiding national activities and encouraging cooperation between the Member States and between 
research institutes. It may provide financial support for joint research, may take responsibility for some of the 
risks involved and may undertake research in its own establishments. 
(e) In the field of industry, the Union may draw up development strategies with a view to guiding and coordinat-
ing the policies of the Member States in those industrial branches which are of particular significance to the 
economic and political security of the Union. The Commission shall be responsible for taking the requisite 
implementing measures. It shall submit to the Parliament and the Council of the Union a periodic report on 
industrial policy problems. 
(f) In the field of energy, action by the Union shall be designed to ensure security of supplies, stability on the mar-
ket of the Union and, to the extent that prices are regulated, a harmonized pricing policy compatible with fair 
competitive practices. It shall also be designed to encourage the development of alternative and renewable 
energy sources, to introduce common technical standards for efficiency, safety, the protection of the environ-
ment and of the population, and to encourage the exploitation of European sources of energy. 
Article 54 - Other forms of cooperation 
1. Where Member States have taken the initiative to establish industrial cooperation structures outside the 
scope of this Treaty, the European Council may, if the common interest justifies it, decide to convert those forms 
of cooperation into a common action of the Union. 
2. In specific sectors subject to common action, laws may establish specialized European agencies and define 
those forms of supervision applicable thereto. 
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Title II — Policy for society 
Article 55 — General provisions 
The Union shall have concurrent competence in the field of social, health, consumer protection, regional, envi-
ronmental, education and research, cultural and information policies. 
Article 56 - Social and health policy 
The Union may take action in the field of social and health policy, in particular in matters relating to: 
— employment, and in particular the establishment of general comparable conditions for the maintenance and 
creation of jobs, 
— the law on labour and working conditions, 
— equality between men and women, 
— vocational training and further training, 
— social security and welfare, 
— protection against occupational accidents and diseases, 
— work hygiene, 
— trade union rights and collective negotiations between employers and employees, in particular with a view to 
the conclusion of Union-wide collective agreement, 
— forms of worker participation in decisions affecting their working life and the organization of undertakings, 
— the determination of the extent to which citizens of non-member States may benefit from equal treatment, 
— the approximation of the rules governing research into and the manufacture, properties and marketing of 
pharmaceutical products, 
— the prevention of addiction, 
— the coordination of mutual aid in the event of epidemics or disasters. 
Article 57 — Consumer policy 
The Union may lay down rules designed to protect the health and safety of consumers and their economic inter-
ests, particularly in the event of damage. The Union may encourage action to promote consumer education, 
information and consultation. 
Article 58 — Regional policy 
The regional policy of the Union shall aim at reducing regional disparities and, in particular, the under-develop-
ment of the least-favoured regions, by injecting new life into those regions so as to ensure their subsequent de-
velopment and by helping to create the conditions likely to put an end to the excessive concentration of migration 
towards certain industrial centres. 
The regional policy of the Union shall, in addition, encourage transfrontier regional cooperation. 
The regional policy of the Union shall comprise: 
— the development of a European framework for the regional planning policies pursued by the competent 
authorities in each Member State, 
— the promotion of investment and infrastructure projects which bring national programmes into the frame-
work of an overall concept, 
— the implementation of integrated programmes of the Union on behalf of certain regions, drawn up in colla-
boration with the representatives of the people concerned, and, where possible, the direct allocation of the 
requisite funds to the regions concerned. 
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Artide 59 — Environmental policy 
In the field of the environment, the Union shall aim at preventing or, taking account as far as possible of the 'pol-
luter pays' principle, at redressing any damage which is beyond the capabilities of the individual Member State or 
which requires a collective solution. It shall encourage a policy of the rational utilization of natural resources, of 
exploiting renewable raw materials and of recycling waste which takes account of environmental protection 
requirements. 
The Union shall take measures designed to provide for animal protection. 
Article 60 — Education and research policy 
In order to create a context which will help inculcate in the public an awareness of the Union's own identity and 
to ensure a minimum standard of training creating the opportunity for free choice of career, job or training estab-
lishment anywhere in the Union, the Union shall take measures concerning: 
— the definition of objectives for common or comparable training programmes, 
— the Union-wide validity and euqivalence of diplomas and school, study and training periods, 
— the promotion of scientific research. 
Article 61 - Cultural policy 
1. The Union may take measures to: 
— promote cultural and linguistic understanding between the citizens of the Union, 
— publicize the cultural life of the Union both at home and abroad, 
— establish youth exchange programmes. 
2. The European University Institute and the European Foundation shall become establishments of the Union. 
3. Laws shall lay down rules governing the approximation of the law of copyright and the free movement of 
cultural works. 
Article 62 — Information policy 
The Union shall encourage the exchange ofinformation and access to information for its citizens. To this end, it 
shall eliminate obstacles to the free movement of information, whilst ensuring the broadest possible competition 
and diversity of types of organization in this field. It shall encourage cooperation between radio and television 
companies for the purpose of producing Union-wide programmes. 
Title HI — International relations of the Union 
Article 63 — Principles and methods of action 
1. The Union shall direct its efforts in international relations towards the achievement of peace through the 
peaceful settlement of conflicts and towards security, the deterrence of aggression, détente, the mutual balances 
and verifiable reduction of military forces and armaments, respect for human rights, the raising of living stan-
dards in the Third World, the expansion and improvement of international economic and monetary relations in 
general and trade in particular and the strengthening of international organization. 
2. In the international sphere, the Union shall endeavour to attain the objectives set out in Article 9 of this 
Treaty. It shall act either by common action or by cooperation. 
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Artide 64 — Common action 
1. In its international relations, the Union shall act by common action in the fields referred to in this Treaty 
where it has exclusive or concurrent competence. 
2. In the field of commercial policy, the Union shall have exclusive competence. 
3. The Union shall pursue a development aid policy. During a transitional period of 10 years, this policy as a 
whole shall progressively become the subject of common action by the Union. In so far as the Member States 
continue to pursue independent programmes, the Union shall define the framework within which it will ensure 
the coordination of such programmes with its own policy, whilst observing current international commitments. 
4. Where certain external policies fall within the exclusive competence of the European Communities pursuant 
to the Treaties establishing them, but where that competence has not been fully exercised, a law shall lay down 
the procedures required for it to be fully exercised within a period which may not exceed five years. 
Article 65 - Conduct of common action 
1. In the exercise of its competences, the Union shall be represented by the Commission in its relations with 
non-member States and international organizations. In particular, the Commission shall negotiate international 
agreements on behalf of the Union. It shall be responsible for liaison with all international organizations and 
shall cooperate with the Council of Europe, in particular in the cultural sector. 
2. The Council of the Union may issue the Commission with guidelines for the conduct of international action; 
it must issue such guidelines, after approving them by an absolute majority, where the Commission is involved in 
drafting acts and negotiating agreements which will create international obligations for the Union. 
3. The Parliament shall be informed, in good time and in accordance with appropriate procedures, of every 
action of the institutions competent in the field of international policy. 
4. The Parliament and the Council of the Union, both acting by an absolute majority, shall approve internatio-
nal agreements and instruct the President of the Commission to deposit the instruments of ratification. 
Article 66 - Cooperation 
The Union shall conduct its international relations by the method of cooperation where Article 64 of this Treaty 
is not applicable and where they involve: 
— matters directly concerning the interests of several Member States of the Union, 
— or fields in which the Member States acting individually cannot act as efficiently as the Union, 
— or fields where a policy of the Union appears necessary to supplement the foreign policies pursued on the 
responsibility of the Member States. 
— or matters relating to the political and economic aspects of security. 
Article 67 - Conduct of cooperation 
In the fields referred to in Article 66 of this Treaty: 
1. The European Council shall be responsible for cooperation; the Council of the Union shall be responsible for 
its conduct; the Commission may propose policies and actions which shall be implemented, at the request of 
the European Council or the Council of the Union, either by the Commission or by the Member States. 
2. The Union shall ensure that the international policy guidelines of the Member States are consistent. 
3. It shall coordinate the positions of the Member States during the negotiation of international agreements and 
within the framework of international organizations. 
4. In an emergency, where immediate action is necessary, a Member State particularly concerned may act indivi-
dually after informing the European Council and the Commission. 
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5. The European Council may call on its President, on the President of the Council of the Union or on the Com-
mission to act as spokesman of the Union. 
Article 68 - Extension of the field of cooperation and transfer from 
cooperation to common action 
1. The European Council may extend the field of cooperation, in particular as regards armaments, sales of 
arms to non-member States, defence policy and disarmament. 
2. Under the conditions laid down in Article 11 of this Treaty, the European Council may decide to transfer a 
particular field of cooperation to common action in external policy. In that event, the provisions laid down in 
Article 23(3) of this Treaty shall apply without any time-limit. Bearing in mind the principle laid down in Article 
35 of this Treaty, the Council of the Union, acting unanimously, may exceptionally authorize one or more Mem-
ber States to derogate from some of the measures taken within the context of common action. 
3. By way of derogation from Article 11(2) of this Treaty, the European Council may decide to restore the 
fields transferred to common action in accordance with paragraph 2 above, either to cooperation or to the com-
petence of the Member States. 
4. Under the conditions laid down in paragraph 2 above, the European Council may decide to transfer a speci-
fic problem to common action for the period required for its solution. In that event, paragraph 3 above shall not 
apply. 
Article 69 - Right of representation abroad 
1. The Commission may, with the approval of the Council of the Union, establish respresentation in non-mem-
ber States and international organizations. 
2. Such representations shall be responsible for representing the Union in all matters subject to common action. 
They may also, in collaboration with the diplomatic agent of the Member State holding the presidency of the 
European Council, coordinate the dipomatic activity of the Member States in the fields subject to cooperation. 
3. In non-member States and international organizations where there is no representation of the Union, it shall 
be represented by the diplomatic agent of the Member State currently holding the presidency of the European 
Council or else by the diplomatic agent of another Member State. 
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PART FIVE: The finances of the Union 
Article 70 — General provisions 
1. The Union shall have its own finances, administered by its institutions, on the basis of the budget adopted 
by the budgetary authority which shall consist of the European Parliament and the Council of the Union. 
2. The revenue of the Union shall be utilized to guarantee the implementation of common actions undertaken 
by the Union. Any implementation by the Union of a new action assumes that the allocation to the Union of the 
financial means required shall be subject to the procedure laid down in Article 71(2) of this Treaty. 
Article 71 — Revenue 
1. When this Treaty enters into force, the revenue of the Union shall be of the same kind as that of the Euro-
pean Communities. However, the Union shall receive a fixed percentage of the basis for assessing value-added 
tax established by the budget within the framework of the programme set out in Article 74 of this Treaty. 
2. The Union may, by an organic law, amend the nature or the basis of assessment of existing sources of 
revenue or create new ones. It may by a law authorize the Commission to issue loans, without prejudice to 
Article 75(2) of this Treaty. 
3. In principle, the authorities of the Member States shall collect the revenue of the Union. Such revenue shall 
be paid to the Union as soon as it has been collected. A law shall lay down the implementing procedures for this 
paragraph and may set up the Union's own revenue-collecting authorities. 
Article 72 — Expenditure 
1. The expenditure of the Union shall be determined annually on the basis of an assessment of the cost of each 
common action within the framework of the financial programme set out in Article 74 of this Treaty. 
2. At least once a year, the Commission shall submit a report to the budgetary authority on the effectiveness of 
the actions undertaken, account being taken of their cost. 
3. All expenditure by the Union shall be subject to the same budgetary procedure. 
Article 73 — Financial equalization 
A system of financial equalization shall be introduced in order to alleviate excessive economic imbalances be-
tween the regions. An organic law shall lay down the procedures for the application of this system. 
Article 74 — Financial programmes 
1. At the beginning of each parliamentary term, the Commission, after receiving its investiture, shall submit to 
the European Parliament and the Council of the Union a report on the division between the Union and the Mem-
ber States of the responsibilities for implementing common actions and the financial burdens resulting therefrom. 
2. On a proposal from the Commission, a multiannual financial programme, adopted according to the proce-
dure for adopting laws, shall lay down the projected development in the revenue and expenditure of the Union. 
These forecasts shall be revised annually and be used as the basis for the preparation of the budget. 
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Artide 75 - Budget 
1. The budget shall lay down and authorize all the revenue and expenditure of the Union in respect of each 
calendar year. The adopted budget must be in balance. Supplementary and amending budgets shall be adopted 
under the same conditions as the general budget. The revenue of the Union shall not be earmarked for specific 
purposes. 
2. The budget shall lay down the maximum amounts for borrowing and lending during the financial year. Save 
in exceptional cases expressly laid down in the budget, borrowed funds may only be used for finance investment. 
3. Appropriations shall be entered in specific chapters grouping expenditure according to its nature or destina-
tion and subdivided in compliance with the provisions of the Financial Regulation. The expenditure of the 
institutions other than the Commission shall be the subject of separate sections of the budget; they shall be drawn 
up and managed by those institutions and may only include operating expenditure. 
4. The Financial Regulation of the Union shall be established by an organic law. 
Article 76 — Budgetary procedure 
1. The Commission shall prepare the draft budget and forward it to the budgetary authority. 
2. Within the time-limits laid down by the Financial Regulation: 
(a) on first reading, the Council of the Union may approve amendments by a simple majority. The draft budget, 
with or without amendment, shall be forwarded to the Parliament; 
(b) on first reading, the Parliament may amend by an absolute majority the amendments of the Council and 
approve other amendments by a simple majority; 
(c) if, within a period of 15 days, the Commission opposes the amendments approved by the Council or by the 
Parliament on first reading, the relevant arm of the budgetary authority must take a fresh decision by a quali-
fied majority on second reading; 
(d) if the budget has not been amended, or if the amendments adopted by the Parliament and the Council are 
identical, and if the Commission has not exercised its right to oppose the amendments, the budget shall be 
deemed to have been finally adopted; 
(e) on second reading, the Council may amend by a qualified majority the amendments approved by the Parlia-
ment. It may by a qualified majority refer the whole draft budget as amended by the Parliament back to the 
Commission and request it to submit a new draft; where not so referred back, the draft budget shall at all 
events be forwarded to the Parliament; 
(f) on second reading, the Parliament may reject amendments adopted by the Council only by a qualified maj-
ority. It shall adopt the budget by an absolute majority. 
3. Where one of the arms of the budgetary authority has not taken a decision within the time-limit laid down 
by the Financial Regulation, it shall be deemed to have adopted the draft referred to it. 
4. When the procedure laid down in this article has been completed, the President of the Parliament shall de-
clare that the budget stands adopted and shall cause it to be published without delay in the Official Journal of the 
Union. 
Article 77 — Provisional twelfths 
Where the budget has not been adopted by the beginning of the financial year, expenditure may be effected on a 
monthly basis, under the conditions laid down in the Financial Regulation, up to a maximum of one-twelfth of 
the appropriations entered in the budget of the preceding financial year, account being taken of any supple-
mentary and amending budgets. 
At the end of the sixth month following the beginning of the financial year, the Commission may only effect 
expenditure to enable the Union to comply with its existing obligations. 
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Artide 78 - Implementation of the budget 
The budget shall be implemented by the Commission on its own responsibility under the conditions laid down by 
the Financial Regulation. 
Article 79 — Audit of the accounts 
The Court of Auditors shall verify the implementation of the budget. It shall fulfil its task independently and, to 
this end, enjoy powers of investigation with regard to the institutions and organs of the Union and to the natio-
nal authorities concerned. 
Article 80 — Revenue and expenditure account 
At the end of the financial year, the Commission shall submit to the budgetary authority, in the form laid down 
by the Financial Regulation, the revenue and expenditure account which shall set out all the operations of the 
financial year and be accompanied by the report of the Court of Auditors. 
Article 81 - Discharge 
The Parliament shall decide to grant, postpone or refuse a discharge; the decision on the discharge may be 
accompanied by observations which the Commission shall be obliged to take into account. 
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PART SIX: General and final provisions 
Article 82 - Entry into force 
This Treaty shall be open for ratification by all the Member States of the European Communities. 
Once this Treaty has been ratified by a majority of the Member States of the Communities whose population 
represents two-thirds of the total population of the Communities, the governments of the Member States which 
have ratified shall meet at once to decide by common accord on the procedures by and the date on which this 
Treaty shall enter into force. 
Article 83 - Deposit of the instruments of ratification 
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the government of the first State to have completed the 
ratification procedure. 
Article 84 - Revision of the Treaty 
One representation within the Council of the Union, or one-third of the Members of the Parliament, or the Com-
mission may submit to the legislative authority a reasoned draft law amending one or more provisions of this 
Treaty. The draft shall be submitted for approval to the two arms of the legislative authority which shall act in 
accordance with the procedure applicable to organic laws. 
The draft, thus approved, shall be submitted for ratification by the Member States and shall enter into force 
when they have all ratified it. 
Article 85 - The seat 
The European Council shall determine the seat of the institutions. Should the European Council not have taken a 
decision on the seat within two years of the entry into force of this Treaty, the legislative authority shall take a 
final decision in accordance with the procedure applicable to organic laws. 
Article 86 - Reservations 
The provisions of this Treaty may not be subject to any reservations. This article does not preclude the Member 
States from maintaining, in relation to the Union, the declarations they have made with regard to the Treaties 
and conventions which form part of the Community patrimony. 
Article 87 - Duration 
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Preface1' 2 
After the Second World War Europe made a very promising start by setting up, firstly with the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) and then with the European Economic Community (EEC), an unprecedented con-
struction which could not be compared with any existing legal entity. The Community — based on the principles 
of pluralist democracy and the respect for human rights which constitute essential elements for membership and 
is one of the constant objectives of its activities throughout the world — answered the complex and deeply felt 
needs of all our citizens. 
Although the Community decided to complete this construction as from the Summit in the Hague in 1969 and 
Paris in 1972, it is now in a state of crisis and suffers from serious deficiencies. 
In addition, however, the Member States have become caught up in differences which have obscured the consi-
derable economic and financial advantages which would be obtained from the realization of the Common Mar-
ket and from economic and monetary union. 
Furthermore, after 10 years of crisis, Europe, unlike Japan and the United States, has not achieved a growth rate 
sufficient to reduce the disturbing figure of alomst 14 million unemployed. 
In this state of affairs Europe is faced with ever more important challenges both in the field of increasing indus-
trial and technological competition from outside and in the struggle to maintain the position of political indepen-
dence which historically it has held in the world. 
Faced with these challenges, Europe must recover faith in itself and launch itself on a new common venture — 
the establishment of a political entity based on clearly defined priority objectives coupled with the means of 
achieving them. 
The Community has not lost sight of the fact that it represents only a part of Europe. Resolved to advance 
together, the Member States remain aware of the civilization which they share with the other countries of the 
continent, in the firm belief that any progress in building the Community is in keeping with the interests of 
Europe as a whole. 
The Committee has placed itself firmly on the political level, and without purporting to draft a new Treaty in 
legal form, proposes to set out the objectives, policies and institutional reforms which are necessary to restore to 
Europe the vigour and ambition of its inception.' 
I — A genuine political entity 4, 5 
It is not enough to draw up a simple catalogue of measures to be taken — even if they are precise and concrete — 
since such exercises have often been attempted in the past without achieving results. We must now make a qua-
litative leap and present the various proposals in a global manner, thus demonstrating the common political will 
of the Member States. At the end of the day that will must be expressed by the formulation of a genuine political 
entity* among European States: i.e. a European Union: 
(i) with the power to take decisions in the name of all citizens, by a democratic process according to their com-
mon interest in political and social development, economic progress and security/ and according to proce-
dures which could vary depending on whether the framework is that of inter-governmental cooperation, the 
Community Treaties, or new instruments yet to be agreed; 
(ii) in keeping with the personality of each of the constituent States. 
See Mr Moller's comments in Annex A. 
See Mr Papantoniou's comments in Annex B. 
Mr Muller felt that the difficulties facing the construction of Europe resulted from .1 failure to implement the existing Treaties fully and could be 
remedied by the strict application of the Treaties. He considered that the achievement of European Union, as already foreseen in existing statements. 
was the objective. 
Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who suggested replacing 'a genuine political entity' by 'a genuine economic and political entity'. 
Mr Moller considered that the expression 'a genuine political entity' should be replaced by the expression 'European Union'. 
Mr Moller considered that the point security should be limited to the political and economic aspects of security. 
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II — Priority objectives 
A. A homogeneous internal economic area 
The aim is to create a homogeneous internal economic area, by bringing about the fully integrated internal mar-
ket envisaged in the Treaty of Rome as an essential step towards the objective of economic and monetary union 
called for since 1972, thus allowing Europeans to benefit from the dynamic effects of a single market with 
immense purchasing power. This would mean more jobs, more prosperity and faster growth and would thus 
make the Community a reality for its citizens. 
(a) Through the completion of the Treaty 
1. By creating a genuine internal market by the end of the decade on the basis of a precise timetable. 
This involves: 
(i) the effective free movement of European citizens;* 
(ii) a favourable climate for investment and innovation through stable and coherent economic, financial 
and monetary policies in the Member States and the Community; 
(iii) pending the adoption of European standards, the immediate mutual recognition of national stan-
dards by establishing the simple principle that all goods lawfully produced and marketed in a Mem-
ber State must be able to circulate without hindrance throughout the Community; 
(iv) more rapid and coordinated customs procedures, including the introduction as planned of a single 
administrative document by 1987; 
(v) the early introduction of a common transport policy; 
(vi) the creation at an early date of a genuine common market in financial services, including insurance;" 
(vii) the opening up of access to public contracts;7 
(viii) the creation of conditions which will favour cooperation between European undertakings and in par-
ticular the elimination of taxation differences that impede the achievement of the Community's 
objectives; 
(ix) the strengthening of European financial integration, inter alia through the free movement of capital 
and the creation of a European financial market, hand in hand with the strengthening of the Euro-
pean monetary system.7 
2. Through the increased competitiveness of the European economy.8 
European economic life must be made fully competitive through a return to the fundamental principle 
embodied in the Treaties of promoting efficient producers, involving in particular: 
(i) the removal of all measures distorting competition in the Common Market, notably through an 
application of national and Community competition rules, adapted to the new industrial situation, 
and through strict control of national State aids in compliance with the rules of the Treaties;' 
(ii) introduction of the necessary transparency in nationalized industries in order to safeguard the prin-
ciples laid down in the Treaties. 
3. Through the promotion of economic convergence 10'" 
(i) the promotion of solidarity amongst the Member States aimed at reducing structural imbalances 
dealt with by the Committee for a Peoples' Europe. 
Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who considered that the introduction of these policies should take account of the particular situation of 
national economies. 
In addition Mr Moller stressed that all the measures in the agricultural area which have in recent years been introduced with the intention of 
renationalizing the common agricultural policy should be dismantled. 
Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who considered that the application of competition rules of the Treaties should take account of the particular 
situation of the less developed economies. 
Reservation by Mr Papantoniou who argued that the text should stress more explicitly the need to reinforce the policies aiming at economic 
convergence, and should give a more comprehensive definition of their scope. 
Mr Ruhfus entered a reservation. He argues that economic convergence by its very nature is a convergence of economic policies aiming at the 
objectives set out in Article 104 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community. It will thus help to improve living conditions in the 
individual Member States. On this basis, positive action is required to counter tendencies to inequality and to reduce structural imbalances in the 
Community. 
Mr Van Eekelen concurs with the argument of Mr Ruhfus. 
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which prevent the convergence of living standards, through the strengthening of specific Community 
instruments and a judicious definition of Community policies; 
(ii) the effective pursuit of integration and the strengthening of Community institutions that underlies it, 
require positive action to counter the tendencies to inequality and promote the convergence of living 
standards.12 
(b) Through the creation of a technological community 
The growth capacity of Europe, backed up by this genuine internal market, will have to be based, inter alia, 
on wholehearted participation in technological innovation, and must result in the creation of a technological 
community through, among other things, the introduction of faster decision-making procedures. This pro-
cess must enable European industry to become a powerful competitor internationally in the field of produc-
tion and application of the advanced technologies. 
This means in particular: 
(i) that industrial enterprises in the Community must have at their disposal common European standards 
and suitable procedures for advanced technology products; 
(ii) that international cooperation during the development phase must be strengthened; 
(iii) that public and semi-public contract procedures in the Community, concerning inter alia, the supply and 
use of electronic and communications equipment, must be liberalized;13 
(iv) that the exchange of services connected to the use of advanced technology must be liberalized;13 
(v) that a successful techno-industrial development in the technological community depends upon and must 
increasingly allow for wider scope for individual creativity and performance; 
and, in addition the following specific activities: 
(vi) the development of vocational education and training; 
(vii) the encouragement of universities and research institutes to orient their activities more towards the com-
mercial sector and to ensure the transfer of the results of their work; 
(viii)the coordination of research and development at national and Community level; 
(ix) the promotion and support of greater industrial cooperation between European companies including the 
launching of transnational projects in key sectors; 
(x) the furthering of undistorted international exchange of technology and advanced technological products 
through an active common commercial policy in conformity with GATT obligations. 
(c) By the strengthening of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
The European monetary system, which was created and set up pending restoration of the conditions for the 
gradual achievement of economic and monetary union, is one of the achievements of the Community during 
the last decade. It has enabled the unity of the Common Market to be preserved, reasonable exchange rates to 
be maintained and the foundations for the Community's monetary identity to be laid. 
The time has come however, to forge ahead towards monetary integration through: 
(i) the closer coordination of economic, budgetary and monetary policies with the aim of true convergence 
of economic performance; 
(ii) the liberalization of capital movements and the removal of exchange controls;14 
(iii) the strengthening of the European monetary and financial market to make it attractive and capable of 
supporting the growth and investment effort; 
(iv) the participation of all the Member States both in the EMS and in the exchange rate mechanism, provi-
ded that the necessary economic and monetary conditions are met; 
12 Reservation by Mr Herman who wishes to see the text of the second paragraph replaced by a call for greater coherence between the economic policies 
of the Member States which is a better guarantee of a reduction in the differences in living standards. 
" Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who considered that the introduction of these policies snould take account of the particular situation of 
national economies. 
14 Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who considered that the introduction of these policies should take account of the particular situation of 
national economies. 
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(ν) the increased but non-inflationary use of the ECU in transactions between central banks whether they 
are members of the system or not; 
(vi) the elimination consistent with monetary stability of obstacles to the use of the ECU in private transac­
tions; 
(vii) the promotion of the ECU as an international reserve currency; the coordination of exchange policies 
with regard to third currencies and in particular the dollar and the strengthening of the role of the 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) by stages depending on the progress made in the use of 
the ECU.'5 
Through these measures as a whole it will be possible for the EMS to progress towards the second institutio­
nal phase envisaged in the decision of the European Council in Bremen in 1978. 
(d) Through mobilizing of the necessary resources'6 
Intensifying the efforts already undertaken, framing new policies and delegating new tasks to the Community 
will often, but not always, entail additional expenditure which will necessitate transfers of resources. Such 
resources should be made available in the context of a clearly identifiable Community financing system firmly 
based on the own resource principle. This system, that would come under review at reasonable intervals, 
should endow the Community with a stable revenue base for a sufficiently long period. 
Actual transfers of resources will only be feasible if they are subject to strict budgetary control and if in most 
cases this is reflected in savings in the Member States. 
B. Promotion of the common values of civilization 
The contemplated European Union will not rest on an economic community alone. The logic of integration has 
already led Member States to cooperate in fields other than economic ones and will continue to lead them still 
further along that path. The accentuation of this essential process will give a European dimension to all aspects 
of collective life in our countries. 
To that end a number of measures must be undertaken, whenever possible in close cooperation with European 
countries which are not members of the Community and with the Council of Europe, which makes a valuable 
contribution especially with regard to the promotion of human rights and the common cultural identity. 
These measures are: 
1. Measures to protect the environment 
Pollution, in most of its forms does not recognize frontiers and poses an increasing danger to the environment 
and the health of people both within the Community and outside. High priority must be given to the protection 
of the environment and the improvement of working conditions and safety at work. 
2. Gradual achievement of a European social area 
An integrated internal economic area must be based not only on industrial, economic and monetary policies, but 
also on social policy. In this field, the Union will have to remain true to the objectives which the Community set 
itself from its inception and will have to have the necessary powers and means to act whenever social policy mea­
sures are required at European level. 
Reservation entered by Mr Ruhfus. He emphasized that, for the ECU to become an international reserve currency, some major requisites are still 
lacking at present. A strengthening of the role of the EMCF is primarily dependent on further progress in the convergence of economic policies and on 
its consolidation through institutional development. 
Mr Moller considered that the increase in the VAT ceiling agreed by the European Council at Fontainebleau would scarcely be sufficient for the 
promotion of new policies. 
The size of additional resources must be determined by the need to continue existing common policies and to develop new ones, in particular with 
regard to research and technology. 
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Progressive introduction of a European social area, as the logical follow-on from an economically integrated, 
dynamic and competitive Community with the will to achieve full and better employment entails: 
(i) definition of frameworks for action, particularly in the basic fields listed in Article 118 of the Treaty, either 
by harmonization, by the adoption of joint decisions or by any other appropriate measures; 
(ii) pursuance of a social policy that reflects the medium-term social action programme and the changing econo-
mic and social needs of the Community; 
(iii) development of the dialogue between employers and employees at European level, which could result, where 
they judge it desirable, in contractual relations between them. 
3. Gradual establishment of a homogeneous judicial area 
This means: 
(i) increasing protection of fundamental freedoms and rights as they derive from common basic principles and 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Justice has played an essential role in this context 
and will do so even more in the future; 
(ii) increased harmonization or approximation of national laws in all the fields covered by the European Union, 
in so far as these are consistent with the objectives of the Union; 
(iii) envisaging, in certain areas of inter-governmental cooperation, agreements between Member States which 
would, in cases where unanimous agreement could not be reached, apply among those States having ratified 
them if the latter constitute a strong majority; 
(iv) a campaign against large-scale crime and terrorism by increasing cooperation between Member States; 
(v) further codification of Community law. 
4. The promotion of common cultural values 
European culture is one of the strongest links between the States and peoples of Europe. It is part of the Euro-
pean identity. The promotion of the European cultural identity should be a comprehensive expression of the cul-
tural variety and each nation's individual values which form an integral part of it. 
The promotion of common cultural values and the European cultural identity requires: 
(i) the safeguarding of the European cultural heritage, 
(ii) support for cultural creation, 
(iii) measures to overcome language barriers, 
(iv) the development of new media in a European-wide context, 
(v) the elimination of obstacles to the free circulation of cultural goods and communication, 
(vi) an improvement in the level of knowledge about all the peoples of the Community in all their diversity and 
their different contributions to European culture,17 
(vii) the intensification of exchange programmes. 
The European Foundation and the European University Institute should be associated with these actions. Co-
operation with third countries and in the wider international context should also be encouraged. The practical 
realization of cultural cooperation requires a coherent organizational framework. 
C. The search for an external identity '8 
Europe's external identity can be achieved only gradually within the framework of common action and European 
political cooperation (EPC) in accordance with the rules applicable to each of these. It is increasingly evident that 
interaction between these two frameworks is both necessary and useful. They must therefore be more closely 
Mr Ferri feels that minority cultures should be expressly mentioned here, as their protection is an achievement of democratic pluralism in its modern 
form. 
Mr Moller entered a general reserve on all of this section. He considered that, instead of structural changes, it is necessary to have a new pragmatic 
development of European political cooperation on the existing base, which has already shown itself to be effective to further this development. 
Particularly in relation to security, it should be confined to political and economic aspeas. 
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aligned. The objective of European political cooperation must remain the systematic formulation and imple-
mentation of a common external policy." 
Similarly in the case of security, although a fundamental aim of European Union is indeed the cohesiveness and 
solidarity of the countries of Europe within the larger European and western framework, it will only be possible 
to achieve that aim by paying special attention to the existing Alliances on the one hand, and the differing indivi-
dual situations on the other, including the situations of the two nuclear powers which are members and of certain 
Member States facing specific problems in this field. 
(a) External policy 
It should first of all be noted that common policies, which have an external dimension, are provided for in the 
Treaties and already exist, along with external policies such as the development policy and the commercial 
policy. 
In particular, Community development policy must be intensified, without prejudice to the traditional 
actions of the Member States. 
On the diplomatic front several measures could be considered initially which might allow progress to be made 
towards finding a common voice.20 
1. the strengthening of political cooperation structures by: 
(i) the creation of a permanent political cooperation secretariat to enable successive Presidencies to 
ensure greater continuity and cohesiveness of action; the secretariat would to a large extent use the 
back-up facilities of the Council and should help to strengthen the cohesion between political coopera-
tion and the external policies of the Community; 
(ii) the regular organization of EPC working meetings at the Community's places of work, while meetings 
of Ministers should also be arranged in the Member States' capitals. 
2. The improvement of political cooperation through: 
(i) an explicit undertaking by the Member States to promote EPC by agreeing to a formalization of the 
commitments to a prior consultation procedure; 
(ii) seeking a consensus in keeping with the majority opinion with a view to the prompt adoption of com-
mon positions and to facilitating joint measures; 
(iii) adopting common positions in multilateral and inter-regional relations, particularly at the United 
Nations. 
3. Member States and the Community should examine on a case-by-case basis the desirability of common 
representation at international institutions, especially in the UN framework and in the countries where 
only a few Member States are represented. 
4. Codification of EPC rules and practices. 
(b) Security and defence1' 
The aim is to encourage greater awareness on the part of the Member States of the common interests of the 
future European Union in matters of security. The relevant Member States will make the fullest contribution 
both to the maintenance of adequate defences and political solidarity, and to the pursuit of security at the lowest 
possible level of forces through the negotiation of balanced and verifiable measures of arms control and disarma-
ment. 
In any event, this question will have to take account of: 
(1) the frameworks which already exist (and of which not all partners in the European Community are members) 
19 Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who suggested replacing the last sentence by: 
'The objective of European political cooperation must remain the systematic search for common positions in external affairs.' 
20 Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou on points 1 ,2 ,3 and 4 of the section on external policy. He argued in favour of preserving the informal 
character of present EPC arrangements and stressed the importance of consensus in the search for common positions. 
21 Mr Dooge did not agree to the inclusion of the section on security and defence. 
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such as the Atlantic Alliance, the framework for and basis of our security, and Western European Union, the 
strengthening of which, now under way, would enrich the Alliance with its own contribution;22 
(2) the differing capabilities and responsibilities and the distinctive situations of the Community Member States; 
(3) the existence of interests and objectives which Member States, while respecting their individual situations as 
regards defence and security, recognize as common, in particular the need for the Atlantic Alliance to main-
tain adequate military strength in Europe for effective deterrence and defence, in order to preserve peace and 
protect democratic values.23 
Accordingly, the following measures are proposed: 
(i) Developing and strengthening consultation on security problems as part of political cooperation. Such 
consultation could involve in particular: 
(a) discussion of the nature of external threats to the security of the Union; 
(b) discussion of the way in which Member States' security interests may be affected by the international 
context, in particular by developments in weapons technology and strategic doctrines, changes in 
relations between the great powers and the progress of negotiations on disarmament and arms con-
trol; 
(c) an effort to harmonize, whenever, possible, the stances to be taken by Member States on the major 
problems posed by the preservation of peace in Europe. 
(ii) The stepping-up of efforts to draw up and adopt common standards for weapons systems and equip-
ment, taking account of the work being done in the relevant bodies. 
Particular attention is to be paid by Member States to: 
(a) rationalizing their military equipment research and development; 
(b) support for production capacity for high-technology equipment which can strengthen Europe's 
defensive capabilities. 
(iii) A commitment by Member States to design, develop and produce such systems and equipment jointly. 
(iv) The will on the part of the Member States to create the technological and industrial conditions necessary 
for their security. 
Ill — The means: efficient and 
democratic institutions24 
European Union — like the Community today — needs institutions which are entirely at the service of the com-
mon interest. Their functioning and behaviour must clearly reflect the original nature of their purpose, within 
the framework of their specific powers. It is of primary importance that the institutions should comply with and 
apply the rules of the Treaties. 
The trend towards the European Council's becoming simply another body dealing with the day-to-day business 
of the Community must be reversed. Heads of State and of Government should play a strategic role and give 
direction and political impetus of the Community. For this purpose two European Council meetings a year 
should suffice. 
A. Easier decision-making in the Council, 
which means primarily changes in practice and certain adjustments to existing rules: 
(i) less bureaucracy within the institutions, as national authorities have, through their experts, gained too much 
ground over the last 10 years; in particular, the authority of the Permanent Representatives over the various 
11 Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who suggested replacing point 1 by 'the frameworks which already exist (and of which not all partners in the 
European Community are members) such as the Atlantic Alliance and the Western European Union'. 
2 ' Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who proposed the deletion of 'for the Atlantic Alliance'. 
2A Reservation entered by Mr Moller on this chapter. Mr Moller considers that the problems faced by the Community are not due to the failure or 
imperfections of the institutions of the Community system. On the contrary, it may be said that the gradual deviation and derogations from these 
fundamental principles together with a lack of political will to take decisions are the root of many of the problems of today. The balance between the 
institutions should accordingly be re-established by respecting the distribution of competences between them as laid down in the Treaties. 
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working parties must be strengthened in order to improve the preparation of the Council's decisions and to 
focus its discussions on the most important matters; 
(ii) the growing number of areas of Community activity has led over the years to the Council meeting in a mult-
iplicity of special compositions. The Council must remain a single institution in which a pre-eminent role of 
coordination and guidance must be preserved for the ministers with general responsibilities (the 'General 
Affairs' Council); 
(iii) the rules and procedures governing the Council should be rigorously applied in the interests of its own effi-
ciency and internal cohesion; 
(iv) concerning principles of voting: 
(a) The majority of the committee favour the adoption of the new general principle that decisions must be 
taken by a qualified or simple majority. Unanimity will still be required in certain exceptional cases, 
which will have to be distinctly fewer in number in relation to the present Treaties, the list of such cases 
being restrictive. 
In a spirit of a return to the Treaties, the Presidency must call a vote if the Commission or three Member 
States so request. The vote must be taken within 30 days.2',26-2 
(b) The minority of the committee considered that more use will need to be made, especially in the context of 
the enlarged Community, of the majority voting provisons laid down in the Treaties. Once a reasonable 
time has been devoted to the search for consensus, the Presidency should call for a vote. 
Where the Treaties require decisions to be taken by unanimity Member States should also make greater 
use of the possibility of abstention in accordance with Articles 148 (3) (EEC), 118 (EAEC) and 28 
(ECSC). 
When a Member State considers that its very important interests are at stake, the discussion should con-
tinue until unanimous agreement is reached.2" 
(v) in order to ensure the implementation of certain decisions, the use in exceptional circumstances of the meth-
od of differentiated Community rules, provided such differentiation is limited in time, is based solely on eco-
nomic and social considerations and respects the principle of budget unity.:" 
B. A strengthened Commission 
The Commission guarantees autonomous representation of the common interest. Wedded to the general interest 
whose guarantor it is, the Commission cannot be identified with individual national interests. 
If it is to carry out fully the tasks entrusted to it, which make it the lynchpin of the Community, its powers must 
be increased, in particular through greater delegation of executive responsibility in the context of Community 
policies. 
In the first place, its autonomy must be confirmed so that it can be completely independent in the performance of 
its duties in accordance with the obligation specifically imposed upon it and on each of its members individually. 
To this end it is proposed that the President of the Commission be designated by the European Council. 
The other members of the college shall be appointed by common accord of the Governments of the Member 
States, acting on a proposal from the President-designate.'" 
; s This proposal is supported by Mr Faure, Mr Ferri, Mr Herman. Mr Ripa Di Meana, Mr Ruhfus and Mr Van Eeke'cn. Mr Dondelingcr accepted [his 
because he considered that this text distanced itself least from the present situation. 
2h Mr Dooge, though in agreement with the principle underlying this text, felt unable to support the text because, though not excluding the pleading in 
exceptional circumstances of a vital interest, it did not include any explicit reference to the protection of vital national interests in exceptional 
circumstances. 
2" Mr Herman underlines the considerable progress which distinguishes these proposals from the solutions envisaged in the Interim Report of the 
Committee in the matter of voting and the veto. 
: s This proposal is supported by Mr Moller, Mr Papantoniou and Mr Rifkind. Mr Rifkind also considers that, in order to prevent abuse, a member of 
the Council insisting thai discussion should continue in this way should, through a special procedure of the Council, explain fully and formally why 
his government considers that a very important interest is at stake. 
24 Reserve entered by Mr Moller. 
,l' Mr Rifkind considers that the other members of the college should be nominated by .Member States, after consultation with the President-designate, 
and appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States. 
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The Commission must not include more than one national from any Member State.31 
At the beginning of its term of office the Commission should receive a vote of investiture on the basis of its prog-
ramme.-2 
Similarly, the Commission must now be acknowledged as an organ with full powers of initiative, implementa-
tion and administration. 
C. The European Parliament as a guarantor of democracy in 
the European system33 
A parliament elected by universal suffrage cannot, if the principles of democracy are logically applied, continue 
to be restricted to a consultative role or to having cognizance of only a minor part of Community expenditure. 
That dooms it to oblivion or over-statement, and more often than not to both. 
An enhanced role will be sought for it in three areas: 
(a) by effective participation in legislative power, the scope of which will be specifically defined, in the form of 
joint decision-making with the Council; to this end the Commission proposal will be discussed first of all by 
the European Parliament; the Council will deliberate on the text adopted by the European Parliament; in the 
event of disagreement, a conciliation procedure will be initiated on the basis of a proposal of the Commis-
sion; the Commission will retain its power of initiative throughout the legislative procedure;34 
(b) by increasing its supervision of the various policies of the Union and its political control over the Commission 
and over cooperation in the external policy field; the association and accession agreements negotiated by the 
Union will also be submitted to the European Parliament for approval;35 
(c) by giving it responsibility in decisions on revenue as the coping-stone of the establishment of a new basic insti-
tutional balance; 
(d) conciliation between Parliament and the Council would take place at the moment when the frame of refer-
ence on the basis of multiannual planning is defined; 
(e) decisions governing the development of own resources will be taken jointly by the Council and Parliament so 
that the latter may be able to have a hand in the balancing of expenditure by revenue. 
These developments should go hand in hand with increased representativeness of Parliament itself through the 
standardization of voting procedures to elect its members. 
D. Court of Justice 
The binding nature of the law of the Union gives the Court of Justice of the European Communities an essential 
role to play in progress towards European Union. The Court ensures compliance with the rights, obligations and 
powers laid down in the Treaties. The Court must be consolidated in its role of supreme arbiter in all matters 
" Mr Ruhfus entered a reservation on this point. He argued that such a change would not improve the supranational character of the Commission 
and would considerably change the internal balance, which has proved its worth ever since the establishment of the Community. 
12 Reservation by Mr Papantoniou who suggested replacing the text of the four preceding paragraphs by the following text: 
'To this end it is proposed that the President of the Commission be designated unanimously by the European Council, and be consulted by the 
governments of the Member States prior to the nomination of the Commissioners. The Commission should be composed of one member per Mem-
ber State.' 
" Mr Rifkind entered a reservation on this section. He considers that the European Parliament should be encouraged, within its Treaty powers, to make 
a more effective contribution to Community decision-making. The Parliament should make more use of its right to put forward proposals for 
Community action. The Council should follow up resolutions with the Parliament, or explain its reasons for not doing so. There should be 
improvement and extension of the conciliation procedure, in particular by more effective consultation between the Council and the Parliament at 
earlier stages of the consideration of proposals. 
" Reservation of Mr Papantoniou. He did not agree with joint decision-making between Parliament and Council in the legislative area and argued in 
favour of improving the conciliation procedure and extending its field of application. 
" Reservation entered by Mr Papantoniou who suggested deleting the last sentence of (b). 
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coming under the Treaties, including the protection of the basic rights of individuals guaranteed under the Com-
munity legal order. To this end, the Court: 
(i) must be relieved in an appropriate manner of responsibilities incumbent upon it as regards disputes between 
officials and the institutions; 
(ii) must be given jurisdiction for the interpretation of agreements concluded within the ambit of the Treaties as 
far as possible by means of a standard clause. 
IV - The method36 
The committee proposes that a Conference of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States 
should be convened in the near future to negotiate a draft European Union Treaty based on the acquis commu-
nautaire, the present document and the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration on European Union and guided by the 
spirit and method of the Draft Treaty voted by the European Parliament: 
(i) the parties to the conference will be the Member States; 
(ii) Spain and Portugal will be invited to attend as full members on the assumption that the Treaties of Accession 
have been signed prior to the opening of the conference; 
(iii) the European Commission will participate in the negotiations; 
(iv) the European Parliament will be closely associated with the Conference. Its outcome will be submitted to the 
European Parliament. 
The very decision of the Heads of State or of Government to convene such a conference would have great symbo-
lic value and would represent the initial act of European Union. 
26 Mr Papantoniou and Mr Rifkind consider that the recommendations in this repon should be the subject of consultations between the governments 
before the June European Council, so that decisions can be taken by the Heads of Government at that meeting. 
Mr Moller shared their view, but pointed out that according to the committee's terms of reference it was not its task to put forward recommenda-
tions on the conclusions which the European Council might draw from the report. 
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Annex A 
Comments by Mr Møller 
I am not convinced that the overall approach in the report is the right one. I agree that the Community needs a 
new impetus, but, in my opinion, the following is required. 
The decision­making process should be more efficient. The distribution of powers between the institutions, as 
laid down in the Treaties, must be respected. The blurring of the powers should stop and be replaced by the clear 
logic of the Treaties. 
The fundamental aim of the Treaty, the bringing about of an efficient production structure, must be re­establi­
shed, and distorting factors which prevent the attainment of this aim must be rejected. The gradual introduction 
of quota systems, production thresholds, etc., pose a danger to this principle. 
New common policies should be developed to supplement the common agricultural policy. The Community 
must have further financial means at its disposal for these policies. 
Our consultations within the framework of European political cooperation must be intensified and strengthened 
so that areas of common interest can be identified and agreement can be reached on an increasing number of 
common positions. 
New activities must be developed at European level, and participation in these should not be limited to the pre­
sent members of the Community. 
Annex Β 
Comments by Mr Papantoniou 
The report rightly identifies the main challenges facing Europe at present. However, the approach followed, 
while containing many useful elements, does not pay sufficient attention to some important points. The overall 
gains from economic integration are not only unevenly distributed, but may also disguise losses for the less pros­
perous regions. The creation, therefore, of an integrated market and a technological community needs to be sup­
plemented by a very substantial effort to strengthen the Community's cohesion by promoting regional develop­
ment and the convergence of living standards. 
In the external field, the improvement of political cooperation and the promotion of solidarity in security matters 
should take fully into account the particular situation and problems of each Member State, and the need for con­
sensus in the search for common positions. 
Finally, institutional reform should reflect the existence of significant possibilities for improved decision­making 
within the framework of the Treaties, and recognize the necessity of protecting vital national interests when inv­
oked by Member States. 
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